1 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 0802,

2 27 August 2019.]

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The commission will come back to
order. All parties present when the commission last recessed
are again present with the exception of the accused who is
absent.

7 The commission has been presented Appellate Exhibit
8 161C, statement of understanding of right to be present at
9 commission proceedings and what appears to be a waiver of
10 those rights by Mr. Hadi.

11 Government, is the assistant staff judge advocate12 available to testify?

13 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Yes, Your Honor, she is.

14 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Please proceed.

15 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Your Honor, the government calls the16 assistant staff judge advocate to the stand.

17 ASSISTANT STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, U.S. NAVY, was called as a **18** witness for the prosecution, was sworn, and testified as **19** follows:

20

DIRECT EXAMINATION

21 Questions by the Assistant Trial Counsel [MR. SPENCER]:

ATC [MR. SPENCER]: And, Your Honor, consistent with past
 practice and the protective order in place, this witness is

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1 testifying under pseudonym. I'll note for the record that it 2 is the same assistant staff judge advocate that previously 3 testified in this commission session. 4 Your Honor, may I approach the witness? 5 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: You may. 6 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: I've handed to the witness what was 7 previously marked as Appellate Exhibit 161C, which I retrieved 8 from the court reporter. 9 Q. Ma'am, is this the standard rights advisement that 10 we've previously discussed on the record? 11 Α. Yes, it is. 12 Q. And did you present this to the accused this morning? 13 I did. Α. 14 Did you go through the same process that you Q. 15 previously testified to? 16 Yes, I did. Α. 17 Q. And can you just briefly again describe that process? 18 Α. Sure. I asked the defendant in this case, 19 Mr. al-Iraqi, if he would like to have his rights waivers read 20 in English or Arabic or both if he was not attending. He said 21 he was not attending. He only needed it in English. Ι 22 proceeded to read this to him verbatim and asked if he was 23 willing to sign, and which he did.

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1 Q. If you'd please turn to the second page. 2 Α. Yes. 3 Q. That's his signature above the section marked 4 "accused"? 5 Α. It is. 6 Q. And did he attach any conditions or other terms to 7 this waiver? 8 He made no statements. Α. No. 9 What was his demeanor when you spoke with him? Q. 10 Α. It was normal. 11 Q. Did he appear to understand everything that you were 12 saying? 13 Α. He did. 14 Q. Did he appear to be in any significant pain which 15 might interfere with his ability to make a decision? 16 Α. No, he did not. 17 Q. And is that your signature as the witness? 18 Α. It is. 19 Q. Thank you. 20 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Your Honor, may I approach? 21 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: You may. 22 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: I've retrieved Appellate Exhibit 161C 23 from the witness and returned it to the court reporter. And I

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1 have no further questions. Defense may have some questions.

2 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Defense, any questions?

3 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No, sir.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Does the defense have any evidence
for the commission's consideration on the determination as to
whether or not the waiver is voluntary?

7 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Only with respect to the evidence
8 which was presented to Your Honor in conjunction with our
9 argument on voluntariness at large, the record regarding his
10 physical condition and the physical pain and discomfort it
11 requires him to come to court.

12 EXAMINATION BY THE MILITARY COMMISSION 13 Questions by the Military Judge [LtCol LIBRETTO]: 14 Ma'am, when you had the discussion this morning with Q. 15 Mr. Hadi you indicated he made no statements at all? 16 Α. Correct. I think I asked him if he was attending, 17 and he said no. I suppose that would be a statement. And if 18 he needed an English or Arabic -- English only -- or he 19 indicated English only. There was another individual there 20 who said English only and that was it.

21 Q. When you -- did you approach him at his cell?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Where was it whenever you had this conversation with

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1 him?

2 A. It's an exterior portion that's adjacent to the3 communal portion.

4 Q. And did you see him ambulatory and coming to you to5 get -- to have this conversation?

A. Yes, sir. He walked up with his walker. We went
7 through the soliloquy. He sat while I read it, signed it, and
8 then got back up.

9 Q. And during that period of time, he was able to move10 about freely and participate in the conversation with you?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

13 A. Yes, sir.

Q. You may step down and return to your normal duties.
[The witness was excused and withdrew from the courtroom.]
DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, for the record, we do wish to
note an objection to moving forward in Mr. al-Iraqi's absence
on the basis that he has a constitutional right to participate
in these proceedings.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: And you'd agree that he has the
 right pursuant to the rules to voluntarily absent himself?
 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes, sir.

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: And it's your position that he --

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1 even this morning -- has not done so?

2 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: That's right, sir.

3 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Do you have any evidence to that4 effect?

5 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes, sir. The months of evidence 6 we've had in these proceedings regarding his -- his physical 7 condition and the pain and discomfort it causes him to come to 8 court. If it were easy and painless for Mr. al-Tamir to come 9 to court, he would, but he -- he is not. And for that reason, 10 the government hasn't met their burden and we object to 11 proceeding.

12 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The commission disagrees. The 13 commission finds that based on the testimony of the staff 14 judge advocate, the advice I provided to Mr. Hadi repeatedly 15 throughout the course of these proceedings, the fact that he 16 appeared to be under no physical or mental limitations this 17 morning in his conversations and interactions with the 18 assistant staff judge advocate, and the voluntarily waiver 19 contained in Appellate Exhibit 161C, that the accused has 20 voluntarily waived his right to be present at these commission 21 proceedings this morning.

As indicated yesterday, the commission's plan movingforward this morning is to hear argument on Appellate Exhibit

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1 157, the defense motion to dismiss on the basis that the 2 convening authority has a personal interest in the outcome of 3 the military commission. We will move on to taking up 4 argument on Appellate Exhibits 158 and 160, the defense motion 5 to dismiss because the military judge and law clerk sought employment with the DoD and DoJ and the defense motion for 6 7 Judge Libretto to disgualify himself under R.M.C. 902 8 respectively.

9 Before hearing arguments on those motions, a few
10 housekeeping matters that I need to clear up for the record.
11 At the beginning of this week's commission session, the
12 defense requested that this commission compel Mr. Fred Taylor,
13 another senior attorney advisor that assists me in my duties
14 as the military judge on this commission, to testify in
15 connection with either AE 158 or AE 160 or both.

Based on the testimony that I provided through the voir dire process, as well as the testimony of Mr. Blackwood and Captain Waits, who described the operations of the trial judiciary staff, the commission denies the motion to compel Mr. Fred Taylor for additional testimony.

As the commission previously noted prior to taking
the testimony of Mr. Blackwood's testimony -- I'm sorry,
Mr. Blackwood is the very rare instance where a judge allows a

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clerk or a legal advisor to testify concerning activities
 within the chambers. In fact, case law discourages it.
 Moreover, the commission finds that any testimony that
 Mr. Taylor might provide would be cumulative with that already
 on the record.

6 Finally, as to the briefing cycle for AE 165, the 7 defense motion to disgualify Commander Short, Defense, any 8 supplemental filing you wish to file must be submitted by 9 4 September of 2019. Thereafter, counsel will follow the 10 normal timeline set forth within the rules of court and the 11 trial conduct order AE 153 concerning the timing for filing 12 requests for witnesses, discovery, and M.C.R.E. 505 notices. 13 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, may I be heard on AE 165 -- the 14 AE 165 schedule?

15 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Go ahead.

16 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: We have requested -- submitted a 17 discovery request to the government for certain evidence 18 regarding the interaction at the center of that motion, and so 19 we would ask that we be permitted to see what flows from that 20 discovery request. And at the moment we formally request that 21 AE 165 be withdrawn, and we plan to refile as soon as 22 possible, hopefully with additional -- with the benefit of 23 additional discovery.

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But unfortunately it's impossible for me to say when
 or how long it will take for that discovery to reach us. We
 have identified particular items for the government which I
 can't go into the record on.

5 [Pause.]

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: So at this time, it's the defense's
request to withdraw the motion currently pending as AE 165?
DDC [MS. HENSLER]: That's right. Because of -- we've
requested further discovery on the issue.

10 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The motion to withdraw AE 165 11 pending receipt of additional discovery and the subsequent 12 refiling of the motion is hereby granted. The commission's 13 full expectation is that motion, provided that the discovery 14 that you're seeking is provided sufficiently to inform your 15 motion -- that it be filed in accordance with the motions 16 filing schedule for the next session such that we can take the 17 matter up during the session in October.

18 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes, sir. Thank you.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Moving on then to argument on
AE 157. Before hearing argument, is there any additional
evidence that the defense requests to submit?

22 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: No, Your Honor.

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Government, any additional evidence

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1 on AE 157?

2 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: No, Your Honor.

3 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Very well.

The commission will now hear argument on AE 157,
keeping in mind the limitations imposed by the commission with
respect to argument and the general guidance that argument
should not simply be a recitation of that which is contained
in the written filing.

9

Defense, you may argue.

10 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, Lieutenant Commander 11 Meusch for Mr. al-Tamir. I have some exhibits that I would 12 like to display. They've been previously provided to the 13 government and reviewed by the CISO, but I need to offer them 14 to the commission at this time.

15 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Have they been -- are they16 attachments to your original filings?

17 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: All -- all of them are attachments18 except for one demonstrative.

19 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Please approach.

20 [Pause.]

21 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: So the demonstrative is the bulk of22 what you're requesting?

23 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Yes, Your Honor. I intend to display

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1 all of them.

2 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Very well. You may proceed.
3 [The military judge conferred with courtroom personnel.]

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: To the extent that there are
documents that have just been handed to the commission that
are not actual attachments to the initial filing in 157, they
will be marked during the next recess and attached to the
record as Appellate Exhibit 157 -- 1570.

9 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, may ----

10 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: You may.

11 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: We would request to publish to the12 gallery.

13 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Go ahead.

DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, there are few things as fundamental to any system of criminal justice as a fair trial and a fair tribunal. In a military commission, for an accused to get a fair trial and a fair tribunal, it is necessary for the convening authority to be neutral and impartial both in fact and appearance.

20 Unfortunately, as demonstrating in the Appellate
21 Exhibit 157 series and Rear Admiral Reismeier's testimony
22 yesterday, moving forward with this commission where
23 Admiral Reismeier serves as the convening authority will

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1 deprive Mr. al-Tamir of this basic fundamental protection.

Unsurprisingly, Admiral Reismeier testified yesterday
that his subjective belief is that he can be fair and
impartial. In a few moments, the government will likely stand
up and argue that he can be fair and impartial, so what's the
problem? The problem, Your Honor, is that Admiral Reismeier's
subjective claim is not the standard. If it were, he would
still be the convening authority in Nashiri and Bahlul.

9 The standards this commission must apply are
10 objective ones, and they center around whether a reasonable
11 person with knowledge of the particular facts and
12 circumstances would impute to Admiral Reismeier a personal
13 feeling of interest in the outcome of litigation in
14 Mr. al-Tamir's case. And for many reasons, Your Honor, a
15 reasonable person would do just that.

As a result, Admiral Reismeier is disqualified from result as a convening authority under both the type three accuser standard and the appearance of partiality standard. To that end, it is necessary for this commission to consider Admiral Reismeier's connection to the charges, to the people, and to the legal issues in Mr. al-Tamir's case.

First, regarding the charge of conspiracy as abaseline matter, consider the convening authority's action in

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1 Mr. Noor Muhammed's case. This is Appellate Exhibit 157 2 Attachment 0, page 1. On January 9th, 2015, the convening 3 authority dismissed Noor Muhammed's conspiracy conviction, 4 finding it was legal error for the prosecution to try the offense. And the reason why? As the convening authority 5 6 cited later, he viewed the D.C. Circuit as providing a 7 dispositive ruling on the issue of whether the offense of 8 conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism could be 9 tried before a military commission. As a result, he believed 10 dismissal was required.

11 Stepping back from Noor Muhammed's case, in January 12 of 2015, there was also a charge of conspiracy against 13 Mr. al-Tamir. Admiral Reismeier, of course, was not the 14 convening authority at that time. He was on active duty as a 15 Chief Judge of the Department of the Navy, the department's 16 senior jurist. Fast forward to November 2015, and the 17 circumstances begin to change. Mr. al-Tamir is still charged 18 with conspiracy, but Admiral Reismeier is a retired flag 19 officer in private practice. Notably, Mr. al Bahlul is 20 challenging the constitutionality of his conspiracy conviction 21 before the D.C. Circuit, a challenge that would impact 22 Mr. al-Tamir's case through the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, a 23 doctrine Admiral Reismeier, the former Chief Judge of the

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Navy-Marine Corps Court of Appeals, was undoubtedly familiar
 with.

3 Sometime before November 2015 -- and this is 4 important -- General Martins, the Chief Prosecutor, the person 5 with oversight of the prosecutors at this table, called or e-mailed Admiral Reismeier to invite him to a briefing on what 6 7 it is only logical to assume was a conspiracy issue before the 8 D.C. Circuit. And as you heard from Admiral Reismeier in his 9 testimony, he was aware that charging conspiracy as a law of 10 war offense was anything but settled as a legal matter. He 11 knew that. And at General Martins' request, Admiral Reismeier 12 traveled to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor to attend the 13 briefing.

14 General Martins was present. A brief was given. And 15 yet the government has produced no records of this meeting in 16 discovery. Appellate Exhibit 157 Attachment K. After 17 huddling with General Martins and members of the Office of the 18 Chief Prosecutor on the issue of conspiracy, the Washington 19 Legal Foundation apparently out of the blue, or maybe at the 20 behest of a retired Navy JAG, contacted Admiral Reismeier, 21 asking him to sign on to an amicus brief in support of the 22 government, and he did.

23

In his sworn testimony, Admiral Reismeier stated that

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1 he stands by the brief. Therefore, Your Honor, consider what 2 that means. On page 4 of the brief it states that it meets 3 your concern that the panel decision in this case would impose 4 unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the elected 5 branches of government to convene military commissions to 6 conduct trials of law of war offenses. That statement of 7 interest is not confined to a single case. It talks about 8 restrictions in military commissions, plural.

9 At the time that Rear Admiral Reismeier advocated for
10 this position, Mr. al-Tamir's conspiracy charge was pending,
11 his case was one of the military commissions, plural. That
12 was referenced in the brief.

13 Notably, as Admiral Reismeier testified, he 14 understood that the issue with conspiracy was anything but 15 settled as a matter of law. Yet he signed onto the brief and 16 supported the government's position. In doing so, he assumed 17 the role of an advocate on an issue of central importance in 18 Mr. al-Tamir's case, the legal validity of the conspiracy 19 charge. And today, even though the law on the conspiracy 20 issue remains unsettled in the appellate courts, Admiral 21 Reismeier stands by the brief.

For Mr. al-Tamir this is problematic on two fronts.
First, if he is convicted of conspiracy, Mr. al-Tamir is going

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1 to ask for the same relief as Mr. Noor Muhammed. And given 2 Rear Admiral Reismeier's inflexible view in support of the 3 government on this issue, Mr. al-Tamir is not going to get it. 4 Moreover, Admiral Reismeier may try to rely on the 5 D.C. Circuit's opinion, which eventually agreed with his position. And even you, sir, have cited that opinion as 6 7 controlling precedent. 8 Second ----9 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Lieutenant Commander Meusch, before 10 we move on from that argument, I want to ask you -- and I'll 11 phrase it -- frame it in the context of a -- a judge because 12 of the unique nature of our military commission system and the 13 role of the convening authority. 14 But in the context of a judge who is being challenged 15 for disqualification, is it the defense's position that a 16 judge who, let's say, testifies before Congress in support of 17 a legal issue cannot then sit on a case in which that legal 18 issue is addressed? 19 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, this may not be directly 20 responsive to your question, but the convening authority is --21 as the defense has challenged in this case -- it serves a dual 22 function. It's not just the judge, but it has the dual role 23 of both prosecutor and judge. And so ----

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1 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Can you repeat that?

DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: They serve both a prosecutorial role
and a judicial role. That's already been ruled on in this,
Your Honor. I understand that the structural challenge was
denied. But the position of the defense is that the convening
authority does more than just serve in a judicial role.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: But your -- in your argument you use
judicial disqualification precedent in support of your
arguments. So to the extent that you do so, does a judge who
argues or supports a legal position prior to taking the bench,
is he disqualified from hearing issues on that very same legal
principle later on?

13 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, the distinction I would 14 note is in your hypothetical it was taking an issue before 15 Congress or providing testimony, which is not what happened 16 It was taking a position in the Superior Court of this here. 17 commission. And so it would be like the judge going to the Supreme Court and signing an amicus brief, which is a 18 19 distinction, and it is not something that would be permitted. 20 That is the position of the defense.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Before they take the bench?
 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, before they were hired to
 take the bench in relation to a specific case that was pending

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1 at the time.

So because Mr. al-Tamir's case was pending at the time that this position was taking -- and the position taken references military commissions, plural, meaning the military commissions presumably in existence at the time that that position was taken -- the position relates to this case, it was taken in the Superior Court, and it would be appropriate under those circumstances for the judge to recuse himself.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Thank you.

