- 1 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 0903,
- 2 21 January 2020.]
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: This military commission is called to
- 4 order.
- 5 I apologize for the three-minute delay. I have
- 6 received AE 463B (Gov), which is an exparte filing
- 7 declaration. It will be relevant to some matters that I'm
- 8 sure the parties want to discuss today with respect to
- **9** AE 658D.
- How is everyone doing this morning? I hope you're
- 11 doing well. It's good to see everyone again.
- 12 General Martins, it's good to see you. Would you
- 13 please account for who is here on behalf of the United States.
- 14 CP [BG MARTINS]: Good morning, Your Honor. Representing
- 15 the United States are Brigadier General Mark Martins,
- 16 Mr. Robert Swann, Mr. Edward Ryan, Mr. Clay Trivett,
- 17 Mr. Jeffrey Groharing, Ms. Nicole Tate, Mr. Christopher
- **18** Dykstra, and Major Neville Dastoor.
- 19 Also at counsel table are paralegals Mr. Dale Cox,
- 20 Mr. Rudolph Gibbs, and Staff Sergeant Clifford Johnson. Also
- 21 present, Ms. Devi Modha and Mr. Todd Musher. And also present
- 22 in the courtroom is Supervisory Special Agent Jeffrey Brown of
- 23 the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

- 1 Your Honor, these proceedings are being transmitted
- 2 via closed-circuit television to sites in the continental
- 3 United States pursuant to the commission's orders.
- 4 Your Honor, I will also announce for the record the
- 5 presence in the courtroom, with the commission's permission,
- 6 of counsel for witnesses scheduled to testify in these
- 7 sessions. They are Henry F. Schuelke, III, and Brian S.
- 8 Paszamant, representing the witnesses James Elmer Mitchell and
- 9 John Bruce Jessen.
- 10 The presence of Mr. Schuelke and Mr. Paszamant is
- 11 intended to assist these proceedings by enabling wrinkles to
- 12 be handled more efficiently should an occasion arise in which
- 13 their representation of their clients can move things forward.
- 14 They are aware not to speak nor to communicate with their
- 15 clients except during breaks or as provided leave to do so by
- **16** the military judge.
- 17 Thank you, Your Honor.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. And I
- 19 thank you -- thank you for anticipating the question about the
- 20 broadcast. I appreciate that as well.
- 21 Mr. Sowards, I know, based on your motion, which I'll
- 22 put on the record here momentarily, that Mr. Mohammad will be
- 23 joining us shortly. In fact, he may be en route. But I

- 1 noticed he's not here currently. But if you would please
- 2 indicate who is here on behalf of Mr. Mohammad.
- 3 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: That is correct, Your Honor. He is
- 4 not present, and we appreciate the commission's indulgence to
- 5 accommodate that matter. Gary Sowards, David Nevin,
- 6 Lieutenant Colonel Derek Poteet, Rita Radostitz, and Denise
- 7 LeBoeuf, all present for Mr. Mohammad.
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir. It's good to see
- **9** everyone.
- 10 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Ms. Bormann, I notice Mr. Bin'Attash is
- 12 here. If you would please announce who is here on behalf of
- 13 Mr. Bin'Attash.
- 14 LDC [MS. BORMANN]: I will. Judge, on behalf of
- 15 Mr. Bin'Attash, myself, Captain Jay Peer, and Ms. Anisha
- 16 Gupta, who is not of record yet, but we intend that to happen
- 17 this morning.
- We appreciate your ruling last night. Unfortunately,
- 19 because of the inability to contact our client via telephone
- 20 or some other way, Mr. Bin'Attash, in anticipation of today's
- 21 hearing, had cancelled his physical therapy appointment and
- 22 then was told when he tried to reinstitute it that the
- 23 physical therapy that he had scheduled would cause him pain

- 1 for about 24 hours after the administration of the physical
- 2 therapy, so -- and he didn't want to miss today's court
- **3** hearing, so he's here.
- **4** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Excellent.
- 5 All right. Ms. Gupta, let's go ahead and take that up
- 6 now before I forget. If you'd please come forward.
- 7 Ms. Gupta, I'll just ask you some generalized
- 8 questions. I know you filed the notice, but you are an
- 9 attorney licensed to practice in a jurisdiction; is that
- 10 correct?
- 11 DC [MS. GUPTA]: I am.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: And which jurisdiction is that?
- 13 DC [MS. GUPTA]: New York and California.
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. And are you an attorney in good
- **15** standing with both jurisdictions?
- 16 DC [MS. GUPTA]: I am.
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: Do you prefer to swear or affirm this
- **18** morning?
- **19** DC [MS. GUPTA]: I can swear.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Please raise your right hand.
- 21 [Counsel was sworn.]
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, ma'am. You may be
- 23 seated.

- **1** DC [MS. GUPTA]: Thank you.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Harrington, good morning. I see that
- 3 Mr. Binalshibh is here. It's good to see you and your team.
- 4 Would you please announce who is going to be here, at least
- 5 for today, on behalf of Mr. Binalshibh.
- **6** LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: Yes, Judge. For Mr. Binalshibh,
- 7 James Harrington, Navy Lieutenant Clarence -- or Clayton
- 8 Lawrence, and Air Force Major Virginia Bare.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, sir.
- 10 Mr. Connell, it's good to see you. And I see Mr. Ali
- 11 is here as well. Would you please announce who is here on
- 12 behalf of Mr. Ali this morning.
- 13 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Good morning, Your Honor. On behalf
- 14 of Mr. al Baluchi is myself, James Connell, Alka Pradhan,
- 15 Benjamin Farley, Captain Mark Andreu of the United States Air
- 16 Force. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas of the United States Air
- 17 Force has previously been excused by military commission
- 18 order.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, sir.
- 20 Mr. Ruiz, I see that -- yes, Mr. al Hawsawi is here in
- 21 the courtroom. Would you please announce, in addition to
- 22 yourself, who is representing him here this week. And good to
- 23 see you.

- 1 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Yes, Judge. Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer
- 2 Williams, Major Joseph Wilkinson, Mr. Sean Gleason are here on
- 3 behalf of Mr. al Hawsawi as well.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Thank you. And you did give
- 5 notice and asked for leave to swap out defense counsel
- **6** mid-session, correct?
- 7 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: That is correct.
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. If it hasn't already gone
- 9 out, that will be approved, and a written ruling will follow.
- 10 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Thank you.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you.
- 12 Mr. Schuelke and Mr. Paszamant, good morning,
- **13** gentlemen.
- 14 [Counsel away from podium; no audio.]
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Go ahead and have a seat.
- I just wanted to give you some general instructions.
- 17 I just want to make sure that you understand that although you
- 18 may be present in the courtroom during the testimony of your
- 19 clients -- you've probably already anticipated this, but I'll
- 20 go ahead and reiterate it anyway.
- I do not anticipate you entering a formal appearance.
- 22 Obviously you're not the prosecution, so I wouldn't anticipate
- 23 the -- that -- a third-party counsel raising any objections

- 1 during the testimony of a witness. That would be the
- 2 obligation of the prosecution or the defense, as parties to --
- 3 to the litigation.
- 4 And unless there's a need, which we -- I could address
- 5 with you at that time, I'll -- I will treat your clients as --
- 6 as I do typical witnesses, which while they were -- while they
- 7 remain on the stand, they should not discuss the contents of
- 8 their testimony. That doesn't mean that I can't be told
- 9 differently, but that is the general rule that we -- that we
- 10 practice here in -- in this commission. But if something
- 11 arises, then we -- we can address it at that time. But those
- 12 are just the general guidelines in anticipation of moving
- **13** forward.
- 14 [Counsel away from podium; no audio.]
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, sir.
- 16 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Your Honor?
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Sowards.
- 18 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, Your Honor. On behalf of
- 19 Mr. Mohammad, may we also ask that in the event that some
- 20 extraordinary circumstance arises that requires their
- 21 communication with their clients about the substance of the
- 22 testimony, that we have notice of that and ----
- 23 MJ [Col COHEN]: Absolutely.

1 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, sir. And if you allow them 2 to do it, then we receive advice as to what that substance of 3 that discussion was? 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right. So what I'll probably do, I 5 understand I will -- I will -- I will find a way to maneuver 6 between attorney-client privilege and just a general 7 understanding of why that -- that discussion might need to 8 occur without requiring the divulge -- them divulging actual 9 attorney-client information. 10 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: I appreciate that, Your Honor. And 11 also not to put too fine a point on it, but I assume that your 12 admonition also applies to attorney for one of the witnesses 13 telling the other witness what -- what his client has 14 testified to, so that -- in other words, what we are -- what I 15 believe the -- the commission was focused on and we're 16 concerned about is them not having information about either 17 coaching as it were on ----18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right. 19 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: ---- their own testimony but also 20 being informed of what the other witness is testifying to. 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right. Yeah, I would treat that the same 22 as any witness who's represented by counsel. I mean, to the

extent that it's a public proceeding and a counsel could

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- 1 always hear what was discussed in the -- in the public
- 2 proceeding, to a certain extent, whether or not they've been
- 3 instructed what to testify might be a fair cross-examination
- 4 question as opposed to the actual nature of -- of
- 5 attorney-client information, et cetera.
- **6** But -- but to the extent that -- that any witness who
- 7 is represented, their client -- their attorney, I would hope
- 8 that they wouldn't coach them.
- **9** I'm being asked to slow down already.
- 10 But like I said, I -- based on the -- the
- 11 understanding of everyone involved here, and that initial
- 12 admonition, I think we'll be okay, but if something comes up,
- 13 we'll address it at that time.
- 14 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, sir.
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. You're welcome.
- 16 I recognize that Mr. Mohammad was not here this
- 17 morning. At 1630 on 20 January 2020 counsel for Mr. Mohammad
- 18 and Mr. Bin'Attash filed AE 690T (KSM WBA) requesting to
- 19 voluntarily waive their presence for the first hour or so of
- 20 the pretrial motions hearing scheduled to begin at 0900 today.
- 21 The request was based upon the fact that the Joint Task Force
- 22 Guantanamo had scheduled physical therapy sessions for
- 23 Mr. Bin'Attash at 0800 and Mr. Mohammad at 0900. I granted

- 1 the motion and directed the trial judiciary staff to notify
- 2 the parties via e-mail, given the hour at which it was
- 3 requested.
- 4 Although I will advise all of the accused who are
- 5 currently present here this morning of their rights with
- 6 respect to voluntarily absences, upon Mr. Mohammad's arrival,
- 7 I will take the few minutes that will be required to remind
- 8 him of what his rights are and to verify with him that he --
- 9 that his absence was both knowing and voluntarily -- voluntary
- 10 here with respect to the portions he will miss early this
- **11** morning.
- 12 With respect to nonemergency medical appointments
- 13 moving forward, I'm asking trial counsel and defense counsel
- 14 to make sure that the JTF has a copy of the scheduled trial
- 15 dates and is willing to work with the accused to deconflict
- 16 nonemergency appointments with the sessions. I'm not saying
- 17 it did or did not happen in this case; I'm just saying let's
- 18 take a look, make sure that everyone understands, you know,
- 19 kind of what's going on.
- However, the accused does have a right to be
- 21 voluntarily absent, and so not withstanding that
- 22 deconfliction, if an accused voluntarily chooses to schedule
- 23 an appointment during a scheduled session of the commission,

- 1 the accused has the right to be voluntarily absent, and I will
- 2 recognize that right.
- 3 Typically, I like them here for the first day, and
- 4 we're still going to have everyone here for the first day.
- 5 This was a minor modification to that, so it was -- I was
- 6 willing to accept it. But I just wanted to make sure that --
- 7 that the parties -- and make sure that the JTF is definitely
- 8 aware, especially their medical staff, as to kind of what's
- 9 going on and so they can possibly deconflict. If this was a
- 10 choice that it could have been deconflicted and Mr. Mohammad
- 11 just chose, that's fine. Like I said, he has the right to be
- 12 voluntarily absent, but I just want to make sure that that is
- 13 the case as opposed to doctors, International Red Cross,
- 14 et cetera, the schedules being -- the schedule being set
- 15 without consideration of the actual session dates. Okay.
- I'm now going to speak directly to Mr. Bin'Attash,
- 17 Mr. Binalshibh, Mr. Ali, and Mr. al Hawsawi.
- 18 Gentlemen, each of you have the right to be present
- 19 during all sessions of the commission. If you request to
- 20 absent yourself from any session, such absence must be
- 21 voluntary and of your own free will. Your voluntary absence
- 22 from any session of the commission is an unequivocal waiver of
- 23 the right to be present during that session.

1 Your absence from any session may -- may negatively 2 affect the presentation of the defense in your case. 3 failure to meet with and cooperate with your defense counsel 4 may also negatively affect the presentation of your case. 5 Under certain circumstances, your attendance at a session can 6 be compelled regardless of your personal desire not to be 7 present. 8 Regardless of your voluntary waiver to attend a 9 particular session of the commission, you have the right at 10 any time to decide to attend any subsequent session. 11 decide not to attend the morning session but wish to attend 12 the afternoon session, you must notify the guard force of your 13 desires. Assuming there's enough time to arrange 14 transportation, you will then be allowed to attend the 15 afternoon session. You will be informed of the time and date 16 of each commission session prior to the session to afford you 17 the opportunity to decide whether you wish to attend that 18 session. 19 Mr. Bin'Attash, do you understand what I just 20 explained to you? 21 ACC [MR. BIN'ATTASH]: Yes.

MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr Binalshibh, do you understand what I

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just explained to you?

- **1** ACC [MR. BINALSHIBH]: Yes.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 3 Mr. Ali, do you understand what I just explained to
- **4** you?
- **5** ACC [MR. AZIZ ALI]: Yes.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: And, Mr. al Hawsawi, do you understand
- 7 what I just explained to you, sir?
- **8** ACC [MR. AL HAWSAWI]: Yes.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, gentlemen.
- I will now go into a summary of the R.M.C. 802
- 11 conference which we held on Saturday.
- 12 For the rest of the parties' edification, the 802 that
- 13 I was going to have yesterday with the government and
- 14 Ms. Bormann's team, that did not happen. It was -- it became
- 15 OBE, and so we did not have it, so I will not be summarizing
- **16** that 802.
- 17 On Saturday, 18 January 2020, I conducted a conference
- 18 with trial and defense counsel in accordance with Rule for
- 19 Military Commissional 802. The accused were absent. In
- 20 addition to parties, we were joined by the Chief Defense
- 21 Counsel, counsel for Drs. Mitchell and Jessen, and counsel for
- 22 the accused in the military commission case of
- 23 <u>U.S. v. al Nashiri</u>. None of the parties objected to the

- 1 presence of these additional attorneys at the 802.
- 2 Ms. Bormann introduced Ms. Anisha Gupta, a new member
- 3 of Mr. Bin'Attash's defense team, and informed the commission
- 4 that one of the other attorneys on the team was not on island
- 5 because he became ill prior to departure; but that if he
- 6 became physically able, he intended to join the team on island
- 7 later in the week; and that this particular attorney was the
- 8 one who they had intended to conduct the examination of the
- 9 witnesses in this session.
- 10 Ms. Bormann, I'm -- for his privacy, I will -- if you
- 11 need to put his name on the record, I will, but for -- for
- 12 purposes of right now, I'll just leave it at one of your
- 13 members of your team.
- 14 At this conference, we discussed our anticipated
- 15 schedule for the next two weeks and various other procedural
- 16 matters. I informed the parties that, due to the impact of
- 17 Monday's federal holiday on the broadcast of our open
- 18 sessions, we would postpone the start of the open sessions
- 19 until today. I informed the parties that we would make use of
- 20 Monday morning for a classified in camera of 505(h) hearing.
- I informed Mr. Ruiz that I wanted to have an ex parte
- 22 in camera session with his team immediately following the
- 23 505(h) hearing in order to address some questions I have --

- 1 have regarding AE 673C (MAH). Mr. Ruiz replied that he was
- 2 prepared to do so.
- **3** For the record, we conducted both the 505(h) hearing
- 4 and the ex parte session as discussed at the 802.
- 5 Additionally, I noted that the commission did not
- 6 intend to make use of the courtroom on Monday afternoon and
- 7 indicated to the parties that they could confer and, if -- if
- 8 practicable, make arrangements to make use of the courtroom as
- 9 they needed.
- I informed the parties that beginning on Tuesday
- 11 morning, I intended to take testimony in open session from
- 12 0900 to 1730 daily. I indicated that I intended to follow our
- 13 usual practice of taking a short mid-morning break of
- 14 approximately 15 minutes and then an afternoon break for
- 15 prayer time of approximately 30 minutes, as well as an
- 16 extended 75-minute lunch break due to the ongoing construction
- 17 between here and the dining facilities.
- I inquired of the parties as to their estimates as to
- 19 the amount of time they anticipated needing to examine the
- 20 doctors, Mitchell and Jessen.
- 21 Mr. Mohammad's team mentioned their pending motion for
- 22 abatement, but indicated that if the motion were denied, they
- 23 anticipated needing two to three days per witness if they were

- 1 to go first, and a day or so if they were to go after some of
- 2 the other teams; but that it would be dependent upon what was
- 3 questioned by other counsel.
- 4 Mr. Bin'Attash's counsel similarly -- noted the
- 5 current absence of the defense counsel that they had intended
- 6 on doing the -- the examination of the witnesses and indicated
- 7 a preference for going last or later in the week or in the
- 8 sessions, although Ms. Bormann at the time was unsure how many
- 9 days she would need per witness, depending on how much
- 10 information had already been elicited at that time, which made
- 11 sense to -- to me, at least.
- 12 And I generally indicated, without ruling, that I
- 13 didn't see a reason why we couldn't find a way of -- of
- 14 allowing for additional time in the event that that defense
- 15 counsel is able to -- to arrive; and if not, to at least allow
- 16 more time for preparation and a change of counsel for their --
- 17 for their team's purposes.
- 18 Mr. Binalshibh's counsel anticipated one day or less
- 19 per witness depending on what is elicited by the other teams,
- 20 which also sounded reasonable under the circumstances.
- 21 Mr. Ali's counsel indicated that he would need at
- 22 least three days of open testimony and two days of closed
- 23 testimony for Dr. Mitchell and a similar period for

- **1** Dr. Jessen.
- 2 Mr. al Hawsawi's counsel reiterated that
- 3 Mr. al Hawsawi was not joining a pending motion to continue by
- 4 some of the parties and instead desired to take the testimony
- 5 of Drs. Mitchell and Jessen. To that end, he anticipated he
- 6 would need three days for Dr. Mitchell and two to three days
- 7 for Dr. Jessen in total for open and closed session.
- 8 The government indicated it would need approximately a
- 9 half a day for each of the two witnesses. The government also
- 10 informed the commission that Drs. Mitchell and Jessen did not
- 11 intend to return to GTMO for further testimony following the
- 12 completion of the current two-week session and asked the
- 13 commission to consider limiting the parties' questioning in
- 14 order to complete the examination of both witnesses within the
- 15 current session.
- 16 Although I did not issue any ruling setting time
- 17 limits on the parties because I do not issue rulings at 802
- 18 conferences, I did indicate that we would begin the
- 19 questioning of Dr. Mitchell by counsel for Mr. Ali on Tuesday
- 20 morning and see how it goes from there.
- 21 Brigadier General Martins inquired as to when would be
- 22 the best time and format for the government to present the
- 23 updated logistics briefing to the commission that has been

- 1 ordered in the Trial Scheduling Order. General Martins
- 2 offered to provide the commission and the parties with a
- 3 classified PowerPoint briefing via e-mail. I indicated that
- 4 that would be acceptable, at least initially, just to get it
- 5 via e-mail and then to review it and see what needed to be
- 6 discussed.
- 7 The commission briefly addressed, without ruling or
- 8 taking argument, the government's motion for reconsideration
- 9 of the commission's order in AE 692, which is AE 692A (Gov),
- 10 or in the alternative, grant the government an exparte
- 11 hearing. The commission notified the parties of its intent to
- 12 clarify its order, or at least desire to clarify its order in
- 13 AE 692, which concerned an opinion by the first camp commander
- 14 that the government elicited in open court, but which
- 15 necessarily required follow-up questions regarding the opinion
- 16 to be done in closed session.
- AE 692 gave the government the option of providing the
- 18 defense with an unclassified summary of classified facts
- 19 sufficient to cross-examine the first camp commander in open
- 20 court as to the basis of his opinion or to have the commission
- 21 disregard his opinion.
- The commission recognized, upon seeing AE 692A, that
- 23 the directive in AE 692 could have been more clear about the

- 1 commission's intentions and expectations and could have
- 2 provided more guidance about how the commission expected the
- 3 parties to work within the procedural framework set forth in
- 4 Military Commission Rule of Evidence 505, which required --
- 5 typically requires the defense to first submit an
- $\mathbf{6}$ M.C.R.E. 505(g)(1)(A) notice to the government advising them
- 7 of the classified information they wish to use to
- 8 cross-examine the first camp commander in open session or
- 9 otherwise. This would typically occur before the government
- 10 elects whether to propose an unclassified summary or
- 11 substitution for the classified information.
- 12 As the briefing cycle for the government was not yet
- 13 complete, the commission asked the parties for their position
- 14 whether the -- position regarding whether the commission
- 15 should issue its clarification of AE 692 prior to the
- 16 completion of the briefing cycle for the government motion for
- 17 reconsideration or simply allow the briefing cycle to
- 18 continue.
- 19 Mr. Connell in particular advised the commission that
- 20 he would have a position regarding the timing of AE 692
- 21 guidance from the commission but suggested that the issue was
- 22 more expansive than this AE 692 series and the parties perhaps
- 23 could benefit from the commission specifying an issue in more

- **1** broad terms.
- 2 Counsel, that is my summary of the 802 session that we
- 3 had on Saturday night. I will start with the prosecution.
- 4 Does the government have any additions or corrections
- 5 to the commission's summary of the R.M.C. 802 conferences?
- **6** CP [BG MARTINS]: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 8 Mr. Sowards?
- 9 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: No. Your Honor.
- **10** MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 11 Ms. Bormann?
- 12 LDC [MS. BORMANN]: Just that the attorney who is missing
- 13 is doing one of the witnesses, not both of them, so ----
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Copy. Thank you very much for letting me
- 15 know that. Thank you. All right.
- 16 Mr. Harrington, is there anything you would like to
- **17** add or correct?
- 18 LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: No, Judge.
- **19** MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you.
- 20 Mr. Connell, as far as additions or subtractions,
- **21** anything?
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: No, thank you, sir.
- 23 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.

- **1** Mr. Ruiz, same to you.
- 2 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: I don't have anything, Judge.
- **3** MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you.
- 4 Counsel, just one second. I need to take a look at
- **5** AE 680A before I say anything else.
- 6 [Pause.]
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. I think I can do this in a
- 8 very generic format based on the review of AE 680A -- we'll
- 9 take a quick break. All right.
- 10 My understanding is that Mr. Mohammad has arrived, and
- 11 so I'd rather just go ahead and take care of that now, allow
- 12 him to arrive. I'll advise him of his rights, and then as
- 13 soon as he's ready, we will -- we'll continue. We're in
- 14 recess.
- 15 [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 0931, 21 January 2020.]
- 16 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 0938,
- **17** 21 January 2020.]
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: The military commission is called to
- 19 order. The parties are present. Mr. Mohammad has joined us.
- Mr. Mohammad, I need to advise you of your rights for
- 21 these military commissions.
- Sir, you have the right to be present during all
- 23 sessions of the commission. If you request to absent yourself

- 1 from any session, such absence must be voluntary and of your
- 2 own free will. Your voluntary absence from any session of the
- 3 commission is an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present
- 4 during that session.
- 5 Your absence from any session may negatively affect
- 6 the presentation of the defense in your case. Your failure to
- 7 meet with and cooperate with your defense counsel may also
- 8 negatively affect the presentation of your case.
- 9 Under certain circumstances, your attendance at a
- 10 session can be compelled regardless of your personal desire
- 11 not to be present. Regardless of your voluntary waiver to
- 12 attend a particular session of the commission, you have the
- 13 right at any time to decide to attend any subsequent session.
- 14 If you decide not to attend the morning session, for
- 15 example, but wish to attend the afternoon session, you must
- 16 notify the guard force of your desires. Assuming there is
- 17 enough time to arrange transportation, you will then be
- 18 allowed to attend the afternoon session.
- 19 You will be informed of the time and date of each
- 20 commission session prior to the session to afford you the
- 21 opportunity to decide whether you wish to attend that session.
- Mr. Mohammad, do you understand the rights I just
- **23** advised you about?

1 ACC [MR. MOHAMMAD]: Yes. 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, my understanding is that you had a 3 medical appointment that you wished to attend this morning, 4 and therefore, you voluntarily chose to not attend starting at 5 0900; is that correct? 6 ACC [MR. MOHAMMAD]: Yes. 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Thank you, sir. 8 Going back to my recitation, the commission is in 9 receipt of AE 680C, Mr. Mohammad's motion to abate the 10 proceedings. 11 After reviewing that motion, which is classified, I 12 have determined that there is no need for additional oral 13 argument on that matter. I understand the -- the matters that 14 were discussed and the particular paragraphs of the -- the 15 guidance in AE 680A that are at issue. I fully understand the 16 position of Mr. Mohammad's defense team and believe that I can 17 rule on the request for abatement absent oral argument. 18 I'll note that throughout these proceedings, at least 19 since I've been the judge in June and based on just historical 20 practices and things that I've read in the record, it appears 21 that this has generally been the case. The defense teams and 22 the prosecution have significantly greater flexibility than --23 and to -- to come and go during a trial to -- to get up and to

- ${f 1}$ move seats, to converse with -- with clients and/or witnesses
- 2 and/or one another with greater flexibility than probably in
- 3 any courtroom in -- in the United States of America or --
- 4 well, we're not there, but clearly in any federal practice and
- 5 probably most state practices that are out there as well as
- **6** any military for court-martial.
- 7 The commission sees no reason to change that. I
- 8 believe that's in the best interest of -- of all the parties,
- 9 to have that flexibility to come and go, to gather
- 10 information, given the sheer volume of it, to bring it back
- 11 and forth, and to allow the -- the counsel to confer with
- 12 their clients, you know, throughout the entirety of -- of
- 13 the -- of the proceedings, to include allowing additional
- 14 time. I know consistently upon request that more times than
- 15 not, if not 90-plus percent of the time, I've even allowed for
- 16 additional consultation time here in the courtroom after a
- 17 session concludes in the evening for -- for defense counsel to
- 18 confer.
- I have looked at the specific classified portions of
- **20** AE 680A. I recognize that there are some modifications. I
- 21 can't say what those are because that -- it's a Secret
- 22 paragraph, but there were some -- some issues with respect
- 23 to -- I probably could say this: It deals with the -- because

- 1 that's in an unclassified paragraph. It deals with the
- 2 handling and access to the -- to the ELC of the classified
- 3 information that's in here.
- 4 And although some of these modifications may have some
- 5 impact on how the counsel interact with that classified
- 6 information while we are here in the courtroom, it does not
- 7 preclude conversations with -- with clients. It does not
- 8 preclude conversations amongst counsel. It does not preclude
- 9 counsel getting up from one table, going to another table, and
- 10 having conversations, which I have routinely allowed
- 11 throughout the -- throughout these commissions.
- 12 And so although I am -- I am aware, I have -- I have
- 13 fully considered it, and based on the -- the facts that all of
- 14 these activities are still allowed to be and the fact that, if
- 15 there is any classified information that has not been cleared
- 16 for the sharing with a particular client, that that was
- 17 impossible, regardless of any -- any additional guidance,
- 18 counsel are still welcome to discuss at any time classified
- 19 information which has been cleared for discussion with the
- 20 client. That -- this makes no change in that.
- 21 But for -- for those reasons, I'm going to deny the
- 22 motion to abate.
- The commission is also in receipt of AE 691 filed

- 1 by -- by Captain Mizer. It's a third-party filing in which
- 2 counsel for Mr. al Nashiri requests permission to attend
- $\bf 3$ closed sessions of this commission in their capacity as
- 4 members of the public who -- who happen to possess security
- 5 clearances. I have not yet ruled on this motion because I
- **6** have not yet ruled that any of the scheduled testimony will
- 7 require one or more closed sessions yet. That -- it would be
- 8 premature to rule on something that I haven't even ordered.
- 9 Nonetheless, I -- I don't require oral argument on that motion
- 10 either. I understand what the issue is.
- In addition, I'm just going to make this very clear:
- 12 The public is the public. The public sits behind the glass in
- 13 the gallery or at one of the closed-captioned television
- 14 locations. That's where the public sits in this case.
- 15 Only the parties or -- and I'm not going to change
- 16 this rule now. I'm allowing the counsel representing a
- 17 witness while the witness is testifying to be present in the
- 18 courtroom.
- So, for example, if Mr. al Nashiri was to ever testify
- 20 in this commission and his counsel wished to be present in the
- 21 courtroom at the time of his actual testimony on the stand,
- 22 that would make sense to allow a similar accommodation to an
- 23 accused that testified to being present in there, given the

- 1 fact that there's a 40-second delay. But with respect to the
- 2 public, the public sits in the -- where the public always
- 3 sits.
- 4 Therefore, if there's room in the gallery during open
- 5 sessions, counsel for Mr. al Nashiri, Mr. Hadi, or any other
- 6 counsel from any other case are welcome and free to observe
- 7 just as the general public is welcome and free to observe the
- 8 proceedings in this case.
- **9** Once again, with respect to access to a closed
- 10 session, I will deal with that if and when I order the closed
- 11 session 806 testimony occur.
- 12 I also received AE 690Q (KSM WBA RBS), Defense Notice
- 13 of Intent to Move to Reschedule Witness Testimony Suppression
- 14 of LHM Statements During January Hearing. Counsel, I have
- 15 been reviewing a lot of stuff over the last -- last night or
- 16 so. Was a motion ever filed by any of those teams with
- 17 respect to the actual move to reschedule?
- 18 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Yes, it was, Your Honor.
- **19** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 20 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: That was 690S ----
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 22 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: ---- as in Sowards.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Thank you.

- **1** LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 3 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: And there may be -- Your Honor, there
- 4 may be some OBE resolution of that. I don't know if the ----
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- **6** LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: ---- the commission wants to hear
- 7 additional facts, but ----
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah. Let me -- here was my -- my
- 9 general thoughts, and so I'll let you all kind of be heard on
- **10** that.
- 11 Mr. al Hawsawi, Mr. Ali, is it your intent to not join
- **12** that motion?
- 13 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: That's correct, sir.
- 14 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: That is correct, Judge, but I want to be
- 15 clear. It's -- it's not because there is no impact, and we do
- 16 not necessarily see that. But we are making a decision to
- **17** move forward.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 19 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: But I just want the court to understand
- 20 that these kind of late disclosures do impact our preparation.
- 21 If I were going first, then it may be a different situation.
- 22 I'm counting on Mr. Connell going first, taking some time,
- 23 and, therefore, we're moving forward. But the ----

- MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: ---- the essence of what the motion says,
 we agree in principle with. We just are not joining it for
 those reasons.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand, sir.
- 6 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Thank you.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you. All right, then.
- 8 So what I'm going to do, then, is I'm going to allow
- 9 the parties that are not joining to go ahead and proceed, and
- 10 then I will take a look at 690S, and we will address it with
- 11 respect to the -- to the other parties. I think that's in the
- 12 interest of individualized justice.
- 13 Mr. Sowards?
- 14 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Yes, Your Honor. I don't know if
- 15 you've been updated on this, but there is now a corrected
- 16 third version which was served on us this morning dated
- **17** 21 January 2020.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 19 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Approximately the same number of
- 20 pages, as -- as far as I can tell very quickly looking at it.
- 21 Of course, I was doing other things in court this morning, so
- 22 I haven't -- I haven't read it. But I can tell you it's
- 23 there, if that helps.

