

UNITED STATES

v.

NOOR UTHMAN MUHAMMED

STIPULATION OF FACT

January __, 2011

1. This Stipulation of Fact is entered into by the Prosecution and Defense knowingly and voluntarily in the case of *United States v. Noor Uthman Muhammed*. It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the Prosecution and Defense, with the express consent of the Accused, that the following facts are true and, based on the evidence the Prosecution intends to introduce against the Accused, could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. The Accused is an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, as defined by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA). The Accused is, and has been at all times relevant to these proceedings, a person subject to trial by military commission under Section 948c of the MCA. The Accused has never been a citizen of the United States and is therefore an "alien." The Accused is an "enemy belligerent" because he has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners. The Accused is an "unprivileged" belligerent because he does not fall within one of the eight categories enumerated under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War:

(1) He is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, including militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces;

(2) He is not a member of some other militia or volunteer corps, including organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, which must fulfill the following conditions:

- (i) being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- (ii) having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- (iii) carrying arms openly;
- (iv) conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war;

(3) He is not a member of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the United States;

(4) He did not accompany the armed forces without actually being a member thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, supply contractors, and others who have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, from whom they receive some sort of identification card;

(5) He is not a member of a merchant marine or civil aircraft crew of a Party to the conflict;

(6) He is not an inhabitant of a non-occupied territory who spontaneously took up arms to resist invading forces and who carried arms openly and respected the laws and customs of war;

(7) He is not a person who belonged to the armed forces of the occupied country and has been interned, after being originally liberated, due to his allegiance to those armed forces; and

(8) He is not a person belonging to one of the above categories who has been interned by a neutral or non-belligerent Power on its territory.

3. In or around 1994, the Accused left his home country of Sudan and traveled to Afghanistan to receive paramilitary training. En route to Afghanistan, the Accused traveled to Pakistan, where he was received into a guest house. Some guest houses in Afghanistan and Pakistan were operated by terrorist paramilitary organizations in conjunction with training camps. At the time the Accused entered Pakistan, to his knowledge, Khalden was the only camp operating in Afghanistan. The Accused became aware that guest houses would later come to serve as intermediate stops to lodge trainees and operatives who were transiting to or between the training camps, convalescing from injuries, or getting ready to travel elsewhere for terrorist operations. One of the purposes of the guest houses was to screen incoming recruits prior to sending them on to the training camps, to ensure they were suitable for training, weed out potential spies, and otherwise control and monitor the flow of trainees.

4. From the guest house in Pakistan, the Accused traveled into Afghanistan to receive training at the Khalden training camp. At that time, Khalden was located in the Khost region of Afghanistan. During the Accused's time in Afghanistan, other camps were also established or revived from the Soviet-Afghan War. Some of these training camps, such as al Farouq and Jihad Wahl, were run directly by al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization run by Usama bin Laden and others.

5. In 1996, Usama bin Laden and others had begun issuing public declarations calling for violent attacks against the property and nationals of the United States and its allies, for the purpose of, among other things, forcing the United States to withdraw its forces from the Arabian Peninsula and opposing U.S. support of Israel. During his time in Afghanistan, as described more fully below, the Accused became aware of these declarations calling for violence against the United States, became aware of the goals and purposes of al Qaeda, and also became aware that al Qaeda and associated international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and elsewhere were conducting hostilities against the United States.

6. The Khalden training camp, where the Accused trained and later worked, was under the principal direction of Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (Ibn Sheikh) who lived at Khalden and directed

Khalden's operations as the camp's *emir* or leader. As *emir*, Ibn Sheikh directed Khalden's staff, training program, weapons, supplies, and other day-to-day operations, and helped Khalden trainees gain admittance into other paramilitary training camps or organizations for follow-on training or operations.

7. Ibn Sheikh worked with a terrorist facilitator named Abu Zubaydah. Based primarily in Pakistan, Abu Zubaydah oversaw the operation of guest houses associated with Khalden, secured funding for Khalden, and maintained a steady flow of trainees to and from the camp. To the Accused's knowledge, Abu Zubaydah provided letters of recommendation for trainees to be accepted into Khalden. The Accused also understood that Abu Zubaydah received trainees leaving the Khalden camp as they entered Pakistan.