10 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: And the second problem this presents 11 for Mr. al-Tamir is that uncertainty in the law affects plea 12 negotiations. And where the convening authority takes an 13 inflexible stand in support of the government, it enures to 14 the detriment of the accused.

15 Now moving on from the conspiracy issue, that is not 16 the only issue before this commission. There are also other 17 connections that should -- the commission should be aware of. 18 The 2015 briefing, for instance, was not the first time that 19 General Martins and Admiral Reismeier interacted on military commission issues. In 2014, General Martins reached out to 20 21 Admiral Reismeier for guidance on the timing of proof of 22 jurisdiction.

23

9

And look at the circumstances in 2014. Rear Admiral

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1 Reismeier is a senior jurist in the Department of the Navy, 2 the second-level supervisor for Mr. Waits, who was the 3 presiding judge in Mr. al-Tamir's case. Notably, in 2014, 4 there is also a DoJ prosecutor providing what Admiral Waits 5 described as extra teeth to the prosecution of Mr. al-Tamir. 6 And yet at the same time Mr. Waits is applying for jobs with 7 the Department of Justice, and Admiral Reismeier is providing 8 guidance on jurisdiction to General Martins.

9 Moreover, and more importantly, at the time that this 10 is happening, none of it is disclosed to Mr. al-Tamir and the 11 defense. And ask yourself, Your Honor, because a reasonable 12 person would, how did General Martins know to call Admiral 13 Reismeier? How did he identify Admiral Reismeier as a subject 14 matter expert that would assist the prosecution?

15 The answer: They worked together on the Detention 16 Policy Task Force in 2009. They interacted with all the 17 relevant stakeholders in military commissions except the 18 individuals accused of crimes. This included the Department 19 of Justice and the CIA on issues such as forum selection. 20 When asked to elaborate on their discussions, Admiral 21 Reismeier noted that he was unable to do so, citing concerns 22 about a deliberative privilege.

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At some point he succeeded General Martins as the

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1 co-chair of the task force. They conducted a turnover. 2 General Martins presumably provided guidance to Admiral 3 Reismeier, and yet we have nothing turned over in discovery. 4 Presumably there were notes taken at these meetings, records 5 of some kind, an agenda, yet nothing turned over in discovery. 6 So from the perspective of a reasonable person, this is 7 another problematic connection, a connection between Admiral 8 Reismeier and General Martins, on important issues like forum 9 selection that transpired behind the veil of a deliberative 10 privilege.

And Admiral Reismeier has more connections to
prosecutors in the Office of the Chief Prosecutor. Not only
did he mentor the prosecutor in <u>Nashiri</u>, but many years ago he
reached out to a talented attorney, who is the prosecutor in
this case.

16 And the connections do not stop there. In 2016, 17 General Martins once again contacted Admiral Reismeier and 18 asked for assistance, this time as a mock judge on an issue 19 that involved part and parcel evidence, an issue that could 20 arise in Mr. al-Tamir's case. He went to the spaces of the 21 Office of the Chief Prosecutor. General Martins was there. 22 An attorney representing the government presented argument to 23 him, and he provided guidance to the attorney.

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Repeatedly, over the course of several years, Admiral
 Reismeier has served as the government's subject matter
 expert. He did this for free; and from the perspective of a
 reasonable person, he did this because he had a personal
 interest in supporting the government's position in military
 commissions.

7 Now let's fast forward to today and how Rear Admiral 8 Reismeier was hired as the convening authority. Notably, 9 General Martins' boss, Jason Foster, was the person who 10 contacted -- or, shall we say, recruited Admiral Reismeier. 11 The first contact came around the same time as Mr. Rishikof's 12 hiring. Admiral Reismeier interviewed for the position. He 13 interviewed with the DoD general counsel. They talked about 14 his background with the military commissions. And in his 15 testimony he describes his characterization of that 16 conversation as something to the effect of his background is 17 what it is.

At that time, Mr. Rishikof was hired and Rear Admiral Reismeier went into private practice, where he started advertising his experience with the military commissions to the world. To be sure, he was an attorney for hire and he used his experience with the military commissions as a part of the advertisement, holding himself out as the author of the

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legislative draft that became the 2009 Military Commissions
 Act.

Then sometime in the summer of 2018, General Martins'
boss, Jason Foster, reaches out to Admiral Reismeier again.
Once again, they discuss the possibility of Admiral Reismeier
becoming the next convening authority, and in the
September/October 2018 time frame he interviews with the DoD
general counsel, Mr. Ney. Once again, he discusses his
background: It is what it is.

To a reasonable person, what does that mean? On the one hand, Admiral Reismeier is a known quantity within the DoD when it comes to the military commissions. He has a public record where he is aligned with the government, worked with General Martins, and held himself out as the author of a legislative draft of the Military Commissions Act of 2009.

16 On the other hand, it does not appear that he 17 disclosed his need for recusal in Nashiri or Bahlul, and as 18 the defense would submit, his need for recusal or 19 disqualification in Mr. al-Tamir's case. This time, however, 20 he was hired. And even then he didn't start right away. He 21 still had cases to finish, and that meant the military 22 commissions had to wait. Mr. al-Tamir's military commission 23 had to wait four months for the government's subject-matter

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1 expert to start as a new convening authority, which begs the 2 guestion: Why?

3 Was there not someone else with less personal 4 interest and apparent bias who could have started sooner? The 5 government has produced one memo associated with 6 Admiral Reismeier's hiring and nothing more. And I won't go 7 into this too much because it deals with the pending discovery 8 motion, but there must be more. The government notably has 9 identified responsive documents. And to highlight for this 10 commission, in the 9/11 case the judge has ordered additional 11 discovery produced on this issue. That ruling can be found at 12 Appellate Exhibit 637F.

13 Why was it necessary to wait for the government's
14 subject-matter expert? It is not good enough for this
15 commission to simply say it is what it is, not when
16 Mr. al-Tamir's right to a fair trial and a fair tribunal is on
17 the table.

We've heard a lot of testimony over the last several days about the musical chairs of military justice, where the uniformed attorneys are always coming and going, moving from prosecutor to defense counsel to judge to appellate judge and then to something else. Admiral Reismeier's service on the -as the convening authority, however, is categorically

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1 different, and as a result, more damaging to Mr. al-Tamir's2 rights.

His service arises in a different system that draws
its constitutional power from a different source, the define
and punish clause. Accordingly, this commission must take
action to ensure Mr. al-Tamir receives the most basic criminal
justice protection, a fair trial and a fair tribunal.

8 Under both the type three accuser standard and the
9 appearance of partiality standard, Admiral Reismeier is
10 disqualified from further service as the military commission's
11 convening authority. Because he has not taken the necessary
12 steps to disqualify himself or even read the charge sheet,
13 Mr. al-Tamir moves this commission to dismiss.

14 Pending your questions, Your Honor, I have nothing15 further.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Why is dismissal -- assuming that the commission agrees with your argument that the convening authority should be disqualified, why is dismissal the appropriate remedy?

20 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, there are -- the defense
 21 acknowledges there are options in terms to remedy this.
 22 Dismissal is the remedy we've asked for.

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Well, why is that appropriate?

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DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Yes, Your Honor. And I would -- are
you suggesting appropriate in comparison to, say, abatement as
a remedy?

4 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Or disqualification.

DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: So, Your Honor, the concern is -- and
it was somewhat highlighted earlier this week, with the
judge's reluctance -- Your Honor's reluctance to order, say,
the commander to do something, the JDG commander. And so it
is unclear that the commission could order the convening
authority to disqualify himself.

But if the commission views it as having that power, that is the remedy here, is to disqualify Admiral Reismeier as the convening authority. Under R.M.C. 504, though, it -- the procedure that's laid out talks about what amounts to self-disqualification and the forwarding of the charges back to the Secretary of Defense.

So that -- for that reason, because he has not taken
the appropriate action to R.M.C. 504, dismissal is the
appropriate remedy.

20 [Pause.]

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: I'm sorry. I'm looking for the area
of the Manual that speaks to the self-recusal issue that
you're citing. That's certainly true in the case of the

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1 military judge. However, under applicable military law and
2 the Rules for Military Commissions, what language is it that
3 you're pointing to that suggests the military judge does not
4 have the authority to disqualify a convening authority?

DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, the language we're looking
at is R.M.C. 504(c)(2), action when disqualified. When a
convening authority who would otherwise convene a military
commission is disqualified in a case, the charges shall be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for disposition.

10 The second part of that sentence, "The charges shall 11 be forwarded," it doesn't -- it's in the passive tense, so it 12 doesn't identify that the convening authority must do it. Ιf 13 the -- this commission believes it has the authority to order 14 the convening authority disgualified and direct the charges be 15 sent back -- or sent up to the Secretary of Defense, then that 16 is the appropriate remedy. But given the nature of this rule, 17 it was not clear on its face. Therefore, the defense moves 18 for dismissal.

19 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Thank you.

20

Trial Counsel, when you're ready.

21 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Good morning, sir. Mr. Spencer for22 the government.

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Good morning.

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ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Sir, the defense's continued and
 increasing practice of demonstrating a cavalier attitude with
 respect to both the facts and the law is deeply concerning.
 I'll get to specifics on that in a moment.

5 Not just for this motion, but certainly in this 6 instance as well, there is no military case that the defense 7 cites or of which the government is aware that extends the 8 appearance of bias standard, the judicial standard, or the 9 unlawful command influence appearance standard to a convening 10 authority.

The cases cited by the defense in its reply, the way that they're cited, frankly, ignores language both behind and in front of the quotes that they point to and take phrases out of context in an attempt to make the point, while ignoring the holdings of the case. And I'm specifically referring to page 3 of the defense reply.

In light of that, the government feels an obligation to look at those cases in some detail, more detail than it would have otherwise desired to. The first case that the defense cites at the top of -- the first paragraph of page 3 is the case <u>United States v. Davis</u>. And the <u>Davis</u> case, Your Honor, I'm sure you're aware of it. In that case, the convening authority made comments about people convicted and

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1 said if they were convicted, don't come crying to me, or words
2 of that effect. And it was the -- the comments made and the
3 attitude demonstrated by the convening authority with respect
4 to an inelastic view on clemency or post-trial relief that
5 resulted in the -- in the disqualification of the convening
6 authority in that sense.

7 The appearance piece of that appears nowhere in the 8 Davis case. What the Davis case says is that where a 9 convening authority reveals that the door to a full and fair 10 post-trial review is closed, we have held that the convening 11 authority must be disgualified. Statements reflecting --12 statements reflecting an unwillingness to consider each case 13 fully and individually create a perception that a convicted 14 servicemember will be denied, so the defense conveniently 15 leaves off the first part of that and points to the perception 16 as somehow establishing an appearance standard in the improper 17 accuser realm. But in that case, it was the statements 18 reflecting an unwillingness to consider each case fully that 19 created the perception, and I'll get to why that's important 20 later, but the cases have consistently been clear since the 21 '50s that this is an objective reasonable person test.

So the government agrees with the first part of thetest as relayed in the oral argument by the defense. It is an

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objective standard and there are numerous cases that point to
 that. <u>Davis</u> being one of them, <u>Dinges</u>, <u>Voorhees</u>, et cetera.
 But <u>Davis</u> does not stand for the proposition that the
 appearance standard is the appropriate standard.

Nor does the next case cited by the defense,
McClenny. McClenny quotes Gordon -- United States v. Gordon,
which I'll talk about in a moment, recognizing that the Gordon
test was probably the -- one of the earlier references to it
being an objective test. The McClenny quote is that in
United States v. Gordon, supra, we note the test is objective.
It must appear that a reasonable person would impute to him.

Now, it's clear in the context of that entire case
that the word "appear" in that instance means appear to the
court, not an appearance standard that's somehow broader in a
different context.

We -- and we know this by looking to <u>Gordon</u> because <u>I7</u> <u>Gordon</u> never uses the word "appear." <u>Gordon</u> simply says we are required to determine under the particular facts and circumstances with which we are dealing, "we" being the appellate court, whether a reasonable person would impute to him a personal feeling or interest in the outcome of the litigation.

23

So those three cases, which is what the defense

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1 points to as establishing this new,

2 never-before-recognized-in-the-military-context appearance 3 test for improper accuser, simply don't say what the defense 4 says they say. The so-called expert report attached to the 5 defense reply authored by, among others, Mr. Eugene Fidell. 6 the defense would argue that -- the defense would argue that 7 that somehow should control or persuade the court. The 8 government is not aware of -- of legal experts being assigned 9 to cases or legal experts outside of the amicus context being 10 used, certainly not in the trial court setting. But let's 11 assume for the sake of argument that Mr. Fidell is an expert. 12 Mr. Fidell is -- I'm sure the commission is aware is a 13 long-time member of the defense bar. He is very well 14 respected within the defense community, but certainly not 15 unbiased. The government's expert in this case would be Judge 16 Baker in the case of United States v. Dinges. Judge Baker 17 with a -- as the commission is probably aware -- a history of 18 service, a history of being neutral and detached as a judge, 19 not biased in one favor -- in the favor of one party or the 20 other.

Judge Baker explains this once and for all, that
should settle the law once and for all. The defense's reply
referenced that this was somehow a red herring. I'm going to

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read the exact full quote, which presumably the defense did
 not look at, and if the -- if the -- the term "red herring"
 can still be applied to that, then I must not understand what
 the term red herring means.

5 Judge Baker makes it clear in his concurring opinion 6 in the case of <u>United States v. Dinges</u>. Since its inception, 7 this court has consistently applied a contextual R.C.M. 601 8 test. Now, I'll note for the record that the commission 9 version is in the 500 series, not the 600 series, but it's the 10 same test, the improper accuser test.

Judge Baker continues, quote, whether under the particular facts and circumstances a reasonable person would impute to the convening authority a personal feeling or interest in the outcome of the litigation, and he cites -function of the litigation, and he cites -function of the section of the litigation. So this is a long history of the -- what the -- what is clear that the test is.

Judge Baker continues, the very next sentence,
Congress has chosen not to legislate a different, more
stringent test, such as those familiar in other contexts,
based on the possibility of a conflict or appearance of a
conflict. So if the -- the court accepts the attachment and
its reply as somehow an expert opinion, the government would
propose that the judges -- Judge Baker's expert opinion

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1 carries slightly more weight.

2 Now, coming back to the law, especially with respect 3 to the defense's confusion on the law, I'd like to address a 4 couple of things that the defense raised in its PowerPoint 5 presentation. The defense points to -- and I won't put it back up, but the defense's first slide was a -- a memo by the 6 7 Convening Authority, Retired General Vaughn Ary, Retired 8 Marine Judge Advocate. In it he writes -- and I'll note on 9 the slide show itself the word "conspiracy" was highlighted. 10 Legal error, conspiracy, and charges were dismissed were 11 underlined. But the full text in context, it appears it was 12 legal error to try the offenses of providing material support 13 for terrorism and conspiracy to provide material support for 14 terrorism.

15 Your Honor, the Noor Uthman Muhammed case was not --16 the issue wasn't conspiracy. The issue was material support 17 for terrorism. And anyone that's been following the military commissions for the last even couple of years understands that 18 19 the material support for terrorism piece of it was the 20 linchpin in that case. Because material support for terrorism 21 fell away under the law, of course, conspiracy to commit 22 material support for terrorism also fell away under the law. 23 And that's why those charges were dismissed. It has nothing

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1 to do with the conspiracy charge, per se. It's the underlying2 charge.

3 Now, I double checked Mr. Hadi's charge sheet a 4 moment ago just to make sure I hadn't missed something. There 5 is no material support for terrorism on the charge sheet for the accused's case. Rather, terrorism, denying quarter, using 6 7 treachery or perfidy, murder of protected persons, attacking 8 protected property, attacking civilians, attacking civilian 9 objects, and employing poisons or similar weapons, those are 10 the conspiracy charges that relate to this case.

11 Now, the defense tried to make much of the timing of 12 the terrorism -- or, I'm sorry, the conspiracy charge in this 13 case somehow syncing up with -- with Admiral Reismeier's 14 involvement in the amicus brief or the Bahlul brief. Your 15 Honor, it's a matter of record in this commission and to the 16 extent that it was in front of, I believe, Judge Waits, the 17 government would invite the commission to go back and review, 18 if -- if it desires to, the conspiracy issue as it relates to 19 this case.

At the time that this -- the conspiracy charge was filed, the defense is accurate in suggesting with its testimony with Admiral Reismeier that the original charges did not include a conspiracy charge. When the government

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re-referred new charges and added Charge V, which was the
 conspiracy charge, the decision in <u>Bahlul</u> had not been made by
 the D.C. Circuit.

