

**CHARGE SHEET****I. PERSONAL DATA****1. NAME OF ACCUSED:**

Majid Shoukat Khan

**2. ALIASES OF ACCUSED:**

Majid Shoukat Khan (aliases Bobdesi; Adnan; Yusif)

**3. ISN NUMBER OF ACCUSED (LAST FOUR):**

10020

**II. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS****4. CHARGE: VIOLATION OF SECTION AND TITLE OF CRIME IN PART IV OF M.M.C.****SPECIFICATION:**

See Attached Charges and Specifications.

**III. SWEARING OF CHARGES****5a. NAME OF ACCUSER (LAST, FIRST, MI)**


Hines, Glen R.

**5b. GRADE**

O-5

**5c. ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSER**

Office of Military Commissions

**5d. SIGNATURE OF ACCUSER****5e. DATE (YYYYMMDD)**

20120213

AFFIDAVIT: Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oath in cases of this character, personally appeared the above named accuser the 13 day of February, 2012, and signed the foregoing charges and specifications under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that he/she has personal knowledge of or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.

James P. Benoit

Typed Name of Officer

Office of Military Commissions

Organization of Officer

Judge Advocate

Official Capacity to Administer Oath  
(See R.M.C. 307(b) must be commissioned officer)O-5  
Grade

Signature

#### IV. NOTICE TO THE ACCUSED

6. On 13 February, 2012 the accused was notified of the charges against him/her (See R.M.C. 308).

THOMAS J. WELSH, CDR, JAG USA  
 Typed Name and Grade of Person Who Caused  
 Accused to Be Notified of Charges

JOINT TASK FORCE - GUANTANAMO  
 Organization of the Person Who Caused  
 Accused to Be Notified of Charges

[Signature]  
 Signature

#### V. RECEIPT OF CHARGES BY CONVENING AUTHORITY

7. The sworn charges were received at 1620 hours, on 14 Feb 2012, at Alexandria, VA

Location

For the Convening Authority: Donna L. Wilkins  
 Typed Name of Officer

GS15

Grade

[Signature]  
 Signature

#### VI. REFERRAL

##### 8a. DESIGNATION OF CONVENING AUTHORITY

Convening Authority, 10 U.S.C.  
 § 948h, designated on 25 Mar 10

##### 8b. PLACE

Alexandria, VA

##### 8c. DATE (YYYYMMDD)

20120215

Referred for trial to the (non)capital military commission convened by military commission convening order 12-01  
 dated 15 February 2012

subject to the following instructions<sup>1</sup>: None, this case is referred  
non-capital.

By Direction of the Convening Authority

Command, Order, or Direction

Donna L. Wilkins, GS15

Typed Name and Grade of Officer

Convening Authority, Chapter 47A  
 of Title 10 U.S.C. § 948h

Official Capacity of Officer Signing

[Signature]  
 Signature

#### VII. SERVICE OF CHARGES

9. On \_\_\_\_\_, I (caused to be) served a copy these charges on the above named accused.

Typed Name of Trial Counsel

Grade of Trial Counsel

Signature of Trial Counsel

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See R.M.C. 601 concerning instructions. If none, so state.

[REDACTED]

## CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950(29), CONSPIRACY

**Specification:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, at various locations within the United States, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, and elsewhere, from about January 2002, to about August 2003, knowingly and willfully conspire with Usama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali; Encep Nurjamen, a/k/a Hambali (Hambali); Mohammed Nazir bin Lep, a/k/a Lillie (Lillie); and Mohammed Farik bin Amin, a/k/a Zubair (Zubair); and other members and associates of the *al Qaeda* organization and its affiliated groups, known and unknown, to commit offenses triable by military commission, to wit: murder in violation of the law of war, providing material support for terrorism and spying, and in order to effect the object and purpose of the agreement, the above accused and his co-conspirators knowingly committed an overt act or acts, to wit:

### OVERT ACTS

1. In about August 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a public "Declaration of Holy War Against the Americans Who are Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," in which he called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian Peninsula.
2. In about 1996, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed traveled to Malaysia and met with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir, two leaders of the Southeast Asia-based organization, *Jemaah Islamiyah*. During this meeting, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed convinced Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir to travel to Afghanistan to meet with Usama bin Laden. Thereafter, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed facilitated Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir's travel to Afghanistan and a meeting with Usama bin Laden. After meeting with Usama bin Laden, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir told Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that Usama bin Laden had advised them that *al Qaeda* and *Jemaah Islamiyah* should fight together.
3. In about March 1997, in an interview with CNN, Usama bin Laden promised to "drive Americans away from all Muslim countries," and warned the U.S. "to get out" if it did "not want to have its sons who are in the army killed." Usama bin Laden could "not guarantee" the "safety" of U.S. civilians since they were "not exonerated from responsibility" for U.S. foreign policy "because they chose the government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its crimes." He promised that if his demands were unmet, he would send the U.S. "messages with no words because" the U.S. President "does not know any words."
4. In about February 1998, Usama bin Laden and others, under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders," issued a fatwah (purported religious ruling) claiming that it was "God's order" and an "individual duty for every Muslim" to "kill Americans ... wherever and whenever"

[REDACTED]

found. The fatwah directed all Muslims to "kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military."

5. On or about May 28, 1998, in an interview with ABC News in Afghanistan, Usama bin Laden reiterated the February 1998 fatwah's call for killing Americans, emphasizing that, "We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They are all targets in this fatwah." Usama bin Laden further stated that if his demands were not met, *al Qaeda* would "send" to the U. S. "the wooden boxes and the coffins" containing "the corpses of American troops and the American civilians." Bin Laden also noted that "American civilians were asked to gather information on Muslims and observant Muslim youth and to convey it to the security section in the embassy."
6. On or about May 29, 1998, Usama bin Laden issued a statement entitled, "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam," under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders," in which bin Laden stated that "it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God."

**PLOT TO USE KHAN IN POST 9/11 ATTACKS**  
**AGAINST THE UNITED STATES**

7. On or about October 16, 2001, in Baltimore, Maryland, KHAN applied to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service for a Refugee Travel Document and fraudulently claimed that he intended to travel to Dubai (to get married) and Saudi Arabia (for a pilgrimage).
8. On or about January 4, 2002, KHAN traveled, using the fraudulently obtained Refugee Travel Document, from Baltimore, Maryland to Karachi, Pakistan.
9. Between about January 4, 2002 and about March 21, 2002, in or around Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN's close associate, Co-conspirator #1, who served on the *al Qaeda* media committee, introduced KHAN to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as a close associate from the United States who could be helpful to *al Qaeda*.
10. Between about January 4, 2002 and about March 21, 2002, in or around Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN met with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and advised him that KHAN's family owned gas stations in the United States.
11. Between about January 4, 2002 and about March 21, 2002, in or around Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN discussed with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed a plot to blow-up underground gasoline storage tanks at gas stations within the United States.
12. Between about January 4, 2002 and about March 21, 2002, in or near Karachi, Pakistan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed directed KHAN to attend training on explosive device detonators and timers.