1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. 2 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, sir. 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you. I will make sure 4 we've got that. 5 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: Sir, we have a hard copy ----6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Please. 7 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: ---- for the commission. 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you. 9 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: May I approach? 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may. 11 [Pause.] 12 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: For the record, sir, it's going to be 13 AE 658F. 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Counsel, is it possible to tell me 15 what paragraphs, if any, were -- were modified, without going 16 into the substance of the modifications? 17 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: Yes, sir. One second. 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you. 19 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: All right. Consistent with an e-mail 20 I sent yesterday to the judiciary and to the defense counsel,

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interrogations of Abu Zubaydah had been previously officially

paragraph 22(v) should have been marked as unclassified as the

fact that Special Agent Gaudin participated in the

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- 1 released by the 9/11 Commission following Executive Branch
- 2 classification review.
- 3 Paragraph 82 was incorrectly portion marked and the
- 4 portion marking should have read U//F0U0.
- **5** We also added two exceptions to a chart listed in
- 6 paragraph 96, and specifically as set forth in the fifth row,
- 7 "Any combination of position title plus functional title plus
- 8 three-character UFI remains classified." But there will be
- 9 two exceptions to that rule. We've added the exceptions.
- 10 For the position title of Chief Interrogator as it
- 11 solely relates to NX2, the UFI NX2, such information is
- 12 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO and may be elicited and discussed in open
- 13 court. And for the position title of Group Chief of
- 14 Renditions as it solely relates to C12, UFI C12, such
- 15 information is UNCLASSIFIED//F0U0 and may be elicited and
- **16** discussed in open court.
- 17 So really it's a downgrade in classification on
- 18 paragraphs 22, 82, and two exceptions in paragraph 96.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 20 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Excuse me, Your Honor. May I be
- **21** heard ----
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Sowards.
- 23 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: ---- one moment?

- **1** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 2 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, Your Honor. Very briefly.
- **3** MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- 4 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: If I understood the commission, the
- 5 indication was to allow the two other teams who -- who are
- 6 prepared to proceed to do so, and then you would revisit this,
- 7 at which time we would have an opportunity to be heard by the
- 8 commission?
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- 10 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Okay. So then I'm not going to talk
- 11 about anything other than just to -- if I might alert you to
- 12 two facts when -- when you look at the new guidance; and that
- 13 is, in the 690S filing that you will receive, one of the
- 14 points we make -- so you can wait to read that or begin with
- 15 this -- is one of the difficulties -- and I don't know if it
- 16 applies to the third, improved edition that we just received
- 17 this morning -- one of the things we did notice is that there
- 18 are -- there are -- there can be significant omissions from
- 19 the earlier versions of the guidance.
- **20** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 21 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: And because they use the convention --
- 22 the government uses the convention of underlining changes,
- 23 those don't show up in the third version. So at least for us,

- 1 or me, having just recently seen it, that complicated the
- 2 comparison, and I'm sure will do so for this.
- **3** Also, Your Honor mentioned in passing a discussion of
- 4 the 802, and we had a general reference to the Ninth Circuit
- 5 case. And so I just wanted to invite the court's attention,
- 6 because it may be available in PACER, but not -- not as a
- 7 published case, we were referring to Husayn v. United States
- 8 of America and James Mitchell and John Jessen and the number
- 9 in the Ninth Circuit, the docket number is 18-35218.
- 10 And as relevant to at least the version we were
- 11 talking about on Saturday, and I don't know if it's affected
- 12 still in this version, was an -- in paragraph 13(iv) in which
- 13 the government -- and this is the government's open
- 14 pleading -- mentions a continent, particular continent in six
- 15 instances; a country name in 21; and country adjective -- so
- 16 if you say "America" and "American," you figure out what the
- 17 country is -- on 15 occasions. And so that was what we were
- 18 trying to invite the commission's attention to.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Thank you, sir. I appreciate
- **20** that.
- 21 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, sir.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 23 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: Sir, may I add something to my earlier

- 1 comments?
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 3 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: It had been the prosecution's
- 4 intention to attach classification guidance regarding the
- 5 Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training, the SERE
- 6 training, the classification guidance that had been used in
- 7 Salim v. Mitchell, to our initial 658 filing. We did not do
- 8 that. That was just inadvertent. We have provided that to
- 9 the defense earlier last week.
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 11 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: That will be -- that will be attached
- 12 to the new filing that we are filing momentarily.
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Thank you. All right.
- So I promised the parties that I would allow them to
- 15 be briefly heard on concerns about the new classification
- 16 guidance found in AE 658D. I will allow the parties no more
- 17 than five minutes per party to inform the commission of their
- 18 concerns in open session.
- I fully understand the concerns, and I -- it's -- at
- 20 least at this point, I believe a short synopsis in the open
- 21 session will be sufficient for me to address the matters as
- 22 they arrive -- arise in these proceedings.
- Mr. Connell, as you have the -- as you will be

- 1 starting the -- the questioning of the witness, you may be
- **2** heard first on the matter.
- 3 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir. And I have a time
- 4 hack of 10:00 exactly.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Perfect.
- 6 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, our objection is
- 7 different. Our objection arises under M.C.R.E. Rule 505(a)
- 8 and 18 U.S.C. 949p-1(a), which provides the rule of privilege.
- 9 It's my understanding that this is the text on which the
- 10 government is relying for its invocations of national security
- 11 privilege. And it provides that, "Classified information
- 12 shall be protected and is privileged from disclosure if
- 13 disclosure would be detrimental to the national security.
- 14 Under no circumstances may a judge order the release of
- 15 classified information to any person not authorized to receive
- **16** such information."
- 17 So the real question is, what does that mean? The
- 18 government has correctly identified Afshar v. Department
- 19 of State, 702 F.2d 1125, D.C. Circuit 1983, as one of the
- 20 important authorities. And I think that this would be easiest
- 21 if I were to just make a quick chart, if I could have access
- **22** to the ----
- 23 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.

- 1 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: ---- camera, please. Your Honor, if
- 2 we may have permission to display this ----
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Let me see what you wrote first.
- **4** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: ---- little chart.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. You may.
- 6 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: So really there are three categories
- 7 of information that are significant.
- 8 The first one of those is unauthorized disclosures.
- **9** We all know what that is. They're defined by Protective
- 10 Order #1, et cetera. But what Afshar says and Schlesinger,
- 11 it's -- it's D.C. District companion case says is that really
- 12 there are two different categories of authorized disclosures.
- 13 Category number 1 is official disclosures. That isn't a
- 14 disclosure not from Mr. Tenet or Mr. Brennan or Mr. Panetta,
- 15 but from the CIA itself. And that's the distinction that
- 16 those two cases draw. So that's official authorized
- 17 disclosures.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, make sure you turn that mike so
- 19 that if you talk while you're writing we're more likely to
- 20 catch it. Thanks.
- 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: And official announcements by the CIA
- 22 or materials released under FOIA fall under that category.
- 23 But what they also make -- those two cases also make clear is

- 1 that there are unofficial/authorized disclosures. And
- 2 unofficial/authorized disclosures are those which go through
- 3 the prepublication review process.
- 4 The fact that the plaintiff in Afshar, for example,
- 5 wrote about CIA activities in Iran was not a violation of that
- 6 person's nondisclosure agreement, but neither was it an
- 7 official disclosure, which is the distinction drawn now there.
- 8 Now, I gave AR 13-10, a courtesy copy to the parties but that
- 9 after Afshar and Schlesinger is the CIA's adoption of this
- 10 exact distinction. And it is the agency prepublication review
- 11 of certain material prepared for public dissemination.
- 12 The -- what falls under this unofficial/authorized
- 13 category are prepublication -- are Publication Review Board
- 14 books, but also this is the category that my statements fall
- 15 into or Dr. Mitchell's statements fall into because we are not
- 16 the CIA. We can't make official disclosures.
- 17 So the -- when the government says that it can invoke
- 18 national security privilege, it can only do so under
- 19 unauthorized disclosures, not unofficial/authorized
- 20 disclosures because those disclosures are not detrimental to
- 21 national security and are not unauthorized.
- Now, the last point I'll make in my final minute is
- 23 that I want to draw the court's attention to Kareem v. Haspel,

- **1** 2019 U.S. District 162656 from the D.C. District in 2019. I
- 2 gave a courtesy copy. And although it's unpublished it is
- **3** from Judge Collyer.
- 4 And if there is any judge in the United States who
- 5 knows both classified information and the death penalty, it is
- 6 Judge Collyer. She was on the Foreign Intelligence
- 7 Surveillance court, and she is one of the very few D.C. judges
- 8 to have ever tried to verdict a death penalty case in the
- 9 D.C. District.
- And she explains at star 14 the way that a national
- 11 security privilege would work in a criminal trial. In a
- 12 criminal trial, she writes, the government may not withhold
- 13 information that would be material to the defense even if it
- 14 is a privileged state secret. To do so would be to deprive
- 15 the defendant of liberty without due process. The
- 16 United States may either proceed with the indictment or
- 17 disclose the information or -- or forgo prosecution by
- 18 dismissing the charges.
- 19 On the second part, at star 15, the plaintiff in that
- 20 case, who was a journalist on the United States kill list,
- 21 argued that he was like a capital defendant. The -- Judge
- 22 Collyer distinguished his situation from that of an actual
- 23 capital defendant.

1 "Were the United States," she says, "to choose to 2 prosecute Mr. Kareem for his alleged involvement in terrorist 3 activities the government would be required to disclose with 4 relevant protections any classified information that would be material to Mr. Kareem's defense." 5 6 So in addition to violating the distinction between 7 official authorized disclosures and unofficial/authorized 8 disclosures, the government's invocation of national security 9 privilege in general, but also with respect to things 10 previously through the publication review process, violate 11 what has been the law of classified information in criminal 12 cases since the Reynolds case from the 1950s. 13 I'm one minute over. Thank you very much. 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you for your time, sir. I 15 understand. 16 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: No, I'm good. 17 Your Honor, would you like this document marked? 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes. Let's go ahead and mark that. I'll 19 get you a number here momentarily. If you'll just hand that 20 to the court reports, they'll let me know what to announce. 21 AE 658G (AAA). 22 Thank you, Counsel. All right.

Are there any other counsel that would like to take

23

- 1 their five minutes now? Mr. Sowards?
- 2 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Yes, Judge. Just looking ahead and
- 3 while the court -- or the commission is considering the facts
- 4 as they unfold and -- and what we're requesting, in part what
- 5 I mentioned earlier is that some of the very modest requests
- 6 we're requesting or relief we're requesting may have been
- 7 overtaken by events in terms of the realignment of counsel and
- 8 how long they may take with the first witness.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Copy.
- 10 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Essentially what we've been requesting
- 11 is that our obligation begin examining witnesses be deferred
- 12 to next week while we review these, now the latest version of
- 13 the -- of the guidance. Which to those who are uninitiated in
- 14 this process of handling national security, always feels sort
- 15 of like buying an iPhone. Then the next week, they've got
- 16 another one that you've got to look at the manual with and put
- 17 together.
- But I just invite the court's attention earlier to
- 19 your comments about 692A which began back in September when I
- 20 respectfully objected and complained that we had on the eve of
- 21 an important series of witnesses new guidance from the
- 22 government purporting to tell us how to -- how to negotiate
- 23 the classified information.

1 And I raised the point that we -- at that point were a 2 number of years into the proceedings and we were getting 3 this -- this new guidance. And the prosecution assured the 4 commission that this wasn't anything new. We should have 5 known about this all along; this was just a compilation of 6 what we had been operating under. 7 And then within that hearing, we had something arise 8 in which, again, on behalf of Mr. Mohammad, we complained that 9 they had violated the very restriction they had imposed upon 10 us in terms of examining the camp commander. 11 Your Honor, who has throughout these proceedings shown 12 the patience of Job to try to put together these pieces and 13 find some middle ground, referred the -- the 692 to the 14 government for some explanation about how we should proceed. 15 And on the day their response was due, rather than give you 16 that -- that explanation, they moved for reconsideration of 17 your order, and you very generously and, you know, without ego 18 involvement, went back and looked at your original order and 19 said, okay, yeah, maybe I could have been a little bit clearer 20 about what it is I want. And now we're going forward to sort 21 that out. 22 But I think what that indicates, or at least from my 23 perspective and so people understand, we're not trying to

- 1 inconvenience witnesses or -- or prolong anything. It's just
- 2 that every time one of these new series of guidances comes
- 3 out, including just this morning -- and, of course, we think
- 4 if there's no -- if there's no need to issue a new set of
- 5 guidance, then why do it? But if there is a need, then there
- 6 also is a need to understand it and comply. And so that's --
- 7 that's what we need time to do.
- 8 And the -- the section that I was referring to earlier
- 9 in the September guidance that we had -- and this is with
- 10 respect to a major potential component of Dr. Mitchell's
- 11 testimony; that is, his -- his book that he wrote on his
- 12 experiences, and -- and that is treated a couple of times in
- 13 the -- what would have been the new guidance if they hadn't
- 14 given us some this morning. But I -- and I'm referring to the
- 15 September 18th filing.
- 16 On page 21 at paragraph 71, the prosecution, the
- 17 government's position is that, "Dr. Mitchell has written a
- 18 book that has undergone CIA prepublication review entitled
- 19 Enhanced Interrogation that contains many unclassified or
- 20 since declassified facts detailing his and Dr. Jessen's
- 21 involvement in the design and implementation of the RDI
- 22 program."
- 23 If you look at the intervening new and improved

- 1 guidance on the 17th of January of this year, and look at that
- 2 same paragraph which I believe now has been moved to 75, you
- 3 will search in vain for the acknowledgment that -- that
- 4 classified information apparently appearing in the book has
- 5 been, quote, since declassified.
- 6 And what I suggest to you, the commission, without
- 7 unnecessary rancor, is that the government is always in charge
- 8 of this information and these facts, and there have been a
- 9 number of instances in which, when it becomes advantageous to
- 10 them in these proceedings, information is declassified.
- 11 Perhaps it's declassified to make things easier. That's fine.
- 12 We encourage that. But other times, it's for the purpose of
- 13 controlling the narrative or allowing someone to say something
- 14 that they find advantageous at the time. And then when they
- 15 find that perhaps defense attorneys doing their jobs are going
- 16 to make use of those disclosures, they wish to reel back that
- **17** information.
- 18 I'm not saying that's necessarily what's going on
- 19 here. I was mystified by the ability to find that language in
- 20 the -- in the new -- the new guidance. But what I do say to
- 21 the court is, and I will admit it, that I'm not as nimble as
- 22 Mr. Connell who probably has this morning's guidance all
- 23 outlined and cross-referenced to the old -- so I'll -- I'll

- 1 check with him at lunch.
- 2 But this is a capital case. And the problem is
- 3 that -- and one of the things I was going to ask Your Honor
- 4 because I wasn't sure you mentioned it, but Mr. Groharing,
- 5 when he generously accepted a lot of the 505 notices that were
- 6 perhaps a little broader than they should have been, twice at
- 7 our 802 said, but I just wish people would understand that
- 8 this -- this stuff is hard to do on the fly, that, you know,
- 9 it's much better if we do this in an orderly fashion.
- And I would be the last person to criticize anyone for
- 11 coming up to the deadline and trying to get something in. But
- 12 when it is a capital case, if people try to do things on the
- 13 fly or in a hurried fashion, facts get missed, objections get
- 14 missed, principles get trampled on. And what happens maybe
- 15 several years after that fact, when no one really thought it
- 16 mattered much, is that's the particular element that kills the
- 17 client.
- So I have a very, you know, focused interest in making
- 19 sure I know what I'm supposed to be doing, and that's why
- 20 we've asked the judge -- or the commission, for this modest
- **21** scheduling alteration.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 23 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Ms. Bormann, I'll give you
- 2 until just past 1019.
- 3 LDC [MS. BORMANN]: I'd like to adopt what Mr. Connell so
- 4 ably argued with respect to the difference and distinction
- 5 between authorized disclosures, because they're both, you
- **6** know, in the public record.
- 7 And so the issue with respect to national security
- 8 damage is sort of OBE, as we like to say. And I feel like I'm
- 9 now a member of the military with the use of acronyms. I'm
- 10 getting accustomed to them.
- 11 I just want to say in echoing what -- something
- 12 Mr. Sowards just said, which is this, it's the eve of the --
- 13 it's the morning of the witnesses' proposed testimony, and we
- 14 are -- I'm frantically looking through the document for the
- 15 changes. We received an e-mail last night, but without it in
- **16** print, I actually didn't know.
- 17 This is information that the government has known for
- 18 a very long time. The proposal that Special Agent Gaudin's
- 19 testimony -- or his presence at a black site for the
- 20 Abu Zubaydah interrogation has been declassified since the
- 21 publication of the 9/11 Commission report oh so many years
- **22** ago, more than a decade ago.
- So I'm not sure what's happening, but things are being

- 1 sort of after-the-fact classified for us that have been out in
- 2 the public sphere and declassified for a very long time. And
- 3 only by the vigilance of defense counsel, frankly, are we
- 4 catching these mistakes. And I'm not that good -- maybe
- 5 Mr. Connell is, but I'm not that good of knowing everything
- 6 that's out there in the public sphere. But we ought not to
- 7 have to point out the errors in their guidance.
- 8 And when there -- so what that leads me to argue is
- 9 that we ought to have time to examine it. Because when I get
- 10 it this morning and -- or yesterday, and I'm supposed to
- 11 examine a witness -- now, I'm not going to this time, we're
- 12 going at the end -- or but we ought to be able to argue
- 13 whether or not it's appropriately filed and whether or not it
- 14 actually is what it purports to do, which is protect national
- 15 security.
- I have one last comment. We're at a bit of a
- 17 disadvantage beyond what I just argued when they do something
- 18 last minute. Paragraph 5 of the guidance talks about the fact
- 19 that previously classified documents with banner markings
- 20 saying SECRET or TOP SECRET now contain unclassified
- 21 paragraphs, information which either was unclassified to start
- 22 with and somebody realized it or, you know, has since been
- 23 declassified. We're supposed to now take that information and

- 1 submit it to a review team to determine whether or not we can
- 2 use it in an unclassified session. I received that
- 3 information two days ago, two business days ago.
- 4 That process for defense counsel takes 60 days. So
- 5 there's no way, if the government gives us classification
- 6 guidance on the eve of a hearing, that we can ever make that
- 7 determination in the way they suggest.
- 8 All of that, I'm done.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, ma'am.
- 10 Mr. Harrington, do you want to take your five minutes
- 11 now or do you want to wait and see how things progress; and
- 12 then if it was your turn to go, you would have the opportunity
- 13 to address it at that point while you need some additional
- 14 time? Either way is fine, sir.
- 15 LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: Judge, I just have an additional
- 16 comment or perspective that needs to be considered.
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- 18 LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: When you work with clients on this
- 19 kind of an issue, obviously it's complicated. It goes on over
- 20 a long period of time, it's talked about. Sometimes you go
- 21 back and forth about it. And it's not like you sit down,
- 22 especially on this issue, with what our clients have been
- 23 through, that you sit there for a day and just go through

- 1 these things one after another. That's not possible in this
- 2 kind of a situation.
- 3 But you discuss things that are in an open book with
- 4 the client and they give you their perspective on it, their
- 5 memories, and all of the rest of it to the extent that you're
- 6 at, and then that's taken back from you. So now we're in a
- 7 position that a witness is going to come in here and testify
- 8 in open session when they are here but not be able to testify
- 9 about things that you've already discussed with them, which
- 10 may be important to their argument and to their presentation.
- 11 And not only that are they not here, but you can't go back to
- 12 them and talk to them again about what was testified in there.
- 13 And so it makes it very, very difficult for us in -- in this
- 14 situation to -- to do this.
- And it's possible in this case that one or more of the
- 16 accused may testify on -- just on the suppression issue,
- 17 right, to the extent that they're able. So how does a defense
- 18 counsel prepare their client to testify about that when you've
- 19 had a witness testify about the facts that your client is
- 20 going to testify about and you can't say to your client he
- 21 said this about that or he said that about that.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand.
- 23 LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: Thank you.

1 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you. 2 Paragraph 75 of -- well, let me see if it's still 3 unclass. I anticipate it probably is, but -- yes. Counsel, I 4 also have permission -- the -- okay. 5 Trial Counsel, I believe that an UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 6 paragraph can be -- can be discussed in this session. Do you 7 concur? 8 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: Concur. 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. So let's go ahead and just 10 talk about ----11 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Judge? 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes. 13 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: May I have an opportunity to make 14 some ----15 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may. I was going to give you a 16 chance just right after I read this. 17 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: No worries. 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right. Absolutely. No, I wasn't 19 forgetting you. Thank you. I just wanted to give some 20 context. 21 All right. So in paragraph 75, which is under the 22 title (u) Drs. James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, the paragraph

says, "Drs. Mitchell and Jessen were integral to the

23

- 1 development of the CIA's RDI program. Drs. Mitchell and
- 2 Jessen were requested by the Defense and are expected to
- 3 testify on direct and/or cross-examination about the design of
- 4 the RDI program, as well as their observations of and/or
- 5 participation in interrogations of the Accused and the
- **6** application of enhanced interrogation techniques.
- 7 Dr. Mitchell has written a book titled 'Enhanced
- 8 Interrogation' that contains many unclassified facts detailing
- 9 his and Dr. Jessen's involvement in the design and
- 10 implementation of the RDI program. The specific language,"
- 11 which is underlined, "in his book is unclassified and may be
- 12 elicited in open session of the Commission."
- The following information is also -- "To avoid
- 14 disclosure of information that would tend to identify CIA
- 15 personnel, contractors, or locations of black sites"
- 16 consistent with -- consistent with previous assertions of the
- 17 national security privilege of which I have made findings in
- 18 favor of the defense along these lines and -- and that has not
- 19 changed nor will it -- will it, unless the government all of a
- 20 sudden tells us they can -- you can just talk about all
- 21 that -- "The defense may not elicit in an open session
- 22 confirmation of any physical descriptions of such
- 23 individuals" -- which is consistent with their previous

- 1 assertions of which I have made findings that the -- the
- 2 defense has been precluded from doing that --
- 3 "pre-RDI/post-RDI biographical information of such
- 4 individuals, or descriptions of locations, even if such
- 5 information is included in the book.
- 6 "Any such questions must be asked in a closed
- 7 session" -- which, to be honest with you, is a slight
- 8 difference from what was previously -- previously discussed,
- 9 so if and when we get to a closed session, I'm curious how
- 10 this is going to play out with respect to what was previously
- **11** precluded.
- 12 "Any such questions must be asked in a closed
- 13 session" -- sorry to repeat myself. "The prosecution will
- 14 continue to assert the national security privilege over all
- 15 such information of all other CIA personnel, contractors, and
- 16 descriptions of locations not specifically described in the
- 17 book."
- 18 My interpretation of that as the -- as the commission
- 19 is as follows: If it's in the book, you can talk about it in
- 20 an open session as long as it does not ask you for -- to -- to
- 21 confirm specific identifying information about a specific
- 22 person or the geographic location of a black site.
- Now, as far as the internal construct of a black site,

- 1 what was being used, what it looked -- what -- what the
- 2 internal stuff looked like, all of those kinds of things, I
- 3 don't see that that's prohibited by this paragraph 75. Just,
- 4 for example, information that would make it very clear that
- 5 country X was the location of that particular place of
- 6 interrogation, for example, whether or not Humvees were there;
- 7 whether or not, you know, people speaking a certain language
- 8 were -- were present, you know, all of -- all of these types
- 9 of things are the types of information that -- that the
- 10 government has asserted that privilege over.
- 11 Now, what's interesting is when we get to a closed
- 12 session, if that information is contained in the book, the
- 13 government is now saying defense can ask about that in a
- **14** closed session.
- 15 Once again, I remind the parties that there -- we are
- 16 still at this pretrial balance between closed and open, and
- 17 the fact that something has -- has -- is necessary to be
- 18 discussed in this closed session, prior to trial, information
- 19 that is disclosed in a closed session, the defense still has
- 20 at least the opportunity, which we will probably end up
- 21 arguing about with the 505 process, of at least giving notice
- 22 of I want to talk about this in an open session or this is the
- 23 information that I want to use.

- 1 And then I'm going to have to make some hard calls 2 about whether or not they can use that actual evidence at 3 trial against the guilt or, you know, not guilt of the -- the 4 accused who are -- who are charged for these offenses. 5 just want to make sure that -- that that unclassified 6 paragraph is out there. 7 With respect to last-minute changes, I get it. 8 is -- it is -- it is not ideal. That's why I specifically 9 wanted the government to put on what -- what they've changed. 10 Declassification is typically more helpful than unhelpful. 11 To the extent that the defense notices that there is 12 something that's inaccurate, something has been declassified, 13 while we would want to avoid that, I do think that is part of 14 the role of the defense, to call the government on something 15 when they see it. I mean, that's the adversarial process of, 16 like hey, I think you got this wrong. You need to fix this. 17 But we shouldn't have overclassification either for stuff 18 that's clearly been declassified for significant periods of 19 time, and so it's finding that balance. 20 So I understand the issues. I haven't ruled on
- Mr. al Hawsawi -- excuse me, you are representing

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anything yet.

23 Mr. al Hawsawi, so -- but, Mr. Ruiz, if you would like your

- 1 five minutes, you may take them now, sir.
- 2 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: I'll take my five minutes, Judge.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. You may.
- 4 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Judge, I've -- we've been here before.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: We have.
- 6 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: In your -- in your short stint, I think
- 7 you've been here before. And that is exactly the -- the
- 8 problem I see with this process. Your comments are well
- 9 taken. I understand and know where they're coming from.
- 10 But the reality is that in 2008, Mr. Clayton Trivett
- 11 filed a notice saying that we're ready for trial, that all
- 12 discovery had been provided. And that would also subsume that
- 13 all classified information disclosures had been made and the
- 14 appropriate guidance was in place and the parties knew what
- 15 the rules were before they engaged in that trial.
- That's 2008. That's 12 years ago. And just a couple
- 17 days ago, we continue to get new rules, new guidelines, new
- 18 explanations on how to conduct this hearing. This is
- 19 fundamentally at odds with due process.
- 20 And I understand that there is a tension between all
- 21 of us on -- in terms of wanting to make positive progress and,
- 22 at the same time, wanting to be faithful to the due process
- 23 that's due in a case where you have a capital defendant who

- 1 ultimately may lose their life through a judicially sanctioned
- 2 process. That is the tension.
- I also understand the military culture. Having served
- 4 for 24 years, I get the fact that part of that mentality and
- 5 part of that conditioning and culture is to try and accomplish
- 6 a mission by any means, in any way, shape, or form, even when
- 7 the conditions are not, as you indicated, ideal.
- 8 But I would suggest to you, Judge, that that is not
- 9 the standard. Less than ideal is not the standard. And I
- 10 think you know that very well; I'm not suggesting otherwise.
- 11 But that's not the standard in a capital trial, even in the
- 12 pretrial stage. These are critical stages of the proceedings,
- 13 where real rights and -- and real issues are being decided
- 14 that will impact significantly what happens at trial.
- 15 I would say to you, Judge, if you find some spare time
- 16 for reading, which is probably not -- not very much, you may
- 17 want to look at the 367 series, the (MAH) 367 series. That
- 18 series chronicles a history of conflicts between due process
- 19 in this case and national security privilege.
- There is language that we've cited about previous
- 21 judges in this commission have said when that tension becomes
- 22 too much, the government must choose, and the choice is -- is
- 23 one or the other. You can't have both.

1 And, quite frankly, what the government has been 2 having for the past decade is both. They've had the ability 3 to erode the defense function, to erode the due process that 4 is due in this case, and continue to prosecute this case, 5 because there is this real desire and there is this culture of 6 getting a mission accomplished. But that is inconsistent with 7 the type of process that is ultimately due in a capital case. 8 And that is the problem, is we continue to press forward. We 9 try to do the best that we can, but it's an ever-shifting 10 landscape that has a real impact on our preparation. 11 not be seen here, but there is a real impact. 12 I received notice of this new guidance when I was in 13 transit. I took the rotator, so I was out of pocket for two 14 days. I didn't have access to the classified system. It was 15 the first thing I read when I got on island because I didn't 16 know how it had changed everything that I had been preparing, 17 thinking, and trying to organize to make an efficient and 18 zealous presentation for Mr. al Hawsawi. But there is a real 19 impact, Judge. 20 Just this weekend, you saw that the NFL played their 21 playoffs. They're getting ready for the Super Bowl, and 22 you're going to have the Chiefs and the 49ers. And the 23 equivalent of this really is that right before that game,

1 teams would be handed a new set of rules. Instead of the 2 rules that they've known for the entire time that they're 3 going to play this game by, they're going to be sent a new set 4 of rules that they're going to have to adjust to. They've set 5 their playbook, they've gotten ready to play this biggest of 6 games. 7 What do you think would happen if a new story broke 8 that the NFL had changed the rules for the Kansas City Chiefs 9 three days before the Super Bowl that told them that, you 10 know, now they could do something entirely different or 11 couldn't do something that they've been doing all along. 12 public wouldn't stand for it. 13 And yet we have a capital defendant, Mr. al Hawsawi, 14 who is looking at losing his life and we get that same kind of 15 treatment very often where the rules change, we have to 16 adjust, we have to reorganize everything that we're doing 17 right before we come in here and question critical witnesses. 18 I would just say, Judge, that's not consistent with 19 due process, and I think we've got to get to a point where --20 the government has had 12 years to figure this out. They've 21 known that this evidence is out there far longer than we've

known. They've known the possibilities and the witnesses that

would likely come and testify.

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1 There has to come a point where there's a finality to 2 the ever-shifting landscape because that goes into what 3 Mr. Sowards indicated, which is this litigation advantage and 4 the way that it does chill the defense function and the way 5 that it does impact our ability to prepare. 6 At some point, there has -- this pattern, this process 7 has to stop or the court has to just say, in my -- in my 8 opinion, this is inconsistent with due process. This is not 9 the way to run a capital trial. At some point, there must be 10 some finality in the guidance, and the defense must be in a 11 position where we understand the rules of the road and we can 12 abide by them. 13 And that goes back to the comment I made in the closed 14 session, Judge, when I talked to you about asking questions of 15 these witnesses, and I said to you, Judge, I'm going to stand 16 up there, and I'm going to ask questions in good faith based 17 on the guidance that I understand, based on consultation with 18 the professionals on my team who are there to guide me along 19 these lines. I mean, that's the best I can do. 20 This whole process of questioning witnesses and 21 constantly having conversations with the government, I 22 understand that. Again, there's a willingness to try to do

things by -- by the rules that are laid out before us.