4 That didn't matter. Because in this case the accused 5 committed numerous overt acts after the enactment of the 6 Military Commissions Act of 2006. So under a bridge 7 conspiracy theory, which is well recognized within the law, 8 the outcome of the Bahlul opinion could not have impacted, in 9 any meaningful way, the ability for -- of the government to 10 charge conspiracy. And the convening authority at the time 11 agreed with that, agreed with the bridge conspiracy theory. 12 And this is all outlined in the -- I believe it's the AE 025 13 series, sir, but I may be wrong on the number. So the -- that 14 argument by the defense is, in fact, a red herring.

15 When Bahlul was decided by the D.C. Circuit -- and 16 the defense suggested a couple of times that it was unsettled 17 law. Your Honor, that's simply not true. The law is settled. 18 Bahlul is decided. The Supreme Court denied cert. Did it --19 did it augment the Hadi case? Potentially. It made one less 20 issue for us to have to litigate fully, although the 21 government may still see litigation on that issue, I suspect, 22 based on the government -- the defense's apparent 23 misunderstanding of the law.

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1 However, the -- in this case, this case did not rely 2 on the outcome of Bahlul. The fact that the current convening 3 authority agreed with a position of the government 4 apparently -- which he didn't even know, frankly, what the 5 position of the government was because he'd never read the 6 government's briefs. What he agreed with was the amicus 7 brief, a position with which the D.C. Circuit largely agreed, 8 according to the witness. The fact that he did that is 9 irrelevant.

Every convening authority in the history of the
military justice system had to agree with the prosecutor on
some level in order for there to be charges referred to a
commission or court-martial in the first instance.

So this unity of mind or purpose that the defense
keeps pointing to is entirely irrelevant. Attorneys -reasonable minds disagree. Attorneys disagree.
Admiral Reismeier felt one way about the state of the law;
other attorneys felt another way about the state of the law.
It went to the D.C. Circuit to decide. They decided it.

Admiral Reismeier testified that he goes back to the an admiral Reismeier testified that he goes back to the source every time he does something to verify what the -- what the law is. There's no indication that if the law changed or adapted or somehow became something that was different from

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what he had previously -- previously opined, there's no
 indication that he would not follow the law. To suggest
 otherwise is both pure speculation and, frankly, somewhat
 slanderous of someone with a -- a career demonstrating
 neutrality, fairness, and professionalism.

6 Now, again, the defense in its slide with respect to 7 the timing issue points to Judge Waits being appointed to the 8 commission around the same time that Rear Admiral Reismeier 9 was -- was providing his expert guidance to those who 10 requested it. This commission has already ruled that 11 Admiral Reismeier's testimony was not relevant on the Judge 12 Waits issue, on whether Judge Waits should be recused. Again, 13 Your Honor, a red herring.

14 Finally, with respect to the defense's slide show 15 presentation, the defense -- the last page -- the last slide 16 of that was a -- an excerpt from the law firm's website, the 17 law firm where the convening authority was previously of 18 counsel as a defense counsel. The defense never questioned 19 the convening authority on this matter. There's no evidence 20 before the commission as to who actually authored this 21 information, whether he was aware that it was posted to the 22 website in that form.

23

So the government would aver that this is completely

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unreliable in terms of information or alleged conflict or
 whatever -- why ever the defense wants to use it, because we
 don't know who authored this. The defense had the opportunity
 to ask him, they had the opportunity to explore this
 information as a -- as allegedly an inconsistent statement.
 They failed to.

7 What the evidence in this case actually showed is an 8 absence of bias, a commitment to neutrality, a commitment to 9 the law, again demonstrated in a 31-year Naval career, most of 10 which were as a judge advocate, from a recognized 11 subject-matter expert within the Navy JAG Corps, who had been 12 both a defense counsel and a trial counsel, who had been a 13 trial judge and an appellate judge, the director of Navy 14 policy for criminal law. Applying equally and providing 15 equally advice to both sides as needed, mentoring individuals 16 on both sides as needed. No bias one way or the other.

Did he -- did he share an opinion on a particular
state of the law? Yes. And as the judge indicated in his
questioning, that's no different than someone who testifies
before Congress or writes a law review article or takes any
other position on any matter in the law and then later becomes
a judge. And even in the higher standard of a judge, that's
not disqualifying. That doesn't even rise to the level of

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1 appearance.

2 Why? Because part of what jurists do as their 3 official duties in their official interests involve this very 4 type of behavior. There's been no expression of animus by the 5 convening authority for any person accused, even Nashiri and 6 Bahlul. There's been -- there's no evidence before this 7 commission that this convening authority has ever been biased 8 against any of these individuals. There's no evidence that he 9 will not faithfully execute his post-trial duties. There's no 10 evidence that he will faithful -- not faithfully exercise his 11 duties as convening authority in referring new cases.

12 Your Honor, as the government stated in its response, 13 it's obviously the government's position that the convening 14 authority's decision -- sua sponte decision to recuse himself 15 from the two cases that he recused himself from was overly 16 conservative perhaps. But that should be a further indication 17 of his extreme commitment to fairness. The defense says no, 18 that proves he should recuse himself from all of these cases, 19 which is an absurd result.

20 The government -- or the defense made representation
21 that Jason Foster was General Martins' boss. Your Honor,
22 that's untrue. The defense knows that's untrue. Jason Foster
23 is an attorney with the Office of General Counsel. He works

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for a person who could be described as General Martins'
 reporting senior, but Jason Foster is not General Martins'
 boss. That's a false statement.

The Secretary of Defense is -- is the statutory
convening authority unless delegated to lower authority. The
Secretary of Defense is also General Martins' boss in that
sense. And even in that sense, someone working for the
Secretary of Defense who's not in the chain would not be
considered his boss.

10 The question that this commission must answer is 11 whether, under the particular facts and circumstances, a 12 reasonable person would impute to the convening authority a 13 personal feeling or interest in the outcome of the litigation. 14 Particular facts and circumstances, not conjecture, not 15 speculation, not false accusation, but the actual evidence.

Now defense made repeated references to nothing turned over in discovery. Although the defense motion to compel discovery on this issue is outstanding, the defense when questioned by the military judge indicated that it had no additional evidence to present. Presumably the blame for that would be cast at the government's feet, so I will take just a brief moment to answer that issue.

23

The government did delay, regrettably, in responding

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1 to the discovery request because it was attempting to secure 2 documents and review documents, one of which needed to be 3 cleared before it could be turned over. So the -- the 4 government has responded to that request. It did so after --5 it was unfortunately not able to do so prior to the defense 6 filing its motion to compel the discovery. But the -- the 7 defense is in possession of the government's response to that 8 as of, I believe, week before last.

9 The defense -- the government has turned over all 10 discoverable relevant information on this issue. The 11 government has no notes or any of the other matters that they 12 alluded to for interviews. The -- any e-mail traffic was 13 reviewed and nothing was discoverable. There is -- the 14 defense can speculate and make baseless allegations all day, 15 but that doesn't create relevance.

16 What the defense has in their possession and -- in 17 terms of the memorandum -- the hiring decision memorandum, the 18 government provided that out of goodwill because it's the 19 government's position that even that wasn't discoverable, but 20 the government was trying to head off any more allegations 21 made without any substance or basis for that. And that is 22 before -- that is what the defense -- I believe they made it 23 as an attachment yesterday with Admiral Reismeier's testimony.

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1 So that's before the commission as well.

In that evidence, in the testimonial evidence, there
is no indication that Admiral Reismeier has anything other
than an official interest in the outcome of this or other
military commissions cases that are before him as convening
authority.

7 Congress has chosen not to legislate a different,
8 more stringent test such as those familiar in other contexts
9 based on the possibility of a conflict or the appearance of a
10 conflict. We are talking about whether he's an improper
11 accuser or whether he has displayed an inelastic attitude
12 toward post-trial responsibilities.

Coming back to the <u>Davis</u> case, sir, that's the crux
of <u>Davis</u>. The court makes clear in <u>Davis</u>, our decisions
disqualifying convening authorities from post-trial action
have fallen into two categories. In the first, the convening
authority will be disqualified if he or she is an accuser.

We've already -- the commission is already aware what that means. In the second category, this is the CAAF speaking, we have found convening authorities to be disqualified if they display an inelastic attitude toward performance of their post-trial responsibilities, which is exactly what happened in <u>Davis</u> when the convening authority

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said, quote, if convicted, don't come crying to me. That's
 the test, Your Honor, not some made-up test that the defense
 has failed to substantiate through case law.

4 And under that test, a reasonable person knowing all 5 of the facts, understanding how jurists typically work in 6 terms of opining on things, writing law review articles, 7 et cetera -- and especially in the military context, military 8 jurists who routinely rotate from one position to the next, 9 trial counsel to defense counsel, back to trial counsel, 10 military -- trial counsel to military judge, all the while, as 11 you heard from Rear Admiral Reismeier, going back to the 12 source, going back to the law, applying the unique facts of 13 whatever circumstances are before him, not bringing the fact 14 that he may have just been a trial counsel and now he's 15 presiding over a similar or even related case, but going back 16 to the law and committed to the law in a fair and unbiased 17 application as he has demonstrated repeatedly for decades. 18 That's the evidence before this commission.

19 Finally, Your Honor, the -- the defense being not 20 aware of disqualification suggests to me that they didn't read 21 the full text of the case of <u>United States v. Davis</u>. Clearly, 22 dismissal is not appropriate. It seems that the defense has 23 conceded that. Their analysis on the -- the parallel with

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pecuniary interests suggests that they're confusing the
 <u>Turner v. Safley</u> test with the improper accuser test. But
 dismissal would never be appropriate in this case, even if he
 were -- even if he did have an other than professional
 interest in the outcome of the case, which he does not.

6 Subject to your questions, Your Honor, I have nothing7 else.

8 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Just one.

9 Understanding that the government's position is that 10 the recusal -- Rear Admiral Reismeier's recusal in the other 11 cases was prophylactic and unnecessary, given that he did, in 12 fact, recuse himself, and understanding that the government's 13 position is the reason for it was not founded in law, how does 14 the commission distinguish between the two, if those factors 15 that Rear Admiral Reismeier relied upon are insignificant? 16 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Sir, insignificant in what sense? 17 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Insignificant in the sense that if 18 they didn't -- if in the reasonable -- well, Rear Admiral 19 Reismeier's reasonable mind, if they caused him to recuse 20 himself, but yet they are so insignificant that the government 21 believes that they shouldn't have caused his recusal, how then 22 standing side by side with this case does the commission not 23 take that into consideration and say, well, if those factors

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1 are insignificant, then you take that out of the equation;2 i.e., his participation in the moot and things like that?

3 Then if he recused in one case, his personal
4 connection to the case would seemingly be equal in this case.
5 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: I think I understand your question,
6 Your Honor.

7 The answer is that the particular -- specific to
8 those cases, Rear Admiral Reismeier determined that in his
9 mind, a reasonable person might consider that he had an
10 other-than-personal outcome -- interest in the outcome of the
11 case because of the facts as it related to those cases.

12 The government suggests that that was overly
13 conservative, but that was his discretion and his -- and
14 again, demonstrative of his commitment to transparency and
15 fairness.

16 Some -- the government's position is that someone 17 familiar with all of the relevant facts, including military 18 practice, including how the military structure -- the military 19 JAG Corps is structured, the practice of going back and forth 20 between positions, the practice of mentoring, the fact of his 21 position at the time -- which not everyone would have 22 necessarily been aware of until this litigation, that he 23 championed or pioneered the military justice career litigation

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track, for example, that he mentored numerous individuals, not
 just prosecutors or defense counsel -- he felt that
 potentially, in his mind, specific to those cases, a
 reasonable person might come down on the other side.

5 Whether that's true or not, we'll never know. But in 6 order to avoid unnecessary litigation in those cases, he chose 7 to recuse himself. That doesn't extend to every other 8 commission case by definition. The facts of those cases were 9 different. He was -- had no involvement in the Hadi case. He 10 had never even heard the name Abd al Hadi al-Iragi until he 11 came to this commission as convening authority.

So he was not aware of anything related to this case. He was not involved in any meaningful way with any counsel in this case. My very limited contacts with him over ten years ago certainly do not imply to anyone with knowledge of reasonable facts, especially if all of the reasonable facts were made aware -- or relevant facts -- that he was -- is biased in favor of me, the -- those cases are separate.

He chose to take an overly conservative path, but that -- that is what it is. He was aware of it. He was attempting to be extra, extra cautious or transparent in cases that aren't related directly to this case in any meaningful way, notwithstanding the conspiracy argument that the -- that

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1 the defense clearly misunderstands.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Let me -- let me -- and that did answer my question. Let me now frame it a little bit differently in light of your argument that they are so separate that the appearance issues that caused Rear Admiral Reismeier to recuse himself in one case should not be attributed to the other.

8 What would the government's position be if Rear 9 Admiral Reismeier's participation in those two cases was 10 perhaps more significant than that? Is it the government's 11 position that even despite those increased -- that increased 12 level of participation, this commission is so separate that 13 Rear Admiral Reismeier would still not be required to be 14 disqualified?

And the question is perhaps even better informed by indicating that this is a consolidated disposition authority, consolidated convening authority, who has authority over all of the commissions cases as opposed to perhaps a typical court-martial convening authority, who handles cases that are more routinely separate and distinct from one another.

So the question is again, going back to it, if
Rear Admiral Reismeier's connection to those two cases -- in
other words, if he provided more input than simply sitting on

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a moot court or provided more guidance than simply being a
 mentor to one of the prosecution members, would that
 disqualify him from sitting as the convening authority on this
 case?

5 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: I understand your question, Your6 Honor.

7 I believe the answer is yes, depending on what the 8 nature of those contacts were. The record is clear that he 9 had strictly professional interactions with General Martins. 10 If he and General Martins were drinking buddies and went out 11 on the weekends every night, then that would create, in a 12 reasonable person's mind, the absence of -- or the presence of 13 a possible bias. Right? Or if General -- if the convening 14 authority had, let's say, been hired as a government 15 consultant on a particular case or been hired ----

16 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Or volunteered.

ATC [MR. SPENCER]: ---- to assist -- to volunteer,
especially in the first instance as a -- in his official
capacity as -- in charge of Navy policy, that -- that
instance, in and of itself, does not -- I should step back,
Your Honor.

He didn't volunteer ever. He was asked. It's not as
if he was reaching out to the commissions and saying, "Can I

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1 help you? Can I help you prosecute terrorists?"

2 If he had done that, that may be an indication that 3 he desires a particular outcome in this case. He was asked, 4 because of his status within the JAG Corps community. Even 5 after retirement as a retired judge advocate flag officer, he 6 was asked because of his expertise generally with the 7 knowledge and his knowledge of the facts surrounding the --8 the drafting and the enactment of the Military Commissions 9 Act. 10 So in response to requests, he provided his 11 Just his -- as he testified, he would do that for expertise. 12 whomever requested his expertise, defense or prosecution, just 13 as he -- in -- in the Code 20 context, he did that routinely. 14 So if the defense had reached out to him in the 15 commissions and said we'd like your expert opinion on X, Y, or 16 Z, it's clear that he would have provided it. He wasn't doing 17 so in a personal capacity. He was doing it with a

18 professional interest in the law and as a member of the 19 retired judge advocate bar as a recognized subject-matter 20 expert within the judge advocate community, specifically on 21 commissions cases given his early involvement in drafting or 22 assisting in the drafting of the Military Commissions Act.

23 Certainly there are instances where if he were more

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1 embedded with the prosecution, then that would create an 2 improper accuser issue. But that's not the facts of this 3 He thought that the facts of the other cases were close case. 4 enough that he wanted to avoid the issue altogether, 5 presumably, which is why he recused himself, even though the 6 government's position is that he didn't need to do that. But 7 he chose to take the high road.

8 Those contacts and connections don't exist in this
9 case, and so under the facts that exist; the relevant facts,
10 not conjecture, there is no improper accuser issue.

11 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Thank you.

12 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Thank you.

13 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Lieutenant Commander Meusch.

14 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, if I may, I'd like to15 respond to a few things.

16 First, the -- Mr. Spencer just -- in describing the
17 type three accuser standard or the R.M.C. 504 standard,
18 described it as other than -- something other than a
19 professional interest. The word "professional" is not the
20 correct one. And this is an important distinction, Your
21 Honor. It's "official." Other than official interest.
22 You can have a personal professional interest, such

23 as if you're in private practice, that would be contrary to

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your official interest under the Military Commissions Act and
 the relevant rules. In terms of the type three accuser and
 the issues with that, the defense takes exception to the - the statements made by the government regarding the case law.

5 One, to the extent that this commission is left with 6 court-martial precedent as its guide, Gordon is a case the 7 government cited that talks about the standard for R.M.C. 504. 8 And if you look at that, it states the right to an impartial 9 review is an important right which must be recognized. The 10 accused is entitled to have the record reviewed and the limits 11 of the -- of his sentence fixed by one who is free from any 12 connection with the controversy.