- [REDACTED]
13. Between about January 4, 2002 and about March 21, 2002, in or near Karachi, Pakistan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed instructed KHAN that when KHAN returned to the United States, he should conduct research about the operation and maintenance of gas stations and fuel tanks in furtherance of a plot to explode underground gasoline storage tanks.
  14. From about January 4, 2002 to about March 21, 2002, KHAN began to work for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali and *al Qaeda*, including checking *al Qaeda* operational email accounts and couriering messages for *al Qaeda* operatives and/or associates.
  15. On or about March 21, 2002, KHAN traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Baltimore, Maryland.
  16. From about March 21, 2002 to about August 11, 2002, in or near Baltimore, Maryland, KHAN worked at a gas station operated by his family.
  17. Between about March 21, 2002 and about August 11, 2002, in or near Baltimore, Maryland, KHAN attempted to recruit a close associate to work for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and *al Qaeda*.
  18. In about July 2002, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and/or another *al Qaeda* associate, ordered Khan to return to Pakistan.
  19. On or about August 11, 2002, KHAN returned to Pakistan, again traveling from Baltimore, Maryland to Karachi, Pakistan.
  20. From about August 11, 2002 to about March 5, 2003, in or near Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN worked directly for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali and other *al Qaeda* associates, all of whom were evading capture by United States and Pakistani authorities.
  21. On or about December 22, 2002, while in or near Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN allowed his United States Refugee Travel Document to expire.
  22. Between about August 11, 2002 and about March 5, 2003, in or near Karachi, Pakistan, Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali directed KHAN to obtain renewed travel documents to permit him to return to the United States so that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed could utilize him as an *al Qaeda* operative or facilitator within the United States.
  23. From about August 11, 2002 to about March 5, 2003, in or around Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN volunteered to go anywhere to help with an *al Qaeda* operation once he resolved his passport issue.

- [REDACTED]
24. On or about December 30, 2002, Aafia Siddiqui (Siddiqui) opened a Post Office Box at a United States Post Office in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Siddiqui listed KHAN as the co-owner of the Post Office Box and falsely listed KHAN as her husband.
  25. On or about December 30, 2002, in or near Gaithersburg, Maryland, Siddiqui mailed an application for a Refugee Travel Document to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service on KHAN's behalf.
  26. From about late January to about early February 2003, KHAN and Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali met with Uzair Paracha and Saifullah Paracha in or near Karachi, Pakistan on at least two separate occasions. During these meetings, KHAN advised Uzair Paracha that he did not want United States Immigration officials to learn that he was not in the United States. KHAN directed that upon Uzair Paracha's return to the United States, Uzair Paracha should, among other things, deposit money into KHAN's bank account, use his credit card, retrieve immigration papers from a post office box in Maryland and call INS from a pay phone, posing as KHAN.
  27. Between about late January and about early February 2003, in or near Karachi Pakistan, Khan attempted to recruit Uzair Paracha to work for *al Qaeda*.
  28. On or about February 17, 2003, Uzair Paracha traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to New York, New York.
  29. Between about February 17, 2003 and about March 28, 2003, in or near New York, New York, Uzair Paracha called a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement telephone number posing as KHAN.
  30. Between about February 17, 2003 and about March 28, 2003, in or near New York, New York, Uzair Paracha visited a website named "Visapro," where he entered the receipt number for KHAN's Refugee Travel Document Application in order to check on its status as KHAN had instructed.
  31. Between about January 30, 2003 and about February 13, 2003, in or near Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN and Co-conspirator #1 showed one of KHAN's close associates a videotape, produced by Co-conspirator #1, depicting *al Qaeda* training.

#### ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF

32. Between about January 4, 2002 and about March 21, 2002, in or near Karachi, Pakistan, KHAN told Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that he was willing to conduct a suicide attack against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. At Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's direction, KHAN recorded a "martyr video," wore an explosive vest and sat in a Mosque waiting for President Musharraf to arrive.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