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- 1 does have a degrading effect on our ability to effectively
- 2 question a witness, to thoroughly question a witness without
- 3 having constantly to check and see if we're stepping on
- 4 eggshells that have been recently laid there for us.
- 5 So those are my comments, Judge. I echo the
- 6 sentiments of my colleagues and adopt their legal arguments as
- 7 well. But I do think the court needs to think long and hard
- 8 about, is there a point at which we just stop this and say
- 9 what is the finality in this guidance? How long does the
- 10 government get to figure this out? And are we going to be
- 11 trying to figure this out on the eve of trial as well?
- 12 Because we're 12 years into this and we're still here.
- And this -- this in and of itself, Judge, is the
- 14 impact. We have a hearing with two witnesses who have
- 15 traveled who are of significant importance to all of the
- 16 parties who are waiting while we discuss this issue because of
- 17 the late disclosure and then the late guidance.
- So those are my comments, Judge. Thank you.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 20 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Your Honor?
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Sowards.
- 22 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Yes. I'd beg your indulgence for just
- 23 a minute in response to a couple of things you mentioned

- **1** before Mr. Ruiz spoke.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Real quick. Two minutes.
- 3 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: First, Your Honor, the happy news is
- 4 that your reading of paragraph 75, if that is consistent with
- 5 the government's understanding of that, the scope of it, may
- 6 be helpful in our resolution of some of these conflicts.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: I'm getting a nod, so I don't think we're
- 8 going to hear them say something different, so ----
- 9 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Okay. Well, Judge -- and we -- as a
- 10 defense attorney, I'm very concerned about knowing and
- 11 intelligent waivers. So let me just say that -- and I
- 12 apologize, I misspoke, that it was paragraph 71; if I said 72,
- 13 it was 71 in the old guidance.
- 14 But that specifically -- in addition to the helpful
- 15 language you read as to the new guidance, 75, the other -- the
- 16 other conflict there is that it specifically said that the
- 17 information in the book is unclassified information, so
- 18 broader in terms of what he's disclosing, the author is
- 19 disclosing. The comparison with paragraph 75 on page 26 of
- 20 the January 21st guidance now narrows that down to the
- 21 specific language, underlined, in his book.
- So as long as that -- what I -- initially it concerned
- 23 us very much and was fairly alarming that we went from general

- 1 information, all facts, all information is unclassified, to
- 2 only being able to rely on specific language gave us a
- 3 problem. So if Mr. Trivett, upon reflection, still agrees
- 4 with the commission, that's great.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 6 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: The second thing was -- and I
- 7 understand Your Honor was speaking in -- in general terms
- 8 about there is obviously several differences between pretrial
- **9** and what we have to do in terms of the actual trial.
- 10 But what I would just, without being presumptuous,
- 11 remind the commission of, because we have mentioned it a few
- 12 times, and that is the United States Supreme Court guidance in
- 13 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, particularly at 68-69, a 1932
- 14 case which remains a guiding principle for the right to
- 15 counsel in capital cases.
- And what that specifically emphasizes is that the
- 17 pretrial stage at which time thorough-going investigation and
- 18 consultation is as important a part of the right to counsel as
- 19 is counsel during the trial. And particularly, in light of
- 20 our colleague, Mr. Harrington's comments which made explicit
- 21 the issue, there is going to be ongoing consultation and then
- 22 further investigation as a result of what we can explore here.
- And then the final point is, with respect to the

- 1 court's ruling on AE 680B, which I'm not going to reargue --
- 2 that was on the one in terms of the position of the parties,
- $\bf 3$ whatnot -- that I -- that I did want the record to reflect my
- 4 formal objection to going forward under -- under those
- 5 restrictions. And then in due course, just to alert, I will
- 6 either file a motion for reconsideration or just a formal
- 7 notice of that objection.
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, sir.
- 9 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you very much, sir.
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you. Okay. All right.
- 11 Trial Counsel, would you like to -- was the court --
- **12** was the court's interpretation of paragraph 75 incorrect?
- 13 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: It was not incorrect, sir.
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you. All right. Is
- 15 there anything else that you need to say on this?
- **16** MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: One second to confer?
- **17** MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 18 [Counsel conferred.]
- 19 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: Subject to any questions you may have,
- **20** sir.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: No questions.
- 22 MTC [MR. TRIVETT]: Thank you, sir.
- 23 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you. All right.

- **1** Mr. Connell.
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: I'm inclined to, before we start the
- 4 testimony of the witness, take a brief comfort break and then
- **5** call the witness. Are you prepared to proceed?
- 6 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. We're in recess for -- we'll
- 8 go ahead and take 20 minutes.
- 9 [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 1038, 21 January 2020.]
- 10 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 1101,
- 11 21 January 2020.]
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Military commission is called to order.
- **13** Parties are present.
- **14** General Martins.
- 15 CP [BG MARTINS]: Your Honor, Mr. Swann is absent from the
- **16** courtroom ----
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 18 CP [BG MARTINS]: ---- on commission business.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir. All right.
- We will go for one hour and then take the lunch break
- 21 and then reconvene after a 75-minute lunch break.
- 22 Mr. Connell, please call your witness.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, I call Dr. James Mitchell.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Please retrieve the witness.
- 2 CP [BG MARTINS]: Sir, please proceed to the witness
- 3 stand, remain standing, and raise your right hand for the
- 4 oath.
- 5 JAMES E. MITCHELL, civilian, was called as a witness for the
- 6 defense, was sworn, and testified as follows:
- 7 CP [BG MARTINS]: The witness answered affirmatively.
- 8 He's a little far away from the mic. If you'd please take
- **9** your seat.
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: Take a seat, sir.
- 11 CP [BG MARTINS]: Please be seated.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Go ahead, sir.
- 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION
- 14 Questions by the Chief Prosecutor [BG MARTINS]:
- **15** Q. Good morning, sir. Could you please state your full
- **16** name and spell it for the record.
- **17** A. Spell my entire name?
- 18 Q. Yes, please.
- 19 A. My name is James Elmer, E-L-M-E-R, Mitchell. So it is
- 20 J-A-M-E-S, E-L-M-E-R, Mitchell, M-I-T-C-H-E-L-L.
- Q. Thank you, sir. And what is your state of residence?
- 22 A. I live in Florida.
- 23 CP [BG MARTINS]: Thank you.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Connell. Oh, Mr. Groharing. 2 TC [MR. GROHARING]: Your Honor, as you may recall in the 3 616 series when we took the testimony of the interpreter, we 4 provided a key to the witness that was marked as an appellate 5 exhibit. I have a similar key prepared for this witness ----6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. 7 TC [MR. GROHARING]: ---- to help facilitate his 8 testimony. If I could approach, Your Honor? 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may. Okay. It will be 628NNNNN 10 (Gov). 11 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Excuse me, Your Honor, before we 12 begin. Is it possible to lay the binders down on their -- on their sides? 13 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Oh. 15 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Does that interfere with you? Then 16 never mind. 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: No, if that's a problem, we can ----
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Which binder offends Mr. -----

MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, let's ----

20 ACC [MR. BINALSHIBH]: Judge?

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- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Wall to our left.
- 22 Mr. Groharing, the intent is I have reviewed
- 23 628NNNNN (Gov). Is the intent to have the witness keep this

- 1 in his possession during his testimony?
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Yes, sir.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. I will allow him to do so.
- 4 TC [MR. GROHARING]: Obviously not during breaks, Your
- 5 Honor. We'll secure it during breaks for classification
- 6 reasons.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, I'm handing you this document. TOP
- 8 SECRET cover sheet is on top of it.
- **9** WIT: Thank you, sir.
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: If you'd please take a minute and look at
- 11 it, and then I just have a couple of questions about the --
- 12 about the document once you've seen it.
- **13** WIT: Sorry, sir?
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: I just have a couple of questions for you
- 15 after you've had a chance to take a look at what it is.
- 16 [Pause.]
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: Have you had the opportunity to
- 18 the discuss the -- how this document is being used with
- 19 respect to the unique functional identifiers and substitutions
- 20 for actual locations of any black sites?
- 21 WIT: Yes.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. And do you have any questions
- 23 about how to use this document at this time?

- 1 WIT: I don't have any questions but I have a comment
- 2 about the document.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 4 WIT: This document identifies a number of people who
- 5 are -- as interrogators who were not interrogators.
- **6** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- WIT: And I think it presents a false and misleading
- 8 picture that these folks were interrogated the entire time
- 9 they were in CIA custody when, in fact, they were not.
- So the vast majority of these people that they
- 11 identify as interrogators simply aren't. They're debriefers.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: They're debriefers.
- 13 WIT: Or targeters or analysts or subject matter experts
- **14** on something like WMD.
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. I'll tell you what, then. We may
- 16 have some questions for you along those lines later.
- 17 WIT: Yes, sir.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: That's one of the benefits of having you
- 19 here to testify is to provide a little more clarity on some of
- 20 these issues, so -- but with respect to then the -- the -- a
- 21 name and a unique functional identifier, do you feel
- 22 comfortable using that, that system?
- WIT: Yes, sir. I can use that for that.

- **1** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Great.
- **2** TC [MR. GROHARING]: Judge?
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel.
- 4 TC [MR. GROHARING]: I just ask, we have invoked the
- 5 national security privilege over the information in that
- 6 document, so to the extent the defense needs to approach, I
- 7 would just ask the witness to cover it at that time ----
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: Makes sense.
- 9 TC [MR. GROHARING]: ---- so that the information is not
- 10 disclosed.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Please do so, sir.
- 12 WIT: I will try. Would someone remind me if that comes
- **13** up?
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, we'll make sure we remind you.
- 15 WIT: I'm an old guy and a little bit slow.
- **16** MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand. All right.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: And, sir, it's very unlikely we're
- 18 going to get to that document before lunch, so you can just
- 19 cover it up now if you want, and I'll let you know if it would
- 20 be helpful to take it out or if you think it would be helpful
- 21 to take it out.
- WIT: Okay.
- LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Connell, just general guidance, I
- 2 haven't ruled on the issue of the limitations in -- in
- 3 paragraph 75 that I read yet.
- 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: So to the extent that you can push that
- 6 towards the end of any open session testimony at this point,
- 7 it would be great if you could until I can actually address
- 8 it.
- 9 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Understood, sir.
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: In other words, the -- the whole book is
- 11 fair game except for, like I said, just specific details about
- 12 an individual or ----
- 13 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I understood. I understood your
- 14 ruling -- or maybe not ruling, guidance, and think I can
- 15 comply.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. If you can't, we'll address it on
- 17 the fly; but I just didn't know how you had structured your
- 18 opening ----
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir. If you need me to -- if
- 20 you're like, "Mr. Connell, could you come back to that,"
- 21 that's fine.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Perfect.
- 23 Mr. Nevin?

1 CDC [MR. NEVIN]: If I could be heard. Lest there be a 2 misunderstanding, I intend to move -- depending on the 3 witness' use or nonuse of that document, I intend to move that 4 it be produced to counsel ----5 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand. CDC [MR. NEVIN]: ---- to the extent that it's relied upon 6 7 by the witness. And I believe I made a similar motion when --8 in -- in the 616 series when we were ----9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes. 10 CDC [MR. NEVIN]: ---- when we took the interpreter's 11 testimony. I -- I don't need to make the motion now, but I 12 wanted you to know I will be ----13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir. 14 CDC [MR. NEVIN]: ---- at a later time. 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Not a problem. 16 All right, Mr. Connell, thank you. It is -- thank you 17 for letting me have a couple of minutes here to start. 18 your witness. 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you. 20 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Your Honor, may I have just a moment 21 with ----

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MJ [Col COHEN]: Or maybe not.

LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: I'm sorry.

22

23

- 1 [Counsel conferred.]
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Connell.
- 3 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you.
- 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 5 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **6** Q. Good morning, sir.
- 7 A. Good morning.
- **8** Q. My name is James Connell, and I'm the attorney for
- 9 Mr. al Baluchi, who is at the fourth table.
- 10 I'd like to begin by saying thank you for traveling
- 11 down here. I know that there's a -- at least a controversy
- 12 over whether civilians can be required to come to Guantanamo
- 13 or to a video teleconference, and I know you didn't have to do
- 14 it, and I just wanted to tell you that I appreciate it.
- 15 A. Well, thank you. I actually did it for the victims
- **16** and families, not for you.
- 17 Q. Well, fair enough. And from my limited experience,
- 18 I'm sure they appreciate it, too.
- 19 The -- you may have noticed already that there is
- 20 somewhat of a ridiculous number of documents that we have.
- 21 And we don't have any network access in this SCIF, so we have
- 22 a lot of paper. I will always give you the opportunity to
- 23 review a document if I ask you about it. Or if you want to

- 1 review a document, can we agree that you'll just ask me, hey,
- 2 can you -- can I review that document, and I'll find it for
- **3** you.
- 4 A. We don't have to agree to that. If you offer me a
- 5 document, I'll review it.
- **6** Q. All right. My specific question is, if you would --
- 7 I'm just letting you know, if you want a document -- maybe I
- 8 don't even know it's relevant, but if you want to review a
- 9 document, please just ask and I'll do my best to get it for
- **10** you.
- **11** A. Will do.
- 12 Q. All right. So I can tell you that the documents are
- 13 organized by trigram.
- 14 A. I don't know what that means.
- 15 Q. Yes, sir. I'm sorry. We're in the sort of the ground
- 16 rules section, so I'm trying to explain to you what things
- **17** mean.
- So, for example, there's a trigram which is STA, and
- 19 that's short for statements. And so basically all the
- 20 statements of the defendants go in that trigram, and then they
- 21 get organized 1 through 20,000 or whatever. There's another
- 22 one, PRG, for program. All certain category of documents
- 23 related to that go in there.

- 1 So each of those binders that is -- basically you're
- 2 surrounded by have a trigram or sometimes more than one
- 3 trigram of information in them. And if I'm orienting you to
- 4 them, I will tell you which trigram we're looking for first,
- 5 let you find the binder, and then I'll tell you the number,
- **6** which are in ordinary numerical sequence. Does that make
- 7 sense?
- 8 A. Yes.
- **Q**. Okay. And this is something very much changing over
- 10 time, but when I can, I'll cut out that process and show you a
- 11 document on the document camera. And if you need me to make
- 12 it bigger, I can make it bigger. If you need me to look at a
- 13 different part of the document, you just let me know. Is that
- **14** fair?
- **15** A. I don't know whether fair or unfair applies to it. I
- 16 don't know what you mean by "fair."
- 17 Q. Okay. Can we agree on that as a procedure?
- **18** A. Sure.
- 19 Q. The -- I just want to inform you that when I'm talking
- 20 to you about Bates numbers, say PRG-777 or something like
- 21 that, your documents are organized by Bates number to make it
- 22 easier for you; but the military judge and the -- the court
- 23 reporters have their documents organized differently, so I'll

- 1 also mention an AE number. That number is for the record and
- 2 for the military judge; you don't have to worry about it.
- 3 It's sometimes confusing because I say two numbers.
- 4 The number that you have to worry about is the trigram
- 5 and then the digits that follow it. Does that make sense?
- **6** A. If I have any questions, I'll ask you.
- 7 Q. Very good. Thank you, sir.
- 8 So obviously a substantial amount of information in
- 9 this case is classified, and I'd like to represent to you that
- 10 classified information in a military commission works a little
- 11 bit differently than, for example, the deposition that you
- **12** were involved in.
- 13 The military judge has ruled that all of us in this
- 14 room are custodians of classified information. That includes
- 15 the defense, that includes you, that includes the prosecution,
- 16 and the judge. And that means that any of us can raise an
- 17 objection if we think that a question calls for a classified
- 18 answer. Do you understand that responsibility?
- 19 A. I understand what you're saying.
- **Q.** Is there a problem?
- **21** A. No.
- Q. Okay. And so I'll represent to you, sir, that every
- 23 question that I ask is intended to call for an unclassified

- 1 answer in this forum. The -- so if you think that I'm asking
- 2 for -- intentionally asking for a classified answer, I'm not.
- 3 So, for example, you have in front of you 628NNNNN, which is a
- 4 key to UFIs. You don't have to take it out.
- 5 A. I don't ----
- **6** Q. The document that the judge just handed you?
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: It would be the Top Secret document I
- 8 just gave you.
- **9** WIT: This thing here?
- 10 Q. Yeah. You don't -- I'm just saying you have that in
- 11 front of you, sir?
- **12** A. I do.
- Q. And did the prosecution explain the UFI process to
- **14** you?
- **15** A. Yes.
- 16 Q. And if I ask you a question that begins with the word
- 17 "who," I'm asking for the UFI, if one exists. Do you
- **18** understand?
- **19** A. I understand what you said, yes.
- Q. Okay. I'm not asking you for the real name of the
- 21 person if they have a UFI. Do you understand?
- **22** A. Yes.
- Q. Yes. And so if I ask you -- have you been briefed on

- 1 the location number or color code system for detention sites?
- **2** A. Is that a question?
- **3** Q. Yes. Have you been briefed on the color code or
- 4 location number system for detention sites, is the question.
- **5** A. It's on this form.
- **6** Q. Okay. Would -- did someone explain -- did the
- 7 prosecution explain to you how it works?
- **8** A. Yes.
- **Q**. Okay. And so I want to represent to you that if I ask
- 10 you a question that begins with "where" and the answer is
- 11 classified, I'm asking you for the unclassified substitute,
- 12 the color code or the location number, instead of the name of
- **13** a country. Do you understand?
- **14** A. Yes.
- 15 Q. Okay. Did the government explain to you that in their
- 16 current interpretation, both the color code, say COBALT or
- 17 BLACK or whatever, and the location number refer to detention
- **18** sites specifically, not countries?
- 19 A. They didn't explain that to me, but it's pretty
- 20 obvious.
- Q. Okay. And I'll also represent to you that if I ask
- 22 you a question that begins with the words "do you know,"
- 23 I'm -- that's kind of a yes-or-no question. I'm asking you

- 1 whether you know the information; I'm not asking for the
- **2** underlying information. Does that make sense?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Okay. The -- sometimes you might want to give an
- 5 answer that involves classified information or you might not
- 6 sure -- be sure whether it's classified or not. Can you
- 7 envision that situation?
- 8 A. I can imagine that might happen.
- **9** Q. Okay. In that case, sir, I'll tell you that this --
- 10 the military judge's practice or best practice is that the --
- 11 that you simply say, "Your Honor, I think there's a 505
- **12** issue."
- A. Yeah, I can't guarantee that I'll remember "there's a
- **14** 505 issue."
- **15** Q. Okay.
- 16 A. I mean, I -- I can probably remember it may be
- 17 classified ----
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Perfect.
- 19 A. ---- but to ask me to memorize your nomenclature at
- 20 your convenience seems a little extreme to me.
- 21 Q. Okay. Can you understand why the military judge might
- 22 not want you to answer a question that the answer to that is
- 23 classified because it might be confirming or denying

- 1 classified information?
- **2** A. Certainly.
- 3 Q. Okay. And so with that in mind, can -- does it make
- 4 sense that referring to the 505 process in some way -- which I
- 5 can write down the number for you if it would help -- would --
- **6** it seems like a reasonable accommodation?
- 7 A. No. Let me -- let me -- I'm here to answer your
- 8 questions. I'm here to shed light on what I -- what I did,
- 9 what I was involved in, what I saw. And so I'm not going to
- 10 make some sort of a guarantee to answer in a specific way
- 11 about a hypothetical question that I haven't heard.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Tell you what, sir. How about this: If
- 13 you think that the answer itself is classified, will you just
- 14 say, "I'm not sure I can answer that right now"?
- 15 WIT: Yes, sir.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Perfect.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Great.
- 18 Q. Did the government explain what it means when they
- 19 invoke national security privilege to you?
- **20** A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that when the
- 22 government asserts national security privilege, that they're
- 23 essentially taking a fact, whether you want to say it or I

- 1 want to hear it, and removing it from the process?
- 2 A. That's my understanding.
- **Q**. Okay. And so without asking you to adopt any
- 4 convention, I have to tell you a convention that I have to
- 5 follow because the judge, military judge, has told me to.
- 6 So that specific convention is that if I want to ask
- 7 whether certain information is covered by the national
- 8 security privilege, I have to ask you the following -- in the
- 9 following form: If I were to ask you X fact, would you have
- 10 to decline based on national security privilege? Do you
- **11** understand?
- I can repeat it if you want. It's a little confusing.
- A. It's not confusing to me. I understand what you said.
- 14 Q. Okay. Good. And the reason for that is that I'm
- 15 often trying to stay on very narrow unclassified ground, and
- 16 so I often have to ask very narrow questions. Make sense?
- **17** A. I understand what you're saying.
- 18 Q. Okay. So I'm sure you'll notice that, unlike the
- 19 deposition that you were involved in, there are no separate
- **20** CIA attorneys present.
- 21 A. Well, since I don't know everyone in the room, I can't
- 22 be sure of that, but I'll take your word for it.
- Q. You know, actually, sir, you shouldn't take my word

- 1 because I don't know either, so I'll move on from that
- 2 question.
- 3 The -- but I will tell you that the prosecution --
- 4 prosecution represents all the interests of the United States
- 5 in this case on behalf of all United States agencies. Does
- 6 that seem fair?
- **7** A. Fair?
- **8** Q. Does that make sense?
- **9** A. Yes.
- 10 Q. And in the same way that your personal attorneys
- 11 represent your personal interests, correct?
- **12** A. I would hope they do.
- Q. And so if anyone objects, can we agree that you'll
- 14 simply wait until whatever discussion there is finishes and
- 15 the military judge instructs you?
- **16** A. I will attempt to do that, but I -- again, I can't
- 17 agree in advance how I'm going to respond to a question that I
- 18 haven't heard. You know, it's possible that I may shoot my
- 19 mouth off prematurely, and what I would expect is that -- that
- 20 you have procedures in case that accidentally happens.
- Q. Right. So I will tell you that we do have procedures,
- 22 and one of them is going through this -- this little
- 23 organizing -- these organizing principles, but there also is a

- 1 40-second delay. Have you been instructed on that?
- **2** A. Yes.
- **3** Q. Okay. So I'll just inform you that the school of
- 4 examination that I follow calls for me to divide my questions
- 5 into -- into -- into broad topics. There will be books, which
- 6 are broad topic, and then within that book, there will be
- 7 chapters. And I'm informing you now they're organized by
- 8 subject and not chronology because I don't want you to be
- **9** thrown off by that.
- And I'll commit to you that when I change chapters,
- 11 like change topics, I'll tell you so that I'm -- I don't trick
- 12 you in some way or you think I'm talking about a different
- 13 topic. Right now, for example, we're in introductory
- 14 material, ground rules.
- 15 And I'll commit to you this is not like TV. None of
- 16 my questions are tricks. You have information that you want
- 17 to tell us. I have information that I want to know. And
- 18 that's the way this process works. Can we agree on that?
- 19 A. I'm -- I'm fine with the process.
- Q. Great. All right. So now in that process, we're
- 21 moving on to a different chapter, which is about your book.
- **22** Understand?
- A. I understand that we're going to talk about my book.

- 1 Q. Very good. So you published a book in 2016; is that
- 2 right?
- **3** A. I would prefer to just look at the book if you're
- 4 going to ask me questions about the book.
- **5** Q. Are you saying you want a copy of the book?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: The court's indulgence, Your Honor?
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- **9** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, may I approach?
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 11 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm going to hand the witness a copy
- 12 of Enhanced Interrogation by James E. Mitchell. And the
- 13 prosecution and I just looked through it to make sure that it
- 14 didn't have any markings in it, so it's a clean copy.
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Counsel, remind me. That is a
- 16 separate AE exhibit or am I now marking that as an AE exhibit
- 17 or appellate exhibit? I know it was referenced in notices of
- 18 exhibits. I just don't know.
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, the general practice has been
- 20 that when we refer to books or -- in fact, the court's rule is
- 21 that when we refer to books or easily available bulky
- 22 material, that we don't place it ----
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.

- 1 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: ---- in the record. If the military
- 2 commission decided this was an exception to that, I would
- 3 understand.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Let's see how much we use it.
- 5 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- **6** MJ [Col COHEN]: Thanks.
- 7 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 8 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **Q.** Dr. Mitchell, about -- and I'll take any kind of round
- 10 number. About how many copies of that book were sold?
- 11 A. I actually haven't been tracking that, so I don't
- 12 know. Probably 40 or 50,000. I don't know.
- **13** Q. Okay. And ----
- **14** A. It's a guess.
- 15 Q. I'm sorry? A guess, sure.
- 16 You hold a security clearance; is that right?
- 17 A. Again, that's one of those things that I assume is
- 18 true, since I'm here and have access to Top Secret
- 19 information. I haven't been briefed that I continue to have a
- 20 security clearance.
- Q. Do you consider yourself to be a good steward of
- 22 national security information?
- 23 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. In the period of time between 2002 and let's just cut
- 2 it off at 2006, you held a TOP SECRET//SCI clearance; is that
- 3 correct?
- **4** A. Yes.
- **5** Q. And I assume there were additional compartments on top
- 6 of the SCI?
- 7 A. Yes.
- **8** Q. One of those compartments dealt with the Rendition,
- **9** Detention, and Interrogation Program, or RDI program?
- **10** A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And you knew, of course, that you were not
- 12 disclosed -- allowed to disclose classified information from
- 13 that compartment, correct?
- **14** A. Yes.
- 15 Q. At any time did you ever see a security classification
- **16** guide for that compartment?
- 17 A. I don't recall.
- 18 Q. I assume that when you got your clearance, you signed
- **19** a standard nondisclosure agreement?
- **20** A. That would be true.
- 21 Q. And in that standard -- in that nondisclosure
- 22 agreement you committed not to disclose classified information
- 23 to any unauthorized person; is that a fair characterization?

- **1** A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And you agreed that if you were uncertain about the
- 3 classification of any information, you would confirm from an
- 4 authorized official that that information was unclassified,
- **5** correct?
- **6** A. If it was part of the nondisclosure agreement, I
- 7 signed it.
- **8** Q. Okay. In your book, *Enhanced Interrogation*, you had a
- 9 coauthor, Bill Harlow; is that right?
- 10 A. Correct.
- 11 Q. And Mr. Harlow is a former spokesperson for the CIA
- **12** from 1997 to 2004?
- 13 A. That's correct.
- 14 Q. And as spokesperson, his entire job was speaking on
- 15 behalf of the CIA without compromising national security.
- **16** Would you agree?
- 17 A. You'd have to ask him what his job was and what he
- **18** did. I -- I wouldn't presume to guess.
- 19 Q. When did you begin the process of writing the book?
- 20 A. After I talked with the PRB about how we could write
- 21 the book together without compromising classified information.
- Q. Great. Could you tell us a little bit more about that
- 23 conversation?

- 1 TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, relevance.
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: We just spent two hours arguing this
- 3 issue, Your Honor. The factual ----
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, I'll allow a little bit of
- 5 testimony. I think this will help me in addressing this
- **6** particular issue. Overruled.
- 7 You may answer, sir.
- 8 A. Okay. So I called the PRB and told them I wanted to
- 9 write the book and that he was going to be the coauthor, and
- 10 they had a system for doing that, which I don't feel that I'm
- 11 at liberty to disclose.
- 12 Q. Did the system involve a mechanism that would allow
- 13 you to check to make sure that facts were unclassified?
- **14** A. Not -- not for the initial draft.
- 15 Q. Okay. How about after the initial draft?
- **16** A. It was submitted to the PRB.
- 17 Q. Through their formal process?
- 18 A. Through their formal process. Every change that
- 19 happened to it after the initial draft had to be submitted to
- 20 the PRB.
- 21 Q. Okay. So the -- if there was a -- you know, a
- 22 version 3, a version 17, whatever, each -- each new change had
- 23 to be submitted to the PRB?

- **1** A. If it was something other than a "he" to "she" or a
- 2 "they" to "them," yes.
- **Q.** For -- without disclosing the substance of the
- 4 communications, can you tell us if they ever gave you any kind
- **5** of feedback?
- **6** A. Of course they do. They grant you a letter that says
- 7 it's been approved.
- **8** Q. Okay. And ----
- **9** A. And they also send a letter that says you need to take
- 10 this stuff out.
- 11 Q. Okay. And did that happen? Did on -- on one or more
- 12 occasions, did they send you a letter saying you needed to
- 13 take something out or change something?
- **14** A. Yes.
- 15 Q. Okay. Approximately how many occasions did that
- 16 occur?
- 17 A. You're talking about specifically for the book?
- **18** Q. Yes, sir.
- 19 A. There were several. I don't remember how many because
- 20 there were -- there were several things that I wanted to
- 21 include in the book that they didn't want me to include. In
- 22 the -- in the final draft, the Department of Defense took more
- 23 out than the -- than the actual CIA did. Because I had

- 1 contact with them where they told me we will not let you write
- 2 about this, we will not let you write about this, we will not
- 3 let you write about this.
- 4 And previously, I had -- because I had been in the
- 5 media for a while, I had submitted a bunch of questions to
- 6 them for review with potential answers that were unrelated to
- 7 the book but became substance for the book. So I already had
- 8 a pretty good feel for what they would let me write about and
- 9 what they wouldn't let me write about.
- 10 Q. And in that answer, is "they" DoD or is "they" CIA?
- 11 A. They is the PRB at the CIA.
- **12** Q. Okay.
- 13 A. The Publication Review Board ----
- **14** Q. Right.
- **15** A. ---- for those who don't know the acronym.
- 16 Q. And did -- when -- when the DoD was undergoing their
- 17 review, did you have to submit it to a separate board, like
- 18 DOPSR under DoD, or did you go through the PRB?
- 19 A. The PRB submitted it to the DoD. In fact, that --
- 20 that was the longest delay in getting the draft back to me.
- Q. So if I correctly understand, the CIA PRB took care of
- 22 making sure that any other agency that might have an equity in
- 23 the information had the opportunity to review it?

- 1 A. And to delete.
- 2 Q. And to delete.
- **3** A. Yeah. Whereas the PRB would say take this sentence
- 4 out, the DoD would say take these pages out.
- **5** Q. I see. And did -- at some point, did DoD write you a
- 6 letter that told you to take certain pages out?
- 7 A. No. It was included with the PRB's letter.
- **8** Q. I understand. Okay.
- 9 Sir, I noticed on the copyright page of your book --
- 10 and you're welcome to look along -- there's a disclaimer.
- **11** A. Yes.
- 12 Q. To the effect that this is not an official release of
- 13 CIA information.
- **14** A. Correct.
- 15 Q. And did the PRB tell you to put that disclaimer in
- 16 there?
- 17 A. Yes, they required it.
- 18 Q. Okay. Now, what year did you begin the book writing
- 19 and PRB interaction process?
- A. You mean in what year did I begin the PRB? They're
- 21 two different answers.
- 22 Q. Fair, sir. Thank you for the clarification. What
- 23 year did you begin writing the book?

- **1** A. Probably 20 -- late 2015, early 2016, somewhere in
- 2 there; maybe even spring 2015, I don't know. Took about eight
- 3 months.
- 4 Q. What year did you submit your initial draft to the
- **5** PRB?
- **6** A. I don't recall.
- 7 Q. Okay. During the course of the process, the overall
- 8 writing process, is it correct that it was during that time
- 9 that you were sued related to some of the subject matter
- **10** material?
- 11 A. I think that what happened was the draft had been
- 12 submitted to the PRB, and we got notice of the lawsuit.
- 13 Q. All right. And during that deposition, you were asked
- 14 about the manuscript which hadn't been finally published yet;
- **15** is that right?
- **16** A. Well, I think at that deposition, the hard copy had
- **17** been published.
- **18** Q. Okay.
- 19 A. And I -- but I don't -- I mean, it's been a while, and
- 20 I just don't recall.
- Q. Sure. The -- during that deposition, there were
- 22 present not just attorneys for you and Dr. Jessen and
- 23 attorneys for the plaintiff, but also representatives of

- 1 various government agencies?
- **2** A. Yes.
- **Q.** And do you have any doubt in your mind that your
- 4 particular manuscript was thoroughly reviewed for classified
- **5** information?
- **6** A. As it stood at the time, given the national security
- 7 classification methodology they were using at the time, I'm
- 8 convinced that they had approved my manuscript saying that
- 9 there was nothing classified in it. That can change, as you
- 10 well know.
- 11 Q. The -- prior to that approval, are you similarly
- 12 convinced that your book was thoroughly reviewed?
- **13** A. By whom?
- **14** Q. By the PRB and associated equity holders?
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, speculation.
- **16** A. Yes, I believe it was.
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: One second. The objection is
- **18** speculation?
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Well, he knows the answer and he's
- 20 already -- we've already laid the foundation for the answer,
- 21 which is the multiple interactions with the PRB.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Overruled. You did ask for his personal
- 23 opinion as to what his thoughts on the process.