In <u>Ashby</u>, it talks about the type three accuser and
other than official interests, such as ego, family, personal
property. These are all things that can give rise to an other
than official interest.

Second, regarding the statement that the defense made
a false statement about General Martins' boss. Your Honor,
the defense understands its duty of candor to this court.
That is the understanding of the defense, that Mr. Foster is
General Martins' boss. And we specifically requested to have
General Martins testify where we could ask him that question,
but Your Honor denied that motion.

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1 Again, this is not a court-martial, and 2 Admiral Reismeier is not a military commander. While 3 R.M.C. 504 incorporates some of the language from the relevant 4 rules for court-martial, the system is different. It draws 5 its authority from a different source. We're talking about 6 the define and punish clause, about prosecuting foreigners who 7 attacked the United States. This doesn't come under the 8 regulations to provide rules for the land and naval forces. 9 It's not about the United States military keeping its house in 10 order.

11 They're different systems, and they're -- to my 12 knowledge, it is unprecedented within military practice for 13 the Secretary of Defense to go out and hire a convening 14 authority to handle all of the cases in a given jurisdiction 15 under the UCMJ, to find a person who is retired, who holds him 16 out -- holds himself out publicly as the sole author of the 17 Uniform Code of Military Justice and then comes in as the convening authority for all cases. So there are factual 18 19 distinctions between the two systems that this commission must 20 take into account.

Regarding the judicial -- what this court has
described as a judicial partiality standard, notably -- and
your -- Your Honor, you highlighted this. Admiral Reismeier

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1 applied that standard to himself. That should be the clearest 2 evidence that the standard applies in the context of the 3 convening authority. Whether he decided to apply that 4 standard to himself in this case or not is unclear, especially 5 given the fact that he hasn't even reviewed the charge sheet. 6 It's not clear to the defense that he has gone through the 7 analysis regarding whether disqualification is necessary in 8 this case.

9 In terms of what it means, the judicial nature of a 10 convening authority, the defense would invite the commission's 11 attention to a relatively old case -- very old, Runkle, which 12 was in the Supreme Court in 1887, which was recently cited 13 and -- by the Supreme Court in Ortiz and talks about the 14 Attorney General basically providing guidance to President 15 Lincoln, where they describe the acts of the convening 16 authority as judicial in nature.

17 The idea that a convening authority or someone 18 passing on a sentence or in post-trial review is doing 19 something that's judicial in nature is not new. It's been 20 around for a long time. There may be debate about it, but the 21 idea that a convening authority would apply the judicial 22 recusal standard to himself is certainly within reason under 23 the law.

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Finally, Your Honor, I guess as a point of
 clarification, Mr. Foster is an attorney in the office of Ryan
 Newman, who the government concedes is Martins' rater boss.
 So to be clear on that.

5 And finally, regarding the discovery issue briefly, the -- Admiral Reismeier testified that at some point, that 6 7 there were e-mails in connection with his hiring process. 8 There was contact and -- in connection with the Detention 9 Policy Task Force, there was turnover with General Martins 10 where things would have been produced in connection with that. 11 To the extent that the relevant documents have not been turned 12 over, we can litigate that, I suppose, in the other motion.

13 Pending your questions, Your Honor, that's all I have14 from the defense.

15 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Thank you. The commission will16 stand in recess for ten minutes.

17 [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 0923, 27 August 2019.]

18 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 0935,

19 27 August 2019.]

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The commission will come back to
order. All parties present when the commission last recessed
are again present.

23

The commission was perhaps a bit remiss in not

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addressing Appellate Exhibit 162 prior to taking up argument
 on that issue, despite asking if there were any outstanding
 evidence by either side. Nonetheless, just to close the loop
 on it, with respect to the issues involved with it, that is
 the discovery of information related to issues with Rear
 Admiral Reismeier's service as the convening authority.

7 In reviewing it once again just a moment ago, based 8 on the opportunity to ask Rear Admiral Reismeier about all of 9 these things and based on what appears to be no attack on Rear 10 Admiral Reismeier's credibility and reliability insofar as the 11 defense to a very large extent is relying upon his assertions 12 in his various different statements to form the basis for 13 their motion, what is it about the contents of 162 that the 14 defense still believes to be in issue?

DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, to give a specific answer,
I would need to go back and review 162. But the general
response are, like, the records and communications involving,
for instance, the Detention Policy Task Force, the records,
agendas, notes, meeting minutes that were included perhaps as
his time on the sub-working group, and the records involved in
the hiring process.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Why was his testimony and theopportunity to ask him all of the questions that you might

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1 have not sufficient to satisfy your needs?

DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, he didn't remember
everything while he was testifying about things happening
several years ago. He did mention and state that there would
be additional records.

6 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Mostly administrative, if not
7 entirely administrative, and trivial in nature. Would you
8 agree?

9 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: He did mention those things, yes, sir.
10 But there are certainly other items, and I -- just as an
11 example -- point to the Detention Policy Task Force where he
12 said he could not discuss because of some concern about a
13 deliberative privilege, but also mentioned that there would be
14 records produced in association with that.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: And why are those -- for purposes of
the motion in which we're litigating, why would those
particular records be material?

18 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Because those records should be 19 examined for any connection between Admiral Reismeier and 20 General Martins as well as for any evidence that could lead a 21 reasonable person to see other unofficial interest in 22 Admiral Reismeier performing the duties of convening 33 authority. And again, that -- that ----

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1 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Because he was assigned to a task2 force roughly 13 years ago?

3 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, not just any task force,
4 but one that was specifically related to the military
5 commissions insofar as a question before that task force was
6 forum selection. So that relates to the forum that we're in
7 right now.

8 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay.

9 Government?

10 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Your Honor, it's the government's11 position that ----

12 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: What have you turned over?

13 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Your Honor, I don't have that list in 14 front of me. We did turn over the policy memorandum that the 15 defense attached yesterday or made an exhibit yesterday. 16 There was an additional matter -- items that we turned over 17 roughly three to four weeks ago that was responsive, and the 18 remainder of the request asked for things that just weren't 19 relevant or wouldn't produce relevant information, or in the 20 example of e-mails, for example, throughout the hiring 21 process, the government reviewed those and they contained no 22 relevant information.

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: And when you say they contained no

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1 relevant information, you're making that conclusion based on a
2 review of the nature. So what was the nature of the
3 communications?

ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Your Honor, similar to what Rear
Admiral Reismeier testified to was related to logistics,
parking, scheduling, access for the interviews.

7 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: So admin and logistics?

8 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Yes, sir, that's correct.

9 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: Your Honor, if I may.

10 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Go ahead.

11 DDC [LCDR MEUSCH]: The other thing that comes to mind 12 is -- that might be relevant to this is also any type of 13 advanced materials that Admiral Reismeier may have reviewed 14 prior to interacting with the Office of the Chief Prosecutor, 15 specifically in the context of the briefing that was provided 16 on the conspiracy issue and also the 2016 mock -- where he 17 served as a mock judge and there was an argument presented to 18 him by members of the Office of the Chief Prosecutor.

19 [Pause.]

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Trial Counsel, have you reached out
 to identify -- and I believe Rear Admiral Reismeier even
 indicated that although he didn't have a present recollection,
 he would -- he believed he would have likely received

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1 something ahead of his participation in that moot court. 2 Have you reached out in an attempt to use reasonable 3 diligence to locate any responsive materials? 4 ATC [MR. SPENCER]: Sir, any responsive material, if 5 they -- if they ever existed, would either be with Rear 6 Admiral Reismeier, who similar to -- with the defense, he did 7 not -- did not allow himself to be interviewed. We were 8 unable to locate within our holdings that particular briefing. 9 It would have been background information on history and 10 status of the case of that particular case. 11 Rear Admiral Reismeier testified about that exchange 12 in some detail, and defense certainly had access to any 13 information that he would have had access to. 14 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. With respect to the --15 generally the topics of this discovery request, by and large 16 the commission finds that the opportunity to inquire with 17 Rear Admiral Reismeier through direct examination yesterday 18 provided the defense adequate opportunity to obtain the 19 information that they seek in another form. That is to say, 20 the defense could have and in some cases did inquire with Rear 21 Admiral Reismeier about the substance of the matters contained 22 within this discovery request.

23

To the extent the defense seeks additional matters

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that are in -- or additional matters relative to Rear Admiral
 Reismeier's connections -- purported connections, that is,
 with General Martins, the commission finds that Rear Admiral
 Reismeier's testimony indicated the extent, limited as it may
 be, of his previous interactions in relationship with General
 Martins.

7 To the extent that the defense is requesting 8 memorandums and other documents generated by Rear Admiral 9 Reismeier's participation on the various working groups to 10 which he was a part, the commission does not find that 11 material to be relevant or material to the preparation of the 12 defense's presentation of this issue. Moreover, once again, 13 the defense inquired with Rear Admiral Reismeier about the 14 nature of those working groups and have based their arguments 15 accordingly.

With respect to the matters involving his hiring to be a convening authority, the commission finds no reasonable basis to believe that anything beyond that which Rear Admiral Reismeier testified to, that is, logistical and administrative exchanges between himself and personnel at the Office of the General Counsel -- the commission finds again that there is no reasonable basis that anything beyond that exists and,

23 therefore, that the motion to compel discovery in that regard

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1 is denied.

The only outstanding matter appears to be any matters provided by the prosecution ahead of his participation in the moot court, and the commission will circle back on that after it has an opportunity to review the testimony associated with Rear Admiral Reismeier yesterday and the documents submitted in support of the motions. Beyond that outstanding issue, the motion brought under AE 162 is denied.

9 Regarding AE 157, the commission will take that issue10 under advisement and issue a ruling in the short-term future.

Moving on to the argument of counsel relative to
AE 158. It's the commission's understanding that defense
would like to take these matters up collectively, that is 158
and 160; is that correct?

15 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes, sir, that's correct.

16 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Any additional evidence that17 you'd like to present on these issues?

18 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No, sir, not at this time.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Government, any additional evidence
that you'd like to present on either of those two issues?

21 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: No, sir.

22 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Very well.

23 Defense, you may argue.

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DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, I'd like to first note that the transcripts of the testimony pertinent to this motion, other than Your Honor's additional voir dire, were not available when I prepared my argument, so I am doing the best to recite the record to the best of my recollection. And I wanted to put that ----

7 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay.

8 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: ---- out up front.

9 Sir, the theme of this hearing has been, in large
10 part, conflicts, a tangle of sorts of conflicts which came to
11 light only in the wake of the <u>al Nashiri</u> ruling recently.

12 The first conflict at the center of this motion bears 13 a striking resemblance to the fact pattern in that case, so 14 striking, in fact, that as we learned on Saturday when the 15 first judge detailed to this case, Captain Kirk Waits, now 16 retired from the military -- when he heard about the decision, 17 he reached out to the trial judiciary and partially 18 self-disclosed.

What did he disclose? He disclosed that he, just
like Judge Spath, had applied for a job with the Department of
Justice as an immigration judge while serving on a military
commission.

23

The dates are noteworthy because unlike in the

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<u>al Nashiri</u> case, not much time had passed with respect to the
 existence of this commission when he applied for the job. He
 was detailed on June 3rd, 2014, to this commission. On
 June 18th, 2014, my client was arraigned. Just a few weeks
 later Captain Waits applied to be an immigration judge in at
 least 11 cities.

Now, he received rejections from a few, but he never
heard from others. And for all he knew, as he testified, he
was still, quote, under consideration from the time that he
submitted those applications until he received a dilatory
response from the Department of Justice several years later.
Rarely is legal precedent so on point, particularly in this
commissions.

14 Now, we also learned that Captain Waits applied for a 15 civilian job in the Department of the Navy. And, sir, the --16 just as the Department of Justice has an interest and is a 17 party to this case, especially through the detailing of one of 18 its national security division prosecutors early on in the 19 case, the Department of Defense also is a party to this case. 20 And he testified that he applied for the position in or about 21 February of 2016, while he was still detailed to this 22 commission, and he was offered the position after some delay, 23 much to his aggravation, and accepted the job.

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1 And then another judge, Judge Rubin, was detailed to 2 the bench in mid-October. So we argue that given 3 Captain Waits' testimony, he was operating under a conflict of 4 interest for at least 97 percent of the time that he was 5 detailed to this commission from the date that he -- at least 6 the date that he submitted his application to be an 7 immigration judge, just a few weeks after my client was 8 arraigned, up until the time that he left the bench.

9 And it's important to highlight that a finding that 10 Judge Waits was operating under a conflict of interest does 11 not require a finding that he was actually partial while on 12 the bench. When asked that question, he testified that, 13 quote, in the military, we don't think in those terms. In the 14 military, we don't think in those terms. He also said it, 15 quote, never occurred to me. And he said that he'd spoken to 16 other judges about the al Nashiri decision after it was issued 17 in April and it -- and they -- they told him it never would 18 have occurred to them either.

But as the military judge well knows, this is not a
court-martial. It's a military commission. It's an awkward
marriage of military justice, federal court practice, and
international law principles, and there's a lot in dispute.
But one thing is not in dispute, not any longer, and that is

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1 that -- the law on judicial conflicts of interests. And Your
2 Honor today is presented with a tangle of them.

3 The fact that it may be that this is not a conflict 4 of interest that would dawn on a military judge in the ordinary course is something which the court squarely 5 6 addressed in the al Nashiri opinion. And I'll quote from the 7 opinion. It's page 240. 921 F.3d, 240. Quote, This much is 8 clear. Whenever and however military judges are assigned, 9 rehired, and reviewed, they must always maintain the 10 appearance of impartiality demanded by Rule for Military 11 Commission 902(a). It would seem, therefore, that some 12 additional encouragement, took more carefully examined 13 possible grounds for disqualification, would be especially 14 appropriate under the circumstances.

And, sir, that -- that portion of the decision quotes a Supreme Court case, <u>Liljeberg</u>, which I'll discuss in a few minutes. But it's important to note that, again, Your Honor need not find any malice, any intentional bias, in order to find that Captain Waits was operating under a conflict of interest while he was detailed to this commission. That's not the standard.

We understand -- again, even Admiral Reismeier's
testimony yesterday was consistent with what Captain Waits

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told us. It just -- it didn't -- it didn't dawn on them. It
 didn't occur to them because this isn't the way that military
 practice works. But as we know from the <u>Nashiri</u> decision, it
 the way that a military commission should work.

The second series of judicial conflicts in this case
relates to an attorney advisor to this commission from
August 2014 or thereabouts to December 2018 or thereabouts.
So that's the first -- effectively the first four years of
this commission.

10 He testified -- Mr. Blackwood, that is -- that it was 11 his long-term goal to work on national security cases. He 12 was -- he testified he was actively applying for jobs at least 13 as early as winter 2018. He had applied for jobs with U.S. 14 attorney's offices, three-letter agencies. And as we just 15 learned just yesterday, after his testament day -- after his 16 testimony, days after his testimony, that he had even applied 17 for a job with the National Security Division of the 18 Department of Justice. That is the very section of the DoJ 19 which offered up a prosecutor in this case, sir.

And I would argue that that renders Your Honor's
interrogatories to the individual from the executive office of
the United States attorneys now moot. We know that
Mr. Blackwood applied for a job with the National Security

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Division. And the fact of that employ -- of that job
 application under the <u>Nashiri</u> decision should be dispositive
 on that question.

4 Sir, Mr. Blackwood now works as an AUSA on terrorism 5 and national security cases, at least as part of his docket, as part of his portfolio, in the U.S. attorney's office in 6 7 Kansas City. As references, it's noteworthy that he testified 8 that he provided the names of two judges from this commission 9 and one individual, the dean of his executive LLM program, who 10 is now a judge or a judge-elect on the CMCR. Those were his 11 three references, so he clearly highlighted his work on 12 commissions in applying for a job.

He leveraged his experience, as we've seen in his two résumés, his experience in handling classified information, in researching and drafting rulings, to get a job, a job which he actually is performing today. Mr. Blackwood clearly played a significant role in this commission. I'd refer Your Honor to Raptain Waits' testimony again.