8. Given their positions of authority and responsibility over Khalden trainees, both Abu Zubaydah and Ibn Sheikh were responsible for the movement of trainees to and from Khalden. Abu Zubaydah used letters of recommendation in order to get people into Khalden and control the flow of trainees into the camp. This system allowed Ibn Sheikh to maintain operational security and restrict access to Khalden. Ibn Sheikh al-Libi assumed responsibility for communications outside the camp was responsible for assisting trainees in returning home or to other camps. While neither Abu Zubaydah nor Ibn Sheikh was a member of al Qaeda, as neither had sworn *bayat* (a formal oath of allegiance) to Usama bin Laden, both men met and communicated with Usama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders on a number of occasions. Although the Khalden training camp was not run by Usama bin Laden or al Qaeda, trainees had the ability to pass between the training camps and organizations, which included al Qaeda and its camps.

9. Not only were there established lines of communication among this network of camps and guest houses in and around Afghanistan, but there were also informal agreements that trainees could continue their training at other camps. The existence of the various camps was not a secret and there was an open market in Afghanistan for men seeking initial or follow-on training. The leaders of one camp or organization, for example, could recommend their trainees for transfer into another camp or organization for further paramilitary training or terrorist operations. If a trainee demonstrated talent in a particular area, he would be recommended for further training or operations in that area with another camp or organization or he could elect on his own to pursue training at another camp. The Accused knew that one of these camps was Derunta. Ibn Sheikh al-Libi was primarily responsible for communications between other camps, such as Derunta, where advanced training on explosives, explosive devices, and poisons was provided by a terrorist trainer named Abu Khabab al Masri.

10. A central aspect of the operational environment for these paramilitary terrorist training camps and organizations in Afghanistan, including Khalden, was the use of *kunyas* (aliases or

noms de guerre), which could be used to conceal the true identities of trainees, camp staff, and ultimately terrorist operators. Often, the passports of the trainees were collected at the guest houses, to preserve operational security over the participants' identities or to be falsified for use by the passport holders (to conceal where they had been) or by other travelers (to conceal who they were and enable them to travel internationally). Terrorist trainers and operatives might also change *kunyas* from time to time, which served as an additional security measure.

11. The Accused received weapons and other training at the Khalden camp in or around 1994. He was taught how to fire the Kalashnikov rifle, the PK machine gun, the 75 and 82 mm recoilless rifles (referred to as artillery), the SPG-9 anti-tank weapon, the 82 mm mortar, and the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher. He adopted the *kunya* of "Abu al Harith" during this initial period. Around the time that the Accused was a trainee, he also used the *kunya* "Farouq."

12. After he completed the initial training program at Khalden, the Accused remained at Khalden and became one of the camp's weapons trainers. Positions in the camp were determined by tenure. The Accused became a weapons trainer in or around 1996, in which capacity he voluntarily taught trainees how to fire small arms and artillery. Around the time he became a weapons trainer, the Accused adopted the *kunya* of "Akrima" (sometimes transliterated "Ikrima" or "Ekrima").

13. After serving as a weapons trainer, the Accused began taking on additional responsibilities at Khalden. He purchased food and supplies to support the camp and oversaw camp operations when the *emir*, Ibn Sheikh, was away. As his status within the camp organization grew, the Accused assumed a position of greater responsibility and began leading the camp's formations. As leader and director of the camp, Ibn Sheikh established a council of trainers that served as his advisors. Ibn Sheikh was required to consult this council but not bound by their advice. The Accused was a member of this council. By this time, in or around 1998-99, in addition to being known by the *kunya*, "Akrima."

14. During the Accused's tenure at Khalden over the course of several years, hundreds of recruits were trained at Khalden on a variety of subjects, including weapons, artillery, tactics, and other areas. Khalden trainees also prayed together and read portions of the Quran and the teachings of the prophet Mohammed. Trainees engaged in discussions regarding religious topics after prayer. Trainees who came to Khalden had already committed to the concept that jihad required military training. It was not unusual throughout the course of the Accused's tenure at Khalden to hear anti-American discussion and rhetoric.