- **1** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay.
- WIT: Judge, if you could bring me up to speed on what
- 3 just happened.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah. There was an objection to
- 5 speculation, sir. I gave him the opportunity to respond. I
- **6** overruled it, so your answer stands.
- WIT: Okay.
- **Q**. At the time ----
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, just so you know, if a party stands
- 10 up and says objection, unlike a deposition where it's kind
- 11 of -- just kind of -- it's free-flowing, because we're in the
- 12 actual court as opposed to a deposition, for example, if they
- 13 stand up and say objection, please just pause for a second.
- 14 I'll then hear what the objection is, then I'll give the --
- 15 the party that's asking the question the opportunity to
- 16 respond. If I overrule the objection, I'll then look to you
- 17 and say you may answer.
- 18 If you're -- if it's been a long objection and so
- 19 you're not sure what the question was, just ask to have him
- 20 repeat the question, then you can answer.
- 21 WIT: Did I miss somebody standing up and objecting?
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah. Mr. Groharing had stood up and
- 23 objected.

- 1 WIT: Oh, sorry.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: That's all right. No, that's okay. Like
- 3 I said, just catching things up, but that will be the process.
- **4** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 6 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- 7 Q. So to your understanding, the -- the nondisclosure
- 8 agreement that you signed threatens various repercussions if
- 9 you were to disclose classified information without approval;
- 10 is that correct?
- **11** A. Yes.
- 12 Q. And to your knowledge, did you include any classified
- 13 information at the time of publication of your book?
- 14 A. Well, I -- I must have included something in the draft
- 15 that they thought was classified because they asked me to take
- 16 it out. The same thing would be true for the Department of
- 17 Defense. So logic would dictate that there was something in
- 18 there they didn't like or they anticipated that they wouldn't
- 19 like, and they asked me to remove it.
- Q. And so at the time of publication, all that
- 21 information had been removed?
- A. At the time of publication for the ----
- Q. Of your book, yes, sir.

- 1 A. ---- of the hard copy of the book, the final draft of
- 2 the book or the draft that went to print of the book, that
- 3 would be true.
- **4** Q. Okay.
- **5** A. But again, that changes, as you know, with the federal
- **6** government.
- 7 Q. Yes, sir.
- 8 The ----
- **9** LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: Excuse me, Judge.
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Harrington.
- 11 LDC [MR. HARRINGTON]: Could I have just a moment with
- 12 Mr. Trivett or General Martins for a message I got?
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- **14** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'll stand by, sir.
- **15** MJ [Col COHEN]: Please.
- 16 [Counsel conferred.]
- 17 CP [BG MARTINS]: Your Honor, Counsel shared with me an
- 18 e-mail that seems to indicate somebody observing in the
- 19 Pentagon is noting the feed isn't working well to the Pentagon
- 20 at the moment.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Please have our IT folks look into
- **22** that.
- 23 CP [BG MARTINS]: We're doing so, Your Honor.

1	MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you.
2	Counsel, continue.
3	LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you.
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
5	Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
6	Q. Dr. Mitchell, prior to this past Thursday, right so
7	I'm putting a time boundary on my question prior to this
8	past Thursday, has anyone ever suggested to you that you made
9	an unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the
10	final published version of your book?
11	A. No.
12	Q. I'll ask you to turn to page
13	A.
14	Q. Yes, sir.
15	
16	A. Correct.
17	Q. All right. Did anyone ever suggest to you
18	
19	
20	A. No. And, in fact, I specifically asked about that,
21	and they told me I could use her name specifically.
22	Q. I'd ask you to turn
23	

- **1** A. Okay.
- **Q**. In it, you describe
- 3
- **4** TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, Your Honor.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Basis?
- 6 TC [MR. GROHARING]: As we discussed earlier, I believe
- 7 where counsel is going is the specific physical details of a
- 8 CIA officer. I think that it would call for a classified
- 9 response.
- 10 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: My -- no. The question was very
- 11 specific. "Did you write?"
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right. You are not asking the specifics
- 13 of what's written there?
- **14** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Right.
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Your question is going to be similar to
- 16 the previous one, which is: Did anyone tell you you couldn't
- 17 write what's written there?
- 18 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: That's right, sir.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. I'll overrule that. You're not
- 20 asking for the specifics, and you're not asking him testify as
- 21 to whether or not whether what he wrote was true.
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Right.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.

1 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED

- 2 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **Q**. Would you like me to repeat the question,
- 4 Dr. Mitchell?
- **5** A. If the question is did I write it, I believe I
- 6 understand the question.
- Q. All right. I'll just put some specificity to what
- **8** "it" is just so I'm very clear.
- 9 Did you write about the physique and complexion of a
- 10 Counterterrorism Center operational psychologist?
- **11** A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you at any time that
- 13 including the physique and complexion of a Counterterrorism
- 14 Center operational psychologist would damage national
- 15 security?
- **16** A. In my book or in my testimony?
- **17** Q. In your book.
- 18 A. In my book, no. In my testimony, yes.
- **19** Q. What were you told about your testimony?
- **20** A. I was told ----
- Q. Let me put it -- let me put it differently.
- 22 A. You asked the question. Let me answer it.
- Q. I just wanted to tell you if the person who told you

- 1 was your own attorneys, then -- then don't answer the
- 2 question.
- **3** A. As part of the briefing on the classification
- 4 guidance, I was told that I could not link descriptions with
- 5 particular identifiers. That's somebody telling me in --
- 6 that -- and it was done by the prosecutors, that I couldn't do
- 7 that. It's part of the briefing. It's not, you know, some
- 8 nefarious thing.
- **9** Q. The -- without telling me the name, you know the name
- 10 of the operational psychologist who is referred to at page 21,
- 11 correct?
- 12 A. I could probably remember it. I'm not sure it would
- 13 come to mind right now, but, yeah, it would -- I could
- 14 certainly identify it on a list.
- 15 Q. Sure. Have you ever seen any of the professional
- 16 profiles of that person, again, in your -- in your
- 17 professional career? LinkedIn ----
- 18 A. No, I don't follow that person.
- 19 Q. Okay. Sir, I'd like to direct your attention



- **21** A. Sure.
- **Q.** In the first paragraph, is it correct that you
- 23 described the hair color of a subject matter expert who

- **1** targeted al Nashiri?
- 2 A. Let me read this.
- **3** Q. Sure.
- **4** A. Yes.
- **5** Q. And prior to last Thursday, did anyone ever suggest to
- 6 you that including describing the hair color of a CIA targeter
- 7 in your book would damage national security?
- 8 A. No.
- **9** Q. Sir, I'd like to direct your attention to page 105.
- 10 Sir, is it correct that at page 105, you use a pseudonym for
- 11 the chief interrogator for the newly formed Rendition,
- 12 Detention, and Interrogation Group of the CTC's Special
- **13** Missions Department?
- **14** A. Say that to me again.
- 15 Q. Sure. Is it correct that on page 105, you use a
- 16 pseudonym for the chief interrogator for the newly formed
- 17 Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group of the CTC's
- **18** Special Mission Department?
- 19 A. This is one of those instances where I may need some
- 20 guidance from the prosecution on whether this is appropriate
- **21** or not.
- Q. Okay. I just want to -- that's perfectly -- you can
- 23 certainly have it. I just want to point out that my question

- 1 is: Did you write that, not is it true.
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: And with that understanding?
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: No objection, Your Honor.
- **4** MJ [Col COHEN]: No objection.
- **5** A. If it's in the printed copy of the book, I wrote it.
- **6** Q. I understand, sir.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. The answer to that is ----
- **8** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes.
- 10 Q. The -- did anyone prior to Thursday suggest to you
- 11 that pairing a pseudonym with a functional title would damage
- **12** national security?
- **13** A. Yes.
- 14 Q. And what were the -- what were the -- other than
- 15 conversations with your own personal attorneys, what were the
- **16** circumstances?
- 17 A.
 18 19 20 21
- 22 Q. The -- so given your knowledge of that danger area,
- 23 did you seek guidance from the PRB?

- **1** A. Well, you're referring to it as a pseudonym. I would
- 2 just refer to it as a position description. Not the same
- 3 thing.
- 4 Q. Yes, sir. The question is -- I'll repeat the question
- 5 for you, but is -- it is my -- my question that you just
- 6 answered was: Did anyone suggest to you that pairing a
- 7 pseudonym with a functional title would damage national
- 8 security. So it's the two things together that I'm asking
- **9** about, and you gave me an answer.
- 10 And so now my question is: Knowing that the --
- 11 those -- that pairing presented -- presented potential
- 12 dangers, was that a topic that you brought to the attention of
- **13** the PRB?
- 14 A. I don't consider that a pseudonym. I don't consider
- 15 the words that are written there that I'm not sure that we can
- 16 say or not say are pseudonym. I think it's a position
- **17** description.
- 18 Q. Okay. And so let me just make sure that I'm caught
- 19 up. The position description is Chief Interrogator, right,
- 20 and later you refer to that person as New Sheriff?
- 21 A. Oh, I see what you're saying. I misunderstood.
- Q. No problem, sir.
- 23 A. That was just something I called him. It was just a

- 1 nickname I called the guy.
- **Q**. Okay. So let's say nickname instead of pseudonym
- 3 because I understand that in the CIA, pseudonym has a
- 4 specific ----
- 5 A. Very specific meaning. And if you ask me about it,
- **6** I'm going to give you the -- the answer that goes with the
- 7 program.
- **8** Q. Did anyone prior to Thursday suggest that pairing a
- 9 nickname and a functional title would damage national
- 10 security?
- **11** A. No.
- 12 Q. If today, three years after the publication of -- or
- 13 more years after the publication of your book, someone told
- 14 you that your book contained classified information, the
- 15 disclosure of which would be damaging to national security,
- **16** what would your reaction be?
- 17 A. My reaction would be buy the publication rights and
- 18 take it off the market.
- 19 Q. Thank you, sir. We're moving to a new chapter
- **20** now ----
- **21** A. There's more?
- Q. ---- which is your preparation for your testimony.
- When did you first learn that you would be testifying

- **1** in the military commission?
- A. When -- when did I learn? When did I know?
- Q. Yes, sir.
- 4 A. Or when did I suspect? I suspected from the beginning
- 5 I would eventually end up here.
- **6** Q. Okay.
- 7 A. When did I actually know that I would be doing it? My
- 8 attorney approached me -- I can't recall exactly when.
- **9** Q. Okay. Have you been served with a subpoena?
- **10** A. No. I'm here voluntarily.
- 11 Q. When did you first -- and I -- and your -- so what
- 12 does that mean to you, "I'm here voluntarily"?
- 13 A. It means I'm here because I chose to come here. I
- 14 could have done it with a videoconference, if I was compelled
- 15 by the judge to do that. But -- I could have held out until
- 16 you folks sent a subpoena, but I chose not to because I'm
- 17 happy to talk about my role in the program and what the
- **18** program did.
- 19 Q. Very good. But you're saying the prosecution never
- 20 sent you a subpoena?
- 21 A. I don't recall getting a subpoena. You'd have to -- I
- 22 don't recall getting one. Oh, maybe my attorney accepted one,
- 23 but I don't recall getting a subpoena.

- 1 Q. Okay. Who are you looking at?
- 2 A. I'm looking at my attorney who's back there somewhere.
- **3** Q. Okay.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, please don't take any notes from
- 5 him. Like I said, just answer to the best of your knowledge.
- 6 If you don't recall personally being informed of it, that's a
- 7 perfectly acceptable response and ----
- 8 WIT: Well, it could have happened. There's chatter
- 9 around these commissions ----
- **10** MJ [Col COHEN]: Right.
- 11 WIT: ---- back and forth all the time between me and my
- 12 attorney. And, in fact, I think I've been approached by
- 13 individual attorneys for other detainees to ask -- you
- **14** know ----
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right.
- 16 WIT: ---- independently at my house to see if I would
- **17** testify on their behalf.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right.
- 19 WIT: So I don't really -- I just don't pay any attention
- 20 to that stuff. When -- when I was asked if I would come, I
- 21 said I would come, and so I'm here.
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay.
- Q. When did you first meet with one of the prosecutors in

- 1 this case?
- **2** A. Sometime before Christmas.
- 3 Q. How many different days did you meet with prosecutors
- 4 in this case?
- **5** A. Are you talking about total?
- **6** Q. Yes, sir.
- 7 A. Eight or nine days. Not the whole day, just bits and
- 8 pieces of the day.
- **9** Q. Okay.
- 10 A. A lot of that was eaten up reading through these --
- 11 some of these documents and -- you've got tens of thousands of
- 12 pages of documents, and, you know, I'm locked in a SCIF by
- 13 myself reading through things that I've never seen before ----
- **14** 0. You ----
- **15** A. ---- theoretically I'm going to be questioned about.
- 16 Q. The -- so in the past maybe two months you've met with
- 17 the prosecution eight or nine different days?
- **18** A. That's probably true.
- 19 Q. Okay. And for the next questions, I just want to be
- 20 clear that I'm not asking you for the substance of any
- 21 conversation between you and your attorneys, what you said to
- 22 them, what they said to you, only what you know. Do you
- 23 understand?

- 1 A. Yes, sir.
- 2 Q. Okay. So do you know that I'm part of a defense team
- 3 that is calling you as a witness, you know, in sort of TV
- 4 attorney vernacular, that you are my witness?
- 5 A. I didn't realize that initially; but I think when I
- **6** met with the prosecution, somebody informed me of that.
- 7 Q. Okay.
- 8 A. Because I originally thought I was coming as a
- **9** prosecution witness.
- 10 Q. Okay. And do you know that I met with your attorneys?
- 11 A. They told me they did.
- 12 Q. Okay. And do you know that I sent your attorneys the
- 13 major themes of my examination and some of the unclassified
- **14** documents?
- **15** A. They told me they did.
- 16 Q. Okay. Please don't tell me what they told you. Just
- 17 say whether you know it or not. I just don't want to invade
- 18 your attorney-client privilege, sir.
- 19 A. Oh, I see your point. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever see the e-mail or the documents that I
- **21** sent?
- **22** A. I don't recall.
- Q. Okay. Do you know that I offered to go over an

- 1 outline of my questions with you and show you the classified
- 2 documents I intended to ask you about?
- **3** A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Okay. And do you know that I offered to go over an
- 5 outline of your questions -- of my questions with your
- 6 attorneys and show them the classified documents that I would
- **7** ask you about?
- 8 A. I know they met with you.
- **9** Q. This is a separate question, so let me repeat this one
- **10** again.
- 11 Do you know that I offered to go over an outline of my
- 12 questions with your attorneys and show them the classified
- **13** documents I would ask you about?
- 14 A. I don't know that that's the case. I know that they
- 15 met with you. I assumed you had an agenda.
- 16 Q. Do you know that I requested that the CIA pass
- 17 clearance to DoD so I could show your attorneys the classified
- **18** documents?
- **19** A. No.
- **Q.** Do you know that your attorneys declined the offer?
- **21** A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And with respect to your attorneys, was it your
- 23 decision or someone else's decision that your attorneys

- 1 decline the offer of seeing an outline of my questions and the
- 2 classified documents I intended to ask you about?
- 3 A. My decision.
- **4** Q. Okay. And ----
- **5** A. On the advice of my attorney, but it was my decision.
- **6** Q. Okay. And without -- other than -- you know, saying
- 7 advice of your attorneys is fine, but what was the basis for
- 8 your decision? Like, why wouldn't you want your attorneys to
- **9** know what I was going to ask you?
- 10 A. You folks have been saying untrue and malicious things
- 11 about me and Dr. Jessen for years, for years. So you
- 12 shouldn't be surprised that I don't want to spend a lot of
- 13 time with you and I'm not particularly interested in looking
- 14 at things that you have to present.
- 15 I'm here to answer your questions. If you have
- **16** questions, please ask them. I will answer them.
- 17 Q. What -- I know there's a whole bunch of documents, but
- 18 what categories of documents did you review with the
- 19 prosecution in preparation for your testimony?
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Do you have a list? The court's
- 21 indulgence?
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, counsel asked me for a

- 1 moment.
- **2** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 3 [Counsel conferred.]
- **4** WIT: Judge? Sir?
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- **6** WIT: What's going on?
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Oh, I think they're just seeing if they
- 8 have the list that they can produce for you, so we're just
- **9** waiting to find out.
- 10 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, I withdraw the question.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- **12** Q. When you ----
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: You don't need to answer that question.
- 14 Q. When you provided services to the CIA, did you have
- 15 access to relevant cable traffic as part of your duties?
- **16** A. I could have had access, yes.
- 17 Q. Okay. Does that mean that you chose -- you -- you
- 18 didn't have access?
- 19 A. I was on the road hundreds of days a year and didn't
- 20 have time to sit in a cubicle reading cables.
- Q. Okay. In the course of your duties when you were
- 22 providing services to the CIA, did you ever see CIA cables?
- 23 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. You're familiar with what they look like?
- **2** A. Yes.
- **3** Q. Okay. Did the government provide you original CIA
- 4 cables to review or some other form of document?
- **5** A. I'm sorry. I don't understand the question. I don't
- 6 understand the temporal timeline that you're asking about.
- 7 Q. I -- fair enough. Since the end of November 2019, in
- 8 your preparation for this testimony, did the government
- 9 provide you original cables to review or did they provide
- **10** documents in some other format?
- 11 A. I -- I don't know how to answer that question because
- 12 I didn't pay any attention to that. I had paper copies of
- 13 stuff that I reviewed.
- **14** Q. Okay.
- **15** A. If you'll show me ----
- **16** Q. Yes, sir.
- 17 A. ---- something, I'll tell you whether I looked at it
- **18** or not.
- 19 Q. Sir, I'm going to show you a document which is
- **20** MEA-STA-1 at AE 628SSSS Attachment C. It is marked FOR
- 21 OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I have access to the document
- 23 camera?

- **1** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- WIT: You're going to put it somewhere? Is it going to
- 3 show up on my screen?
- **4** MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- 5 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: It will in just a moment, yes, sir.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: It's marked -- you may publish to the --
- 7 to the gallery.
- 8 Q. Okay. I'm not going to ask you about the content of
- 9 it, you're not -- but I do want to ask, did the -- when you
- 10 reviewed intelligence reports -- or documents that involved
- 11 intelligence reports from CIA Headquarters out to the
- 12 intelligence community, did they look like this or did they
- 13 look like a normal CIA cable?
- **14** A. I don't know that it -- during this review that you're
- 15 referring to that I actually looked at intelligence reports.
- 16 I don't remember doing that. The things I were reviewing were
- 17 things like papers that I had read and that I forgot about and
- 18 text messages and, you know, that sort of stuff.
- 19 This looks like an intel report or part of a -- of a
- 20 summary from an interrogation. Actually, it looks like the
- 21 first couple of chapters of a cable. But I didn't review any
- 22 cable, so I don't know what they would have presented me with
- 23 if they had presented me with this.

- 1 Q. Okay. I'm going to ask -- I understand your answer.
- 2 I'm going to ask one more question about it.
- 3 Did you see -- in the course of your review from
- 4 November -- the end of November 2019 until today, in the
- 5 course of your preparation for testimony here, did you review
- 6 intel reports or cables that included headers and dates?
- 7 A. Probably. I mean, I -- I can't remember, but
- 8 probably. I mean, it's just a mountain of paper. And to be
- 9 candid with you, the last thing I'm looking at is the format
- 10 of the paper.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, you've got about five minutes.
- 12 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay.
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Just before the lunch recess.
- **14** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure.
- 15 Q. Did -- in preparation for your specific --
- 16 specifically in preparation for your testimony here, did you
- 17 review any documents already in your possession?
- **18** A. I looked at my book.
- **19** Q. Okay.
- A. That's it.
- Q. Did you review any documents given to your attorneys
- 22 by third parties in preparation for your testimony?
- A. Not to my knowledge, no.

- **1** Q. Okay.
- 2 A. I went to a SCIF in D.C. and sat in a SCIF and tried
- 3 to wade through that mountain of paper.
- 4 Q. Yes, sir. What, if anything, did the prosecution tell
- 5 you was the legal issue in this hearing?
- **6** A. This particular -- in this particular hearing?
- 7 Q. Yes, sir.
- 8 A. I -- I had a chance to glance at your -- I think you
- 9 have a motion out there. I think I had a glance -- a chance
- 10 to glance at the motion. My impression is that you're trying
- 11 to get their earlier statements to FBI agents set aside.
- 12 Q. Okay. Did they tell you about any other legal issues
- 13 in the case?
- **14** A. We didn't talk about legal issues.
- 15 Q. Okay. Did you have a practice examination?
- 16 A. I don't know what that means.
- 17 Q. Did -- did you ever practice question and answer with
- 18 the prosecution?
- 19 A. They -- I didn't practice question and answers. They
- 20 asked me questions, provided answers -- and I provided
- 21 answers, but they didn't give me feedback.
- Q. Was it in this sort of feed -- you know, was it in an
- 23 interview format or was it in this kind of stylized legal

- **1** question/answer format?
- **2** A. Probably both. You know, they asked me questions, I
- 3 gave them answers. And -- and the main point that they were
- 4 making is tell the truth. Don't let us put words in your
- 5 mouth. We're not -- and they wouldn't let Dr. Jessen and I
- 6 participate in any of this stuff together. They kept us
- 7 separated. You know, even reading the documents, we were
- 8 separated.
- **9** So, you know, my view was they were trying very, very
- 10 hard to avoid, you know, coaching me, you know. So they asked
- 11 questions. I gave answers. They took notes.
- 12 Q. Okay. Was there a court reporter present?
- **13** A. Not to my knowledge.
- 14 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, that's the end of a
- 15 chapter. I'm happy to move to the next one or break here as
- **16** your ----
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: Let's go ahead and break here. So we're
- 18 going to take a 75-minute lunch. While we're on break -- I
- 19 don't know what the plans are for getting you lunch, but we'll
- 20 make sure that you get the opportunity to eat lunch as well.
- 21 Please do not discuss your testimony with anyone other
- 22 than the prosecution and the defense while the case is
- 23 ongoing. And while you're on the stand, please do not discuss

- 1 the substance of your testimony here today.
- WIT: I'm sorry, sir? The last ----
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Please do not discuss the substance of
- 4 your testimony. So, in other words, if your attorneys just
- 5 want to have general conversations, but not about the specific
- **6** things you're testifying about today.
- 7 WIT: No worries.
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you, sir. We're in
- 9 recess until 1315.
- 10 [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 1159, 21 January 2020.]
- 11 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 1316,
- 12 21 January 2020.]
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: The military commission is called to
- 14 order. Parties are present. All five accused are present.
- 15 Thank you.
- **16** General Martins?
- 17 CP [BG MARTINS]: Your Honor, Mr. Ryan is absent from the
- **18** courtroom ----
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 20 CP [BG MARTINS]: ---- on commission business. I do
- 21 expect him to return at some point.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- Mr. Connell, are you ready to proceed?

- 1 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Please call the witness.
- 3 [The witness resumed the witness stand.]
- 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Dr. Mitchell, just -- you may take
- 5 your seat again, I remind you that you're still under oath,
- 6 but the questioning will continue. Thank you, sir.
- **7** WIT: Thank you.
- **8** MJ [Col COHEN]: Your witness.
- 9 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir.
- 10 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 11 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- 12 Q. Dr. Mitchell, you commented earlier that you felt
- **13** the ----
- **14** A. I can barely hear you. I don't know why.
- 15 Q. I'm sorry. It's my fault for being too far from mic.
- 16 You commented earlier that the list that you'd been
- 17 given of the -- the unique functional identifiers, the UFIs,
- 18 that you thought was misleading. Do you recall that?
- **19** A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And I told you that you'd have a chance to get
- 21 back to it. So that's where we are now. We're moving to a
- 22 new chapter, which is issues with that list. So could you --
- 23 just without describing specifically anything about the list

- 1 yet, could you tell us what your general -- what the general
- 2 issue is?
- **3** A. The general issue?
- 4 Q. Yes, sir.
- **5** A. Can you please be more specific ----
- **6** Q. Certainly.
- 7 A. ----- because I'm not sure ----
- 8 Q. What did you -- what did you feel was misleading about
- 9 it?
- 10 A. Well, Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was subjected to 21 days
- 11 of interrogation and 1287 days of debriefing. Those
- 12 debriefings were done by debriefers who you have mentioned
- 13 listed as interrogators. So you might think that he had close
- **14** to 1800 days or, you know, 2000 days of -- I'm sorry, 1300
- 15 days of interrogations when that just isn't true.
- 16 Q. All right. So help us out with vocabulary. What does
- 17 the word "interrogator" mean to you?
- 18 A. "Interrogator" in the CIA vernacular means questioning
- 19 an unwilling -- a person who is unwilling to provide
- 20 information using enhanced interrogation methods.
- **21** Q. Okay.
- A. Or the potential use of enhanced interrogation
- 23 methods. You don't have to use them the whole time they're

- 1 authorized.
- 2 Q. Sure. And what does "debriefer" mean to you?
- **3** A. A debriefer is a person who services intel
- 4 requirements through question and answer, just ordinary
- **5** question and answer.
- **6** Q. Okay. And the distinction there is whether some --
- 7 the potential of physical coercion is present; is that right?
- 8 A. Physical coercion or any kind of psychological
- 9 coercion beyond just plain question and answer and normal
- 10 social influence exchange sort of things.
- 11 Q. Okay. And so at -- during those first days that you
- 12 mentioned and the example that you gave with Mr. Mohammad,
- 13 the -- there was a period of time where only interrogators
- **14** were involved in questioning; is that right?
- **15** A. A short period of time.
- **16** Q. A short period of time?
- 17 A. Because about halfway through the application of the
- 18 EITs, debriefers would sit in the room but not ask any
- **19** questions.
- But the debriefers were mainly subject matter experts.
- 21 You know, if -- if they're questioning him about al Qaeda's
- 22 WMD efforts, it would be the CIA's best WMD person who was
- 23 there, not an interrogator. Not someone who was trained to do

- 1 interrogations the way the CIA wanted them done.
- 2 Q. Sure. And there's another phrase that is sometimes
- 3 used in the cables which is "transitioned to full debriefing
- 4 mode." Are you familiar with that phrase?
- **5** A. Yes.
- **6** Q. And what do you consider that to mean?
- 7 A. What that means is that even the interrogators will
- 8 just use question and answer and ordinary social exchanges, if
- 9 they're servicing intel requirements, and not use any EITs.
- 10 Q. Okay. And so with those definitions in mind, what do
- 11 you find misleading about the list that you have in front of
- 12 you that is AE 628NNNNN?
- 13 A. Is that -- is that that list that says ----
- **14** MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- **15** A. ----- TOP SECRET on it?
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: That's the TS document that I provided
- 17 you with.
- 18 WIT: Let me get my glasses out.
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure.
- A. I see people who are debriefers who are listed as
- **21** interrogators.
- Q. Okay. So on your list, is the first person listed
- 23 Interrogator Number 1? I've never seen your list, so I don't

1 know what order it's in. 2 I -- are you just asking me for a description of the 3 list? 4 No, sir. I'm asking you whether the first person --5 the first UFI listed on your list is Interrogator Number 1. 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Tell you what, Counsel, why don't we ask 7 it this way: 8 Sir, are you able as you sit there, based on having 9 that document now, to kind of go through and tell us a UFI 10 number and tell us whether that person was or was not an 11 interrogator or a debriefer? 12 Not for everybody on the list because, frankly, I 13 don't know everybody on the list. 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. But for those that you do 15 recognize, are you able to do that? 16 WIT: I could do that in the -- here's my problem, Judge. 17 18 19 Sometimes I know those. Sometimes I 20 don't.

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simply don't know who they are, even if they had been deployed

be a debriefer, and there are some people on here I just

So there's some people on here that I would know would

21

22

23

- 1 with me, because I may not know their true name.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand. I understand. So for
- 3 those that you do know, then, are you able to tell us whether
- 4 or not they've been incorrectly designated as an interrogator
- **5** when they were a debriefer?
- 6 WIT: Some of them.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. I tell you what. Why don't you
- 8 tell us those -- by using the unique functional identifier,
- 9 please tell us the ones that you do recognize and
- 10 understanding that you don't recognize all of them.
- 11 WIT: Holy moly. Okay. How much time do you have, Judge?
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Well, this is kind of an important issue,
- 13 so we'll take the time, sir.
- 14 WIT: Okay. Interrogator DC1 is a debriefer.
- 15 Interrogator DS7 is a debriefer.
- 16 I do not know who interrogator EH1 is. That name is
- 17 completely unfamiliar with me.
- 18 Interrogator ----
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: One second, sir.
- Mr. Nevin?
- 21 CDC [MR. NEVIN]: Was that Echo-Hotel-1?
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- WIT: Echo-Hotel. I don't know whether that person is a

- **1** debriefer or an interrogator. Don't know.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Anyone else, sir?
- WIT: Oh, yeah.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Please continue.
- 5 WIT: I was just waiting for people to catch up.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. The nice thing is we have an
- 7 almost instantaneous access to the transcript among the
- 8 parties, so they'll be able to catch up with you, sir.
- **9** WIT: F1G, I don't think that's an interrogator.
- **10** FC4 -- I'm sorry, F4C was trained as an interrogator.
- **11** GK8, I never heard -- I never heard of that person,
- 12 and I think I've heard of most of the interrogators, so I
- 13 don't -- I don't -- I don't think she was an interrogator.
- 14 I don't know about HL4.
- 15 I believe that HV5 was a debriefer.
- **16** MJ [Col COHEN]: V as in Victor, sir?
- 17 WIT: Victor, yes.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 19 WIT: I believe that -- well, I don't know about 12F. I
- 20 don't know. The name is completely unfamiliar to me.
- J, as in Juliet, Y8, I believe she -- she was a -- I
- 22 believe it was a debriefer.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, you can't ask them. You have to

1 just testify from your own ----2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah, that's fine, sir. Just recall from 3 your recollection. If you not sure ----4 I mean, the person is a debriefer. 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Copy. 6 WIT: K12 is a debriefer. 7 KG5, a debriefer. 8 LQ3. debriefer. 9 I don't know about LY9. 10 MA2 was trained as an interrogator. 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, let me ask you a follow-on. I want 12 to kind of guide you a little bit through this because I think 13 it's in the benefit of all the parties. 14 When you say "trained as an interrogator," does that 15 mean you're aware that they were trained but may not have 16 actually acted as an interrogator or is it -- does -- does the 17 training in your mind mean that they also interrogated? 18 WIT: I -- they also -- I know he also ----19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. 20 WIT: ---- did it. 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you very much, sir. 22 WIT: N4A. debriefer. 23 N75. debriefer.

- 1 I don't know about NE5.
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Mike-Echo?
- WIT: No.
- 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: November-Echo.
- 5 WIT: November-Echo.
- **6** Well, obviously Number 1 and Number 2 are considered
- 7 interrogators. I think Number 3 is also considered an
- 8 interrogator.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Any other changes, sir?
- 10 WIT: Number 4 and Number 5 were also considered -- were
- **11** also interrogators.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- 13 WIT: Interrogator Number 6 was a debriefer.
- **14** NY7 was a debriefer.
- **15** NZ7 was an interrogator.
- I don't know about PU2 because the name is unfamiliar
- **17** to me.
- 18 QW9, I think was a debriefer.
- 19 QY7, never heard of that person, would -- couldn't
- **20** tell you.
- **21** R19, never heard of that person.
- 22 And I would say that if I've never heard of the
- 23 person, they're probably debriefers. So where I am at?