My colleague, Lieutenant Commander Meusch, showed
Captain Waits a portion of the transcript from this case,
pages 709 to 710. And I'd like to quote from that transcript,
sir. Mr. Rushforth, counsel for my client at the time, said,
"Let me turn to the subject of 505 ex parte meetings. Those

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1 ex parte -- 505 ex parte meetings that you've held with the 2 prosecution in this case. Have you had such meetings?" 3 Captain Waits responded, "I've had one. Usually 4 the -- my law clerk, Captain Blackwood, is the one who 5 actually physically, you know, has a physical meeting with the 6 prosecutors. I try to avoid those myself. There wouldn't be 7 anything wrong with me doing it, but I'm located, you know, 8 and physically stationed in Naples, Italy. So Captain 9 Blackwood, my law clerk, is the one who normally meets with 10 them." 11 Mr. Rushforth asked, "Do you know how many times 12 Captain Blackwood has met with him?" 13 And Captain Waits responded, "I don't know for sure. 14 I would say probably less than five or six times." 15 And then, sir, the transcript goes on, but 16 Captain Waits estimates that in terms of the quantity of 17 information that would have been reviewed in connection with 18 those meetings, it would have been something in the 19 neighborhood of, quote, probably close to 40 binders. 20 So he, at least in Captain Waits' estimation, played 21 a significant role in the -- in these proceedings, 22 particularly with respect to the very important question of 23 what substitutions the defense receives, substitutions which

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are the center of our ability to defend our client against the
 charges against him, and substitutions which we will not have
 an opportunity to seek reconsideration of. These are the
 substitutions that Mr. Blackwood was handling.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: You cannot -- you'd agree that
reconsideration would not be appropriate pursuant to the
rules, but if this commission took action much like the
<u>Nashiri</u> case -- the D.C. Circuit did in the <u>Nashiri</u> case, that
would necessarily involve a review of the 505 summaries?

10 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, Your Honor is correct. We've 11 requested dismissal. There is other relief Your Honor may 12 consider in attempting to cure the taint here. But certainly 13 given then-Captain Blackwood's very significant involvement in 14 the 505 process, we would argue that all of those 15 substitutions be thrown out and we start over. So yes ----16 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: You agree that Mr. Blackwood is not 17 laboring under any conflicts at the time that those were

17 Taboring under any conflicts at the time that those were 18 generated?

DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Respectfully, sir, I disagree. Your
Honor would not allow me to get into Mr. Blackwood's -Mr. Blackwood's -- for instance, his participation in the
executive LLM program. But I will point out, Your Honor, that
one of the things that the government recently produced to the

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court in an attachment to its filing in the AE 160 series
 was -- it looked like the handwritten notes from
 Mr. Blackwood's interview with the U.S. Attorney's office.
 And there was a reference there, sir, that related to his LLM
 program and underneath it said that one of his professors was
 a lawyer at the National Security Division. This was
 experience he highlighted.

8 It is likely that he talked to these professors about 9 seeking employment at their agencies. Why else would you do 10 an executive LLM program? The point is that the adjunct 11 professors are currently employed in the field in which you 12 seek to seek employment. You are making contacts. And a 13 member of our own team actually did this program and 14 Dean Schenck, Judge Schenck, referred him for an internship at 15 the time with a three-letter agency.

16 That's how it works. And that makes sense. They're 17 expensive programs. If they're not going to help someone who 18 is already working secure better employment in the field in 19 which they seek to work, then there is no point.

So sir, I would argue that Mr. Blackwood's conflict 21 began earlier than even winter 2018, but it's also important 22 to note, sir, that much earlier than that -- and Captain Waits 23 was on the case. So we're really talking about a very narrow

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1 window of time.

2 Sir, I'd also like to address Mr. Blackwood's role 3 working with Colonel Rubin. It's noteworthy that there was a 4 difference between the testimony that Mr. Blackwood gave and 5 the sworn affidavit provided by Colonel Rubin. And it also --6 Colonel Rubin's informed our team, consistent with his 7 affidavit, that he never served as a job reference for 8 Mr. Blackwood. He indicated that he was actually surprised 9 when he heard where he was working because I believe Colonel Rubin's from Missouri, and it would have stuck out to 10 11 him that he was looking for a job in Kansas City.

12 So Colonel Rubin noted that -- and this is the second 13 page -- excuse me, the second paragraph of his affidavit, 14 which is AE 158F Attachment B that Mr. Blackwood provided 15 day-to-day assistance and counsel to me during the performance 16 of my judicial duties. Mr. Blackwood had a broad range of 17 duties such as conducting legal research, reviewing and 18 managing filings, reviewing classified information, attending 19 conferences and hearings, interacting with counsel and staff, 20 and preparing draft orders and rulings. He was an invaluable 21 sounding board, confidant, and advisor to me.

And, sir, this is consistent with the role that a law
clerk plays in Article III courts, but even more so here with

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1 a case this large, that as Your Honor has seen from
2 Mr. Blackwood's résumé, the second iteration of it, he
3 highlights only being assigned to work on one commission case,
4 and that is this one. And that makes sense because it is a
5 huge undertaking. And so Your Honor necessarily needs to rely
6 on the assistance of other attorneys in working through the
7 subject matter.

8 Sir, Mr. Blackwood also testified, again, consistent
9 with his first résumé, that his role remained the same -- his
10 role and responsibilities remained the same over the pendency
11 of the -- of his work on the trial judiciary.

12 And given that commissions judges, again, even as 13 Your Honor's voir dire highlighted, are not housed in the 14 trial judiciary and the fact that the trial judiciary staff 15 may out-serve the tender of the military -- tenure of the 16 military judges assigned to these cases, the play -- the role 17 they play is key. They are the institutional knowledge of the 18 commissions. Their role can't simply be sliced out of the 19 proceedings with a -- with an affidavit or with a correct 20 assertion by the judges.

Again, that they feel they are responsible for all of their rulings and they take responsibility for all of their rulings, that isn't the standard. The standard is the context

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1 and what a reasonable person would think knowing all of the2 circumstances.

It's the appearance of partiality that matters. And given the tangle of conflicts that we've uncovered during this hearing, the appearance of bias towards the prosecution is pervasive. <u>al Nashiri</u> is instructive. For that reason, we've asked that Your Honor dismiss this proceeding.

8 Sir, the last part of the sort of factual part of my 9 argument relates to Your Honor's voir dire. You are based in 10 Parris Island. You indicated you'd only spent about 20 days 11 in Washington since being detailed to this commission. You 12 indicated you don't have a SIPR terminal and you don't have a 13 P to P account. And that you rely on your clerks for access 14 to classified information.

15 The volume of classified information in the pleadings 16 in this record is enormous. I tried to have two case analysts 17 simply count up the pages that an individual would have to 18 review to -- simply in the matter in the record, and it was in 19 the thousands of pages. We -- and that did not include the 20 ex parte contacts between -- that is permitted between Your 21 Honor and the prosecutors pursuant to Rule 505.

So clearly the attorney advisors are playing asignificant role in the classified litigation that is the

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center of this case. And, Your Honor, structurally they must
 since, as Captain Waits testified, he was located in Naples at
 the time; Colonel Rubin was located, I believe, in Georgia at
 the time that he was detailed to this case, and Your Honor is
 located in South Carolina.

6 Mr. Blackwood testified that he did not disclose his 7 job search process to the trial judiciary, but when he finally 8 did disclose it, he wasn't screened off the case. It didn't 9 occur to his supervisor, who we all know, Fred Taylor -- and 10 we all know to be a smart, diligent person -- it didn't occur 11 to him to screen him off this commission. It didn't occur to 12 Your Honor to screen him off this commission. Again, it's not 13 the intention that matters, it is the fact of the conflict. 14 The fact of the conflict requires recusal and dismissal.

Your Honor does not have to find bad faith. Again,
it never -- it might have never dawned on anyone, and it
sounds like it never did, but <u>al Nashiri</u> addresses that point
head on.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Well, and <u>al Nashiri</u> discusses it
and addresses it head on in the context of a military judge.
Now we're imputing <u>al Nashiri's</u> decision to a law clerk, which
my review of the applicable case law and advisory opinions is
far less narrow than that which the <u>Nashiri</u> opinion seemingly

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1 directs. And that is to say although the case law -- the
2 language used is what a judge cannot do, a law clerk cannot
3 do, or vice versa.

But in any event, the law clerks are not bound by the
same -- to the same extent at least, you would agree, to the
appearance issues that a military -- a judge is.

7 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: So, sir, I understand Your Honor's 8 point. However, given the facts elicited on the record in the 9 past few days and the structure of the military commissions, 10 that distinction does not bear out in the context of these 11 commissions, again, because of the fact that a law clerk is 12 assigned, as in this case, to one commission; he invests all 13 of his time in one commission. The judge and the law clerk 14 are not co-located.

Much of the information and pleadings in the case are
not even available apparently to the military judge when Your
Honor is serving, as you must, in your role as a judge with an
active military docket in Parris Island.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Let's -- let's break that down a
little bit because you're -- that is a very broad-brush stroke
to paint the picture of the nature of the litigation thus far
over the course of the last five years.

23

So while it may be true that during the 505 summary

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substitution process Captain Waits, and by way of perhaps
 judicial efficiency, relied upon heavily Mr. Blackwood to
 review a lot of those matters and then himself come to a
 conclusion, the same cannot be said, for instance, for the
 last year.

6 The nature of the litigation and the amount of
7 classified information that has been involved with that
8 litigation has been significantly less, you'd agree?

9 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: I would agree with respect to, yes, 10 the time that Your Honor has been on the bench. But, sir, 11 Mr. Blackwood's testimony again was that his job search 12 process started earlier than that. It started 13 approximately -- approximately six months before Your Honor 14 was even detailed to this commission. And during the pendency 15 of Judge Rubin's tenure as military judge on this case, there 16 was a significant volume of 505 material.

17 It's also -- and, Your Honor, I think it probably
18 makes sense to move to the <u>Liljeberg</u> factors because they are
19 instructive on what the remedy would be in this case. But
20 because, again, of the way that these commissions work, it's
21 not so easy to simply excise the seven or eight months
22 where -- seven, eight, actually nine months with time on the
23 front end before Captain Waits applied for a job and before

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Matthew Blackwood was assigned to this commission and simply
 move forward.

Again, because of the way that the 505 process works,
we rely on determinations made by Your Honor and Your Honor's
predecessor and we build from there in our litigation.

6 So if there is a -- if there is a taint at the core
7 of those 505 substitutions, if there's a taint in the original
8 rulings, then it necessarily affects the rest of the process.

9 But, Your Honor, I would invite the court to walk 10 with me through the Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition 11 Corp. factors in determining -- and this was the case law 12 relied upon in the Nashiri decision, 486 U.S. 847, a Supreme 13 Court case from 1988. These are the factors which should --14 we assert under Nashiri and under the case law applicable to 15 law clerk judicial conflicts that Your Honor should rely on in 16 fashioning appropriate relief.

17 Sir, the first factor is the risk of the injustice to 18 the parties in the particular case. The second factor is the 19 risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other 20 cases. And the third factor is the risk of undermining the 21 public's confidence in the judicial process.

With respect to the first factor, the risk ofinjustice to the parties in the particular case, first let's

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look to the injustice to my client, Nashwan al-Tamir. We
 don't know exactly when the conflict began -- conflict began
 to infect this case. We know that -- we don't know the date.
 We know from Captain Waits' testimony that it was sometime in
 the month or so after my client was arraigned.

6 We also don't know with clear specificity when the
7 second conflict applicable to Mr. Blackwood arose in this
8 case, but based on his testimony, it's on or about winter
9 2018. And that is -- as in January, winter of 2018.

10 Again, we know that Captain Waits applied for an 11 immigration judge a few weeks after detailing and we know that 12 he was under consideration for several years. We know he 13 applied for and accepted a civilian position at DoD while 14 detailed to the case. We also know that Blackwood worked on 15 the case almost from its inception. He testified to the broad 16 nature -- the broad swath of his job responsibilities. And he 17 also testified about being -- his lifelong goal to be a 18 prosecutor.

So clearly the injustice to Mr. al-Tamir of moving forward when both of these individuals worked on the case for -- from inception basically would be significant. And the injustice to the government on the other hand would be -would be not significant. It's noteworthy that their

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1 disclosure was late and incomplete.

We learned only yesterday, only yesterday, after his testimony, that Blackwood applied for a job at the National Security Division. Sir, I didn't have access to the transcripts of Saturday, and it would have been an act of certainly attorney incompetence to not ask, "And did you apply anywhere else in that period of time?"

But I am certain that one of my questions should have
9 elicited the answer, "And I applied for a job at the National
10 Security Division," knowing as an attorney that Mikeal Clayton
11 was -- was an attorney at the National Security Division when
12 this case -- at the genesis of this case.

So I don't -- I don't lay that dilatory disclosure at
the feet of the government because I do believe that Captain
Squires did not know until yesterday, but it is worth taking
into consideration when considering any injustice to the
government.

18 It's also -- it's also worth referring again to the
19 <u>Nashiri</u> decision -- again, this is on page 240 of the
20 opinion -- to the discussion of the powerful task for -- the
21 powerful case for dissolving the current military commissions
22 entirely. In that section, sir, it talks about the huge
23 remedy which the defense requested again. In that case, they

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1 requested the dissolution of the commission system.

But the -- what the panel settled on, which was
restarting the clock from 2015, that was also quite a dramatic
remedy. And that is -- that is very similar to the remedy
that we are asking for here, sir. So this is something surely
that this court has the ability to do.

7 The second factor in the <u>Liljeberg</u> analysis is the
8 risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other
9 cases. As we know from <u>Nashiri</u> -- and again, as we know from
10 page 240 of <u>Nashiri</u> -- this is a systemic problem. Again, we
11 heard it from multiple witnesses. It just never dawned on
12 them.

It isn't how conflicts -- because this isn't how conflicts are dealt with in the military justice system. This again refers us to -- back to that awkward marriage of the military commission system. It may not be how military practice works, but it is how military commissions practice works and should work particularly in light of mandatory authority on the point.

Sir, the final factor in the <u>Liljeberg</u> analysis is
the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the
judicial process. Again, this is where <u>Nashiri</u> comes in.
There is very little mandatory authority in the judicial -- in

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this particular jurisdiction. We are arguing frequently
 before Your Honor as to the applicability of the Constitution.
 We disagree on that point.

The district court -- excuse me, the D.C. Circuit has
ruled conclusively on this point and done so recently. And
for that reason, Your Honor, we are requesting dismissal.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Thank you. I'm going to -please stand by a few moments. I want to break it down a
little bit. I don't want to in my own mind conflate the two
issues between judges and their law clerks.

11 So first I want to high -- ask some questions 12 relative to the basis for disgualification of Captain Waits. 13 A moment ago you highlighted the difference between 14 courts-martial practice and military commissions practice, and 15 apparently, the D.C. Circuit did as well in the Nashiri 16 opinion by seemingly dismissing the case law -- whether or not 17 it was explained to them is another story -- about the nature 18 of military justice practice and CAAF's holdings as what 19 measures were in place that adequately insulates and protects 20 the -- even the appearance of military judges' bias.

But bringing it back to the issues that are presented
before us. If the <u>Nashiri</u> opinion relies in part on a
distinction between military commissions and military justice

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1 practice -- and they cite to Scott, for example, as a case 2 that warranted the conclusion that they came to -- in light of 3 Captain Waits' applications to the Department of the Navy, how 4 should -- why should this commission not rely strictly on 5 military justice practice which seemingly would authorize, if 6 not take issue with, a military judge applying for a position 7 within the Department of the Navy while sitting on the bench 8 and there being no conflict with it?

9 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, again, this is one of the two10 conflicts that Captain Waits was operating under.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Which I'm -- again, I don't want to
conflate the issues. I want to parse them out ----

13 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes.

14 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: ---- so we can address them15 individually.

16 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, our position is the Department of 17 Defense is a party to this action and that if Captain Waits 18 were applying for civilian positions within the Department of 19 Defense, as we know he did at Code 20, that was something 20 which should have been disclosed to the parties and that 21 didn't happen.

And while understanding that military courts may
offer justification or may prevent this, it's -- again, the

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distinction in <u>Nashiri</u> has been highlighted. Again, this not
 a courts -- this is not a court-martial, and so we ask that
 the court rely on the exact same analysis that was relied on
 for reviewing the role of immigration judges and another party
 of the Department of Justice.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: My question is a little bit more
pointed than that, and it's nuanced in that the <u>Nashiri</u>
opinion seems to take the same position that the commissions
is different insofar as the Department of Justice in that case
was held to be a party.

In military practice, the Department of the Navy, at least in the courts-martial that I preside over, is arguably always a party in that they provide prosecutors, defense attorneys, military judges, appellate counsel, court reporters. The entire construct of the military justice system within the Department of the Navy is the Department of the Navy.

So in looking at that -- because you've highlighted
that as a potential conflict of Captain Waits as well. So why
should this commission not apply military justice precedent,
despite of <u>Nashiri</u>, for looking at that narrow issue?
DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, may I confer with my ----

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: You may.

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DDC [MS. HENSLER]: ---- much more informed co-counsel on
 this particular point?

3 [Pause.]

DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, the distinction is that military
courts are housed within Article I of the Constitution.
That's where they find their judicial basis. Whereas the
military commissions; as we know, they fall underneath the
D.C. Circuit, are housed within the Article III part of the
Constitution. That's where they find their genesis. So
that's the distinction.

11 But, sir, if that is a point, I would argue based on 12 the record of this proceeding -- and I understand Your Honor's 13 point and I understand the distinction that Your Honor is 14 making. However, under judicial canons, I would argue that 15 you need not reach that point because the factual record in 16 this case now, given Captain Waits' testimony, is that he 17 applied for a job at the Department of Justice within the 18 first few weeks of being detailed to this commission and was 19 under -- operating under that conflict for the remainder of 20 his time.