15. Khalden trainees were also trained on maintaining security to prevent sensitive information from getting into the wrong hands. Khalden had a security perimeter at all times. Trainees would use this security training to prevent uninvited people from coming into the camp. This also prevented those that were not wanted from learning what was going on in the camp.

This included training in smaller operational groups. This type of training was also useful for whatever types of activities that trainees would be involved with after they left the camp.

16. The Accused was aware that al Qaeda's goals and purposes were to advocate, support, and conduct terrorist attacks against the United States. While training terrorist operatives at Khalden, the Accused was aware that Usama bin Laden and others were issuing and circulating multiple public declarations calling for violent attacks against the United States. In one of these declarations, entitled a "Declaration of Holy War Against America and the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," Usama bin Laden called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian peninsula. The Prosecution produced a translation of this 1996 declaration in discovery as Bates numbers 10620 – 10643. In another declaration, issued under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders," Usama bin Laden called on all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans—whether civilian or military—anywhere they can be found and to "plunder their money." The Prosecution produced a translation of this 1998 declaration in discovery as Bates numbers 10644 – 10646. The Accused was aware of these and other declarations calling for violence against the United States, which were widely circulated among the terrorist training camps and organizations in Afghanistan, including Khalden.

17. In addition, during the time he served at Khalden, the Accused became aware that al Qaeda and associated international terrorist organizations were actively engaging in hostilities against the United States. On 7 August 1998, two nearly simultaneous terrorist bombing attacks were carried out against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The bombing at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi killed or seriously injured hundreds of people, including Americans and other civilians working at the embassy as well as Kenyan civilians who were in the vicinity at the time of the blast. The bombing at the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam killed or seriously injured dozens of people, including American and Tanzanian civilians.

18. On 20 August 1998, in response to these attacks against its embassies, the United States fired cruise missiles into Afghanistan that damaged or destroyed several al Qaeda compounds. While Khalden was not hit by these cruise missiles, the Khalden trainees and staff, including the Accused, became aware of the U.S. cruise missile attacks and were aware that they were in retaliation against al Qaeda for its involvement in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Accused became aware of the Embassy bombings after they happened. At this time, the fatwas of Usama bin Laden, calling for violence against the United States, were broadcast and referred to on radios that were available at Khalden.

19. Not only were terrorist attacks such as the Embassy bombings being carried out by al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations engaged in hostilities against the United States, but terrorist operatives who had trained at Khalden were participating in these hostilities. Although the Accused did not train any individuals for specific terrorist acts, among the terrorist operatives

who trained at Khalden during his tenure were several men who later participated in plots or attacks against the United States, including the following:

a. Mohammed al Owali

Al Owali is a Khalden trainee who admitted he subsequently participated in the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, as described in the Stipulation of Expected Testimony of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] executed in conjunction with this Stipulation of Fact. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is the FBI agent who interviewed al Owali during his investigation of the bombing in Kenya in 1998.

b. Ahmed Ressam

Ressam is a Khalden trainee who admitted he subsequently participated in a plot to bomb Los Angeles International (LAX) Airport on 31 December 1999, as described in the Stipulation of Expected Testimony of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] executed in conjunction with this Stipulation of Fact. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is the FBI agent who investigated the Ressam case and interviewed Ressam on multiple occasions in 2001.

c. Zacarias Moussaoui

Moussaoui is a Khalden trainee (known to the Accused by the *kunya*, "Khalid al Sahrawi") who admitted he subsequently participated in the conspiracy to attack various United States targets with hijacked civilian airliners on 11 September 2001. During his trial in U.S. federal court, Moussaoui submitted a "Statements of Facts," which he signed as the "20th hijacker," and provided testimony regarding his involvement in the 9/11 attacks, which is outlined in the Stipulation of Expected Testimony of Zacarias Moussaoui, executed in conjunction with this Stipulation of Fact.

20. Throughout his time at Khalden, as news spread of the terrorist plots and attacks against the United States, the Accused remained committed to his continued work in support of operations at Khalden.