1 SR2, debriefer. 2 SD6, I don't know that person. 3 SG1, a debriefer. 4 SM1, debriefer. 5 TV5, debriefer. I have no idea who UB1 is; name is not familiar to me. 6 7 VC9, debriefer. 8 W87. debriefer. 9 WC2, I have no idea who that person is. 10 WU4, I have no idea who that person is. 11 WX7, debriefer. 12 X3L, I have no idea who that is. 13 I have no idea who X7Q is, YP3 is, or Z2C. But since 14 I know virtually everyone who did interrogations for the --15 who were actually interrogators for the CIA, my guess is if I 16 don't know them, they were a debriefer that was working at a 17 site -- and that's just a guess -- that I wasn't at. 18 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay. 19 Anyway, that's the clarification of that list to the 20 best of my ability at this time. 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir. 22 [END OF PAGE]

23

1 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED

- 2 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **3** Q. Is Z9A on your list? Z9A?
- **4** A. Let me -- let me make sure. I have these things
- 5 arranged two different ways. One is alphabetical and one is
- **6** numerical by the numeral designator. Repeat the number.
- 7 Repeat the ----
- 8 Q. Sure. So the last one you told us about was Z2C, and
- 9 I'm asking about Z9A.
- **10** A. I don't see a Z9A listed as an interrogator.
- 11 Q. Okay. So if I understand what ----
- 12 A. Z9A is not listed as an interrogator ----
- **13** Q. Got it. Okay.
- 14 A. ---- and I know for a fact wasn't.
- 15 Q. Okay. The military commission asked you about -- when
- 16 you said that MA2 was trained as an interrogator and you said
- 17 that MA2 also interrogated, is the same true for F4C? Your
- 18 comment was that F4C trained as an interrogator.
- 19 A. Let me look at it.
- **20** Q. Sure.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Take your time, sir.
- A. Well, I wasn't making the distinction between people
- 23 who had trained and not trained, so the odds are good that --

- 1 you know, that if I said that, he was -- I keep using the sex;
- 2 that's probably bad.
- **3** Q. No, the gender is authorized, sir.
- **4** A. Oh, is it? He was trained and acted as an
- 5 interrogator.
- **6** Q. And so you mentioned that you basically know everyone
- 7 who acted as an interrogator in the RDI program.
- 8 A. I said it would be unusual if I didn't know them.
- **9** Q. So let's ----
- **10** A. I'm not trying to lead you to believe that I know
- 11 everyone that's there because there were essentially people
- 12 that I didn't know who were trained earlier.
- 13 Q. In fact, that's exactly where my question was going.
- 14 So we're going to get -- cover this in some detail,
- 15 but just while we're here, there was an early training program
- 16 run by NX2 and MA2.
- 17 A. Let me look at these names.
- 18 Q. Sure. I can tell you that NX2 is the New Sheriff.
- **19** A. I will ----
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, again, NX2 and?
- 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: And MA2.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Copy. Thank you.
- **23** A. Okay.

- 1 Q. Okay. Did you have a chance to look at those?
- **2** A. Uh-huh.
- 3 Q. So my question was: Is it possible that somebody like
- 4 X3L, for example, that you don't know was trained in some
- 5 separate or earlier generation of training?
- **6** A. Anything is possible.
- Q. Okay. Is it -- to be fair, that's not actually my
- 8 experience of the world, but the -- does it seem consistent
- 9 with the information that you have that they might have been
- 10 trained earlier?
- 11 A. I don't have that information because I never saw the
- 12 roster of who attended those classes. I had nothing to do
- 13 with those classes.
- 14 Q. Right. And we're going to talk about that.
- 15 The -- the other specific question that I had about
- 16 this list is: When you say that someone was a debriefer,
- 17 what -- is what you mean that they were not authorized to use
- **18** coercive pressures beyond question and answer?
- **19** A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And so to you, the distinction between
- 21 interrogator and debriefer is authorization to use coercive
- **22** pressures?
- A. Well, my primary distinction, of course, as it applies

- 1 to the detainees is what phase of the -- their captivity
- 2 they're in; you know, whether they're in debriefing mode or
- 3 the -- the opportunity or the sometimes necessity or the
- 4 possibility of using EITs are there. Debriefers weren't
- 5 trained to use EITs, they weren't authorized to use EITs, and
- 6 wouldn't have been authorized by headquarters to use them if
- 7 they had requested them.
- **8** Q. Okay. Sometimes -- and just to close this out,
- 9 sometimes interrogators used question and answer, obviously,
- 10 right?
- **11** A. Well, that's our primary job.
- 12 Q. Right. And there were plenty of times when
- 13 interrogators would be in an interaction but would not either
- 14 use or threaten the use of coercive pressures, right?
- **15** A. Right. If you're asking me if I've done debriefings,
- **16** the answer is yes.
- 17 Q. Yes, and beyond you, other interrogators did
- **18** debriefings?
- 19 A. I'm sure that's true.
- Q. Okay. Now, back to your global point, now that you've
- 21 gone through the list and explained, what -- can you -- can
- 22 you tell us how you feel that someone might be misled by this
- 23 list?

- **1** A. Well, it's -- the -- the list as it's currently
- 2 printed suggests that they were interrogated every single day
- 3 that they were in CIA captivity, and that's simply not true.
- **4** Q. And so a person who was working off the information
- 5 contained in this list without your life experience or access
- 6 to the underlying information would not get an accurate
- 7 picture of what actually happened in the RDI program; is that
- 8 your point?
- **9** A. My concern is that a person may think that the
- 10 detainees were subject to being exposed to EITs which were
- 11 only for a short duration even though -- just simply because
- 12 this says interrogator, interrogator, interrogator. And the
- 13 misinformation that's out there suggests that all
- 14 interrogators did these things, and if you list somebody as an
- 15 interrogator, then those things may be misperceived as being
- **16** authorized.
- 17 Q. Sure. Combined with other things which are out there
- 18 in the open source, would be misleading to a reader?
- **19** A. That's my belief.
- Q. Yes, sir. Thank you.
- 21 Does your version of the list contain real name
- 22 pseudo, in the way that you described it, or both? They will
- 23 object if they -- if they need to. They're well trained at

- 1 it.
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: No objection.
- **3** WIT: Say again.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, what he's asking for is can you tell
- 5 us what the -- without giving -- without giving any specifics,
- 6 do you have a real name, a pseudonym, and unique functional
- 7 identifier as far as general columns of information or how is
- 8 it -- how is it -- how is the document organized as opposed to
- 9 what the actual contents of the -- the documents say?
- 10 WIT: True name, pseudonym, unique functional identifier.
- 11 Q. All right. So, for example, for -- let's just take
- 12 12F, who you said was a person that you don't know at all.
- **13** A. Who?
- 14 Q. You don't know them by their -- by the true name
- 15 that's listed and you don't know them by the pseudonym?
- **16** A. Stand by. Let me find it.
- **17** Q. Sure.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Give him a chance to locate that,
- 19 Counsel.
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Like I said, I think the document itself
- 22 is about 12 pages.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay. I haven't seen it.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: I know. I just wanted to let you know
- 2 that's why it might take him a minute to see where that one
- **3** is.
- **4** A. I found it.
- **5** Q. All right. And so for orientation, 12F was a person
- 6 that you mentioned that you weren't familiar with them.
- 7 A. I don't recognize the name. I'm not saying I'm not
- 8 familiar with them. They could be somebody that I'm very
- 9 familiar with but just don't know their name ----
- **10** Q. Sure.
- **11** A. ---- and don't recall the pseudonym.
- 12 Q. Okay. In -- in stating, however, that you don't know
- 13 the name, you mean both, you don't know the name which is
- 14 listed as true name and you don't know the CIA-assigned
- **15** pseudonym?
- **16** A. I will double check just to be sure. No.
- 17 Q. No doubt it's a problem with my question.
- I just wanted to make sure that in -- in reviewing
- 19 that document, you have access to both true name and
- 20 CIA-assigned pseudonym; is that correct?
- 21 A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. You said that debriefers are really subject
- 23 matter experts, and you gave a WMD example.

- **1** A. I said some debriefers are subject matter experts.
- 2 Often the debrief is a targeter.
- **Q.** Okay. And could you explain the difference to us?
- 4 A. Right. The debriefers came in kind of three flavors.
- 5 There were targeters, debrief -- subject matter experts and
- **6** analysts, right.
- 7 A targeter is an analyst who targets a specific
- 8 person, right, so they -- you know, they're following that
- 9 person. They kind of know everything there is to know about
- 10 that particular person and they're attempting to locate them,
- **11** right?
- An analyst is a person who is interested in putting,
- 13 you know, intelligence together, you know, disseminatable
- 14 intelligence, and they analyze and then put together different
- 15 pieces of raw intelligence into finished intelligence.
- And that actually is one of the key differences
- 17 between a law enforcement approach to doing these kinds of
- 18 interrogations and the way that the CIA approached it. I
- 19 don't know how other intel communities do it, but essentially
- 20 an investigator for the law enforcement is trying to put the
- 21 case together and that person usually asks a question and does
- 22 the analysis of the data.
- In this particular case, neither Dr. Jessen nor I nor

- 1 any other intel -- interrogator who was a trained interrogator
- 2 did the analysis. We didn't do the investigation. We turned
- 3 the information over to intel analysts or targeters or subject
- 4 matter experts who did that themselves, and they made the
- 5 decision about whether it was useful information or not.
- **6** We included them as soon as we can because very often
- 7 the person who is the subject matter expert is right there
- 8 outside of the cell when the interrogations are initially
- 9 started and then inside, about halfway through the EITs, so
- 10 that they can, you know, ask some questions and do some other
- 11 stuff. And then pretty much asking all the questions once
- 12 they're in full debriefing mode. So you have those people.
- And then who was the other? Target? Intel analyst?
- **14** Q. Subject matter expert, I think.
- **15** A. Huh?
- 16 Q. SME, I think.
- 17 A. Subject matter expert. So there are people who work
- 18 for the CIA who are their foremost expert on whatever it
- 19 happens to be, right? They're not really -- I mean, they may
- 20 be analysts, right, but they're the expert. And so they would
- 21 send that person out to actually ask the questions or to feed
- 22 us intel requirements or provide us with briefings about the
- 23 person.

- 1 I mean, one of the reasons I didn't have to spend
- 2 weeks going through written cables is because very often the
- 3 person who had written the cables was sitting across the desk
- 4 from me telling me here are the links, here's what we know,
- 5 here's what we're looking for, here are the gaps, you know.
- 6 Otherwise, I would have had to have been spending all that
- 7 time you were asking about.
- **8** Q. So you mentioned that on -- in some occasions when,
- 9 very early in detention, when an interrogation is still going
- 10 on, that sometimes the targeter or analyst or SME might be
- 11 waiting outside the room. How does that process work?
- 12 A. They would monitor it, the same way those folks
- 13 monitor, usually with a camera and a -- you know, and a
- 14 monitor through some kind of closed circuit with an audio
- 15 capability. They could send in notes. They could send
- 16 someone in to stop the interrogation if there was a topic that
- 17 was particularly interesting to them that they wanted us to
- 18 spend more time on.
- But our job as interrogators was to get them in the
- 20 room as quickly as possible because they're the people who
- 21 should be asking the questions, in my view, not me, right? My
- 22 job was to get the person engaging with the question.
- Q. And we're going to talk about this in more detail, but

- 1 in general, the whole point of the conditioning model was to
- 2 condition detainees to answer questions of debriefers so the
- 3 right person would have the right information?
- **4** A. That would be one way to characterize it. It's --
- 5 it's simplistic, but yeah.
- **6** Q. Okay. Well, I'll let you give nuance to it later.
- 7 And speaking of simplistic, the last chapter in the
- 8 introductory part is I just wanted to put some sort of
- 9 temporal boundaries on time you spent with -- with the
- 10 defendants, and two of them in particular.
- 11 So you're aware, I take it, that Mr. al Baluchi and
- 12 Mr. Bin'Attash were -- were taken into custody at the same
- **13** time?
- 14 A. I believe I was aware of it. I -- I don't recall it
- 15 right now.
- 16 Q. Okay. And you never acted in the role of
- 17 interrogator -- no, let me say it a different way.
- When you -- when was the first time that you ever
- 19 saw -- not interacted with, but saw Mr. al Baluchi?
- A. I don't remember the exact date, but the EITs were
- **21** over.
- 22 Q. Right.
- A. So he was in debriefing mode.

- 1 Q. And he was in Location 7?
- A. I'd have to look.
- **3** Q. Sure.
- **4** MJ [Col COHEN]: Please do, sir.
- **5** A. I believe that's correct.
- **6** Q. Okay. And did you ever see him electronically,
- 7 Mr. al Baluchi, before you interacted with him in person?
- 8 Like, you told us about people monitoring. Did you monitor
- 9 him for some period of time before you interacted with him
- **10** directly?
- 11 A. Are you asking me if I ever saw him on a video camera?
- 12 Q. No. I'm asking you did you see him on a video camera
- 13 for some length of time prior to your first actual interaction
- **14** with him.
- 15 A. I would have -- the reason I'm -- I'm trying to
- 16 provide you with an accurate answer, but it's a question that
- 17 doesn't really fit my reality, you know.
- 18 Q. Tell me what you mean.
- 19 A. You know, I mean, I go to a site. The first thing I
- 20 do is read the rules of engagement, because they change. I
- 21 sign the book that says that I've read the rules of
- 22 engagement, because they change. I get a debriefing from
- 23 whoever is in charge, because things change.

- 1 Then I go to the security thing and I look at the
- 2 panels to look at who -- because, you know, they're under
- 3 constant surveillance. I may sit there and watch them for a
- 4 while, I might not. So I don't recall. I probably watched
- 5 him more than you might think and less than I might claim, if
- **6** you know what I mean.
- 7 Q. Okay. All right. And is it fair to say that in the
- 8 debriefing that you just described, or that debriefing process
- 9 at Location 7, that your role was to sit in and help the
- 10 debriefers elicit the information that they wanted?
- **11** A. Yes.
- **12** Q. And ----
- **13** A. Well, I did other things as well.
- **14** Q. Okay. What were those?
- 15 A. Well, the way that -- the way that Dr. Jessen and I
- 16 handled these things is that we liked to stop in with the
- 17 person first thing in the morning, give them some sort of a
- 18 sense of what their day was going to be like to add some
- 19 structure, to see how they were doing, to see if they have any
- 20 issues or any concerns.
- 21 Because I believe at the time -- and it gets a little
- 22 fuzzy because things change and it's been 17 years, right --
- 23 at the time, they weren't allowed to talk to the guards or the

- 1 guards weren't allowed to talk to them. So I would try to get
- 2 a sense of what was going on with them, whether they had any
- 3 complaints or not.
- 4 And then when he was moved to be into the
- 5 interrogation room or the debriefing room, whichever happened
- 6 to be going on -- they were the same rooms -- I would go in.
- 7 They were usually hooded and shackled. I would take the hood
- 8 off. I would tell them that a friend of mine was going to
- 9 come in and talk with them, blah, blah, and see how they
- 10 were doing and make sure they were ready, and then I would sit
- **11** in.
- And then afterwards, we would do these things which
- 13 I'll elaborate on later if you would like me to, called a
- 14 fireside chat, where we would talk about their reaction and
- 15 the process of them being interrogated, right?
- 16 So I interacted with him more than just sitting in the
- 17 room when the debriefer was asking questions.
- 18 I also monitored sometimes -- sometimes as the
- 19 debriefer got more familiar with him, I would actually monitor
- 20 the debriefing session from a camera rather than being in
- 21 there, because we wanted to get them used to talking to the
- 22 debriefers.
- Q. So the -- the different pieces of the process that you

- 1 just described, the check-in in the morning, the dehooding,
- 2 the introduction, sometimes staying in the room for the
- **3** debriefing, and the fireside chat afterward, all those are
- 4 part of the overall exploitation process. Would that be fair
- 5 to say?
- **6** A. If -- if what you -- yes.
- 7 Q. Okay. Ballpark -- and so I'm going to talk about just
- 8 the debriefing part for a moment. I'll let you talk about the
- **9** whole spectrum, but I want to pull out the debriefing first.
- 10 Ballpark, how many debriefings would you say that you
- 11 either -- that you were physically present for of
- 12 Mr. al Baluchi?
- A. I couldn't possibly tell you. You know, he was not
- 14 top on my list, and so I just -- I don't know, you know.
- 15 Q. Okay. A hundred?
- **16** A. Oh, no.
- 17 Q. Two dozen?
- 18 A. I would have probably -- I don't know -- remember how
- 19 many days I was with him. I would have probably done what I
- 20 did for each day that I was at the site that he was at.
- Q. Okay. And about how long were you at Location 7 in
- **22** 2003?
- A. Off and on for weeks at a time. I -- I mean, I

- 1 don't -- I don't know. I don't recall. I don't keep -- you
- 2 know, oddly enough, the CIA frowns on you keeping a diary, you
- 3 know, so I don't actually know.
- **4** Q. Okay.
- 5 A. I assume there's a record. And if you have it and you
- 6 want me to talk about, I would be happy to talk about it.
- 7 Q. Sir, nothing would make me happier than to have that
- 8 record; but if it exists, I don't have it. I would show it to
- 9 you if I did.
- **10** A. Okay.
- 11 Q. And so when you say that -- so I want to widen it out
- 12 now because you properly said it wasn't just debriefings,
- 13 there's more to the structure.
- 14 Is the answer the same for all the different parts of
- 15 the structure, the check-in, the dehooding, the introduction,
- 16 the fireside chat; if you were there at the same place as
- 17 Mr. al Baluchi was, you did it with Mr. al Baluchi; is that --
- **18** is that accurate?
- **19** A. Well, it would depend on what phase of interrogation
- 20 Mr. al Baluchi was in, you know.
- Q. Well, you told us he wasn't in -- in the -- I don't
- 22 know what you called the -- the -- there were no physical
- 23 coercion being applied at the time, right? You told us that

- 1 already. And that he's in debriefing ----
- 2 A. I left one thing out.
- Q. Yes, sir.
- **4** A. Sometimes we just stopped in to talk to him. Because
- 5 they were by themselves, and, you know, somebody that's locked
- 6 in a cell by themselves with nobody to talk to -- we called
- 7 them maintenance visits. They really weren't interrogations;
- 8 they were just sitting and talking to them about whatever they
- 9 wanted to talk about.
- 10 Q. Okay. All right. So with that addition, is it fair
- 11 to say that basically if you and Mr. al Baluchi were in the
- 12 same location, that you did those things with Mr. al Baluchi?
- A. I did. I -- if there was another interrogator there,
- 14 we might have traded off, but it would have been me or another
- 15 one if we were there. It would depend on, you know, how
- 16 troublesome some of the other of the clients here might have
- 17 been that were attracting our attention.
- 18 Q. Sure. If I were to tell you that you had only
- 19 interacted with him twice, would you say I was not telling you
- 20 the truth?
- 21 A. I don't know. I really don't know.
- Q. You -- do you think you only interacted with him
- 23 twice?

- 1 A. It seems low to me.
- **2** Q. Okay.
- **3** A. Well, in terms of -- in terms of monitoring ----
- **4** Q. Any kind of interaction.
- **5** A. I'm sorry?
- **6** Q. Any -- any kind of interaction, yeah.
- 7 A. Oh, I would say that was low.
- **8** Q. Was Mr. -- so I mentioned Mr. Bin'Attash earlier. Was
- **9** he at the same location at the -- around the same time as
- 10 Mr. al Baluchi? Were you at Location 7 with both of them?
- 11 A. I think that's where I first encountered him.
- 12 Q. And approximately when did you first directly interact
- 13 with Mr. Bin'Attash?
- **14** A. Oh, I don't -- I don't recall the approximate day.
- 15 Q. Did you interact with Mr. Bin'Attash anyplace other
- **16** than Location 7 that you recall?
- 17 A. If he had been moved to the -- the other locations, I
- 18 would have probably seen him while I was there. But again, he
- 19 wasn't someone on my radar.
- Q. All right. I should have asked you the same question
- 21 for Mr. al Baluchi. Did you interact with Mr. al Baluchi at
- 22 any site other than Location 7?
- A. I believe so, but again ----

- 1 Q. Location 5, maybe? You can look it up if you need to.
- **2** A. 5, you say?
- **3** Q. 5, yes.
- **4** A. I don't recall that.
- **5** Q. Okay. Do you recall where it would have been?
- **6** A. I think it would have -- it would have either been 9
- **7** or 10.
- **8** Q. Okay. So late in the program?
- 9 A. Uh-huh.
- 10 Q. You have to answer yes or no.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Affirmative response. I'll note it.
- 12 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you.
- Q. What -- when you interacted with Mr. Bin'Attash, what
- **14** role were you in?
- **15** A. I was an interrogator supporting the debriefings.
- 16 Although he and I had a -- he and I had a long talk about him
- 17 helping the Taliban blow up those Buddhas that were in
- 18 Afghanistan. That wasn't really part -- it was just a,
- 19 stopped in to see how he was doing and that topic came up,
- 20 and, you know, he told me about doing that.
- **Q.** Was that as part of the fireside chat?
- **22** A. Yeah.
- Q. And when was the last time that you saw

1 Mr. Bin'Attash? 2 Α. I couldn't tell you. 3 Okay. When was the last time that you saw 4 Mr. al Baluchi? 5 I'd have to guess. Probably before they were moved to Α. 6 the DoD custody. 7 Now, see, the difference is, is that you may think 8 that by that, I mean that I go in the room with him, right, 9 and that I stand and talk to him. But there were other 10 interrogators there, and I would have monitored that on the 11 camera and watched what they were doing. So I wouldn't have 12 necessarily shown up as being someone that was in the room 13 with him. But I don't recall, to be candid with you. 14 Q. Okay. Prior to this trip, when was the last time you 15 were at Guantanamo? 16 Α. 17 18 Okay. So we're done with that sort of stage-setting. 19 The -- and I told you that it was sort of organized by subject 20 and not by chronology, so now we're going to talk about early, 21 even before there was an RDI program, when -- with your

interactions with Mr. Abu Zubaydah. Do you understand?

22

23

Α.

Yes.

- 1 Q. Okay. So is it true that in April 2002,
- 2 the department that housed the CIA's operational psychologists
- 3 called you?
- **4** A. Yes.
- **5** Q. Okay. And ----
- **6** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I have a moment?
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may. Sir, there will be periodic
- 8 moments where I allow the counsel to confer to determine
- 9 whether or not an unclassified question and response can be
- 10 solicited.
- 11 WIT: As I said, Judge, my main goal is just to answer the
- 12 questions and give you some insights into what we did.
- 13 However it works is good for me.
- 14 LDC [MS. BORMANN]: Judge, can we put that on the record,
- **15** please?
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes. The witness said his main goal is
- 17 just to answer the questions and put as many facts on the
- 18 record as he possibly can, so he understands there might be a
- 19 slight delay periodically. Or words to that effect, if I did
- 20 not get it exactly, but the mic should have picked it up.
- 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, counsel is consulting.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 23 [Counsel conferred.]

- 1 WIT: Is it possible for me to have an alibi?
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Fine with me.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: What would your alibi be about, sir?
- 4 With clarification for a prior question that was answered?
- 5 WIT: Yes, sir.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: I'll ask the question: What is your
- 7 alibi with respect to a particular issue?
- 8 WIT: You asked me what the interrogators did with the
- 9 detainees. I gave you a list of things that they did
- 10 routinely with the detainees. What I forgot to tell you is
- 11 later in the program they played basketball with them, they
- 12 lifted weights with them, they watched movies with them, they
- 13 ate dinner with them, they read books with them, they -- you
- 14 know, they did all sorts of things that were kind of
- 15 recreational with them. I left that out because I just didn't
- **16** recall it at the time.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure, no problem.
- 18 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 19 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **20** Q. When did that start?
- 21 A. I believe it would have been Location 7 or 8. I don't
- 22 know. I don't recall specifically.
- Q. I'm sorry. My question was when. When did that

- 1 start?
- A. Oh, I'm sorry. I -- it would have been whenever they
- 3 were at those locations. To me, the time frame is less
- 4 important than where they are. I organized things in my
- 5 memory by where people are located for the most part,
- 6
- 7 Q. All right. And you were with Mr. al Baluchi at
- **8** Location 7 in 2003, correct?
- **9** A. 7 in 2003?
- **10** Q. Yes.
- 11 A. Well, then I may be wrong about the date that that
- 12 started. But if that's -- if that's the date, I won't
- 13 question the date. I don't recall the specific date.
- 14 Q. Okay. You're not saying that there was some sort of
- 15 outdoor recreation that was occurring at Location 7, are you?
- **16** A. No.
- **17** Q. But maybe Location 9 or 10?
- **18** A.
- 19 What I'm saying is that there was a movement for the people
- 20 who were cooperating to give them books and movies and chances
- 21 to eat with each other, one or two of them and -- and I didn't
- 22 say anything about taking them outside at Location 7.
- Q. All right. Fair enough. The -- okay.

- 1 So the department -- so are you done with your alibi?
- **2** A. Yes.
- **3** Q. Okay. The department that housed the CIA's
- 4 operational psychologist was in the Directorate of Science and
- 5 Technology, Office of Science and Technology, correct?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 Q. Okay. They will definitely object when they object,
- 8 and you even saw me consult with them before. So that's what
- 9 we're doing, is working it out, so this thing stays
- 10 unclassified.
- 11 So does the name of the person who called you have a
- **12** UFI?
- **13** A. Well ----
- **14** Q. Does the person who called you have a UFI?
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may look at the list of names, sir.
- **16** A. Yes.
- 17 Q. And what is it?
- **18** A. CIA Officer DF7.
- 19 Q. Okay. And DF7 asked you to attend a meeting at the
- 20 Counterterrorism Center; is that right?
- A. When he called me?
- **22** Q. Yes, sir.
- **23** A. No.

- **1** Q. Okay.
- A. He told me to come back to the headquarters as quickly
- 3 as possible. Actually he said immediately and I told him I
- 4 couldn't do it, and then he said come back the next day. And
- 5 it wasn't until I was actually in the headquarters building
- 6 that he escorted me to the Counterterrorism Center and told me
- 7 on the way I was going to attend a meeting.
- **8** Q. Okay. So the distinction between -- that you're
- 9 drawing is that you were -- you were asked to come to the CIA,
- 10 and you didn't know it was at the Counterterrorism Center at
- 11 the time, but later, you -- the meeting actually occurred at
- 12 the Counterterrorism Center?
- 13 A. Yeah. I had no idea why they were asking me to come
- **14** back initially.
- 15 Q. Okay. And that meeting, how many people attended that
- **16** meeting?
- 17 A. I don't know. A roomful of people. It was -- it was
- 18 a fair-sized conference room. Probably as many as in the
- **19** gallery back there.
- **20** Q. Maybe 40?
- 21 A. That seems a little high, but it was packed. It was
- 22 absolutely packed. It was standing room, and everybody was
- 23 seated, and there were people all over the place.

- 1 Q. Okay. And the meeting was chaired by Mr. Rodriguez,
- **2** Jose Rodriguez?
- **3** A. Jose Rodriguez chaired the meeting.
- 4 Q. Okay. And this is a "do you know" question: Are you
- 5 aware that the Senate Armed Services Committee has identified
- 6
- 7 A. Well, I -- the Senate Armed Services Committee?
- **8** Q. Yes, sir. It's a Senate Armed Services Committee
- 9 report.
- 10 A. I don't know what the Senate Armed Services Committee
- **11** did.
- 12 Q. All right. I can help you out then.
- 13 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: 628 -- sorry. I need RDI-6750.
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, is this for use as ----
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes. It's an unclassified document.
- **16** I'm just pulling the document.
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, those will show up momentarily on
- 18 your screen.
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Unclassified document, Your Honor.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. It is marked UNCLASSIFIED. You
- 21 may publish to the gallery. Counsel, Dr. Mitchell may be way
- 22 ahead of us, but can you orient us where you need him to look.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sorry. Sorry about that, too fast.

1 The full paragraph. 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Middle paragraph now. 3 WIT: Run over by that paragraph. 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm sorry. The paragraph marked 5 UNCLASSIFIED, 6 7 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, Counsel. 9 Q. So I'll just move on to the next question, which is, 10 was present? 11 TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, Your Honor. 12 A. For what? 13 TC [MR. GROHARING]: Relevance. 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Relevance. 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, we're -- this -- let me back up 16 because I don't want to overclaim it. I can explain. I don't 17 mind. 18 TC [MR. GROHARING]: What I'm assuming, maybe this will 19 clear things up, is that Mr. Connell may be wanting to elicit 20 testimony regarding what, if any, connection would 21 have to the CIA RDI program. If that's the line of 22 questioning, we would invoke the national security privilege 23 off -- over that information.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Entirely or just with respect to
- 2 open session?
- **3** TC [MR. GROHARING]: I ----
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: In other words, are you saying it's
- 5 classified or that -- I just want to make sure that I'm --
- 6 we're all on the same page as what you're doing.
- 7 TC [MR. GROHARING]: It's classified and we've invoked the
- 8 national security privilege for that information.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Copy. All right. All right. So his
- 10 role with the RDI program, you're invoking the national
- **11** security privilege over.
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: And I'm not even acknowledging that
- 13 he had a role with the RDI program.
- **14** MJ [Col COHEN]: Copy.
- 15 TC [MR. GROHARING]: So just the line of questioning to
- 16 identify him or anyone else who hasn't been officially
- 17 identified with the CIA RDI program.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- **19** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: So, Counsel, I -- what finding do you
- 21 need me to make potentially based off of that?
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm going to give a little bit of
- ${f 23}$ context, and then I'll answer the question directly.

1 MJ [Col COHEN]: That's fine. 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: It's widely believed that Dr. Mitchell 3 was the first person to ever suggest SERE techniques to the 4 SCI [sic]. That's not, in fact, accurate. JPRA had -- the 5 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency had been working, positioning 6 itself forward on interrogation issues, including many of 7 which were derived from SERE techniques for a long time. 8 The -- one of our core points is that, although 9 Dr. Mitchell is often painted as the face of the RDI program, 10 that it was an institutional program; it was a CIA program, it 11 wasn't Dr. Mitchell's program. 12 So the part of the way that we're going to elicit 13 information about that is to show the institutional 14 bureaucracy that was involved here. The -- that what's --15 what happens at this meeting is the -- a decision is made by 16 someone, and I don't think it's Dr. Mitchell -- though he'll 17 tell us, of course -- that extralegal -- and I don't mean 18 illegal, I just mean outside the judicial process --19 interrogation is going to be made Abu Zubaydah -- of 20 Abu Zubaydah. That eventually leads to a meeting at the CIA, 21 eventually leads to approval of enhanced interrogation 22 techniques.