So for that reason Your Honor need not reach the
question of whether or not applying for a civilian position at
the Department of the Navy is also a conflict.

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1 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: I understand your argument in that 2 regard, but it was raised, so this commission might feel the 3 need to address it. 4 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, may I be heard just on that 5 point? 6 And I apologize for that. Part of the reason that 7 158 and 160 were separate motions is because of the way that 8 our information about these conflicts was disclosed on a 9 rolling basis. We would have potentially made different 10 decisions about what to raise in motions had we had full 11 information at the time. So ----

12 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Understood. Thank you.

Moving on to the second question. In one of your
filings, either the initial motion or perhaps even the reply,
you talk about the subplots in the <u>Nashiri</u> decision not
driving the conclusion, but rather being talking points of
sorts.

My question is: I'm sure you've heard the term "bad facts" or "incomplete facts make bad law." In the context of comparing the two cases, the <u>Nashiri</u> case and this case, would you agree that the bad facts, for instance -- and I'm going to make a comparison between the two. The D.C. Circuit seemed to highlight and focus in on the conversations that Judge Spath

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was having with counsel at the time where these negotiations
 were ongoing, such that a reasonable inference could be drawn
 that he very well was thinking about the very negotiations
 while he was having these conversations in court, and I think
 that that was pervasive throughout the opinion.

6 Here, the facts are not the same. Here, it appears 7 that the facts are that Captain Waits, among many members of 8 the judiciary, were unaware until April 19th that this -- that 9 the -- number one, the DoJ would be considered a party in the 10 context of these commissions. Two, that even if the DoJ was 11 considered to be a party within the context of these 12 commissions, the immigration courts, a subagency of the DoJ, 13 would not be. And if the judge, Captain Waits, believed that 14 there were to be a conflict, he would have certainly made that 15 known.

Coupled with the fact that as soon as the <u>Nashiri</u> opinion did come out, he, in fact, did make it known, and then this commission, this military judge, took action to ensure that the parties were made aware of Captain Waits'

20 disclosures.

So on one hand, we have the bad facts associated with what appears to be or could arguably be an intentional omission or perhaps hiding of certain facts that were being

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contemplated at the same time he was making decisions in this
 case, decisions which were, on their face, arguably -- went
 against the defense's positions, whereas in this case, you
 have none of those bad facts.

5 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, I disagree with Your Honor's6 characterization of the record as us not having bad facts.

7 We're here today. It's hard to review the record
8 we've all lived through through the lens of the D.C. Circuit.
9 We don't know what they will regard as bad facts.

10 But I think the fact that Mr. Blackwood disclosed the 11 fact that he'd applied for a job in the National Security 12 Division two days after his testimony is a bad fact. I also 13 think that Your Honor's recitation of the facts in the 14 al Nashiri case focus on the second Nashiri factor, which 15 is -- again, the first thing that they looked at was the fact 16 of the application and we have that here in the record. But 17 the bad facts in Nashiri, they revolved mostly around, at 18 least in my understanding of Your Honor's point, that second 19 factor, which is the highlighting of the experience.

We do have the highlighting of the experience also in
the record here. We have that through Mr. Blackwood's
testimony about his -- what he included in his résumés, for
instance. The fact that he -- he applied for affirmatively --

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this isn't a job -- he didn't apply for a job as an
 immigration judge. He applied for a job with -- which -- with
 effectively a member -- a former member of the prosecution.
 That's a bad fact. And he didn't disclose it. That is a bad
 fact.

6 With respect to Captain Waits, it's hard to know at 7 the time because -- at the time what happened. Now we're 8 operating four years later. But certainly at the time, he 9 would have been thinking about having applied for a job with 10 11 separate immigration courts because he bothered to do it. 11 So it's impossible for us to know at the time what sort of 12 record would have been made if prior members of the defense 13 team had known that he was operating under a cloud of conflict 14 at the time.

So -- so, sir, I'd argue that the record is replete with these bad facts. And we have testimony on these points, but we also have documents, even neutral documents like the job description which was provided, which highlights this was a national security and terrorism prosecution job that Mr. Blackwood applied for.

21 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: That brings me to my next question.22 You have not addressed Advisory Opinion No. 81.

23 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Certainly -- and I'm mad at myself

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1 because I meant to bring a copy of that opinion with me to 2 the -- to court today, and I left it back at the Navy Lodge. 3 But certainly that is the legal precedent that we 4 must struggle with the most, as the defense. But, sir, I 5 would argue, one -- number one, unlike Nashiri, it's not 6 mandatory authority that Your Honor can use with which to 7 glean what analysis you should use in approaching this 8 decision of whether or not to dismiss, recuse, or do something 9 else.

10 Second, sir, that ethics opinion, which applies to 11 judicial law clerks in Article III courts, does separate out 12 from its analysis clerks who are -- who have significant 13 contacts with one of the parties and we have those contacts 14 here. And again, we have that from the testimony of 15 Mr. Blackwood. We have that from the voir dire of 16 Captain Waits. And we have that from the affidavit submitted 17 by Colonel Rubin. And, sir, we have that from Your Honor's 18 own voir dire which sets up the structural difficulties 19 presented to a military judge detailed to a case with such a 20 large volume of classified evidence.

So, Your Honor, I would argue that both -- it's not
applicable, but even if it is applicable, that this is the
circumstances highlighted in that opinion where a clerk would

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1 have a duty to disclose.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. I want to circle back
generally on a grander scale now, taking it out of the context
of any one individual, but the idea that <u>Nashiri</u> stands for
what it stands for; that is, this appearance of conflict.

6 Within the context -- and we can take it -- make a 7 comparison to participants of the Article III courts where, 8 for example, the federal public defenders are selected by an 9 own organization funded by the U.S. courts. Here, if I'm not 10 mistaken, Ms. Hensler, you're paid by the Department of the 11 Defense and trickling down to the department of -- or the 12 Defense Services Organization.

So while <u>Nashiri</u> made a point to hold that military
commissions are not simply military courts, it would appear
that you're laboring under a conflict of interest as well.

16 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: I agree, sir. The entire structure of 17 the military commissions still baffles me, having worked in it 18 for 18 months. But again, I would argue that for this 19 particular conflict, that Your Honor need not reach that 20 question of whether or not everyone in this courtroom is 21 operating under a conflict of interest because -- because we 22 have contacts to the Department of Justice and ----

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Do you believe that you are laboring

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1 under a conflict simply because you are being paid by the2 Department of Defense?

3 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No. But particularly since my client 4 is aware of it, and he has -- he has represented to this court 5 that he wanted to appoint me, an employee of the Department of 6 Defense, as his lead counsel. Not a pro bono attorney, who 7 would not be operating under the same conflict, me. So I 8 understand Your Honor's point.

9 Again, the structure of this commission baffles me
10 and the D.C. Circuit even referred to, you know, the troubling
11 status of these commissions within its own sort of
12 jurisprudence. But ----

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: But yet the Supreme Court has held
that military tribunals, courts-martial, that labor presume -seemingly under the same conflicts are constitutionally okay.

16 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, I understand your point, but I 17 would argue that <u>Nashiri</u> is mandatory authority on this point 18 and Your Honor need not reach the question of the DoD contacts 19 now that we know more about the DoJ -- the extensive DoJ 20 contacts and we have mandatory precedent on that from the 21 D.C. Circuit.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: My final question, I believe -- I
might have one more -- is unlike the <u>Nashiri</u> case where the

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1 record was built after the fact without the opportunity to 2 question the participants that might have been laboring under 3 a conflict here, the parties have been given the opportunity 4 to develop the record. The commission has ensured that the 5 record has been developed such that we are not trying to build 6 facts after the fact to rely upon them to come to a 7 conclusion.

B Do you think that some of the conclusions and
9 language contained within the <u>Nashiri</u> opinion was based on
10 unknown facts, looking back at action that hindsight could
11 have been addressed more appropriately and in this case are
12 being addressed more appropriately?

DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No, sir, because the facts -- the true
scope of the facts that would have been knowable in <u>Nashiri</u>
aren't knowable because the government didn't disclose.

And I would, again, point to the language ---MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The government didn't disclose ---DDC [MS. HENSLER]: The government, even when questioned
specifically on whether or not Judge Spath had applied for one
of these positions, did not disclose.

But, sir, I'd like to point to I'm sure the language
Your Honor is aware of. The court's indulgence.

23 [Pause.]

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2 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes. Again, this is page 239 to 3 page 240. "All elements of the military commission system, 4 from the prosecution team to the Justice Department to the 5 CMCR to the judge himself, failed to live up to that 6 responsibility. And we cannot dismiss Judge Spath's lapse as 7 a one-time aberration, as al-Nashiri's is not the first 8 meritorious request for recusal that our court has considered 9 with respect to the military commissions proceedings."

Your Honor, we cannot ignore the existence -- the
fact of the issuance of this <u>Nashiri</u> ruling is essentially a
fact witness in this case. It was the issuance of this ruling
that led to the disclosure.

14 And we are in a period now where military 15 commissions, military judges in the same role as Your Honor 16 are going to have to interpret this decision and decide what 17 relief is appropriate given what we now know. It's -- again, 18 as I said, it's clear from the witnesses as it was -- as the 19 court addressed in the Nashiri decision, it didn't dawn on 20 them, but that -- but what does that mean to my client? Ιt 21 doesn't fix four years of proceedings which were tainted by a 22 conflict of interest, and that's why we've requested 23 dismissal.

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1 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. One more question. My last2 one.

3 Even assuming Mr. Blackwood was laboring under a 4 conflict that should have been disclosed and that should have 5 caused his recusal from participation in this commission, in 6 light of the nature of the issues that have been addressed or 7 were addressed between the time that I took the bench and the 8 time that Mr. Blackwood stopped working on this case 9 altogether, why is this military judge's recusal necessary and 10 appropriate, keeping in mind it has been almost nine months 11 now since Mr. Blackwood has had any participation -- or 12 actually over nine months.

DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, there are two things I'd like to say in response to this. One is, first, Your Honor's question reminded me of another point I wanted to make in response to Your Honor's former question about the <u>Nashiri</u> decision and disclosure and the factual record.

18 There's one other fact I'd like to highlight and that 19 is that Mr. Blackwood testified for this court that he'd done 20 work on the Nashiri commission, and that -- as he'd 21 highlighted in his first résumé. And that he was aware that 22 that issue, that litigation, was percolating. He was aware of 33 it and he didn't disclose. So I would ask that the court take

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1 that under consideration.

With respect to Your Honor's question about the
relief that my client is entitled to, as I stated before,
we've requested dismissal given the way that military
commissions work. They build upon -- rulings build upon
rulings build upon substitutions build upon rulings.

7 If Your Honor is willing to reset the clock to the
8 very beginning without recusing, then I understand that that
9 may be an appropriate form of relief. We've requested
10 dismissal, but I understand -- I understand Your Honor's
11 position, certainly.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Well, standing alone, AE 160
requests the military judge recuse himself based on
Mr. Blackwood's -- so putting aside Captain Waits' and what
relief may be warranted in that circumstance, AE 160, you've
requested the military judge recuse himself.

And by way of one of the comments made earlier on this week in the session, it did appear at least -- and I'm happy that you did -- you went back to review what substantive motions were actually resolved by me as the military judge between the time of June and November to December time frame. And I would submit to you I think there was one substantive ruling of any -- well, and that arguably wasn't even

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1 substantive.

So based on the status of the case at that time where we were waiting and waiting to proceed with very little activity, why would -- are you suggesting now that your position has changed and recusal would not necessarily be warranted based on that potential conflict with Mr. Blackwood?

7 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, it's difficult for me to answer 8 that question because it's almost as if the military judge 9 finds -- you, yourself, find your -- yourself in the same 10 position that I have found myself in, which is that I -- I'm 11 late to the game. And the prosecutors over and over and over 12 and over again have said to Your Honor we missed deadlines. 13 We missed deadlines. We have failed to take advantage of the 14 time afforded to this defense team. Tough luck for us that I 15 wasn't here at the time or any of my co-counsel.

16 It is -- the detriment should inure -- excuse me.
17 The penalty should be on my client. And I understand that -18 that that seems unfair, and that is why we have asked Your
19 Honor to effectively restart the clock.

In some instances, Your Honor has -- on our
1 litigation deadlines. In some instances, Your Honor has said
yes. In some, you've said no. But it would seem even Your
Honor agrees that -- strike that.

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| 1 | It's difficult without starting over. I'll say that, |
|----|--|
| 2 | sir. If Your Honor would restart the clock, start from the |
| 3 | very beginning, the first three weeks of this case and not |
| 4 | recuse, that would potentially be a remedy which would fall |
| 5 | within the scope of <u>Nashiri</u> . |
| 6 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Hensler. |
| 7 | We're going to take a ten-minute recess, and then I will hear |
| 8 | argument from the government. |
| 9 | [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 1045, 27 August 2019.] |
| 10 | [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 1058, |
| 11 | 27 August 2019.] |
| 12 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The commission will come back to |
| 13 | order. All parties present when the commission last recessed |
| 14 | are again present. |
| 15 | Trial Counsel? |
| 16 | ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Captain Squires for the government. |
| 17 | If the commission would permit, I would like to take up the |
| 18 | two motions separately, to the extent that I can, AE 160 first |
| 19 | just so that I can try to stay organized. |
| 20 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Go ahead. |
| 21 | ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: The defense has walked back their |
| 22 | argument significantly from money matters and allegations of |

 ${\bf 23}$ personal financial interests to now an accusation of a

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1 conflict of interest. But the defense has never been able to2 state articulately what that conflict actually is.

3

B MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: We're talking 160 now?

4 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Yes, sir.

Mr. Blackwood, during his time as a law clerk on this 5 6 commission, did not labor under any identifiable or 7 discernable conflict of interest. The defense's accusation 8 appearances is a prophylactic rule meant to inspire the 9 public's confidence in the judiciary. There has been by his 10 way of participation on this case virtually no injustice 11 whatsoever to the accused. All that is present here is a 12 legal question and, in fact, a legal fiction of an accusation 13 that an average citizen would doubt the partiality of the 14 presiding military judge because a former law clerk, who is 15 now no longer on the case, began looking for post-clerk 16 employment.

A couple of the specific questions and accusations that the defense has raised here bear mention. The first is the late disclosure by Mr. Blackwood and I guess by proxy the prosecution as to his application for the National Security Division. The defense is correct that it was brought to my attention for the first time yesterday afternoon. It was disclosed within two hours. You know, my apologies for the

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1 delay -- I do have to eat lunch -- but I turned it over as
2 soon as I knew it.

It would have been preferable for the government if Mr. Blackwood had stated that -- you know, when he was being sexamined by Ms. Hensler -- I don't recall the exact question, but my recollection of the record -- and the transcript will repeak for itself -- was that he stated I applied to -- all over the place, or words to that effect, and then Ms. Hensler moved on.

In any event, it is an extremely rare witness who will purposely withhold information on examination and then call a federal prosecutor and ask him to make sure that the record is clear. It's my, you know, belief and I think the reasonable person viewing his testimony would see that as either an oversight or an inartful answer to an inartfully worded question.

In any event, care, diligence, and transparency has been the mantra of the government since we learned of these issues. And I read once -- I'm not sure what case or what wise jurist wrote these words -- that sunlight is the best disinfectant. And if there ever was a cloud or a taint or an infection as the defense claims, I do not think any reasonable person viewing these proceedings now would believe that Your

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1 Honor is disqualified or ever was anything less -- or issued a
2 ruling or order that was anything less than fair, neutral,
3 impartial.

The defense highlights two bad facts in their attempt
to bring Major Blackwood -- and we'll discuss this later -but also Captain Waits -- within the universe of facts as
found by the court of appeals in <u>al-Nashiri</u>. The first is the
alleged late disclosure.

9 I don't think, looking back, that there ever was any
10 obligation for Mr. Blackwood to disclose. In fact, the
11 government's, you know, disclosure of this to the defense,
12 which we learned from at some point a member of the trial
13 judiciary staff, may have been unnecessary and dragged
14 Mr. Blackwood through a lot of unnecessary publicity for what
15 are his private affairs.

16 He, as a judicial employee, is -- if not entitled, he 17 is certainly reasonable in his reliance on what are the 18 published ethical advisory opinions on uscourts.gov. I don't 19 know what else is expected of a law clerk other than when he 20 considers searching for other employment to search for the 21 Judicial Conference Committee's Code of Conduct and read the 22 ethical advisory opinions and then strictly abide by them. So 23 there has never been a late disclosure unless there was some

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1 impropriety to disclose.

Second, the government disclosed everything it knew
when it knew it. If I could -- I would think by this point
every time the defense gets an e-mail from me, they have to
get a little bit excited because it's some new fact for them
to use in these pleadings. But there's no information that it
has been withheld ----

8 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Dispense with the commentary on what
9 the defense may or may not do when they get an e-mail from you
10 and focus on the facts and law that are applicable to the
11 issues before us.