21. The Accused knew that by continuing to produce trained operatives at Khalden, it was foreseeable that some of his trainees would take part in terrorist attacks of the sort al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations were conducting against the United States. The Accused further knew that many Khalden trainees went on to receive advanced training at other camps, including the al Qaeda camps, and could reasonably foresee that they would eventually take part in terrorist paramilitary operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

22. Sometime between 1999 and June 2000, the Accused learned from Ibn Sheikh al-Libi that the Khalden Camp was to be moved to Kabul. The Accused assisted in moving the Khalden Camp and its trainees from Khost to Kabul. Shortly thereafter, the Accused attended a meeting in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul, Afghanistan, alongside Abu Zubaydah and Ibn

Sheikh, to discuss closing the camp. Many of the trainers who participated in Khaldan's advisory council were also present at the meeting. Although they were consulted regarding the continued operation of the camp, the final decision was Ibn Sheikh al-Libi's. Ibn Sheikh al-Libi instructed the Accused and the other trainers that were present that Khaldan was to be closed. The Accused assisted in the camp's closure. To the Accused's knowledge, the trainees were left to attend other camps or to leave Afghanistan.

23. On 11 September 2001, nineteen terrorist operatives affiliated with al Qaeda hijacked four civilian airliners and crashed them into various targets in the United States, including the twin World Trade Center towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the countryside in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. These attacks resulted in the death or serious injury of thousands of people, many of whom were civilians. In September and October 2001, Usama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan released videotapes claiming responsibility for and celebrating these attacks.

24. In early October 2001, in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States and its coalition partners launched attacks in Afghanistan to find and destroy terrorist camps, compounds and facilities; capture members of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations; and put an end to the terrorist attacks against the United States stemming from the network of terrorist training camps and organizations in Afghanistan.

25. After the U.S.-led bombing raids and military invasion of Afghanistan began, the Accused joined groups of other terrorist operatives who were escaping into neighboring Pakistan. At or around this time, in addition to his other *kunyas*, the Accused also used the *kunya*, "Samir Muhammad Hasan," or simply "Samir."

26. By March 2002, the Accused's group of around a dozen or more fugitive terrorist operatives settled into a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, where they were joined and led by Abu Zubaydah, who at this time was using the *kunyas*, "Tariq" and "Dawoud." As at Khalden, the residents in the safe house used *kunyas* rather than their real names. The group of terrorist operatives with whom the Accused resided at the safe house in Faisalabad included, but was not limited to, the following individuals:

- a. Abu Zubaydah (known to the Accused as "Dawoud"),
- b. Soufian Barhoumi (known to the Accused as "Shafiq"),
- c. Jabran al Qahtani (known to the Accused as "Jabran"),
- d. Ghassan al Sharbi (known to the Accused as "Abdullah"),
- e. Bakush (known to the Accused as "Abdul Razzaq"),
- f. Abu Kamil al Suri (known to the Accused as "Noor al Din"),

- g. Asad al Suri (known to the Accused as "Khalid Habib"),
- h. Abdullah Hussein (known to the Accused as "Abdullah al Libi"),
- i. Noor al Deen (known to the Accused as "Saleh"), and
- j. Younes Skhaita (known to the Accused as "Anas").

27. For several weeks, this group of terrorist operatives used the safe house in Faisalabad as both a hideout and a training facility. Different rooms were generally used for different types of training. The Accused became aware that some of the terrorists were being trained how to build electronic detonators for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), in order to conduct hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Some learned how to use computers to communicate with other terrorist operatives outside the safe house or to develop propaganda on the internet. Some received language or other training. The Accused provided logistical support, such as cooking meals, to keep the house running while, along with Bakush, he was learning Americanized English from Ghassan al Sharbi. The Accused was also waiting for Abu Zubaydah to acquire or falsify travel documents for him so that he could return home to Sudan. The Accused could not travel to Sudan without fraudulent travel documents because his travel documents were taken from him when he arrived in Pakistan around 1994.