### ATTACK ON J.W. MARRIOTT IN JAKARTA, INDONESIA

33. In about mid January 2002, Mohammed Jabarah, an operative sent by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, met with Hambali in Thailand. Hambali stated that he planned to have his group conduct bombings against soft targets such as bars, cafes or nightclubs frequented by "Westerners" in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia. Hambali also stated that he had one ton of explosives in Indonesia.
34. In about January 2002, Hambali instructed his lieutenants, Lillie and Zubair, to travel from Hat Yai Thailand, to Hambali's location in Bangkok, Thailand.
35. Between about January 2002 and about June 2003, in or near Bangkok, Thailand, Hambali provided Lillie and Zubair with money to procure false identification documents for Hambali.
36. In about late 2002, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali, who were located in or near Karachi, Pakistan, directed KHAN to deliver \$50,000 United States Dollars (USD) to Hambali in Bangkok, Thailand. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed directed that KHAN should arrange the money transfer in the "black market," to avoid detection and the carrying of cash from Pakistan to Thailand.
37. In about late 2002, Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali instructed KHAN to conduct Internet research about tourist activities in Thailand so that KHAN could dress appropriately and "blend in" unnoticed. Ali instructed KHAN to travel with his wife and use his honeymoon as a "cover story" for his trip to Thailand.
38. In about late 2002, Hambali's brother, Rusman Gunawan, a/k/a/ Abdul Hadi, (Gunawan), located in or near Karachi, Pakistan, notified Hambali that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was sending \$50,000 USD to Hambali in Thailand.
39. In about late 2002, in or near Bangkok Thailand, Hambali told Zubair that they would be receiving \$50,000 USD from *al Qaeda*. Zubair gave Hambali his telephone number to pass on to KHAN, so that KHAN could contact Zubair when he arrived in Thailand. Hambali told Zubair that the money was to be used for an "operation," such as a bombing or similar type of terrorist attack. Hambali subsequently provided Zubair's telephone number to Gunawan.
40. In about late 2002, Gunawan provided Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali with Zubair's telephone number in Bangkok, Thailand. Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali then provided Zubair's phone number to KHAN.
41. On or about December 24, 2002, KHAN and his wife traveled from Pakistan to Bangkok, Thailand.

- [REDACTED]
42. On or about December 24, 2002 to about December 29, 2002, KHAN and his wife stayed at the Sofitel Hotel in Bangkok, Thailand.
  43. On or about December 24, 2002 to about December 29, 2002, in or near Bangkok, Thailand, KHAN adopted a code-name and used coded methods to communicate with Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali, who was located in or near Karachi, ~~Thailand~~ Pakistan. MTH 14 FEB 12
  44. On or about December 26, 2002, KHAN received a message on the Sofitel Hotel's automated message system asking him to call "Mr. Farooq" at a Thailand-based telephone number. KHAN called that phone number from his hotel room on or about December 28, 2002.
  45. From about December 24, 2002 to about December 29, 2002, in or near Bangkok, Thailand, KHAN exchanged several e-mail messages with Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali discussing the \$50,000 USD money transfer to Hambali.
  46. Between about December 24, 2002 and about December 28, 2002, KHAN telephoned Zubair and arranged to meet with him at a set location in Bangkok, Thailand.
  47. On or about December 28, 2002 Zubair and KHAN met at a location in Bangkok, Thailand. At this meeting, KHAN delivered approximately \$30,000 USD to Zubair. KHAN and Zubair arranged to meet again later that day so that KHAN could deliver the balance of the \$50,000 USD to Zubair.
  48. On or about December 28, 2002, Zubair and KHAN met a second time at a location in Bangkok, Thailand. KHAN delivered the remaining balance of the \$50,000 USD to Zubair.
  49. On or about December 28, 2002, KHAN sent an e-mail message to Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali confirming that he had successfully received the \$50,000 USD and that he was delivering the money to Zubair.
  50. On or about December 28, 2002, at Hambali's instruction, Zubair took the \$50,000 USD he had received from KHAN to an apartment in or near Bangkok, Thailand, shared by Zubair and Lillie, for safekeeping.
  51. In or about January 2003, at Hambali's instruction, Zubair met with a second *al Qaeda* money courier in or near Bangkok, Thailand. At this meeting, the *al Qaeda* money courier gave Zubair approximately \$49,000 USD. Zubair took this money to the apartment he shared with Lillie in or near Bangkok for safekeeping as well.
  52. In or about February 2003, in or near Bangkok, Hambali directed Lillie and Zubair to take the money that they had received from KHAN and other conspirators and change it into other currencies.