12 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Aye-aye, sir. The fact, if -- stated13 in a better way is absolute transparency.

14 Mr. Blackwood in his résumés did highlight his 15 experience with these commissions and his experience in 16 military law in general. Frankly, I think a reasonable person 17 reading those résumés, in light of the amount of time he spent 18 practicing in national security law, the education he's 19 obtained, would find his résumés not to be boastful, but 20 somewhat reserved and humble to an extent. So there is no --21 at least in my read of these documents any inference that he 22 was trying to leverage his ability to influence the 23 commission, to the extent that he ever had it, as a way to

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1 obtain employment elsewhere.

2 The defense is now requesting or bartering with the 3 commission that if the military judge will reset everything 4 and vacate all prior orders, that recusal would be 5 unnecessary. That's not the process. If the military judge's 6 neutrality is in question, he shall recuse himself unless the 7 defense waives such recusal. They cannot, you know, trade a 8 remedy that they deem preferable to having this military judge 9 preside.

10 And the government has no interest in any particular 11 jurist presiding over these proceedings. We simply ask that 12 the rules be enforced as written. Appearance is a shared 13 interest. It's shared by the government and the commission. 14 And if the military judge's impartiality is found to 15 reasonably be in question, Your Honor, respectfully, you 16 should recuse yourself and you should also broadly construe 17 grounds for challenge, but you should not step down 18 unnecessarily.

We continue to defer to the military judge on the military judge's fitness to serve. We just ask that the law be applied correctly and the statements of law not be parsed simply to the favorable -- the parts the defense deems favorable.

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The defense has repeatedly used words like "taints"
 and "clouds of impartiality," which while rhetorically nice
 don't clarify why Mr. Blackwood's employment process places
 the presiding judge's impartiality in question. They've never
 alleged actual bias either by this court or Mr. Blackwood.
 Mr. Blackwood has left the case. So if there ever was taint,
 the taint has been removed.

8 Regarding the application to National Security 9 Division which, as the defense pointed out, is probably the 10 closest he came to the prosecution, Ethical Advisory Opinion 11 No. 74 would guide that. Even if he had been applying to the 12 Office of the Chief Prosecutor directly, he would -- the mere 13 application alone would not be disqualifying. He would have 14 at least required, in order for there to be a conflict, an 15 offer of employment that may be accepted. He was -- he was 16 clear in his e-mail that's attached to the record that he 17 never received any such offer or any word back.

He did send out his résumé to a number of different
agencies and organizations. There's no evidence whatsoever
that he was attempting to use his current position to gain
that employment.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Captain Squires, just briefly so the
record can be clear, what e-mail are you referring to?

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ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: So I believe 160I is the defense's
 most recent notice. And we agree with the facts as stated in
 there, that yesterday at 3 -- I'm sorry, at 1501, we produced
 additional discovery to the defense, which was an e-mail from
 Mr. Blackwood to me that he sent or was time stamped 1301
 yesterday, August 26th.

7 If the commission has not had the opportunity to 8 review that, Mr. Blackwood's e-mail states, "Captain Squires, 9 when Ms. Hensler was listing off places I had applied, she did 10 not mention NSD. Just wanted to make clear that I did apply 11 to the National Security Division at some point in 2018. I 12 never heard back from anyone. Let me know if you have any 13 other questions. VR," for very respectfully, "Matt 14 Blackwood."

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Thank you. Stand by a moment.
[The military judge conferred with courtroom personnel.]
MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. You may continue.
ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: The defense argues that
Mr. Blackwood's interests in national security law creates
four years of taint. I don't think that's a fair
characterization.

He did not submit any applications until 2018. Thefact that a Marine judge advocate has an interest in a

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particular area of law is not sufficient for a reasonable
 person to believe that that individual is anything less than
 neutral or, even worse, would attempt to influence the rulings
 of the commission.

5 A reasonable person also would not doubt the 6 partiality of a law clerk who applied for and completed an 7 educational program such as the George Washington University's 8 LLM program in national security law. First, I believe I 9 heard the defense correctly saying that one of the 10 defense's -- defense counsel in the case went through the same 11 If that were true, that defense counsel would also program. 12 have a -- the same conflict of interest that Mr. Blackwood is 13 alleged to have in this case.

Simply put, a judge advocate or civilian attorney who
desires to further his education is not in any way indicative
of impartiality.

As the commission previously pointed out at the time that Mr. Blackwood was searching for other employment and ultimately left the case, there was very little substantive litigation going on for him to influence. We were disputing over docketing continuances, and I believe Ms. Hensler's security clearance, all of which has since been resolved.

23

So if there was error, the appropriate remedy would

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be the military judge, who is not alleged to have actual bias,
 to simply take a fresh look at whatever rulings were issued
 and determine whether a different relief or reconsideration is
 warranted. But as I stated, we do defer to the commission.

5 And unless the military judge has further questions6 on AE 160, I'd like to proceed to 158.

7 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Not on 160. Thank you.

8 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: The court of appeals in In re al 9 Nashiri held that under the totality of the circumstances in 10 that case, the military judge's impartiality could reasonably 11 be in question. It did not alter the objective test that is 12 to be applied, and it did not create a sixth enumerated bright 13 line circumstance that would disqualify a military judge in 14 every case. The objective test is still the objective test 15 and the law remains the law.

Now, the defense would have the commission hold or believe that whenever a commissions judge applies to DoJ, the remaining circumstances of the case become irrelevant. The totality of the circumstances are replaced by the presence of one. In short, they ask the commission to ignore the forest and obsess over a tree.

22 Perhaps ----

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Didn't the -- Captain Squires,

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1 didn't Nashiri focus on the tree and say this application to 2 the immigration -- to be an immigration law judge is a 3 conflict of interest or the apparent conflict of interest? 4 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Yes, sir, it did. And ----MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: So how do -- how does this 5 6 commission get around that starting point? 7 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Because there will be cases, unless a 8 new rule is created, in which that circumstance is present, 9 but the totality of the circumstances do not require 10 disgualification. In short, you cannot read the outcome of 11 the totality of the circumstances test to eliminate the test 12 itself. 13 There are cases -- I believe this is one of them --

14 that if a reasonable person were only to know that one fact, 15 they would doubt the partiality of the military judge. But if 16 the reasonable person were fully informed of all the facts, as 17 these proceedings have shed a lot of sunlight on, they would 18 not doubt partiality of the court.

19 It is the totality of the circumstances that matter.
20 And that is a unique individualized test to every case. I
21 struggle to believe that a fully-informed citizen, viewing the
22 totality of the circumstances in which a Navy officer with
23 nearly 30 years of honorable service, had been a federal judge

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since 2006, facing statutory retirement, began looking for
 other judicial positions in the federal government. He was
 moving or attempting to move from one bench to another.

4 During that process, he never so much as spoke to 5 anyone in the Department of Justice. He never received an 6 offer of employment. He never interviewed. He never 7 negotiated for a salary. His résumé, again, giving his 8 qualifications, was fairly reserved. While on the case, he 9 permitted extensive voir dire. As soon as the opinion was 10 released -- which he describes as monumental -- he 11 self-disclosed. Again, he answered extensive questions from 12 the defense here.

13

There is no ----

14 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: But does -- is it the government's 15 position -- just so I'm clear where your argument is going. 16 Is it the government's position that the Nashiri opinion 17 allows room to determine whether or not there was a conflict 18 on its face despite Captain Waits having applied for the 19 immigration law position? Or is it just a matter of what 20 remedy is appropriate in light of the distinctions between 21 perhaps Nashiri and this case?

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: It's -- it's the former, sir.
 The <u>Nashiri</u> opinion did not change the totality of

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the circumstances test. And if this case, under the totality
 of the circumstances, would not raise any doubts of the
 neutrality of the military judge, then the <u>Nashiri</u> outcome is
 not warranted.

Now, certainly the fact of application is a
significant factor for the commission to consider, but there
are other factors that must be considered. And if this
commission in its discretion finds that Judge Waits'
neutrality would not be questioned by the fully informed
citizen, then Nashiri is distinguishable.

11 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Stand by just a moment.

12 [The military judge conferred with courtroom personnel.]
13 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Go ahead.

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: This may speak more to remedy, but the defense has not pointed to a single sentence of a ruling that indicates any actual impropriety. A review of the record reveals that Captain Waits called this case right down the middle, and that ultimately his application to the Department of Justice was of no moment. He took a position with his existing employer in a neutral policy office.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: How does that matter in light of
 <u>Nashiri</u>? Because, I mean, they made a point to say we don't
 doubt his impartiality, but the appearance issue is what we

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1 based our decision on.

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Yes, sir. Well, it bears -- that may bear more on the question of remedy. But if the defense could point to actual issues in the case coupled with the other factors, that fits within the totality of the circumstances.

6 The absence of any accusations of actual impropriety 7 when considered with all of the -- I guess if we're calling 8 them bad facts versus good facts -- when considered with all 9 of the good facts would not be considered by a reasonable 10 person to have any question of a lack of neutrality.

I think, speaking to remedy, the requested remedy dismissal is wholly inappropriate, and it would, in fact, undermine a rule which is designed to instill confidence in the judiciary. If a reasonable person would have doubts about Judge Waits' conduct, they would not expect the entire proceedings to merely be dumped. They would expect the commission to correct it.

An extreme remedy would do nothing to restore confidence in the citizens -- citizenry of this country, who expect not just neutrality within their courts, but a functional system that is able to identify and correct error where it occurs. The confidence in these proceedings is not increased or protected whatsoever by any rash extremes or

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1 unnecessary windfalls for the parties. In fact, I think many 2 people would be outraged for any criminal case to be dismissed 3 based on a legal fiction like this, where there is no actual 4 bias, conflict, misconduct, whatever you call it, where no 5 ruling was issued in error, where no finding of fact is 6 unsupported, and where three years have passed since the 7 offending judge left the case.

8 If there is error, the commission should/must correct 9 it and proceed on. By our count, there are only four 505 10 motions that were ruled on by Judge Waits. Those are 11 Appellate Exhibits 023E, 023J, 023R, and Appellate Exhibit 12 044. We concede that if the military commission does find 13 Captain Waits to be disqualified, that he certainly may 14 reconsider. And indeed the government, if there is error in 15 this, requests that it be scrubbed from the record as 16 necessary, and we will join any motion by the defense to 17 reconsider those four rulings.

Additionally, if the military judge finds
Captain Waits to be disqualified, he can set aside those
rulings, and the defense can move to compel the underlying
discovery and we will go through the 505 process as it need be
at the time.

23

The defense cited the <u>Liljeberg</u> case, which stated

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1 clearly that a Draconian remedy is not required in every case 2 and I'd like to point the commission's attention to a second 3 case that was in our brief, and that's United States v. 4 Microsoft, particularly at page 116. Congress delegated to 5 the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that will 6 best serve the purpose of the disqualification statute. The 7 purpose is to instill confidence in the justice system and in 8 the judiciary.

9 At a minimum, Subsection 455(a), which is the
10 equivalent to R.M.C. 902(a), requires prospective
11 disqualification of the offending judge. That is
12 disqualification from the judge hearing any further
13 proceedings in the case.

By virtue of the timing that this was raised and
discovered, that has already happened. Both Captain Waits and
Mr. Blackwood are prospectively disqualified. They are no
longer on the bench or in chambers.

So the question then is, is there any need for
retroactive disqualification and in <u>United States v. Microsoft</u>
the district -- the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that, "Most important, full
retroactive disqualification is unnecessary to protect
Microsoft's right to an impartial adjudication. The district

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judge's conduct destroyed the appearance of impartiality.
 Microsoft never alleged nor demonstrated that it rose to the
 level of actual bias or prejudice. There is no reason to
 presume that everything the district judge did is suspect."

Now, the -- the judge in that case had made comments
to the press regarding a party to the litigation, so the
purpose of disqualification was somewhat different.

8 But if we go through that analysis, the prospective 9 disgualification has already occurred. If there was error, it 10 is no longer present in the case. So the defense would have 11 retroactive disqualification of everything, but they can't 12 explain why. They speak simply in terms of taint and clouds 13 and infections, but they can't point to one error, to one 14 example of actual injustice to the accused, to one ruling, 15 order, sentence, word, to a moment during these proceedings in 16 which anything unfair actually happened.

17 It is a legal fiction designed to instill confidence
18 in the judiciary that the jurists in question are
19 disqualified. There has been no injustice. There has been no
20 prejudice. Indeed, the remedy they request would cause
21 significant injustice to the government, who had no ability
22 whatsoever to prevent this from happening, who were not
23 contributing factors in it. We learned about this well after

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1 the fact, years after it happened.

Every party, from this court to the prior judges to
the government, have carefully, diligently, and transparently
approached this issue. And if there was error, it was
innocent and harmless error.

6 And if -- if I may be just permitted one more 7 statement, it's that Judge Waits did nothing unethical. He 8 presided honorably over this commission and throughout his 9 service both as a military judge and as a judge advocate in 10 the United States Navy. It's deeply unfortunate that at the 11 end of the career this happened and he's -- his judicial 12 behavior is called into question.

But absent any showing that he did anything wrong during these proceedings other than seek post-employment -post-retirement employment, there is no reason to grant the remedy requested by the defense. It would be in every sense of the word unjust.

18 Barring any further questions of the commission, that19 is all I have.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: I just want to go back specifically
to the issue that I asked initially some questions of you
about.

And that is the idea that the totality of the

23

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circumstances apply, suggesting that sort of the bad facts
 that were alluded to earlier in the <u>Nashiri</u> opinion can still
 open the door to this commission finding that Captain Waits'
 application to become an immigration law judge does not
 necessarily require disqualification.

6 How does that square with the language contained 7 within the Nashiri opinion, quote, the fact of Spath's 8 employment application alone would be enough to require 9 disqualification. So while understandably the test may not 10 have changed in the general context of disqualification, it 11 appears that the D.C. Circuit may have just created a new 12 per se disqualification in the context of military judges 13 applying to become an immigration law judge.

14 Is this not a per se rule by virtue of the language15 that the D.C. Circuit used?

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: I would point the commission to the
Supreme Court case of <u>Liteky v. United States</u> for that
analysis, specifically footnote 2. There are a list of
enumerated rules within -- whether you're looking at
subsection 455(b) of the United States Code or R.M.C. 902(b)
that enumerates per se bright lines in which the presence of
any of those factors are disqualifying.

23

The applicable one raised by the defense in this case

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1 would be Rule 902(b)(5)(B) and the claim that the military
2 judge has an interest in the outcome of the proceedings. The
3 specific rule states that the military judge must recuse if
4 it's known to have an interest, financial or otherwise, that
5 could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
6 proceeding.

7

In <u>Liteky</u> ----

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Isn't (a) just as applicable to the
D.C. Circuit's resolution of the issue as -- as the enumerated
grounds are? That is to say, the military judge is
disqualified in any proceeding in which that military judge's
impartiality might be reasonably questioned?

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Yes, sir. And the D.C. Court was
not -- did not actually look at any of the enumerated grounds
whatsoever.

16 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Right.

17 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: The analysis was specifically under18 the appearance.

19 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: So why are we going under the20 specific grounds?

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: If there is a new enumerated ground,
 then the language of <u>Liteky</u> would apply. So <u>Liteky</u> said
 subsection (a) goes beyond (b) in another important respect.

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It covers all aspects of partiality and not merely those
 specifically addressed in subsection (b). However, when one
 of those aspects addressed in (b) is at issue, it is poor
 statutory construction to interpret (a) as nullifying the
 limitations (b) provides except to the extent the text
 requires.

7 The text of the rule requires that any interest in
8 the outcome of the proceedings be one that could be
9 substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. So
10 unless the D.C. court was creating an entirely new rule at
11 which -- it would not apply retroactively, you cannot read
12 that opinion to replace the totality of the circumstances with
13 something new.

So if -- if, as the defense claims, there was an interest in the outcome of the proceedings and it was a financial interest or otherwise and they said that a dozen times in their brief, I think they've walked that back. It is only disqualifying if it could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.

If it cannot be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding and there's no evidence that Judge Waits' employment, prospective employment or otherwise, could be substantially affected, then you don't simply fall back on (a)

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1 as a catch-all. It would be very poor statutory construction
2 to enumerate a list of specific rules and then put a -- a more
3 strict rule above that.

And that's what the court in <u>Liteky</u> was saying. You
don't go through the analysis of (b) and then say, "Oh, we've
passed that test. But we go to the other test."

7 An example would be where the judge has a familial
8 relationship with one of the parties and that -- that's the
9 example they use in the case.