And then there were some elements -- and that

23

- 1 eventually leads to an RDI program. There were some elements,
- 2 mostly the ones that Dr. Mitchell didn't recognize, who
- 3 engaged in coercive pressures outside the structure set up by
- 4 the DoJ.
- 5 The -- this is -- it's not the very beginning of this
- 6 process, we're going to -- I'm going to talk to Dr. Mitchell
- 7 about this as well, but this is a critical inflection point,
- 8 this meeting. It winds up with Dr. Mitchell sent halfway
- 9 across the world and sets us -- sets the United States on the
- 10 path with eventually leads to institutionalization of the RDI
- 11 program. So that's the context.
- What I understand the government to be doing is to be
- 13 invoking national security privilege over details of what
- 14 happened at that seminal meeting, including the people who are
- 15 present, also known as witnesses, and the -- so the finding
- 16 that I would ask for is that the government, by invoking
- 17 national security privilege, is removing from the case vital
- 18 information about the origin of the RDI program which is at
- 19 issue in 628 and other series.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. All right.
- 21 Mr. Groharing?
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Your Honor, to be clear, we haven't
- 23 objected to discussion of the meeting or what took place at

- 1 the meeting or what he did after the meeting. The objection
- 2 is to identifying the particular people that were in
- 3 attendance at the meeting, other than those that have been
- 4 officially acknowledged by the CIA.
- 5 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, may I respond?
- **6** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 7 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: You know, Dr. Mitchell is sometimes
- 8 painted as like this rogue actor. He's not a rogue actor. He
- **9** is a -- one small but important part of an institutional
- 10 structure. He takes orders from others; he's a contractor and
- **11** not an employee.
- 12 And the fact that this decision was made so
- **13** deliberately with advice of counsel
- 14 probably, and others and was done institutionally is at the
- 15 core of the argument that we're making about the
- 16 United States' decision to go down this path.
- And that's why we keep bringing the FBI information;
- 18 we have a lot of focus on the FBI. The -- the discovery order
- 19 from the military commission brings in the DoD. That's why
- 20 we're talking about JPRA -- or we're going to talk about JPRA.
- 21 That this is not one person off -- who decided to engage in --
- 22 in coercive pressures. Dr. Mitchell plays an important role,
- 23 but only a small one, in this overall structure which is set

- **1** up to extract information.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: I need to make -- I need to ask for
- 3 clarification from the government real quick.
- **4** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. So, Mr. Groharing, just --
- 6 just help me understand, okay? So I have this unclassified
- 7 paragraph that just says that -- that seems to have a
- 8 statement of fact in the very first paragraph, or an
- 9 assertion, at least, by -- by someone that someone attended a
- 10 meeting.
- 11 Attending a meeting doesn't in and of itself
- 12 necessarily mean that someone was or was not affiliated with
- 13 anything down the road, but just I may have attended a
- 14 meeting. I mean, all of us can attend meetings. I guess is
- 15 what I'm saying is, what is the extent, that ----
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Well, the meeting in the document is
- **17** a different meeting.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, that's right. I agree.
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Mr. Connell ----
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. That helps me. All right. So
- 22 what you're just saying is, is any additional questions on to
- 23 what role may or may not have been with the

- 1 RDI program is what the government is asserting national
- 2 security privilege over.
- **3** TC [MR. GROHARING]: That's correct, Your Honor.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. All right. So, Counsel, we're
- 5 going to talk about the finding based on that.
- 6 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: And I'll give you -- instead of making it
- 8 on the fly, I'll give the parties some time to think about
- **9** that. But right now, it sounds to me like the meeting you
- 10 want to talk to him about, let's go ahead and ask questions
- 11 about it because they haven't asserted anything over that.
- 12 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: And then what his role was and what
- 14 finding of fact is -- is relevant in the case, let's talk
- 15 about that down the road.
- 16 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir. That will also let us wrap
- 17 any other assertions ----
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Perfect.
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: We'll see what the cumulative ----
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand.
- 21 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Sowards.
- 23 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: I apologize. For reasons we discussed

1 with you in the ex parte, we just needed to excuse 2 Mr. Mohammad for maybe 20 minutes. And he's happy to leave 3 without ----4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Not a problem. He may -- he may go. 5 Guards, you're free to take him out and bring him back 6 when he's ----7 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you very much. 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. 9 Counsel, you may continue. Thank you. 10 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you. I'm done with the ----11 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Sir, just so you're 12 understanding, based on the assertion, all -- if you believe 13 that any question calls for you to respond as to what 14 role was or was not, please do not answer that at 15 this time. 16 WIT: Got it, sir. 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you. 18 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 19 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]: 20 Q. This is a "do you know" question. Do you now know the 21 identity of anyone else who was present at that meeting other 22 than Jose Rodriguez and a person over whom the government has

invoked national security privilege?

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- **1** A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Okay. How many?
- **3** A. I couldn't tell you. I'd have to look at names
- **4** and ----
- **5** Q. Okay.
- $\mathbf{6}$ A. ---- see if I can recall them.
- Q. I -- you're having the same problem that I am, which
- 8 is microphone -- being close to the microphone.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel -- excuse me. IT personnel, you
- 10 guys are awesome. Can you just turn up the volume a little
- **11** bit for today? Thank you.
- 12 Q. Do any of those persons whose identity you know who
- 13 were present at the meeting have UFIs?
- **14** A. Yes.
- **15** Q. Okay. What were those UFIs?
- **16** A. I will look and see if I can recall.
- 17 Q. Thank you.
- 18 A. And I'm going to need to ask prosecution a question.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: What is it? What is the general topic,
- **20** sir?
- 21 WIT: The -- the name of a person who I believe is
- 22 unclassified or been declassified that was at the meeting.
- 23 That doesn't -- well, maybe he doesn't have a UFI. Yeah.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah, please check the list first, and
- 2 then we can look at that. Is the person's name on the list?
- WIT: No.
- **4** MJ [Col COHEN]: It's not on the list?
- WIT: No.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 7 TC [MR. GROHARING]: Judge, I believe the answer is
- 8 probably in 658, the classification guidance.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: On page 8. I have it, if you want me
- **11** to ----
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: I've got a copy, thanks. Let me -- let
- 13 me take a look before -- before I hand this to the witness.
- **14** You're talking 658F?
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Foxtrot, Your Honor.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir. All right.
- 17 Counsel, is the relevant topic you need here is
- 18 whether or not there were CIA personnel and -- present and
- 19 whether or not there were any other agencies present as
- 20 opposed to the specific identities? I'm just trying to figure
- 21 out kind of what is the -- what is the -- the fact of
- 22 consequence.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir. I can ask about other

- 1 agencies. I don't believe that there were other agencies
- 2 present. But if you want, we can clear up that piece by
- $\mathbf{3}$ just -- if I just want to -- if you want me to ask the
- 4 witness.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Let me just ----
- 6 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: A fact of consequence, let me
- **7** answer ----
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: In other words, it's an unclass paragraph
- 9 so I have no problem saying it. They say they reserve the
- 10 right to object under 401, I mean ----
- 11 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yeah, of course.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: I mean, so essentially, could have just
- 13 made a relevance objection. I'm just trying to understand the
- **14** relevance.
- I don't want to cut you short, but I'll admit that the
- 16 fact of consequence that -- that you described is more of --
- 17 that the institution was talking about these topics as to
- 18 potentially who -- who specifically was talking about the --
- **19** about these topics.
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I understand, sir. Your -- your
- 21 understanding of the institution as the fact of consequence is
- 22 correct. The -- it makes a difference whether this was a
- 23 formal meeting with counsel and different elements represented

1 like an institutional decision of the CIA or at least of the 2 Counterterrorism Center versus whether it was low-level 3 people, you know, just being led by Mr. Rodriguez. So the --4 that's the -- it's the institutional nature of it that I'm 5 going for. That's the fact of consequence. 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. All right. So essentially what 7 you're wanting to ask is was this some ad hoc meeting held by 8 low-level -- low-level employees or was this a more 9 significant meeting where actual institutional decisions on 10 programmatic efforts were -- were going to be decided? 11 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: That's the fact I'm driving toward. 12 It wouldn't be the question exactly that I would ask, but 13 that's the fact. 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Tell you what, let's ask some 15 questions along that lines -- along those lines, and then I'll

think about with respect to the other names, and then I'll

also get an opportunity of how I'm going to handle this.

may know someone that's unclassified that the government may

- 19 not realize is unclassified.20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir.

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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED

- 2 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **3** Q. So at the time Mr. Rodriguez was Director of the
- **4** Counterterrorism Center; is that correct?
- 5 A. I'm confused about what meeting you're talking about.
- **6** Q. April of 2002.
- 7 A. No.
- **8** Q. Okay. What was his role at that time? Oh, that's
- 9 right. Cofer Black was the -- was the Director of
- 10 Counterterrorism Center at the time, correct?
- **11** A. Right.
- 12 Q. And was Mr. Black at the meeting?
- **13** A. Not to my recollection.
- 14 Q. Okay. What was Mr. Rodriguez's role at the time --
- **15** in -- during April 2002?
- 16 A. It's unclear to me. I think in my book I said that he
- 17 was the Deputy Director of the CIA, but -- I mean, Deputy
- 18 Director of Counterterrorism Center. But later, much later, I
- 19 found out that he went through a phase where he was something
- 20 called the Chief Operating Officer or something like that and
- 21 then the Deputy and then the Chief of Counterterrorism Center.
- 22 So which of those amorphous roles he had at that
- 23 particular time, I don't know.

- 1 Q. Okay. Would it be fair to say that he ----
- **2** A. Fair?
- **Q**. ---- a relatively senior person in the CIA at the
- 4 time?
- 5 A. I don't know what you mean by fair.
- **6** Q. It's just a legal convention. What -- what -- how
- 7 would you prefer me to ask that question? I want to ask
- 8 it ----
- **9** A. Is it accurate to say that he was a fairly senior
- **10** person?
- 11 Q. Yeah, sure.
- 12 A. Because in my mind, it's not about dividing up equity
- 13 or making sure that one person doesn't have an advantage over
- 14 another. It's about am I answering accurately or
- 15 inaccurately.
- 16 Q. Absolutely. Is it accurate to say that Mr. Rodriguez
- 17 was a fairly senior person in the CIA at the time?
- **18** A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. Were other persons in -- in senior roles at CIA
- **20** or CTC also present at the meeting?
- 21 A. This is -- this was my first contact with the CTC,
- 22 right? And so how senior -- it was -- it was a room full of
- 23 heads, right, to me. It's just a room full of heads, and I

- 1 was kind of brought in there and sat down.
- 2 And so I didn't quiz people about what their role was
- 3 because that's just not something I would do. So we could
- 4 have had, you know, people from the 7th floor, senior people
- 5 there that I didn't know. I just don't know.
- I do know a couple of the people who have designators
- 7 who were there, and -- but my guess would be there were some
- 8 fairly senior people there. It's a guess, but I don't know.
- **9** Q. Okay. So ----
- 10 A. Certainly from CTC. Certainly from CTC and from Alec
- 11 Station.
- 12 Q. Okay. So I'm going to draw a line there, sir. That's
- 13 my foundation. I'm going to ask the question again, and -- so
- 14 who were the person with UFIs? Who were the persons with UFIs
- 15 who were present at the meeting in April of 2002?
- **16** A. That I can recall?
- **17** Q. Yes, sir.
- 18 A. W87. I believe DF7 was there as well. PJ1 was there.
- 19 And I'm not sure completely, but I think EX2 was there as
- 20 well; I could be wrong about that last one. This is just
- 21 to my best recollection.
- Q. Does that complete your answer, sir?
- 23 A. Yes. sir.

1 Q. At the meeting, you and -- and all the other people 2 assembled were briefed that Abu Zubaydah had been captured in 3 a raid: is that right? 4 Α. That's correct. 5 Okay. And were you briefed that that capture had Q. 6 taken place on 29 March 2002? 7 I don't recall the date that they used. 8 Q. Okay. Were you briefed that it took place in 9 Faisalabad, Pakistan? 10 I believe that's correct. 11 Q. Are you aware now ----12 Α. Am I aware now? 13 Q. Yes. 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: He was just starting a question, sir. 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes. 16 Q. Are you aware now that Robert Grenier has given the 17 following description of events: "On the afternoon of 18 March 28th, 2002, a pseudonym laid out the plan for the 19 visiting Senators. 20 21 22 23 So my question to you is: Are -- are you aware now of

- **1** that description?
- **2** TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection. Relevance.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Relevance?
- 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, if -- if Robert Grenier, who I
- 5 think the prosecution does not want me to state his role,
- 6 although it's on the back of his book jacket, is accurate,
- 7 then, in fact, members of the Senate Select Committee on
- 8 Intelligence were present, being briefed before the raid that
- 9 captured Abu Zubaydah, which is going to become important
- 10 later when we talk about what the Senate Select Committee on
- 11 Intelligence knew and didn't know.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. So is the question relatively
- 13 then -- is he aware that Grenier said it or is he aware that
- **14** that happened?
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: So I would like to ask the question of
- 16 whether he's aware that it happened, but the way that the
- 17 government has set this up, I have to sneak up on it. So I
- 18 don't know if they're going to invoke national security
- 19 privilege to did that actually happen or is the witness aware
- 20 that that happened.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Let's find out.
- **22** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm sorry?
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Let's find out. Are you going to assert

- 1 national security privilege over whether or not he's aware
- 2 that that occurred?
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: No, Your Honor.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Great. Let's just ask it, then.
- 5 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Great.
- 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 7 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **8** Q. Are you aware that there were members of the Senate
- 9 Select Committee on Intelligence who were present in Pakistan
- 10 and briefed before the raid on Abu Zubaydah?
- 11 A. I'm not being flippant, but you just told me that, so
- 12 of course I'm aware of it.
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Were you aware of it before he mentioned
- **14** it?
- **15** WIT: No.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Thank you.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you. All right.
- 18 Q. Were you briefed about any role of the FBI in the raid
- 19 that captured Abu Zubaydah?
- A. I don't recall being briefed about a role that the FBI
- **21** played.
- Q. Okay. Do you know now of any role that the FBI played
- 23 in the raid that captured Abu Zubaydah?

- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, relevance.
 MJ [Col COHEN]: Relevance. I'm not -- I'm actually --
- **3** I'm just following the process.
- 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir. The central issue in these
- 5 series of hearings is the involvement of the FBI in the
- 6 greater effort to use coercive pressures. I -- I say it that
- 7 way specifically because there are -- I -- I think this
- 8 witness will testify that the RDI program was a -- that he --
- 9 as he understood it, was a -- had a certain scope and that
- 10 there were coercive pressures used outside the scope of that
- 11 particular program.
- 12 The involvement of the FBI in the -- in the larger
- 13 U.S. effort that resulted in the use of coercive pressures in
- 14 the exploitation of statements from Mr. al Baluchi is like the
- 15 core issue ----
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand that. But with respect to
- 17 Abu Zubaydah -- I mean, I guess that's really the relevance
- 18 here. In other words, we call the various FBI agents to get
- 19 their -- I guess that's what I'm saying is, is ----
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I make a proffer, Your Honor?
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: ---- even -- yeah. That's kind of what
- 22 I'm looking for, is why -- if things went really bad with
- 23 Abu Zubaydah and so they changed the process, I can see some

- 1 relevance with -- with -- with that, right, because then it
- 2 goes specifically to what was or wasn't done and why it was
- 3 done and those kinds of things.
- **4** But what I can't figure out is if the FBI played a
- 5 role with Abu Zubaydah, it seems like the real importance
- 6 would be whether or not the FBI played a role in this case.
- 7 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay. Yes. The FBI -- our point is
- 8 the FBI had -- and we have more witnesses; I know that he's
- 9 not the very best witness on this -- is that the FBI has been
- 10 involved in the use of coercive pressures from the very
- 11 beginning, from -- even from the capture of Abu Zubaydah
- 12 through the transfer to Guantanamo.
- 13 The -- that takes a wide variety of different sort of
- 14 mechanisms. It's involvement in the captures. It's
- 15 involvement in the prerendition interrogation. It's feeding
- 16 questions -- excuse me, intelligence requirements to the CIA
- 17 which are sometimes used during coercive pressures and
- 18 sometimes used during the debriefings which follow the
- **19** coercive pressures.
- It's -- this is -- this whole effort to extract
- 21 information from these defendants has been an interagency
- 22 process. It has been a government-wide process. We're going
- 23 to have the Bureau of Prisons that's going to become involved

- 1 from the DoJ. We're going to have the Office of Legal Counsel
- 2 famously involved. We're going to have JPRA become involved.
- 3 The -- and so this is just one fact among a wide variety of
- 4 the deep involvement of multiple agencies in the decision to
- 5 use coercive pressures.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. With respect to Abu Zubaydah, I'm
- 7 going to sustain it on relevance. But -- but obviously any
- 8 questions related to the FBI's involvement with -- with any of
- 9 the -- the -- the accused here, completely relevant and we've
- 10 had testimony on that.
- 11 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: All right.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: I'm not saying you can't call additional,
- 13 I'm just saying that obviously that is -- I mean, we've talked
- 14 about FBI agents -- well, I can't remember whether something
- 15 is classified or unclassified, to be honest with you.
- 16 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I understand what you're saying, sir.
- 17 Your -- your ruling with respect to the involvement of the FBI
- 18 in the capture or -- because if you -- I thought that's all we
- **19** were talking about.
- If you're talking about the role of the FBI in the
- 21 entire decision from -- the process from April 2002 to the
- 22 FBI-CIA meeting in July 2002 to the involvement of the FBI
- **23** in ----

- **1** MJ [Col COHEN]: Not necessarily. I'm talking about
- 2 specifically with respect to Abu Zubaydah.
- 3 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I know, sir. But the first six months
- 4 of this story are about Abu Zubaydah. I was just talking
- 5 about -- my question to the -- to this witness related to like
- **6** the first day of this story. There's -- most of the
- 7 information that later became the Rendition, Interrogation --
- 8 Detention, Interrogation Program and was used -- was hashed
- 9 out in the first place in the Abu Zubaydah process.
- So I just -- I want to make sure that I understand the
- 11 scope of your ruling because my question was about FBI
- 12 involvement in the capture. The -- I think that we will be
- 13 spending the rest of the day on the evolution which eventually
- 14 led to the creation of EITs and the Rendition, Detention, and
- 15 Interrogation Program, lots of cables about it.
- 16
 It has nothing to do with whether statements made by
- 17 Mr. Abu Zubaydah were voluntary or not. I'm ----
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: No, I understand.
- 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: ---- not asking that question. I'm
- 20 going to the origin story of the RDI program. And if you skip
- 21 over that origin -- if -- origin story, then we've excluded
- 22 a -- then we sort of pick up in the middle of the -- of the
- 23 story.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand. I guess the relevant
- 2 question that I think would -- would be a predicate question
- 3 is, one, does he even know what the FBI's role was? And then,
- 4 two -- you know, in the -- in -- basically in the -- in the
- 5 development of the RDI program.
- 6 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir. I'll ask those foundation
- 7 questions.
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah. That's what I -- that's what I
- 9 really want to know. Because your explanations, I -- I get,
- 10 but I don't see -- but to me, it seems like we can get to the
- 11 point where, why was the RDI program created the way that it
- 12 was? What was it meant to correct? Those kinds of things.
- **13** And I'll -- did the FBI have a role in that?
- 14 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Right. I'm going to lay some
- 15 foundation, and then I'm going to skip some pages and ----
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: ---- I think I know what you want,
- **18** sir.
- 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 20 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- Q. In April of 2002 when you -- so at the meeting that we
- 22 just -- I'm backing up.
- In April 2002, you attended the meeting. As a result

- 1 of that meeting, you were engaged as a consultant in an
- 2 interrogation of Abu Zubaydah; is that right?
- A. Correct.
- **4** Q. Okay. And what was your role in that interrogation?
- **5** A. It was to monitor the resistance to interrogation
- 6 techniques that he employed and to suggest countermeasures.
- 7 Q. All right. And at that time in April 2002, were you
- 8 in any way, shape, or form designing a program or creating
- 9 enhanced interrogation techniques or making policy in any way?
- **10** A. No.
- 11 Q. So we're going to go through this in some detail, but
- 12 would it be fair to say -- would it be accurate to say -- did
- 13 you just use an interrogation technique on me? Very clever.
- 14 The -- would it be accurate to say that the process
- 15 evolved through the spring and summer of 2002 until it was
- 16 finally presented to the Office of Legal Counsel in July of
- 17 2002 for their consideration?
- **18** A. That's not how I would characterize it from my
- **19** experience.
- **20** Q. How would you characterize it?
- 21 A. In April, May, June of 2002, they were -- the CIA and
- 22 the F -- and the FBI agents that were there were both focused
- 23 on questioning Abu Zubaydah. And once he was out of the

- 1 hospital and he was able to participate better, there was a --
- 2 there was an emphasis on it.
- I didn't hear any discussions about an evolving
- 4 program myself, although people were concerned that -- you
- 5 know, that he had basically shut down after a couple of
- 6 incidents that I describe in my book. And there was some talk
- 7 about what do we do next, how do we -- how do we move this guy
- 8 forward. But it wasn't like there was a consistent churning,
- 9 evolutionary process that was goal-directed and -- and
- 10 controlled by someone.
- **11** Q. All right. So ----
- 12 A. At least that's my perception.
- 13 Q. Sure. With that as foundation, let's go back to the
- **14** briefing.
- **15** A. The 2000 -- the April 2002?
- 16 Q. The April 2002 briefing, yes, sir.
- 17 At that time, were you briefed about a Presidential
- 18 finding regarding authorization for the CIA to capture,
- 19 detain, and interrogate people like Abu Zubaydah?
- **20** A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Did the CIA briefer mention any limits on that
- **22** authority?
- A. I don't recall them doing that.

- 1 Q. During that meeting, was the phrase "the gloves are
- 2 off" used?
- **3** A. I believe it was.
- 4 Q. And at the time, what did you understand that phrase
- 5 to mean?
- **6** A. Well, I have to put it in context.
- 7 Q. Please do.
- **8** A. It was immediately after 9/11. There was credible --
- 9 are you going to argue that a couple of months later is not
- **10** after 9/11? I saw you roll your eyes.
- 11 Q. I -- I'm not arguing anything. I -- please continue
- 12 with your answer.
- **13** A. Okay.
- **14** Q. I was actually doing the math.
- **15** A. It was after 9/11. It felt at the agency like we were
- 16 in a run-and-gun battle. There was credible intelligence that
- 17 I was briefed about before, during, and after that meeting
- 18 that there was another catastrophic attack planned by the
- 19 defendants that could possibly involve nuclear weapons.
- I was told that they had credible reason to believe
- 21 that al Qaeda had already had some kind of a biological or
- 22 chemical warfare capability that they were working on and that
- 23 they intended to do a nuclear weapon, and that the President

- 1 had directed them to do everything that was legal to stop that
- 2 from happening because they were not going to set off -- let
- 3 al Qaeda set off a nuclear weapon in a city of ours. That's
- 4 the context for this thing.
- 5 So everybody was leaning forward, and many of the
- 6 people who were at that meeting had just been chewed out by
- 7 the Senate Select Committee and the House Select Committee
- 8 about being too risk averse to stop 9/11. So they were --
- 9 they did say that the gloves were off, but I don't recall that
- 10 they mentioned any limitations.
- 11 Q. I'm -- my question is: What did you understand the
- 12 phrase "the gloves are off" to mean?
- 13 A. That they were intending to do whatever was legal to
- 14 get the information that they -- that they needed out of this
- 15 person to stop the next attack, because the focus is on
- **16** stopping the next catastrophic attack.
- 17 Q. In your answer, you referred to "the defendants."
- 18 What did you mean by that?
- **19** A. What did I mean by "the defendants"?
- Q. Yes. You were -- so you told us you were briefed that
- 21 the defendants were planning an attack.
- A. al Qaeda.
- Q. Is -- is that the complete answer?

- **1** A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Okay. In April, early April 2002, you were asked by
- 3 the Counterterrorism Center to deploy with an interrogation
- 4 team; is that right?
- **5** A. Yes.
- **6** Q. And so there was a contract drawn up?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. And your contract at that time was not to be an
- 9 interrogator at all, correct, but to act in the role of
- **10** psychologist?
- **11** A. I was to act in the role as an operational
- 12 psychologist providing them consultation on the resistance
- 13 techniques that were employed. You -- you probably have a
- 14 copy of it. We can just read what the statement of work is.
- **15** Q. Do you feel that you need to do that?
- **16** A. No.
- 17 Q. Okay. And was it made clear to you that decisions
- 18 regarding what would be done during interrogations were the
- 19 responsibility of the CIA; that you were not the decider?
- A. Yes, many times.
- Q. And in what context did they make it clear many times?
- A. Well, they just -- they basically said that I could
- 23 make recommendations, but whether or not they chose to follow

- 1 those recommendations or even entertain the recommendations or
- 2 ask for further clarification of the recommendations was
- 3 really not my call. I was a green-badger. Green-badgers
- 4 don't run the CIA. Blue-badgers do.
- **5** Q. Can you explain the terms green- and blue-badger for
- **6** us?
- 7 A. Yes. A green-badger is a contractor or a
- 8 subcontractor who works for the CIA. A blue-badger is a
- **9** federal employee.
- 10 Q. And what was the significance of that distinction?
- **11** A. It's a kind of a caste system like it is everywhere.
- 12 You know, if you're a federal employee -- for example, a CIA
- 13 officer can maintain custody of a detainee at the time. A
- 14 contractor could never take custody of a detainee.
- 15 There were -- there were things that officers,
- 16 employees, federal employees, were authorized to do that
- 17 contractors were not.
- 18 Q. Was one of those having decision-making authority?
- **19** A. Always.
- Q. And what was the distinction? Blue-badgers had
- 21 decision-making authority and green-badgers didn't?
- **22** A. That's correct.
- Q. The answer that you gave a moment ago, the context to

- 1 "the gloves are off," you included a comment that there -- you
- 2 had been briefed that there was credible information that
- 3 al Qaeda was planning a nuclear attack on the United States?
- **4** A. That it would possibly include nuclear material.
- **5** Q. Were you -- during that briefing, not other times, but
- 6 during that briefing, were you told the basis of that belief?
- 7 A. Not during that briefing. I subsequently came to know
- 8 what the basis is.
- **Q**. Was -- the judge told me to ask this question a while
- **10** ago, and I forgot. I apologize.
- 11 Was any -- anyone from the FBI present at that
- 12 meeting, the April 2002?
- A. No. In fact, there were no other government agencies
- 14 there. Bruce Jessen was initially brought into the meeting
- 15 but when they found out that he was -- Dr. Jessen, but when
- 16 they found thought that he was a Department of Defense
- 17 employee, they politely asked him to leave.
- 18 Q. Okay. Were you -- did the briefing include that the
- 19 WMD conclusions were not universally shared by CIA analysts?
- 20 A. That briefing that I'm referring to was to me
- 21 separately when they were bringing me up to speed before I
- 22 deployed. I don't recall that being said.
- Q. Okay. Are you -- do you know who Philip Mudd is?

- **1** A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Okay. Did you read his book?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. Okay. I'd like to read you a statement from it and
- **5** ask if you agree.
- **6** A. You want me to agree to some guy's book? Have you got
- 7 a copy of it or something?
- **8** Q. Sure.
- **9** A. Because I mean I ----
- 10 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, I'm going to show it to
- **11** the government first.
- **12** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- For counsel's planning purposes, my understanding is
- 14 that -- and if I'm incorrect, Mr. Sowards, let me know. I'm
- 15 tracking 1522 for 'Asr prayer. My intent is to stop at 1515
- 16 for a 30-minute recess.
- 17 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: That's correct, Your Honor. Yes.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you. Counsel, we're
- **19** going until 1515.
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir. May I approach?
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 22 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Just to follow
- 23 up, there's also a 5:46, if you were planning to stop at ----

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah, we're going to hard stop at 1730.
- 2 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Okay. And then they remain.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: It makes sense to let them pray before
- 4 they go.
- 5 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you.
- **6** MJ [Col COHEN]: Thanks.
- 7 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, I was otherwise engaged, I
- 8 missed that last bit of scheduling.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: 1730 hard stop.
- 10 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Ruiz?
- 12 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Just going to ask if Mr. Hawsawi can be
- 13 excused after the next break?
- **14** MJ [Col COHEN]: Absolutely.
- 15 LDC [MR. RUIZ]: Thank you.
- 16 WIT: Okay. So what am I going to do with this book?
- 17 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 18 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- 19 Q. Okay. First, who is Philip Mudd?
- 20 A. Philip Mudd was a CIA officer.
- **21** Q. Is he ----
- A. I think he worked for the -- he was an analyst, I
- 23 think.

- 1 Q. All right. Was he one of the deputy directors of the
- 2 Counterterrorism Center between 2002 and 2004?
- A. I have no idea.
- **4** Q. Okay. Here's the question that I'd like to ask you.
- 5 I'm going to read you the sentence. It's the last sentence on
- 6 page 129. It's underlined on your book there.
- 7 "For the agency, those kinds of troubling unknowns" --
- 8 referring to WMDs -- "motivated managers to press for
- 9 continued detainee transfers to black sites and for authority
- 10 to use enhanced interrogation techniques."
- 11 Do you agree with that characterization?
- 12 A. I would agree with that characterization.
- 13 Q. All right.
- **14** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I approach, Your Honor?
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 16 Q. All right. Next chapter, your travel to Location
- **17** Number 3.
- **18** A. My ----
- 19 Q. Did you travel essentially immediately after the
- 20 April 2002 CTC meeting?
- 21 A. I traveled that night.
- **22** Q. Okay. You traveled
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, relevance.

- **1** MJ [Col COHEN]: Relevance?
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: We're going to talk about who is on
- 3 the jet, so that's where this is foundation for that.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Let's get to the -- so the
- 5 specific type of jet that it was, whether or not he traveled
- 6 with other, for example, CIA personnel or FBI personnel or
- 7 something like that to that location.
- **8** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay.
- **9** Q. Did you -- let me ask it a different way.
- 10
- **11** A. No.
- 12 Q. Okay. And on the plane, you sat next to the chief
- 13 psychologist for Counterterrorism Center; is that right?
- **14** A. I checked -- I sat next to the operational
- 15 psychologist who had been detailed to the Counterterrorism
- 16 Center, so he was the only psychologist and, thus, the chief
- **17** psychologist.
- 18 Q. Okay. And -- and you told us a little bit about
- 19 green-badgers and blue-badgers earlier. What did that
- 20 psychologist tell you about decision-making authority on this
- 21 mission?
- A. He told me that he had -- that he had lobbied for me
- 23 not to go; that he didn't think I should be there; and that

- 1 any decisions that were made about any psychological aspects
- 2 of the interrogation would be his decisions; and that
- 3 essentially I was to -- I don't want to characterize it that
- 4 way. That's a euphemism that isn't true. That essentially
- 5 was his decision.
- **6** Q. Okay. Did he tell you his reasons?
- 7 A. That's an interesting question. I think he thought he
- 8 could do what I did and I wasn't needed. That was my
- 9 impression. It struck -- you know, at that particular time,
- 10 deploying for such a high-visibility mission carried a lot of
- 11 gravitas, you know. He had been hand-selected to go, and then
- 12 they stuck this other guy in there with him who was doing
- 13 something that he felt that he was qualified to do and --
- 14 that's my impression. And he just -- he just basically said,
- 15 "I'm the operational psychologist. You're a consultant.
- 16 These decisions are my decisions."
- 17 Q. Okay. And was the message you took from that this CIA
- **18** operation, not a Dr. Mitchell operation?
- 19 A. I never thought it was a Dr. Mitchell operation. And,
- 20 in fact, I never thought of it as a CIA inter -- thing either.
- 21 I thought of it as America's, because we were trying to stop
- 22 that next attack, and that was the only thing we were focused
- **23** on.

- 1 Q. And when you say it was not CIA, it was America's, is
- 2 that because it was a full government effort?
- A. That was because it -- I don't recall whether it was
- 4 then or later, but I was told that the President had approved
- 5 of -- of the things and that it had been briefed to the
- 6 National Security Council. And so I thought of it as
- **7** America's program.
- **8** Q. Okay. And the implication -- is it accurate to say
- 9 that the implication is that, if the President knew about it
- 10 and the National Security Council knew about it, then the --
- **11** it was a full government effort?
- 12 A. You're asking me to come to a conclusion that I didn't
- 13 make at the time, you know. I just didn't make that
- 14 conclusion at the time. My sole focus was on stopping the
- 15 next attack. I was told that it was legal. I was told that
- 16 the -- you know, that it was authorized. And that these
- 17 people were going to hit us any minute. And I didn't stop and
- 18 quibble about whether it was a full government authorization
- 19 or whether there was food-fighting between the FBI and the
- 20 CIA. That's not my focus.
- Q. What led -- at the time, what led you to the
- 22 conclusion that it was America's effort?
- A. Because we were trying to save American lives.