- [REDACTED]
53. In or about Spring 2003, at Hambali's direction, Lillie transferred the money to a fellow Malaysian and instructed him to hand-deliver the money to Indonesia, using codes and code names. Hambali told Lillie that this money was intended for *Jemaah Islamiyah* member Dr. bin Husseln Azahari (Azahari).
  54. In or about late Spring or early Summer 2003, *Jemaah Islamiyah* associate Mohammed Ikhwan, a/k/a Ismail (Ismail), received the money delivered to him in Indonesia at Hambali's instruction.
  55. In or about June 2003, Hambali contacted Zubair, at or near Bangkok, Thailand, and instructed him to remind Azahari that that some of the money that had been derived from the co-mingled funds, a portion of which had been delivered to Thailand by the Accused, and subsequently delivered to Indonesia by Hambali, was for families of *Jemaah Islamiyah* members and a portion was for a terrorist operation.
  56. In or about late Spring or early Summer 2003, a group of *Jemaah Islamiyah* members began planning for a terrorist bombing, using the funds that had been delivered by Hambali, which were derived from the co-mingled funds that KHAN had delivered to Thailand in December 2002.
  57. In or about early Summer 2003, *Jemaah Islamiyah* associates Nordin mat Top (Top) Ismail, and Azahari traveled to Jakarta, Indonesia, to construct a truck bomb. In order to covertly construct the truck bomb, Asmar and Tohir rented a safe house with a garage.
  58. In or about mid-July 2003, Top and Azahari settled on the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, as the target of the terrorist attack. They did so in large part because they believed it had a large American presence.
  59. On or about August 5, 2003, after allowing the selected suicide bomber to stop in a mosque to pray, Azahari joined Ismail on the motorcycle, and led the bomber in the truck bearing the bomb to the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. Ismail and Azahari turned left on the street immediately prior to the J.W. Marriott Hotel and paused to ensure that the bomber turned into the J.W. Marriott Hotel driveway.
  60. On or about August 5, 2003, in Jakarta, Indonesia, the suicide bomber drove the truck into the front entrance of the J.W. Marriott Hotel and detonated the bomb, killing eleven people, wounding at least eighty-one others, and severely damaging the J.W. Marriott Hotel.
  61. All of the groups' expenses for conducting the bombing of the August 5, 2003 J.W. Marriott hotel were paid for using the funds that were delivered by Hambali from the co-mingled funds he received from KHAN and another *al Qaeda* money courier.

[REDACTED]

**CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(15), MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.**

**Specification:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, on or about August 5, 2003, at or near Jakarta, Indonesia, in the context of and associated with hostilities, intentionally and unlawfully kill one or more protected persons in violation of the law of war by detonating a vehicle laden with explosives in front of the J.W. Marriott Hotel located in Jarkarta, Indonesia, resulting in the deaths of 11 persons. (See Charge Sheet Appendix A for a list of victims killed in the attack).

**CHARGE III: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(28), ATTEMPTED MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.**

**Specification 1:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, on or about August 5, 2003, at or near Jakarta, Indonesia, in the context of and associated with hostilities, intentionally and unlawfully attempt to commit murder in violation of the law of war by intentionally detonating a vehicle laden with explosives in front of the J.W. Marriott Hotel located in Jarkarta, Indonesia, with the intent to kill protected persons in and around the hotel, which actions amounted to more than mere preparation and apparently tended to effect the commission of the offense of Murder in Violation of the Law of war. (See Charge Sheet Appendix B for a list of victims).

**Specification 2:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, on or about March 8, 2002, at or near Karachi, Pakistan, in the context of and associated with hostilities, intentionally and unlawfully attempt to kill Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in violation of the law of war, by wearing a vest containing an improvised explosive device and traveling to a mosque where he expected President Musharraf to be with the intention of detonating the vest and killing President Musharraf, which actions amounted to more than mere preparation and apparently tended to effect the commission of the offense of Murder in Violation of the Law of war.

**CHARGE IV: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25), PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM**

**Specification 1:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, from about January 2002 to about March 2003, at various locations within the United States, Pakistan, and Thailand, and elsewhere, in the context of and associated with hostilities, provide material support or resources, to wit: property, including currency or monetary instruments, and services, including financial services and personnel, including himself, knowing or intending that they were to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, an act of terrorism as set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24).