10 So it requires a third-degree familial relationship. 11 And I'm going to confess, I don't know what a third-degree 12 familial relationship would be. I think it would be like a 13 second cousin or a first cousin. But if no person that is a 14 party to the case is within the third degree of the 15 relationship, you cannot then go back to subsection (a) and 16 say, well, the reasonable person would find that a person 17 within the fourth degree of familial relationship would be 18 disqualifying.

So in short, the -- the defense is saying that <u>In re</u>
Nashiri created a rule that where it is known by the military
judge to have an interest, it's disqualified, eliminating the
congressionally -- or in this case, the SECNAV instructed
language that it requires that it be substantially affected by

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1 the outcome of the proceeding. And I'm not entirely sure if I 2 made that clear.

3 Does the commission have any further questions on 4 that argument?

5 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Only to the extent it might be 6 unclear in my mind as to where you're going.

7 Are you saying, then, the D.C. Circuit 8 inappropriately did not look to Liteky in conducting its 9 analysis?

10 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Well, so the -- one of the 11 significant differences between this case and the D.C. Circuit 12 case in In re al Nashiri is the -- procedurally the way it 13 happened. There was no trial court rulings or facts for an 14 abuse of discretion.

15 The D.C. Circuit was reconstructing the timeline of 16 events based on a FOIA request. And they were very clear that 17 they intended the whole thing to send a message. And so they 18 used language that was very strongly worded and does say the 19 fact of application alone is disqualifying, but they did not 20 expressly overrule the totality of the circumstances test. 21 They did not say that the commission does anything else other 22 than go through the objective test of the reasonable person. 23

So there are circumstances where -- and we completely

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agree that it is a significant factor and it may be the
 dispositive factor. But unless the D.C. Court stated that the
 totality of the circumstances become irrelevant whenever this
 one factor is present, that recusal is required, then you
 can't read that opinion the way the defense has it.

6 And just to reiterate the point, while I want the 7 D.C. Court of Appeals rule -- ruling to be applied correctly, 8 if there is in this commission's mind an appearance or a 9 reasonable question as to Judge Waits' impartiality, we 10 believe that remedy is appropriate and necessary. We do not 11 believe, under any set of facts as pled and supported by the 12 facts of this case, that dismissal or total vacatur or any of 13 these remedies are appropriate or warranted.

14 The remedy is within the court's discretion to impose 15 and it should be one that instills and reinforces public 16 confidence in these proceedings. And I think what any 17 reasonable citizen would expect is a careful, diligent, and 18 efficient, functional court. And the best way to do that 19 would be to reconsider the 505 determinations of 20 Captain Waits. The defense can move for reconsideration of 21 any adverse rulings that they feel were affected by this 22 They can keep any favorable rulings that were issued process. 23 That puts them in a much better place than simply to them.

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1 restarting these proceedings anew.

2 The amount of time that that would unnecessarily 3 waste is -- is extraordinary and unnecessary. 4 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Two questions along those lines. 5 What is your position -- what is your response to the 6 defense's argument that everything that they've done, whether 7 filed or not filed, has been driven by the 505 process? 8 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: It's a conclusion without a premise. 9 They can say that, but they can't tell the commission why. Ιn 10 every court, rulings build upon each other. If one ruling 11 that followed another was so connected to it that they can't 12 be divorced or that the outcome would change if the first was 13 affected, the commission can fix that too. 14 But there's -- there's no plausible connection 15 between most of Judge Waits' rulings, which a tremendous 16 amount were purely administrative at that stage of the 17 proceedings, and the motions that they have filed in the past 18 several years. I would -- I'm not going to hazard a guess the 19 amount, but a number of the issues that they complain about 20 that are tainted here have been moot for years.

We are still in the pretrial phase of this case.
They don't explain in any way how the merits of the case and
the determination of guilt or innocence of the accused can be

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1 affected by the -- by the supposed taint.

And there is a presumption of impartiality; there is
not a presumption or inference of all pervasive infection of
the proceedings. I -- tangles can be untangled by combing
through the record.

6 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: And isn't that -- but isn't that 7 analysis and that question, whether or not there's actual 8 impartiality, a nonfactor when we're looking at it through the 9 lens of a reasonable person, understanding all the -- all the 10 circumstances would question the -- again, it's that fiction 11 that you might -- that you referred to earlier, but when we're 12 looking at fiction, we're not looking at actual impartiality. 13 You'd agree?

14 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Yes, sir.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: So how does that -- how does that argument, how does that analysis support the position when viewed through the lens of <u>Nashiri</u> when we are under the 902(a) as opposed to 902(b) where there's an actual conflict of interest insofar as a personal or a financial interest at stake?

ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: So <u>Nashiri</u> was -- was written and
intended to send a message and I think it's clear that it did.
So the remedy imposed was somewhat on the extreme side.

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Functionally what is going to happen in that case is
 those motions are going to be refiled and decided by a new and
 impartial judge. There's not a lot of difference in that and
 the presiding judge in this case simply taking a fresh look at
 the motion.

6 I don't think a reasonable person in light of the 7 accusation against Judge Waits would see, okay, the -- let's 8 use AE 044 as an example. Judge Waits issued Appellate 9 Exhibit 044. If a second judge, with no accusation of bias, 10 no appearance of bias, reads the pleadings, reconsiders it and 11 reaches the exact same conclusion, there is no basis to 12 believe that there is any lack of impartiality existing in the 13 commission.

The defense is on virtually the same footing as they would be if it was vacated, set aside, repled, reargued, and ruled upon. The -- the significant difference is it would -and probably the reason that it's the preferred remedy is one would take much longer and be much more disruptive to the forward progress of justice.

20 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Thank you.

21 ATC [Capt SQUIRES]: Thank you, sir.

22 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Ms. Hensler?

23 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, I only have a few points.

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| 1 | First is we've not withdrawn our argument that the |
|---|---|
| 2 | that looking for and applying for a job creates a financial |
| 3 | interest in when the employer prospective employer is a |
| 4 | party. That is the crux of the conflict of interest. |

Second, to embrace the language that Captain Squires
used, <u>Nashiri</u> did intend to send a message to us, to this
court. And Your Honor seems to understand quite well that it
would take a lot of parsing to find that <u>Nashiri</u> does not
apply to the circumstances that Your Honor has taken testimony
on over the past few days.

11 Sir, I believe Captain Squires started with the quote 12 that sunlight is the best disinfectant. And when he talked 13 about that, he was talking about not the first conflict in 14 this case -- and that's the one involving Captain Waits in a 15 very similar position to Judge Spath -- but to the second 16 conflict, which relates to Mr. Blackwood.

He said Mr. Blackwood did everything he should have
done. He disclosed. And it would be unusual if one weren't
in a posture of full and honest disclosure to reach out to a
federal prosecutor and leave a voicemail and send an e-mail.
But that's not exactly what happened here.

22 Mr. Blackwood, we were informed, was working as an
23 AUSA, and on a rolling basis we started receiving these

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disclosures. Even disclosures from the government about a
 month ago did not include all of the -- all of the prospective
 employers that Mr. Blackwood testified about on Saturday.

A reasonable person looking at what happened would say we started with a disclosure of an application at a -- for a job in a U.S. -- United States attorney's office. Then we moved on to an application at NCIS. Then we moved on to a late disclosure of an application to NSD, which was, again, the precise party to this proceeding. A reasonable person would say, "What else is there?"

And that's why this particular conflict is soproblematic.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The issues that you're pointing to in terms of the continuous and trickling nature of the disclosures, in order for that to actually matter, would you agree that an actual conflict must have existed? Or do you believe that the nature of the trickling disclosures is in itself a conflict of some sort?

19 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: The -- I think your -- the former,20 sir.

21 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay.

22 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: And finally, sir, you asked both me
23 questions and Captain Squires questions about what remedy Your

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1 Honor should fashion.

2 Given Your Honor's findings on these particular 3 conflicts, I would ask that if Your Honor were to find that 4 Captain Waits alone is -- was operating under a conflict of 5 interest, that -- and seeks to fashion a remedy from there to 6 somehow preserve some of the rulings and 505 disclosures in 7 this case, Your Honor, I would ask that we be permitted time 8 to brief that issue. Because as I have mentioned, in this 9 case because of its -- the central importance of classified 10 evidence, the discovery and rulings and litigation is driven 11 by determinations made very early on, and it would require a 12 lot of parsing for the court to make an -- an informed 13 decision about what to keep and what to throw out.

And, sir, even then, I think it would be very difficult to do that and time consuming. It makes more sense if Your Honor is not inclined to dismiss, to simply start over as Your Honor effectively -- and did as Your Honor did when you first were detailed to this case, issue a litigation schedule and let's go.

20 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Do you have any additional
21 argument? I've got two follow-up questions for you.

22 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No, sir, I don't.

23 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The first -- and it sort of goes

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back to the argument of the government counsel that <u>Nashiri</u>
 was -- intended to send a message, which they explicitly state
 it was, and what can be gleaned from that intention for future
 cases -- for the application of it to future cases.

5 Clearly, the D.C. Circuit took issue with two cases 6 that came to it in close proximity to one another, one with 7 the CMCR and now one at the trial level. And they sent a 8 message. My question, perhaps more academic than instructive, 9 but it could be so I'm going to ask it, the -- what judge --10 if the commission is to take at face value what Nashiri's 11 opinion stands for or apparently stands for at face value and 12 apply it across the board to any case, sort of the bright line 13 per se rule that it purportedly establishes, where does 14 that -- where does that end? Where does the application end?

15 And to use an example from -- perhaps tie it to the 16 D.C. District Court. If a D.C. district court has aspirations 17 to be promoted, if you will, for lack of a better term, to the 18 D.C. Circuit Court -- and we all know who appoints 19 D.C. Circuit Court judges. Isn't there inevitably in any 20 participant in the military justice or criminal justice 21 process -- isn't career aspirations, which would -- is -- what 22 appears to be the case here, where you've got a retiring 23 military judge, aspiring to continue his career as a judge, no

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1 less -- aren't there always those conflicts that but for the 2 unique circumstances of being presented two cases that they 3 took issue with close -- in close proximity to one another and 4 then the arguably aggravating facts associated with the 5 Nashiri opinion -- can't this commission take those matters 6 and fact considerations into account when determining to what 7 extent it ought to apply and sort of take for what it's worth, 8 if you will, the -- the statement in Nashiri that says one 9 equals the other? Application equals disqualification.

10 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Respectfully, no, sir, as the decision 11 says what it says. And at this point, the question is what is 12 the remedy? And that is where the deliberation -- the 13 difficult deliberation is really -- centers in this case, sir.

14 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: My second question goes to that 15 point, and that is this: The Circuit -- D.C. Circuit took 16 issue with what appeared to them, I believe, by my read of the 17 opinion, an intentional omission or an intentional lack of 18 forthcomingness by the judge in that case in disclosing 19 matters that he was actively engaged with minutes or hours 20 before coming into court and discussing those matters, but 21 leaving out some certain facts.

Here, the record is clear. Nothing in this case byway of Captain Waits' testimony and the record in this

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commission suggests that he was deliberately avoiding letting
 people know that, deliberately nondisclosing his applications.
 As he stated, it just simply didn't occur to him.

4 The fact now that we have a record -- the parties 5 have been given the opportunity to question Captain Waits, to 6 question Mr. Blackwood, to question this military judge -- is 7 that remedy enough? In other words, is it remedy enough in 8 light of the answers and responses to those questions where 9 there is no doubt or at least by way of their -- in their own 10 minds that there was a -- a question of their impartiality or 11 their duty to disclose.

And in light of the fact that the parties have had
the opportunity to question those witnesses, is that remedy
enough?

DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No, sir. Because as Your Honor
pointed out earlier, I believe in your colloquy with
Captain Waits, it's not enough because the purpose of that
testimony was not to glean whether or not he was actually
partial while on the bench. Certainly if he was, that would
be a factor Your Honor could take into account. But the query
is into the appearance of partiality.

So there's no record. Since it's sort of beside the
point, it's not -- it's not central to this -- it should not

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| 1 | be central to this court's determination in light of |
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| 2 | particularly in light of mandatory authority. |
| 3 | And again, Captain Waits argued he discussed the |
| 4 | <u>Nashiri</u> opinion with fellow military judges, I presume. And |
| 5 | it was certainly his feeling that the D.C. Circuit got it |
| 6 | wrong. But as Your Honor knows, I'm sure from your practice |
| 7 | in courts-martial |
| 8 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: We apply the law; we don't make it. |
| 9 | DDC [MS. HENSLER]: That's that's true, sir. And if |
| 10 | Your Honor has nothing else |
| 11 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: I have none. Thank you. |
| 12 | TC [CDR SHORT]: Your Honor? |
| 13 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Yes. |
| 14 | TC [CDR SHORT]: I have one thing left over from |
| 15 | yesterday, an open question from Your Honor that I'd like to |
| 16 | address. It will take about 30 seconds. |
| 17 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Go ahead. |
| 18 | TC [CDR SHORT]: Yesterday, Your Honor, in connection to |
| 19 | the AE 137 motion, you had asked the question about the Bates |
| 20 | stamps on page 3 of our reply. |
| 21 | MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Yes. |
| 22 | TC [CDR SHORT]: Which was Hadi Bates stamps number |
| 23 | HADI-4-010235 through HADI-4-010259. Those are, in fact, |
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1 detailed photos of the Site A that were provided to defense2 counsel. Your Honor.

3 Due to the -- I believe they're addressed in AE 138G,4 Your Honor.

5 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Thank you.

DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Sir, there's one more housekeeping
matter I'd like to put on the record. It relates to a
question Your Honor had asked me a few days ago on the record.
MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay.

10 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Your Honor had asked the defense to
11 file on its docket the pleadings in a pending habeas petition
12 in the District Court in the District of Columbia.

13 We filed with the court the pleadings associated with 14 the request for a temporary restraining order and also a 15 motion for the lift of a stay which is currently in place in 16 the preliminary injunctions proceeding in that jurisdiction. 17 The defense filed a motion to withdraw -- has officially 18 withdrawn the TRO request as of yesterday, I believe. And if 19 it hasn't been filed on Your Honor's docket, that notice 20 should be filed with the court shortly. The TRO has been 21 withdrawn.

MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Formally? Okay. Got it.
DDC [MS. HENSLER]: Yes.

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1 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Thank you.

2 TC [CDR SHORT]: Just to be clear, Your Honor, that's not
3 defense, it was petitioner withdrew.

4 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: I'm sorry?

5 TC [CDR SHORT]: In that court, it was the petitioner, not6 the defense.

7 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. I might be confused as to the
8 nature of the litigation. I only had an opportunity to very
9 briefly review it.

The petition for the stay was filed by ----

TC [CDR SHORT]: Your Honor, it's just that Ms. Hensler
referred to it as the defense withdrew. It's -- in the D.C.,
in the habeas case, it is the petitioner that withdrew.

14 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Oh, I gotcha. Okay. Understood.15 Thank you.

16 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: I am noticed defense counsel in both
17 cases, so it would be me ----

18 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay.

10

19 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: ---- and additional counsel.

20 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Got it. Thank you.

All right. Earlier -- yesterday when I indicated
what we were going to be taking up today, I stated that which
we have taken up already today. I am prepared, if the parties

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1 are prepared, to take a lunch recess and come back and address 2 one additional matter for this afternoon. I will hear the 3 parties' position on that as it may be, and that issue is 4 AE 159, the defense motion to compel discovery of information 5 related to Rear Admiral Ring's statements. 6 If the parties would like to take that up this 7 afternoon, I am happy to do so. If you'd like to wait, in 8 light of the commission's guidance yesterday, until tomorrow, 9 we can take up the three remaining motions at that time. 10 Government, your position? 11 DTC [CDR FLYNN]: Your Honor, the government is prepared 12 to go forward this afternoon. 13 DDC [LT DANIELSON]: Your Honor, Lieutenant Danielson. We 14 would respectfully request to delay that argument until 15 tomorrow. There is a -- an issue regarding the defense's 16 presentation. It's currently under OCA review. We don't 17 expect it to be reviewed completely until tomorrow. We'd like 18 to work those issues out and prepare accordingly. 19 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. Very well. We'll do that. 20 So tomorrow we will be taking up in this order 21 AE 156, the motion relevant to the testimony of Lieutenant 22 Colonel Martin. 23 Government, he will be prepared to testify at 0-8; is

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1 that correct?

2 DTC [CDR FLYNN]: That's correct, Your Honor.

3 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: Okay. We will roll right into4 argument on that issue following his testimony.

5 We will then take up the defense motion pertaining to
6 Rear Admiral Ring's statements. And we will conclude this
7 commission session with the defense motion to compel the
8 employment and funding of a defense mitigation specialist.

9 With that, is there anything to take up before the10 commission stands in recess until tomorrow morning?

TC [CDR SHORT]: Nothing from the government, Your Honor.
 DDC [MS. HENSLER]: No, sir. Thank you.

13 MJ [LtCol LIBRETTO]: The commission is in recess.

14 [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 1149, 27 August 2019.]

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