28. On 28 March 2002, this safe house in Faisalabad was raided by Pakistani authorities. The Accused and several others in his group attempted to escape, but, after a shootout, were captured. Materials collected from the house included but were not limited to the following:

- a. electronic components, Casio watches, and other tools and components used to build IED detonators;
- b. training notebooks, military manuals, and other training materials;
- c. passports, passport photographs, and other identification documents, some of which were falsified;
- d. propaganda and motivational materials, including dozens of audio cassettes and a videotape of Abu Zubaydah explaining his activities in affiliation with and support of Usama bin Laden; and
- e. diaries of some of the safe house's occupants, including Abu Zubaydah, outlining the group's activities prior to capture.

The Prosecution produced in discovery photographs, summaries, and translations of these materials, as well as reports of forensic analysis performed on them. Certain of these items are listed by the Bates number of their production in the Appendix to this Stipulation of Fact.

29. In light of the above facts, the Accused admits that he voluntarily participated as a trainer and member of an advisory council of trainers at the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan and later voluntarily participated as a contributing member of the safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan,


knowing that his activities were materially supporting international terrorist organizations, including but not limited to al Qaeda, engaged in hostilities against the United States. While the Accused did not know the entire scope or the details of al Qaeda's plans, the Accused was aware that al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations were engaged in hostilities against the United States to achieve their political objectives. He also knew that his actions at the Khalden camp and the Faisalabad safe house were supporting al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations in conducting such hostilities against the United States. Such actions by the Accused amounted to providing material support for terrorism.

30. The Accused also admits that in providing the above material support for terrorism, he was working with coconspirators at the Khalden camp and at the Faisalabad safe house to provide material support for terrorism. While he was not party to all the actions of Abu Zubaydah, Ibn Sheikh, and other coconspirators at Khalden and the Faisalabad safe house, he nevertheless had entered into a longstanding agreement with them to train recruits to commit acts of terrorism in support of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations engaged in hostilities against the United States. Specifically, the Accused was aware of the interrelationship between his own group and the other *jihadi* terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda; knew that he was supporting this relationship by training recruits; and knew that such support would ultimately materially support terrorist attacks by al Qaeda or affiliated groups engaged in hostilities against the United States. He joined this agreement and remained a party to it willingly and willfully, and with the intent to further its unlawful purpose, and knowingly and intentionally committed various overt acts in order to accomplish an objective or purpose of this agreement.

31. IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that this Stipulation of Fact, as well as the items referenced by Bates number herein and in the Appendix, may be received in evidence as Prosecution Exhibits and considered by the members during sentencing. In addition, the Stipulations of Expected Testimony executed in conjunction with this Stipulation of Fact and referenced herein may be considered by the members during sentencing.

SO STIPULATED.

28 JAN 11
Date



Maj James W Weirick, USMC
LCDR Arthur L. Gaston, III, JAGC, USN
Lt Col Kenneth W. Sachs, USAF
MAJ Daniel Cowhig, USA
James L. Trump
Mikeal M. Clayton
Trial Counsel

26 Jan 11


Date

Noor Uthman Muhammed
Accused

We certify that we advised the Accused of the effect of the foregoing and we witnessed his voluntary signature to this document.


26 Jan 11

Date


MAJ Amy Fitzgibbons, JA, USA
Defense Counsel

28 Jan 11

Date


CDR Katharine Doxakis, JAGC, USN
Defense Counsel


28 Jan 11

Date


Capt Christopher Kennedy, USMC
Defense Counsel

1/26/11

Date


Howard Ross Cabot
Defense Counsel

**UNITED STATES V. NOOR UTHMAN MUHAMMED
STIPULATION OF FACT**

APPENDIX

<u>Item</u>	<u>Identifier</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bates</u>
FBI lab explosive device report		Forensic report	38769-38781
Electronics and tools examined by FBI lab	805217	Photos	15412-15450
Schematics notebook examined by FBI lab	K4556	Photo Translation	15413 45509-45514
Detonator training notebook	805210	Photos Scanned original Translation	05612-05613 18904-18983 18984-19093
Detonator, chemical, poisons notebook	805211	Photo Scanned original Translation	11159 19095-19181 09773-09886
Abu Khabab explosives/poisons manuals	805383	Photo Scanned original Translation	21542 12229-12633 11801-12228
Chemical explosives training notebook	805432	Photo Scanned original Translation	21622 12767-12792 12793-12819
Printed chemical explosives manual	805437	Photo Scanned original Translation	21636 13014-13113 12820-13013
Printed AQ manual	804812	Photo Scanned original Translation	05509 18220-18490 09418-09661
Jihad/guerrilla tactics notebook	805235	Photo Scanned original Translation	09899 19721-19760 19761-19785
Jihad/guerrilla tactics manual	805240	Photo Scanned original Translation	05643 20196-20307 20308-20378