[REDACTED]

**Specification 2:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, from about January 2002 to about March 2003, at various locations within the United States, Pakistan, Thailand, and elsewhere, in the context of and associated with hostilities, provide material support or resources, to wit: property, including currency or monetary instruments, services, including financial services, lodging, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, explosives, personnel, including himself, and transportation, to an international terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the United States, to wit: *al Qaeda* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*, with the intent to provide such material support to *al Qaeda* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*, and knowing that *al Qaeda* and *Jemaah Islamiyah* has engaged in or engages in terrorism as set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24).

**CHARGE V: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(27), SPYING**

**Specification:** In that Majid Shoukat KHAN, a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, did, in the context of and associated with hostilities, from about January 2002 to about March 2003, at or near Karachi, Pakistan and Baltimore, Maryland, collect or attempt to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, intending or having reason to believe the information collected would be used to injure the United States or to provide an advantage to a foreign power and intending to convey such information to an enemy of the United States or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, in violation of the law of war.

## **CHARGE SHEET: APPENDIX A**

**The names of persons killed as a result of the August 5, 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott**

**The following are persons who were killed on August 5, 2003, in or around Jakarta, Indonesia, as a result of the attack on the J.W. Marriott Hotel:**

1. Edi Haryanto
2. Edi Sucipto
3. Eyoh Zakaria
4. Hans Winkelmolen
5. Hidayat
6. Johannes Bolan
7. Miptah Tobiin
8. Rudi Dwi Laksono
9. Slamet Heriyanto
10. Syamsudin Bin Kosim
11. Ujang Harna

**The names of persons who suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the August 5, 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott**

Demographic	Threat to Security (%)	Not a Threat (%)
All respondents	85	15
Gender		
Male	88	12
Female	82	18
Age		
18-29	92	8
30-49	88	12
50-69	85	15
70+	80	20
Education		
High school or less	82	18
Some college	85	15
Bachelor's degree	88	12
Postgraduate	90	10

United States	100%
China	100%
Germany	100%
France	100%
Japan	100%
United Kingdom	100%
Italy	100%
Spain	100%
Sweden	100%
Netherlands	100%
Belgium	100%
Austria	100%
Switzerland	100%
South Korea	100%
Singapore	100%
India	100%
Canada	100%
Brazil	100%
Argentina	100%
Chile	100%
Colombia	100%
Venezuela	100%
Russia	100%
Ukraine	100%
Poland	100%
Czech Republic	100%
Slovakia	100%
Hungary	100%
Romania	100%
Bulgaria	100%
Greece	100%
Portugal	100%
Ireland	100%
Luxembourg	100%
Malta	100%
Cyprus	100%
Slovenia	100%
Croatia	100%
Serbia	100%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	100%
Montenegro	100%
Albania	100%
Moldova	100%
Ukraine	100%
Georgia	100%
Armenia	100%
Azerbaijan	100%
Yemen	100%
Saudi Arabia	100%
UAE	100%
Qatar	100%
Oman	100%
Bahrain	100%
Kuwait	100%
Lebanon	100%
Syria	100%
Iran	100%
Turkey	100%
Israel	100%
Palestine	100%
Jordan	100%
Yemen	100%
Somalia	100%
Ethiopia	100%
Kenya	100%
Uganda	100%
Rwanda	100%
Burundi	100%
DRC	100%
Congo	100%
Angola	100%
Nigeria	100%
Ghana	100%
Senegal	100%
Sierra Leone	100%
Liberia	100%
Ivory Coast	100%
Upper Volta	100%
Chad	100%
Niger	100%
Mali	100%
Burkina Faso	100%
Guinea	100%
Guinea-Bissau	100%
Senegal	100%
Gambia	100%
Sierra Leone	100%
Liberia	100%
Ivory Coast	100%
Upper Volta	100%
Chad	100%
Niger	100%
Mali	100%
Burkina Faso	100%
Guinea	100%
Guinea-Bissau	100%
Sen	

[illegible]