- 1 Q. Who -- who is "we" in that sentence?
- A. The CIA.
- 3 Q. Could you explain what you mean? Because you're
- 4 saying it was CIA effort but that made it America's effort.
- 5 Is that the -- is that your point?
- **6** A. I think that CIA was -- represented America at the tip
- 7 of the spear. You may feel differently, but I don't.
- **8** Q. Okay. So -- thank you.
- **9** Was there -- but -- so CIA is the tip of the spear.
- 10 Was there anybody from the FBI on the plane?
- **11** A. No.
- 12 Q. The -- did you fly to the country that hosted
- 13 Location 3?
- **14** A. Let me look.
- **15** Q. Sure.
- **16** A. It's easy to get confused.
- **17** Q. Sure.
- **18** A. Yes.
- TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, relevance.
- 21 MJ [Col COHEN]: Relevance?
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm sorry?
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Where they stopped on the way, why is

1 that relevant? 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Oh. One of the things that's not 3 clear from the public record and is not clear from the book --4 well, actually, I can be -- is that George Tenet says that 5 they -- that this group flew Jose Rodriguez in 6 his book says they flew The -- and they talk 7 about who else was on the plane. So there's other pieces of 8 information that are coming together. 9 What I am trying to find out is whether there were two 10 fliahts, one went and one went to the country of Location Number 3, or whether we're all talking about just the 11 12 same flight and perhaps it made a stop 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. For decision before me, what --14 what -- why would that matter? 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Because the FBI, Special Agent Franco 16 and Jennifer Hill Keenan, who shows up here a lot, and 17 Christopher Riemann are all with Abu Zubaydah at 18 this time. So my hypothesis is that the plane stopped 19 picked up Abu Zubaydah, and took him to the country 20 of Location Number 3. That's what I think happened with FBI 21 involvement. And that's why I'm trying to find out. 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: So wouldn't the better question be, did 23 the FBI then travel with you ultimately to that location even

1 though they weren't initially on the flight. 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure. 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. I'll allow that question. 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: But there's nothing classified about 5 right? 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: No, no, no. I'm just trying to -- like I said, I'm just really -- just for me and the decisions that I 7 8 need to make, I mean, I -- I see -- as you've noticed, I mean, 9 I -- I get why the -- the FBI's involvement has some 10 relevance ----11 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Uh-huh. 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: ---- but what -- to -- but so to me, 13 that's -- that is the -- that is the factor that I need --14 that I potentially need to know, is, is so at some point on 15 that trip -- if they went to China first, for example, I 16 really don't care. What matters to me is, is was the FBI 17 involved in assisting in the -- in the interrogation or 18 present while the -- these were being used, et cetera. 19 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir. 20 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED

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Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:

of Abu Zubaydah to the country of Location 3?

21

22

23

Q. Was the FBI -- did the FBI participate in the transfer

- 1 A. I have no idea.
- 2 Q. Okay. And by "I have no idea," you mean you did not
- **3** observe any?
- **4** A. That's correct.
- **5** Q. Okay. When did you first interact with a person in
- 6 the country of Location Number 3 that you knew to be part of
- 7 the FBI?
- **8** A. Probably the day we landed.
- **9** Q. And at that time, was Abu Zubaydah in a hospital?
- **10** A. Correct.
- 11 Q. Okay. And just to be clear, that hospital was not
- 12 part of Location Number 3, correct?
- **13** A. Correct.
- **14** TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, relevance.
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: The -- well, it's quite important
- 16 where the -- like, what I think happens is the FBI is -- I
- 17 think Dr. Mitchell has described it as like snatching words,
- 18 you know, random words from Abu Zubaydah when he surfaces from
- 19 consciousness at this hospital. And then later, they as a
- 20 group, the interrogators, which include the FBI, move to
- 21 Location Number 3. I just want to make sure that's the --
- **22** what actually happened.
- 23 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. So -- so the fact of consequence

- 1 is whether or not the FBI was present with him at the
- 2 hospital?
- 3 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may ask that question.
- **5** Q. Was the FBI present with Abu Zubaydah at the hospital?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Okay. And was that Special Agents Soufan and Gaudin?
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may answer that one.
- **9** A. Yes.
- 10 Q. Okay. Did you, yourself, go to the hospital?
- 11 A. I believe once or twice.
- 12 Q. Okay. And what did you observe -- what role of the
- 13 FBI did you observe? What did -- what was happening?
- 14 A. Well, the FBI and the -- and the CIA were taking turns
- 15 sitting by his bedside, he was drifting in and out of
- 16 consciousness, and attempting to talk to him when he was
- 17 conscious.
- 18 Q. Okay. Why was he in the hospital?
- **19** A. He engaged in a fire fight with the arresting force
- 20 and was shot leaping from one building to another building.
- Q. How serious was his injury?
- 22 A. It was pretty serious.
- Q. Life threatening?

- **1** A. It would have been if the CIA had not deliberately
- 2 brought a hospitalist there to save his life.
- **3** Q. On the same plane with you?
- **4** A. Yes.
- **5** Q. The -- were there any other patients in the hospital?
- **6** TC [MR. GROHARING]: Objection, relevance.
- 7 MJ [Col COHEN]: Relevance?
- 8 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Those are witnesses, Your Honor. I'm
- 9 just trying to find out who -- who all is there. Is this a --
- 10 like, I -- I don't know if it's a -- I don't know what is
- 11 meant by "hospital." I'm not sure if it means ----
- 12 Q. Was this a regular public hospital?
- **13** A. It was not a public hospital.
- 14 Q. Okay. Was it a hospital-like environment which was
- 15 set up specifically for Abu Zubaydah?
- **16** MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel?
- 17 TC [MR. GROHARING]: No objection to that particular
- 18 question, but ----
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Counsel, I'll give you some brief
- 20 leeway because of the nature of the case and -- and the
- 21 classification, putting things together, but let's not spend
- 22 too much time on discovery as opposed to the issues currently
- 23 before us.

1 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, I just do want to be super clear 2 that the -- throughout this process since July, you have 3 encouraged us to participate in this process despite the fact 4 that the government has not satisfied its discovery 5 responsibilities fully. 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: No, I'm allowing some -- like I said, but 7 the idea is we get too close to the line of identifying marks 8 about that, then that would -- that -- it's another fact. 9 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: The -- the security -- national 10 security privilege part is completely ----11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah. 12 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I completely understand. 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: That's my concern right now. 14 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay. Got it. 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: See what I'm saying, is this like a 16 public hospital, those kinds of things, those are the factors

- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Is that true? You have to -- so
- 21 you're saying that the government has asserted national

start putting things together.

17

18

19

22 security privilege over whether it was a public hospital? I

of which they've asserted the national security privilege

because it could tend to identify. In other words, you can

23 did not understand that. That's the reason why I'm asking.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Well, in my reading of that guidance --
- 2 I'll let him speak, but my reading of some of that guidance
- 3 was most recently with respect to black sites, it's ----
- 4 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: But this isn't a black site. He's not
- 5 at a black site. He's at a -- he's not at location -- that's
- 6 why I was so specific about what does Location 3 mean. He's
- 7 not at location -- Abu Zubaydah is not -- at this point in the
- 8 story, Abu Zubaydah is not at Location 3 yet. You ----
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: I thought you prefaced -- let me just ask
- 10 you. I thought the initial question you asked him was a
- 11 hospital in the country of Location 3.
- 12 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, the country of Location 3.
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Right, which would be an identifier of
- 14 the country in which Location 3 is located.
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yeah, I didn't ask anything about the
- **16** country.
- 17 MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand. That's similar to the
- 18 issue of were Humvees there, were -- you know, you see what
- **19** I'm saying?
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sir, if that's covered by national
- 21 security privilege, all I'm asking for is a ruling ----
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: I'll verify that that seems to be
- 23 consistent with the finding that I made in your favor, is that

- 1 those kinds of questions because they tend to elicit
- 2 information that could -- from which you could discern
- 3 Location Number 3's true identity.
- **4** But Mr. Groharing, you may speak.
- **5** TC [MR. GROHARING]: That's correct, Your Honor.
- 6 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. All right. So you have -- you
- 7 have a finding that also encompasses that.
- **8** TC [MR. GROHARING]: Yes, sir.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah, that's what I meant by too far
- **10** afield on the discovery.
- 11 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I under -- I apologize for being too
- 12 slow to pick that up.
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Nope. Nope. Like I said, this is --
- **14** we're all working through this.
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes.
- 16 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 17 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- 18 Q. Were any American -- no, let me -- I withdraw that
- **19** question.
- 20 How many -- do you know how many times Abu Zubaydah
- 21 had been shot?
- A. I believe he had been shot twice.
- Q. Is it accurate to say that when you arrived,

- **1** Abu Zubaydah had a massive leg wound?
- A. He had a massive leg wound as a result of the
- 3 physicians trying to -- it was a tunneling wound, and they
- 4 opened his leg up in order to fight the infection.
- **5** Q. Did Abu Zubaydah also have an emergency tracheotomy?
- **6** A. I don't recall that.
- 7 Q. Would it be accurate to say that until American
- 8 medical intervention, he was dying?
- **9** A. That was my understanding at the time.
- **10** Q. Was he on pain medication?
- 11 A. I have no idea.
- **12** Q. Okay.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, where are you going with this?
- 14 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Nowhere further.
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- **16** Q. At some point, did you learn
- 18
- **19** A. You mean at some point ever?
- **20** Q. Yes.

17

- 21 A. Possibly, I was told. But, you know, details like
- 22 that, you know, my focus is not behind. It's forward. So I
- 23 wouldn't have tracked it. I don't recall it.

- 1 Q. Okay. So there's a story that is sometimes told about
- 2 an alphabet chart, an Arabic alphabet chart, being brought to
- 3 the hospital because of a tracheotomy. Do you know if that
- 4 story is true? Mr. Soufan tells it sometimes.
- 5 A. I have no idea whether that's true or not. I don't
- **6** recall anything like that.
- 7 Q. Okay. Is it -- is it fair to say that the effort to
- 8 obtain information at the hospital from Abu Zubaydah was a
- 9 joint effort between the FBI and CIA?
- **10** A. That would be true.
- 11 Q. Was it a -- sort of a regular interrogation process or
- 12 was it something different? At the hospital.
- A. Well, it couldn't be a regular interrogation process.
- 14 He was drifting in and out of consciousness.
- 15 Q. Okay. And how did that interfere with their ability
- **16** to gather information?
- 17 A. When he wasn't awake, you couldn't talk to him. And
- 18 when he was awake, he was sometimes disoriented, sometimes
- 19 delirious, depending on how sick he was.
- Q. And despite that delirium and disorientation, the FBI
- 21 continued to question him?
- 22 A. I don't -- I don't think they did. I -- you know, I
- 23 think that they stood by looking for opportunities to question

- 1 him, the FBI and the CIA, when -- when he was lucid enough to
- 2 be responsive to them.
- 3 I didn't -- I didn't get -- I didn't get that
- 4 impression. I saw several videotapes of their efforts to
- 5 question him, and I didn't see anything that resembled
- 6 anything that you just described.
- **7** Q. What do you think I just described?
- 8 A. Him being delirious and them continuing to try to
- **9** question him.
- 10 Q. Okay. So two questions -- two answers ago when you
- 11 said that he was delirious and disoriented, what did you mean?
- 12 A. I mean at times. Sitting by his bedside, waiting for
- 13 him to become lucid enough, sometimes he comes out of
- 14 consciousness and isn't lucid. Sometimes he comes out of
- 15 unconsciousness and is.
- 16 Q. Okay. The -- so can you -- there are many versions of
- 17 the story, of the -- of the questioning or volunteered
- 18 information or the connection of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad to
- 19 Mukhtar by Abu Zubaydah. Can you tell us your understanding?
- A. I can tell you what I was told.
- **21** Q. Okay. Who told you?
- 22 A. Ali Soufan.
- Q. Okay. Yes, with that understanding, please go ahead.

- **1** A. Well, what he said -- well, I was also told, I think,
- 2 by the chief of station's chief of security, who -- who was
- 3 there.
- 4 The story, as I understand it, was Abu Zubaydah
- 5 thought he was dying and identified himself as Abu Zubaydah at
- 6 some point, and provided a tidbit of information, which was
- 7 that, you know, KSM was the mastermind behind 9/11 or the --
- 8 or something to that effect, Mukhtar, and then -- and then
- 9 essentially quit responding for a time, quit providing some
- **10** information.
- 11 So I think the way that it was described to me by the
- 12 people involved was that he provided bits and pieces of
- 13 information that would suggest that he was a valuable person
- 14 to keep alive but, in the long run, wasn't particularly useful
- 15 for actionable intelligence because the agency had already
- 16 identified through banking records what -- you know, who was
- 17 involved.
- 18 Q. The -- I just want to break that down and make sure I
- 19 understand it.
- 20 Do you understand a phone to have been involved in
- 21 that process?
- **22** A. No.
- Q. Okay. So you -- when you spoke to the chief of

- **1** station, chief of security, and ----
- A. Well, the chief, the ----
- **3** Q. ---- the ----
- **4** A. The chief of security for the station.
- **5** Q. The station.
- 6 The chief of security for the station and Mr. Soufan,
- 7 did they tell you that Mr. Soufan had brought up a photograph
- 8 on his phone and showed it to Abu Zubaydah?
- **9** A. Oh, that I do remember, yes.
- 10 Q. Okay. So can you -- can you explain that to us?
- **11** A. You just explained it.
- 12 Q. Okay. So where does that fit in with your previous
- 13 answer that Abu Zubaydah identified Khalid Shaikh Mohammad as
- 14 the mastermind of 9/11?
- **15** A. He did it in response to the picture.
- **16** Q. He said ----
- **17** A. Not quite like that.
- 18 Q. What were you told? I know you weren't there, but
- **19** what were you told?
- A. I can't remember the exact wording of what I was told,
- 21 but the basic -- the basic thrust of it is precisely what
- 22 we've been dancing around, that -- you know, that he
- 23 identified a picture of KSM and that he said essentially that

- 1 that was -- he was Mukhtar.
- 2 Q. Okay. Did he -- and when you were told this story,
- 3 was there any mention of 9/11?
- 4 A. Yeah, I believe it was. I mean, that was -- that was
- 5 the point behind it.
- **6** Q. All right. And so what was the -- what did -- what
- 7 were you told?
- 8 A. Essentially that. I mean, it was a very short
- 9 statement.
- **10** Q. Okay. And ----
- 11 A. That he was shown a picture of KSM and that -- and
- 12 that he said it was Mukhtar and that he was the mastermind
- 13 behind 9/11, something to that effect. It's been many years,
- **14** so I could be conflating it.
- 15 Q. Okay. Now, you just explained to us that as you
- 16 understand the story, Mr. Abu Zubaydah provided that
- 17 information to the FBI because he ----
- **18** A. And the CIA.
- **19** Q. ---- was dying ----
- 20 And CIA, excuse me.
- 21 ---- to try to convince him to keep him alive,
- 22 basically. Is that fair?
- A. Well, what's accurate is that that's something that

- 1 was the opinion of the chief of security and the other CIA
- 2 folks who were around.
- 3 Q. Okay. So the station chief of security and other CIA
- 4 folks who were around told you that Abu Zubaydah thought he
- 5 was dying and provided valuable information in an attempt to
- **6** have himself kept alive; is that accurate?
- 7 A. I think the word they used was "tidbits."
- **8** Q. So here's my actual question -- or the question that
- 9 I'm leading to: That -- it is sometimes described that the
- 10 FBI was trying to use rapport-building techniques in this
- 11 questioning. That -- getting tidbits from a person you think
- 12 is dying has nothing to do with rapport-building, does it?
- A. I didn't witness this, and I can't read Ali Soufan's
- 14 mind, nor would I want to. But the -- the point that I
- 15 would -- that I would make about that is, if I were an outside
- 16 observer and I came to that conclusion, I would think rapport
- 17 didn't play a huge role in it; that the person was actually
- 18 bargaining for additional medical care, or at least trying to
- 19 position themselves in a position where it would seem like it
- 20 was a good idea to keep them alive.
- 21 Perhaps some rapport-building was involved, you know,
- 22 in the sense that there was hand-holding and -- and, you know,
- 23 reassurance that everything was being done to keep him alive.

- 1 I don't -- you know, I don't know. I wasn't there.
- 2 Q. Okay. The -- I'd like to -- are you familiar with
- 3 Marc Thiessen?
- **4** A. I do know him.
- **5** Q. Okay. Did you read his book?
- **6** A. I did read his book.
- 7 Q. Okay. I'd like to read you a statement from it and
- 8 see if you agree.
- **9** A. Do you ----
- 10 Q. And I'm happy to give you a copy, if you'd like.
- **11** A. Do you have a copy of it that I could look at?
- 12 Q. I have like a whole library back here, so ----
- A. I would encourage you to buy more of my books.
- 14 Q. You know, in this room, I think there are about eight
- 15 of them, so I hope -- I hope that you made some money off of
- **16** that.
- 17 Here's the book.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, you're about five minutes before
- 19 the recess.
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir.
- 21 [Counsel conferred.]
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I approach, Your Honor?
- MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.

- **1** WIT: Thank you, sir.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, while he -- you can point him to
- 3 the point you want to be.
- **4** WIT: The underlined piece?
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: And if you'll put that on the record now,
- 6 please. And then remind us what the title of the book is and
- 7 the page number he's looking at.
- **8** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you.
- 10 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: The title of the book is not easily
- **11** accessible in my notes.
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: Dr. Mitchell, would you tell us the title
- 13 of the book, please?
- 14 WIT: Do you want me to read it to you?
- **15** MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, please.
- 16 WIT: Courting Disaster: How the CIA Kept America Safe and
- 17 How Barack Obama is Inviting the Next Attack by Marc A.
- 18 Thiessen.
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you.
- 20 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: And I've directed the witness'
- **21** attention to page 82.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you.
- [END OF PAGE]

1 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED

- 2 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- **Q.** And, sir, the statement I would like to ask you about
- 4 is, "Considering his condition, this was hardly a standard FBI
- 5 interview. His circumstance, lying in a hospital bed,
- 6 dependent on his captors for pain medication and
- 7 life-sustaining care, was by its very nature coercive."
- **8** Do you agree with that statement?
- **9** A. I'm thinking about the word "coercive," right?
- 10 Certainly he's in a position where he's dependent on his
- 11 captors writ large, not the FBI, because the FBI doesn't make
- 12 a decision about whether or not he gets pain medication; and
- 13 they don't make a decision about whether or not he's kept
- **14** alive.
- 15 So what I try to -- what I'm trying to do -- it's
- 16 psychologically coercive, I would think, because the decision
- 17 not to provide some information would put you in a position
- 18 where they might think that you -- that a person like
- 19 Abu Zubaydah is of really no value. So I could see how a
- 20 person might do that.
- 21 Whether or not he did -- because I don't -- I can't
- 22 read Zubaydah's mind, even though I know him pretty well, but
- 23 who knows what he actually thought, what -- I could certainly

- 1 see that. I don't disagree with the way that Marc wrote it.
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: This would be a good time to stop,
- 3 Your Honor.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. Thank you.
- 5 All right, sir. We're going to be in a 30-minute
- 6 recess. That's for the parties as well. We'll reconvene --
- 7 well, actually, we'll take a 32-minute recess. We'll
- 8 reconvene at 1545.
- 9 [The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 1513, 21 January 2020.]
- 10 [The R.M.C. 803 session was called to order at 1548,
- 11 21 January 2020.]
- 12 MJ [Col COHEN]: The military commission is called to
- 13 order.
- **14** General Martins, is anyone missing from your team?
- 15 CP [BG MARTINS]: No, Your Honor. Except Mr. Swann is
- 16 still out on commission business.
- **17** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 18 CP [BG MARTINS]: Your Honor, I do have a brief update on
- 19 the Pentagon.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Oh, thank you, sir.
- 21 CP [BG MARTINS]: That it has been experiencing
- 22 intermittent fluctuation in the signal.
- MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.

- 1 CP [BG MARTINS]: The estimate I got was up to 5 percent
- 2 is sometimes lost in different conversations.
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. All right.
- 4 CP [BG MARTINS]: And they're -- they're doing everything
- 5 they can. They're going to try ----
- **6** MJ [Col COHEN]: I understand.
- 7 CP [BG MARTINS]: ---- to put in a new circuit. And I'll
- 8 just keep the commission updated.
- 9 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir. Appreciate it. All
- 10 right.
- 11 And Ms. Radostitz is not here, apparently. Do you
- 12 expect her back, sir?
- 13 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: We may have sent Lieutenant
- 14 Colonel Poteet to look for her. I don't know what's ----
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. That's right, he's not here
- 16 either. They're welcome to come back. That's fine.
- 17 LDC [MR. SOWARDS]: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Ms. Bormann, you're good to go.
- 19 Mr. Harrington, you're good to go.
- Mr. Ali, looks like your team is all the same.
- 21 Mr. Ruiz, looks like your team is all the same.
- 22 Okay. Let's call the witness.
- Sir, please take your seat again. Remind you that

- **1** you're still under oath.
- 2 [The witness resumed the witness stand.]
- **3** MJ [Col COHEN]: Mr. Connell, your witness.
- **4** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you, sir.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: You're welcome.
- 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 7 Questions by the Learned Defense Counsel [MR. CONNELL]:
- 8 Q. All right. Dr. Mitchell, I would like to move forward
- 9 to the transition to the black site. I'd like to draw your
- 10 attention to AAA-RDI-2817, which is found in the record at
- 11 AE 628GGGGG Attachment B. It is an UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC
- 12 RELEASE document.
- 13 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I have access to the document
- 14 camera?
- 15 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 16 Counsel, if you can just show me the classification.
- **17** Is it on there?
- 18 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I've learned not to move this thing
- **19** too quickly.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: That's all right.
- 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: It will cause whiplash.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. You may publish to the gallery.
- LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you.

- 1 Q. Sir -- oh. Were -- did communication take place
- 2 between the base where you were and CIA Headquarters via
- **3** cable?
- **4** A. Yes.
- **5** Q. Did you have any role in drafting of cables?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. Okay. Did -- when ----
- **8** A. I mean, it depends on the cable you're talking about;
- 9 but I assuming you're talking about this one.
- 10 Q. Well, I actually just meant in general. But -- so
- 11 sometimes is the answer?
- 12 A. Well, the role that I would have is somebody would ask
- 13 me an opinion while they were writing the cable. At the time
- 14 that these things were being done, I didn't even have access
- 15 to the system.
- 16 Q. Okay. The -- I'd like to draw your attention to the
- 17 date on this cable, 12 April 2002. Do you see that?
- **18** A. I -- I do.
- 19 Q. Okay. In your experience, did cables generally have a
- 20 date on them?
- 21 A. In my experience, they always had a date on them.
- Q. All right. I'd like to draw your attention to the
- 23 highlighted material at the center of the page which says --

- 1 which refers first to the three-member Behavioral
- 2 Interrogation Team. Do you know who that refers to?
- **3** A. I have no idea who -- oh, wait a minute. Let me look
- 4 at this again. What is an NVTAG special agent?
- **5** Q. I was going to ask you, but apparently neither of us
- 6 know.
- 7 A. I've never seen this cable before. But if I had to
- 8 guess, I would think it was -- that I was one of those three
- 9 members, I would guess, because I was there when they did
- 10 this. But I don't know if they're specifically referring to
- 11 me, if they're referring to some, you know, other person.
- 12 Q. Were there three psychologists at the base?
- **13** A. Eventually.
- **14** Q. Okay. Were, as of ----
- 15 A. Well, one of them left almost as soon as the other one
- 16 got there. So there was a very temporary period of time when
- 17 there were three.
- 18 Q. Okay. Do you think that temporary period of time
- **19** involved 12 April 2002?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Okay. Was there something on base called a Behavioral
- 22 Interrogation Team?
- A. I've never heard of the term.

- 1 Q. Okay. Do you know who -- this is a "do you know"
- 2 question. Do you know who of the psychologists who at some
- 3 point were at Location 3 wrote cables? You didn't have access
- 4 to the system, you told us.
- 5 A. Not at the time that this was done.
- **6** Q. Right.
- 7 A. Once I got my clearance, I had access to the system.
- 8 And I might have written a cable towards the end of the --
- 9 before the move to Site 4. But at the time this was done --
- 10 but I do know who the psychologists are that had access to the
- 11 system, is that what -- was that your question?
- **12** Q. Yes, sir.
- Do any of those psychologists have a UFI?
- **14** A. I will look.
- 15 Q. Thank you, sir.
- **16** A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Okay. And what are the UFI -- what is the UFI or what
- **18** are the UFI?
- 19 A. Well, one of them doesn't have a UFI.
- **20** Q. Okay.
- 21 A. The other one is ZQ5.
- Q. Okay. Do you believe that ZQ5 wrote this cable?
- 23 A. No.

- 1 Q. Okay. Do you believe the person without a UF -- the
- 2 psychologist without a UFI wrote the cable?
- **3** A. All I can see is one paragraph. This looks like a
- 4 cable that would be written by the chief of base, not by the
- **5** psychologist.
- **6** Q. Okay. Does the chief of base have a UFI?
- 7 A. I will look. I don't know -- I don't know his true
- 8 name, and I don't know his pseudonym, so I don't know.
- **9** Q. Was the chief of base a psychologist?
- **10** A. No.
- 11 Q. Did you find in the course of your involvement in the
- 12 Abu Zubaydah interrogation and then later in the RDI program
- 13 that non-psychologists would sometimes adopt psychological
- **14** terms without a full understanding of their meaning?
- **15** A. Absolutely.
- **16** Q. And could you give us an example of that?
- 17 A. Learned helplessness.
- **18** Q. Could you explain?
- 19 A. Sure. You want me to explain what learned
- 20 helplessness is or ----
- Q. You are going to have to do it at some point, so why
- 22 don't you just take us through the whole thing.
- A. Okay. In the literature, "learned helplessness," the

- 1 term, gets used in three different ways. One way that it's
- 2 used, it refers to the procedure that's used, the experimental
- 3 procedure or the -- it's called a paradigm that's used in
- 4 experiments involving learned helplessness to induce learned
- 5 helplessness.
- 6 Sometimes in the literature it's used to mean the
- 7 emotional reactions or the behavioral affect of reactions that
- 8 you can see, if it's an animal, during exposure to a learned
- **9** helplessness paradigm.
- 10 The third way that it frequently gets used is --
- 11 and -- and the only way that it's legitimately used in the
- 12 literature by most people is when you expose that animal
- 13 that's been trained in a learned helplessness model to a new
- **14** problem that is solvable and they don't solve the problem;
- 15 they approach it in a very passive way.
- 16 So let me explain what most people think learned
- 17 helplessness is. The learned helplessness paradigm is when
- 18 you put a person or an animal in an inescapable situation,
- 19 doesn't matter what they try to do, doesn't matter if they try
- 20 to answer questions, doesn't matter if they jump across a net,
- 21 doesn't matter, they cannot escape it.
- And in the animal model, the easiest example to
- 23 understand -- and I want to say that I object to these studies

- 1 because I don't think -- I think dogs should be catching
- 2 frisbees, not taking place in shock experiments. But what
- 3 they do is they put a dog in an electrified -- a room that has
- 4 an electrified floor and they put a net running across the
- 5 thing. They electrify the floor, and he jumps to the other
- 6 side, but that section is electrified and electrified and he
- 7 keeps jumping back and forth. And for a majority of the dogs
- 8 who are exposed to that, not all of them, but a majority of
- 9 them, they will just lay down and whimper and not even try to
- 10 escape, right? So that would be a description of the paradigm
- 11 and a description of the behavioral indices of the affect of
- 12 the animal at the time.
- The learned helplessness piece of this thing is when
- 14 you put him in a situation where there's an electrified floor
- 15 but only half of it is electrified, if they jump over the net,
- 16 they can escape the adversive shock, but they don't even try.
- 17 They just lay down on the floor and they're passive. They
- 18 don't do anything.
- The -- but the literature is pretty clear in that --
- 20 especially -- there's a book called Human Learned
- 21 Helplessness: A Coping Perspective. That's the best review
- 22 of the learned helplessness literature that I'm aware of. And
- 23 in that book, they point out that a significant number of

- 1 people who are exposed to learned helplessness paradigms
- 2 actually improve their performance at later tasks. Not
- 3 everyone, but a significant number of people do. And in
- 4 addition to that, there are some people who never develop
- 5 learned helplessness and show the behavioral indices of it.
- 6 And with people, because the story that you tell
- 7 yourself about what's going on is so important in your
- 8 attributions about your failure, once you explain that the
- 9 situation was inescapable, that there was nothing you could do
- 10 to get out of it, the helplessness effects dissipate very
- 11 rapidly. They just don't continue. They tend to go away very
- 12 rapidly.
- 13 And I would make one more comment about learned
- 14 helplessness studies. In the studies that appear in the
- 15 literature, they screen the animals and they screen the people
- 16 to weed out those folks for whom -- who are relatively immune
- 17 to the learned helplessness paradigm because they're not
- 18 interested in studying those. They're only interested in
- 19 studying the ones who are affected by it. And they also weed
- 20 out those people who come into the experiment already feeling
- 21 kind of helpless and not being able to work it.
- I don't think it's a very good model for
- 23 interrogation, but it is something that you want to avoid.