Tactics manual	805244	Photo	11192
		Scanned original	20630-20745
		Translation	10092-10235
Training manual	805264	Photos	05671-05674
		Scanned original	21106-21340
		Translation	21341-21479
Training notebook	805252	Photos	05658-05659
		Scanned original	21001-21035
		Translation	21036-21070
Internet training notebook	804815	Photo	09662
		Scanned original	18556-18677
		Translation	14253-14274
Electronics training manual	805202	Photos	05592-05598
		Scanned original	18743-18787
		Translation	18788-18831
Computer training notebook	804832	Photo	09682
		Scanned original	09683-09758
		Translation	46281-46299
Daily schedule	804803	Photo	18203
		Translation	18211
Kitchen roster	805415	Photos	10274-10275
		Translation	12653-12654
Saudi passport	804671	Photos	05229-05235
		Scanned original	16062-16087
Syrian passport	804714	Photos	05368-05369
		Scanned original	17114-17143
Syrian passport	804715	Photos	05370-05371
		Scanned original	17145-17175
Yemeni passport	804718	Photos	05375-05376
		Scanned original	17308-17328
Jordanian passport	804747	Photo	05426
		Scanned original	17793-17818

Saudi passport	804748	Photo Scanned original	05427 17820-17844
Syrian passport	804749	Photos Scanned original	05428-05429 17846-17874
Saudi passport	804752	Photos Scanned original	05434-05438 17902-17927
Moroccan passport	804753	Photos Scanned original	05439-05440 17929-17954
French passport	804754	Photos Scanned original	05441-05442 17956-17973
Saudi passport	805236	Photos Scanned original	05627-05638 19787-19813
Saudi passport	804690	Photos Scanned original	05261-05262 16646-16674
Colombian passport	804719	Photos Scanned original	05377-05378 17330-17351
Somali passport and photo of Accused	804750	Photos Scanned original	05430-05431 17876-17900
Passport-size photos of Zubaydah	804686	Photos	05255-05256
Passport-size photos of Accused	804694	Photo	05265
Laminating sleeves	804720	Photo	05379
Misc office supplies	804724	Photo	05385
ICE forensic document laboratory report		Forensic report	37807-37814
Summary of audio cassettes		Summary translation	45540-45548
Training cassette	805190	Photo Translation	05580 21852-21893
Training cassette	805193	Photo Translation	05583 21894-21938
Training cassette	805194	Photo	05584

		Translation	21939-21973
Training cassette	804758	Photo	05453
		Translation	21828-21851
Zubaydah video	804692	Photo	05263
		Video	10754
		Translation	04801-04805
		Translation	16678-16682
		Subtitled video	45537
		Edited/subtitled video	40689
Diary of Abu Kamil al Suri	805360	Photo	05700-05701
		Scanned original	05702-05746
		Translation	28288-28379
Multi-volume diary of Abu Zubaydah	805450	Photo	21725
		Scanned original	09029-09084
		Translation	13197-13253
	805448	Photos	21681-21724
		Scanned original	13114-13154
		Translation	13155-13196
	904128	Scanned original	47120-47213
		Translation	47214-47309
	805416	Photo	28462
		Scanned original	28463-28483
		Translation	28485-28506
	804706	Photo	05276
		Scanned original	08106-08278
		Translation	08281-08406
	804707	Photo	05362
		Scanned original	07873-07957
		Translation	07958-08105
	804710	Photo	05366
		Scanned original	07424-07641
		Translation	07652-07862
	804705	Photo	05275
		Scanned original	07180-07309
		Translation	07312-07423