- **1** Q. Okay.
- **2** A. Did I answer your question?
- **Q**. Yes, sir. We're -- I knew that at some point we have
- 4 to distinguish between different types of learned helplessness
- 5 because it's going to come up later, different people's
- 6 understanding, so thank you for the -- for the explanation.
- 7 The -- directing your attention to RDI-2818 -- and I
- 8 want to let you see the whole thing, and then I want to scroll
- 9 into the paragraph as you choose.
- **10** A. Can I look at the date?
- 11 Q. Yes, sir. What page you want?
- 12 A. I just want to see the date. Isn't there a date --
- 13 oh, that's the release date, isn't it?
- **14** Q. Yes, but this is still the 12 April 2002 ----
- **15** A. Okay.
- **16** Q. ---- document.
- 17 So the second page of the document, and I'm going to
- 18 draw your attention to paragraph 6. In describing the
- 19 physical environment, psychological state and interrogation
- 20 process, states that "They're intentionally designed to
- 21 develop three basic psychological conditions, to enhance
- 22 cooperation and willingness to discuss vital intelligence.
- 23 The development of psychological dependence, learned

- 1 helplessness, and short-term thinking are key factors in
- 2 reducing" -- redacted -- "sense of hope that is well-honed
- 3 countermeasure interrogation skills will help him from
- 4 disclosing important intelligence."
- 5 My question is: Given that the chief of base was not
- 6 a psychologist, in your view, is this one of the examples of a
- 7 non-psychologist taking a layperson's understanding of learned
- 8 helplessness or is this a more sophisticated understanding of
- 9 learned helplessness?
- 10 A. It's not sophisticated, and the wording suggests that
- 11 it wasn't written by a professional psychologist because I
- 12 don't -- I wouldn't write it this way.
- I would like to make a comment about the way that I
- 14 think this person was using the word "learned helplessness."
- **15** 0. Please.
- **16** A. There's actually a better theory to explain what he's
- 17 trying to refer to as learned helplessness, and that's
- 18 self-efficacy theory. In order to continue to resist, a
- 19 person has to believe that they have the capacity to organize
- 20 and execute the courses of action to protect a piece of
- 21 information and that they can call on that capacity now.
- 22 And I think what this person meant was the person --
- 23 they were -- they were wanting the psychological dependence,

- 1 which is just another word for feeling indebted to and, you
- 2 know, having some sense of dependence on the interrogators --
- 3 that they were hoping to undermine his efficacy to continue to
- 4 resist, and short-term thinking, meaning focused on his --
- 5 shifting his priorities away from protecting information to
- **6** trying to improve his conditions.
- 7 So I don't think I wrote that. I mean, I know I
- 8 didn't write it.
- **9** Q. So I have another question about psychological terms,
- 10 and I'm directing your attention higher on the page. It's
- 11 paragraph 4, just so you can see.
- 12 The highlighted language refers to diminishing --
- 13 essentially, cutting off communication with others as
- 14 "diminishing affirmation of the person as an individual and
- 15 restricting psychological affiliation." What do those terms
- **16** mean?
- 17 A. Nothing to me, but I'll attempt to unpack it for you.
- 18 Q. Thank you, sir.
- 19 A. It sounds like this person is proposing to get this
- 20 guy not to focus on himself as an individual, right? Or at
- 21 least reinforce himself as an individual, affirm, right, and
- 22 to restrict psychological affiliation, which means --
- 23 affiliation means feeling like you belong to something. So

- 1 undermining his belongingness, I guess, a sense of
- 2 belongingness. But I have no idea. That -- to me, that's
- **3** gobbledygook.
- **4** Q. Okay. And then the last question I want to ask you
- 5 about in this cable, I'm showing you page 4 of the same cable.
- 6 It's RDI-2820 in the record. Let's let that focus for a
- 7 second.
- 8 A. I hope that's not my eye.
- **Q**. This is -- this is written by the same person, same
- 10 cable. And paragraph 11 refers to, "White noise generators
- 11 will be used in variable lengths of time to help disrupt" --
- 12 blank's -- "problem-solving thinking and to increase his sense
- 13 of helplessness by highlighting his inability to alter the
- 14 environment around him."
- 15 Do you know in what sense "helplessness" is used in
- 16 that sentence?
- 17 A. Well, it looks to me like whoever is talking about
- 18 this, this is suggesting that if you play white noise, it will
- 19 make it more difficult for him to focus -- focus his
- 20 problem-solving skills on resisting interrogation when he's
- 21 questioned in future attempts.
- That's what it looks like. But it just looks like
- 23 that to me, that's just my opinion. It's not a -- I don't

- 1 know what the fact is because I don't know -- I don't know
- 2 who -- I mean, I'm familiar with the use of white noise
- 3 generators, and that's not why I would use them.
- **4** Q. On that point, did you find that, especially in the
- 5 early days in the black sites where you were not present, that
- 6 people often did things that you wouldn't do?
- 7 A. That's an interesting question. Let me -- let me --
- 8 give me just a second to think about that.
- **9** Q. Sure.
- 10 A. I know that they didn't use the interrogation approach
- 11 that we used, and they had a different role in mind when it
- 12 came to the use of EITs, right? And so if they used EITs --
- 13 and I don't know they did -- there were several times when I
- 14 took objection to the way that they were used and the lack of
- 15 a fireside chat or, you know, a bridging question. But again,
- 16 I'm a contractor, and contractors don't control what's
- 17 happening.
- Also, they did -- well, let's just take the case of
- 19 Gul Rahman. You've asked me this question, and I suppose it's
- 20 okay if I answer it. You know, Dr. Jessen made a number of --
- 21 of suggestions, right? Get a physician involved; get him some
- 22 blankets; you know, get him adequate food. He suggested that
- 23 they continue to interrogate the guy, but if they had been

- 1 interrogating him, he wouldn't have died of exposure, you
- 2 know.
- 3 And then I went to a physician and said -- not a
- 4 physician, but a physician's assistant, and said, "Hey, you
- 5 need to go see that guy. I think his wrists are infected,"
- 6 you know, and he cursed at me and said he didn't have time to
- **7** do it.
- 8 And so in that circumstances, I would have got a
- 9 physician down there immediately. And that is, in fact, what
- 10 would have happened at a black site that I was at. Because
- 11 what may not be known even to your clients is that there was a
- 12 physician or a physician's assistant assigned to each black
- 13 site to deal specifically with them and to monitor what was
- 14 happening to them.
- 15 So it was inconceivable to me that I could walk up to
- 16 a -- you know, a physician's assistant, because I know that's
- 17 what he was, and say, "Hey, there's a -- there's a detainee
- 18 that needs medical attention, and he -- you know, he -- he'd
- 19 tell me that that's none of my business, you know?
- 20 So there were many -- there were several things like
- 21 that that I -- I -- I objected to the use of some of the EITs
- 22 that weren't approved.
- Q. In fact, if they weren't approved, they weren't even

- 1 really EITs, right? They were just other forms of coercive
- 2 pressure.
- 3 A. You know, you're right. You know, I actually --
- 4 you're right. I won't add to that.
- **5** Q. And that location that you just described, that was
- **6** Location 2, or COBALT?
- 7 A. It was Location 2, but I also saw it in Location 4.
- **8** Q. All right. Returning for a moment ----
- 9 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: And I'm done with the camera, Your
- **10** Honor. Thank you.
- 11 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you.
- 12 Q. Returning to Location 3 for a moment, what -- what
- 13 role did the FBI have in moving Abu Zubaydah from the hospital
- **14** to the -- to the site itself?
- 15 A. I don't know because I wasn't part of the move. I was
- **16** at the site awaiting his arrival.
- 17 Q. Okay. There were -- in your book, you tell a story
- 18 about -- involving Abu Zubaydah and plastic chairs.
- **19** A. Oh, yes, sir. I'm very familiar with that.
- Q. Sure. And were there plastic patio-style chairs in
- 21 use at the black site?
- A. Everybody used the same chairs.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: So, Your Honor, this document is

- 1 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO. It is displayable to defendants but not
- 2 to the public. So I would ask that, after I show that to you,
- 3 that I would have access to the document camera but it will
- 4 not be published to the gallery.
- 5 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. That's fine. We've taken
- 6 precautions to -- yeah, that's fine. You may publish it to
- 7 everyone except the gallery.
- 8 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you.
- **9** Q. Sir, I'm going to show you a picture. Is -- and for
- 10 the record, it is LHM-1720. Where -- is this the sort of
- 11 plastic patio chairs that were in routine use?
- **12** A. It is, but that's not ----
- 13 Q. I know that's not -- I'm asking only about the chairs,
- 14 not the location.
- **15** A. Okay. Yes. Sort of. I mean, they could be slightly
- **16** different, but those are the kind of chairs.
- 17 Q. Okay. All right. So ----
- 18 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm done with the document camera for
- **19** now, Your Honor.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, Counsel.
- Q. So during the interrogation process of Abu Zubaydah at
- 22 Location 3, part of the daily battle rhythm was to review
- 23 intelligence requirements; is that right?

- 1 A. You'll have to explain what you mean by battle rhythm.
- **Q**. Sorry. It's a militarism I've picked up.
- 3 Let me -- let me -- part of the daily schedule is --
- 4 the military never uses one word when they can use two --
- 5 so part of the daily schedule was to review intelligence
- **6** requirements; is that correct?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Okay. And can you tell us what intelligence
- 9 requirements are?
- 10 A. Sure. They're -- it's information that the analysts
- 11 who are putting together intelligence reports would like to
- 12 have in order to flesh those out. So if you're a targeter,
- 13 you'd like to know locational information or contact
- 14 information or -- or something like that.
- 15 Q. Sure. And other types of subject matter experts would
- 16 want to know different ----
- **17** A. Yeah.
- **18** Q. ---- different ----
- 19 A. It would vary depending on what you were interested
- 20 in. I mean, if you were interested in interdicting, you might
- 21 want to know smuggling routes.
- Q. Sure. If you were interested in prosecuting, you
- 23 might want to know prior criminal activity?

- 1 A. CIA was never interested in prosecuting. They had one
- 2 thing in mind and I think ----
- Q. Future attacks.
- **4** A. ---- and that, I think, was the core conflict between
- 5 the CIA and the FBI. The CIA was not going to let them set
- 6 off another catastrophic attack in the United States. They
- 7 were going to walk right up to the line of what was legal, put
- 8 their toes on it, and lean forward.
- **Q.** Let's finish out the second half of that. The FBI, on
- 10 the other hand, was interested in prosecuting criminal
- **11** behavior.
- 12 A. Both. They were interested in stopping attacks if
- 13 they could; but in my view, they were easily distracted and
- 14 the -- especially Abu Zubaydah was quite good at providing
- 15 information that would be useful in a criminal case, if you
- 16 were trying to build a criminal case, but not particularly
- 17 useful for stopping that next attack or capturing, you know,
- 18 someone like Binalshibh or something like that.
- 19 Q. Okay. Now, when -- did you ever see the -- so did
- 20 intelligence requirements come in cables from headquarters?
- **21** A. Yes.
- **Q.** Did you ever see them?
- A. I'm sure that I did. You know, in the beginning, they

- 1 could not show me documents with certain classifications
- 2 because I had not taken a polygraph, right? So by August of
- 3 that year, I had taken a polygraph and, you know, could have
- 4 access to the cables.
- 5 But the way that it would work, just so that you would
- 6 know, is that -- and this is during the period of time between
- 7 April and when the FBI left the site, right? So I'm not
- 8 talking about EITs or other -- or similar sort of thing.
- **9** What would happen is they would gather together in the
- 10 morning. There would be a meeting. The physician and the two
- 11 nurses that were attending to Abu Zubaydah would give an
- 12 update, you know, what his medical status was, what sort of
- 13 care had to be given to him that day.
- 14 The security folks would give an update that included,
- 15 you know, any potential threats of site location and any
- 16 threats they might have noticed about other sorts of things
- 17 and -- and, you know, how comfortable they were with the
- 18 security of the thing.
- 19 The -- the COB would give kind of what the Navy would
- 20 call a muster, where he would pass out things that were
- **21** important for folks to know.
- Then an intel analyst would brief us on the intel
- 23 requirements and then give us a briefing on the supporting

- 1 intel documents, right?
- 2 And then after that, the -- the chief of base, who was
- 3 in charge of the base, and the FBI and the CIA would figure up
- 4 how to split the interrogations that day.
- 5 And then -- just so that you know the order of battle,
- 6 then what would happen is once the interrogation had ended,
- 7 they would come out. They would talk about what intel they
- 8 had received, if any, out of that process. Some people would
- **9** go off and write reports. There would be another discussion
- 10 of the next interrogation and any intel requirements that were
- 11 associated with this. The next interrogation would start, and
- 12 the process would just keep repeating until it was late enough
- 13 for them to stop interrogating him.
- 14 Q. Okay. Focusing on the requirements and the associated
- 15 briefing, some -- the requirements would be basically
- 16 questions, here's what we need to know. And the briefings
- 17 would be here is what we know so far or why we believe certain
- 18 things; is that right?
- 19 A. It's a generalization. Sometimes yes. Not only would
- 20 they be here's what we need to know. It would be question --
- 21 it would be specific questions. Ask him for Abu whoever's
- 22 phone number, the one that they use, you know, that sort of
- 23 thing.

- 1 Q. Hmm. Okay.
- 2 A. So ----
- **Q.** And did you ever see the cables that the requirements
- 4 came in?
- **5** A. I'm sure I did towards the end of my tenure there,
- 6 after August of twenty -- 2002, but I don't know that I
- 7 actually physically saw the cables before that. I mean,
- 8 they'd be sitting at the table, I'm sure the cables were there
- 9 so I glanced at them, but I'm not reading headers and footers.
- 10 Q. All right. But the -- did you see -- well, actually,
- 11 let me just ask the question. You tell me if you don't know.
- 12 The requirements would come in essentially question
- 13 format with a question mark at the end sometimes? Who is ----
- **14** A. What would typically happen is there would be -- this
- 15 is my experience, right? And since I didn't see the cables, I
- 16 can't tell you precisely what was happening there, but
- 17 typically there would be a paragraph that says we are
- 18 interested in these kinds of things. This is what we're
- 19 interested in. This is what we need to flesh out. Here are
- 20 the questions that we suggest you ask.
- 21 Q. Great. So at the black site, there was video
- 22 recording; is that right?
- **23** A. Initially.

- **1** Q. And ----
- 2 A. Actually, I think at that black site, it was almost
- 3 always.
- **4** Q. Okay. Were FBI agents captured on the videotapes?
- **5** A. Yes. Well, no, wait. Let me think about that. I
- 6 think so. The early tapes, I'm trying -- right now I'm
- 7 blanking on whether they started taping in April or they
- 8 started taping in August, but I think they started taping in
- 9 April.
- 10 Q. Sir, do you have your book in front of you? Let
- 11 me just -- it might just refresh your recollection. At page
- 12 261. I'll draw your attention to the first full paragraph on
- 13 page 261. There's a sentence, "Just before CIA and FBI
- 14 interrogators entered the room with Abu Zubaydah, one of the
- 15 guards monitoring on a closed-circuit TV would push a VCR tape
- 16 into a recorder and press record."
- 17 A. That refreshes my memory. So the decision was made in
- 18 that meeting, the initial meeting in April, to do the
- **19** recording.
- Q. And just to -- just because we're lawyers and have to
- 21 put the final point on everything, thus, the images of the FBI
- 22 conducting interrogations were captured on the recordings?
- 23 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Now, you made a comment just a few moments ago
- 2 about that there were some coercive pressures that were in use
- 3 at Location 3, although there was no such phrase as enhanced
- 4 interrogation techniques yet; is that accurate?
- **5** A. Yeah, I think they called them standard pressures or
- **6** something like that.
- 7 Q. Okay. And would you agree that the coercive pressures
- 8 which were in use there included nudity, a liquid diet,
- **9** sensory deprivation, and sleep deprivation?
- 10 A. I don't know that sensory deprivation -- he's in a
- 11 light cell with a light on. He can see the guards, you know.
- 12 It's not what I personally would call sensory deprivation.
- 13 Sensory deprivation to me is in a tank in the dark floating in
- **14** Epsom salts.
- 15 Q. The guards were head to foot in black with kind of
- **16** NASA-looking space helmets on?
- **17** A. Yes, they are.
- **18** Q. And ----
- **19** A. But that's a sensory ----
- Q. It is a sense. I'll give you that. The -- so did the
- 21 FBI agents present ever object to interrogating someone nude?
- A. I don't recall. I do know that the typical thing for
- 23 both CIA and FBI interrogators were to take a towel in with

- 1 them when they -- you know, when they went in and give him a
- 2 towel to cover himself.
- **Q**. Because he was naked the rest of the time?
- **4** A. Yes.
- **5** Q. Okay.
- **6** A. Well, not the rest of the time, the whole rest of the
- 7 time. You know, there was some debate in the beginning as I
- 8 recall -- and it's been a long time ago -- with the physicians
- **9** about whether it would be better to keep him in a diaper,
- 10 because you didn't want anything on that leg, or to keep him
- 11 nude, right? Because if he's in a diaper and he inadvertently
- 12 soiled himself in the diaper, it could get into that wound.
- 13 And that wound had to be debrided every day because it was
- 14 heavily infected.
- 15 And the physicians were under the -- said that
- 16 although it seemed odd -- this is my recollection -- it would
- 17 be better for him in the long-run if he was nude, and the
- 18 decision was made by the chief of base, who had all final say
- 19 in this thing, that that could also be used as kind of a
- 20 twofer, in the sense that he might be willing to shift his --
- 21 well, they wouldn't use that term -- that he might be willing
- 22 to provide intelligence in order to improve his conditions and
- 23 get some clothes.

- 1 But regardless, he wouldn't have had anything covering
- 2 that wound until that wound was much better healed than it was
- 3 in the beginning.
- 4 Q. Okay. Can you tell us a little bit about the use of
- 5 sleep deprivation at Location 3 in the interrogation of
- **6** Abu Zubaydah?
- 7 A. Well, there was sleep deprivation and then sleep
- 8 disruption, right? Sleep disruption is where you keep a
- 9 person up for a few hours and then give them a few hours --
- 10 not a few hours. You keep a person up for like a day or so or
- 11 two days and then you give them about three hours of sleep, so
- 12 they never really get enough REM sleep in order to catch up,
- 13 and it's like they're jet-lagged for the most part.
- 14 And the whole point behind that kind of sleep
- 15 disruption was to make it more difficult for them to plan
- 16 ahead and think ahead and, you know, you wanted to kind of
- 17 short-circuit that thing. Because Zubaydah is a very bright
- 18 guy who had not only studied resistance to interrogation but
- 19 had trained it, so he was very familiar with resistance
- 20 techniques. And the -- the idea was to -- was to do that,
- **21** that he would seek some relief.
- **22** Q. And ----
- A. But there was sleep deprivation used as well, because

- 1 it would be disingenuous of me to say that they didn't keep
- 2 him up 48 hours or, you know, whatever. Probably more than
- 3 that, but I don't recall. It would be listed in the cables.
- **4** Q. Sure. The -- so there's one fairly well-known
- 5 interrogation or piece of information that came out of this
- 6 interrogation relating to two men, one of whom was ultimately
- 7 identified as Jose Padilla. Do you know what I'm referring
- 8 to?
- 9 A. I do.
- 10 Q. And how many hours had Abu Zubaydah been sleep
- 11 deprived when he provided that piece of information?
- **12** A. I think in my book I talk about sleep disruption.
- Q. I think I might be able to ----
- **14** A. And I think that's probably more accurate.
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Court's indulgence just for a moment.
- **16** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- **17** Q. Can I direct your attention to page 34 in your book,
- 18 Dr. Mitchell?
- 19 A. Sure. I was looking too far back into it.
- **20** Q. 34.
- 21 A. Okay, I'm there.
- Q. At the top of page 34, there's a statement, "The
- 23 initial breakthrough happened after 126 hours of sleep

- 1 deprivation during around-the-clock interrogations conducted
- 2 over a little more than five and a half days. That is hardly
- 3 rapport-only interrogation."
- **4** A. I wrote that.
- **5** Q. Yeah.
- **6** A. I believed it to be true at the time I wrote it. I
- 7 believe it to be true now.
- **8** Q. Thank you. And those around-the-clock interrogations,
- 9 they involved both FBI and CIA?
- **10** A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And would it be accurate to say that the FBI fully
- 12 participated in using sleep deprivation as a technique?
- A. I -- I can't say whether they objected to the chief of
- 14 base or not because I wasn't privy to those conversations. I
- 15 know towards the end Ali Soufan objected vociferously to
- 16 everything, you know. But they certainly participated in the
- **17** interrogations.
- 18 And -- and, in fact, here's my recollection. My
- 19 recollection is that when the discussions about sleep
- 20 disruption and sleep deprivation was taking place, that -- I
- 21 don't remember which one of them it was, but that one of the
- 22 agents said, well, you know, if the agent who is questioning
- 23 the person stays up with that person, then it's okay for them

- 1 to keep them awake for longer periods of time. If the -- if
- 2 the interrogation involves the same agent.
- **Q**. Okay. But is it accurate to say what actually
- 4 happened is that, because it was round-the-clock interrogation
- 5 over five days, that you -- they worked in shifts? Some of
- **6** them would go sleep while the other ones interrogated?
- 7 A. I believe that's accurate.
- **8** Q. In -- moving forward to June of 2002, there came a
- 9 time when there was a decision to have an isolation phase for
- 10 Abu Zubaydah; is that correct?
- **11** A. That's correct.
- 12 Q. Let me draw your ----
- 13 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Can I have 128? I'm on page 78.
- 14 Sir, I have here a document marked UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
- 15 PUBLIC RELEASE. It's a FOIA cable.
- **16** MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I have access to the document
- **18** camera and publish to the gallery?
- 19 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may. Well, before you make it
- 20 public, let me just -- show me again the ----
- 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Sure.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: ---- classification.
- 23 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I can't see what you can see. Now I

- 1 can. Do you see it?
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Got it. We're good. You may publish.
- 3 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: All right. I'm going to zoom out
- 4 first, so don't let me give anybody whiplash.
- **5** Q. Sir, do you see the -- can you see that cable? I can
- 6 zoom in when you want to see it more, but you wanted to see --
- 7 earlier you wanted to see the cables in full first, so can you
- 8 see that page?
- 9 A. Yes, sir.
- 10 Q. Okay. And you see that there is a redacted date, but
- **11** June '02 appears?
- **12** A. Yes.
- 13 Q. And then in the subject line, there is a reference to
- 14 some sort of update occurring 1900 hours 30 June 2002?
- 15 A. You said there's a redacted date? Oh, I see what
- 16 you're saying. Okay. It's just that there's a date
- 17 underneath it.
- 18 Q. Yes, that's right. And so I was about to mention
- 19 that, that there's a reference to 30 June 2002?
- A. I see that.
- Q. Okay. The -- do you see paragraph 1 on this cable?
- **22** A. I do.
- Q. And it's a little bit cut off, but it seems to say,

- 1 "Please ensure that substantive portions of information below
- 2 are shared with" -- I believe that says FBI Headquarters, FBI
- 3 HQS.
- **4** A. I wouldn't hazard a guess.
- **5** Q. Okay. Did you ----
- **6** A. Well, if -- but I would say this: If the FBI asked,
- 7 agents were still there, they certainly would share it with
- 8 the FBI Headquarters. They wouldn't ----
- **9** Q. Sure. So it doesn't -- it is routine that information
- 10 coming out of this would be shared with FBI Headquarters?
- **11** A. You're asking a question that I can't answer.
- 12 Q. Fair enough. You don't have to answer it then.
- 13 That's fine.
- **14** A. But it just seems logical to me that it probably does
- 15 say FBI Headquarters; and if you have two FBI agents on site,
- **16** I would think they would share that with headquarters.
- 17 Q. All right. So did you -- does -- this cable familiar
- 18 to you? Did you see it at the time?
- 19 A. I don't think I -- I don't think I saw the cable, but
- 20 I probably was part of the conversation or heard part of the
- 21 conversation. I don't know if I was actually at the site in
- 22 30 June or not. I -- you know.
- **23** Q. Okav. The ----

- 1 A. Do you mind if I read the ----
- **2** Q. Yes, please.
- **3** A. Are you going to ask me questions about it?
- 4 Q. Yeah, of course.
- **5** A. Okay.
- **6** Q. Okay. My question is: Do you know who wrote this
- **7** cable?
- 8 A. No.
- **9** Q. Okay.
- 10 A. I would think it was the chief of base.
- 11 Q. Do you see the sentence about a little bit past
- 12 halfway, "Isolation will likely be highly disconcerting to the
- 13 subject given the extent of his pre-capture level of activity
- 14 and affinity for interaction with others and his generally
- 15 intensive post-capture rate of interaction with team members"?
- **16** Do you see that?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Was -- is that a summary of any discussion that was
- **19** had in your presence?
- A. It likely is. I -- you know, it was a long time ago,
- 21 but it's not inconsistent with a discussion that I would have
- **22** had.
- 23 Q. And what were the discussions about the role of

- **1** isolation in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah?
- 2 A. Here's the -- the -- part of it was based on the
- 3 reason that the isolation stage started in the first place.
- **4** Q. Would you explain?
- 5 A. Sure. The -- the FBI had thought that they had
- 6 established so much rapport with him that if they -- this is
- 7 just based on my observations and my conversations with the
- 8 other operational psychologist that was there -- that they
- 9 could express disappointment in his -- because he had
- 10 basically just shut down and -- oh, wait a second. I'm
- 11 getting these confused.
- 12 The CIA -- the FBI had posited a couple of times
- 13 that -- I may have these two reversed. They're proper in my
- 14 book, but in my mind sitting here today, I may have them
- 15 reversed. Two things happened. They pitched him and he
- 16 rejected it and then they did this thing they called going
- 17 Sipowicz on him, where they went in there and they cursed at
- 18 him. Now, I don't know sitting here right now which one
- 19 occurred first, but I think it's correct in my book.
- **20** Q. Okay.
- 21 A. And so what happened is he just basically said I'm not
- 22 going to talk to you guys anymore. You might as well go home
- 23 and have babies. And he just quit talking. And the decision

- 1 was made -- there were sorts of things of how do we get this
- 2 guy to talk because we're going in there and we're begging him
- 3 and we're begging him and we're begging him and that's going
- 4 nowhere. How do we get this guy to talk?
- 5 And so the thought was -- the discussion was around,
- 6 well, how about isolation? What if we put him in isolation
- 7 because he does like to talk. Eventually, he'll get tired of
- 8 not talking and -- and provide some information or be willing
- 9 to talk to us again, even talk to us.
- 10 Q. Prior to the -- the isolation, was there a crisis
- 11 precipitation event? Do you recall that?
- 12 A. Well, the two things that I suggested, that I just
- 13 described. The Sipowicz ----
- **14** Q. So the Sipowicz is the crisis precipitation event?
- 15 A. There were two of those events.
- **16** Q. Okay.
- 17 A. I think the first one -- I'd have to look at my book
- 18 to get the order correct.
- 19 Q. Please do, sir.
- 20 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, just make sure we verify which
- 21 page he used to refresh ----
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, sir.
- 23 MJ [Col COHEN]: ---- refresh. If it refreshes.

- 1 A. Okay. So the decision to go Sipowicz was first,
- 2 right? They -- essentially every now and then, he would
- 3 squirt out a piece of information, usually after some sort of
- 4 psychological ploy, which I had a hand in crafting, and then
- 5 he would just shut up for a while. And he had shut up.
- 6 And so the FBI agents, the two of them together -- and
- 7 I listened, and the operational psychologist was there
- 8 listening as well, though not participating, right, said,
- 9 well, you know, the -- this guy likes us. He seems to like
- 10 us. He talks to us. We've got a good rapport. So if we go
- 11 in there and go Sipowicz on him -- and that was the term they
- 12 used, which is based on that NYPD Blue character who yelled at
- 13 people and cussed at people and did that sort of stuff -- then
- 14 he'll feel so bad that he'll start talking to us again. And
- 15 the goal at that point was just to get him talking again, you
- 16 know, get him talking about anything.
- 17 And so they did that. They went in there and they
- 18 started yelling at him. You know, they started cursing at
- 19 him. And at one point, one of them called him ----
- 20 Can I use the words that they used or -- these are
- 21 obscene words.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes, sir.
- A. Motherfucker, right? And in -- in his language and in

- 1 his culture, that's a generally frowned on, right? And
- 2 when -- and when he shut down and started pulling back from
- 3 that, he was called a son of a bitch, which equates his mother
- 4 to a dog, and he just literally leaned back and said, "You
- **5** boys might as well go home. I'm not talking to you anymore.
- 6 Go home, have babies. I'm not talking anymore." And he just
- 7 stopped, right?
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: And the witness laid back in his chair as
- 9 he said that?
- 10 A. Yeah. He leaned back in his chair and he put his hand
- 11 on his crotch like a street thug might and just glared at them
- 12 with his one eye, right?
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: Sir, real quick, before you -- what page
- **14** did you use to refresh your recollection?
- 15 WIT: Oh. Let me just look.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- **17** WIT: Page 35.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you, sir.
- **19** WIT: Thank you.
- **20** Q. 35. Thank you.
- 21 A. Do you want me to go on about the second incident
- 22 because it was really the second incident combined with the
- **23** first that ----

- 1 Q. Yes, I want you to do that, but I have a question
- 2 about that first incident first, which is: Was that plan
- 3 coordinated with headquarters in advance or was that just kind
- **4** of an idea -- spur-of-the-moment idea?
- 5 A. I don't believe it was coordinated with headquarters.
- **6** Q. Okay. And was it intended to be followed by an
- 7 isolation phase or was it intended for Abu Zubaydah to talk to
- 8 them?
- **9** A. It was intended for Abu Zubaydah to talk.
- 10 Q. Okay. Now the second event.
- 11 A. Okay. So after that, the whole team was really
- 12 scrambling about what to do, kind of brainstorming what to do,
- 13 what to do, what to do to get him talking again. And the FBI
- 14 suggested that they pitch him to see if they could turn him to
- 15 work for them, and the CIA Headquarters said no, not under any
- 16 circumstance, we're not going to do that, right?
- But they did it anyway. And they did it in that sort
- 18 of surreptitious way that people who like to ask forgiveness
- 19 but not permission do, and by that I mean they said America
- 20 remembers her friends. They take care of their friends. They
- 21 take care of their friends' mothers and sisters and they --
- 22 they find a way to provide support for them. And we -- you
- 23 know, we could get you Pepsi -- because he's rabid about

- 1 Pepsi -- we can get you Pepsi and candy and improve your
- 2 conditions.
- 3 And Abu Zubaydah again leaned back and said, "What
- 4 makes you think I would betray my God for a Pepsi?" And it
- 5 was over. I mean, it was just done, you know.
- **6** Q. All right. So when was the -- so on 18 June 2002, was
- 7 there a -- was that the crisis precipitation event intended to
- 8 be followed by isolation?
- 9 A. I think the two -- I think the two combined and his
- 10 continued refusal to talk -- because generally, he would talk
- 11 to the CIA chief of base, who was also questioning him, but he
- 12 wouldn't even answer questions for him at all, not -- you
- 13 know, nothing.
- 14 Q. Okay. The isolation idea was coordinated with
- 15 headquarters in advance, right? No, not -- this is the
- 16 twelfth day of the isolation phase, but in advance of the
- 17 isolation phase, it was coordinated; is that right?
- **18** A. I would think so, yes.
- **19** Q. Yes. And ----
- A. It would be very unusual for the chief of base to not
- 21 coordinate with headquarters.
- 22 Q. Yeah. And so this document shows us that on 30
- 23 June 2002, there's a report that it's the twelfth day of

- **1** isolation phase, right?
- **2** A. Okay.
- **Q.** All right. And suggesting, would you agree, that the
- 4 isolation phase began on -- on or about 18 June 2002?
- 5 A. Well, I mean, you're within the time. I don't know
- 6 what a day or two one way or the other would make, but the
- 7 time frame sounds rational to me, if you count back 12 days
- 8 from the date they have there.
- **Q**. Were you involved in planning for an isolation phase?
- 10 A. I think I was asked my opinion about it.
- 11 Q. And what was your -- did -- do you recall what it was?
- 12 A. Yeah. My opinion was you're not going to beat it out
- 13 of him. You know, you're not going to increase the coercive
- 14 pressure. There's a very limited number of things you could
- 15 do. This might work, but you need to carefully monitor it.
- **16** Q. I'm moving now to AAA-RDI-117 contained in the record
- 17 at AE GGGGG [sic] Attachment B. It is marked UNCLASSIFIED FOR
- 18 PUBLIC RELEASE. I'm going to zoom out so you can see the full
- 19 cable, sir.
- 20 A. You don't need to do that.
- **21** Q. Okay.
- A. I can see that it's a cable.
- Q. All right. This is following up on the question of

- 1 coordinating possible increases in coercive pressure, although
- 2 this one is in April of 2002. The -- this cable involves a
- $\bf 3$ discussion of making a box 85 inches long, 30 inches wide, and
- **4** 20 inches deep. Do you see that?
- **5** A. I do. You know, I've seen this cable before in
- 6 preparation for the case that it was released for. And I'm
- 7 befuddled by the cable because my recollection is until EITs
- 8 were approved, no box was used, but this cable suggests that
- 9 there was discussion about that before the EITs were approved.
- 10 Q. Right. And my specific question is: If you look at
- **11** paragraph 5 ----
- **12** A. Uh-huh.
- 13 Q. ---- "We're consulting with the FBI Headquarters and
- 14 will advise soonest." Are you aware of discussion with the
- 15 FBI about use of a -- I guess this would be the large box?
- **16** A. Yeah. It's a quite large box, if you look at the --
- 17 the numbers that they're talking about. I'm aware of --
- 18 because it's in the paragraph.
- I mean, my assumption for -- was that from April
- 20 through whenever the FBI left the black site and that meeting
- 21 occurred with Mueller because there was a meeting with Mueller
- 22 and Tenet that I was at when the FBI said we're not going to
- 23 participate in this, we're not going to do any black sites,

- 1 we're not going to have any coercive pressure where we're at,
- 2 that until then, the FBI was intimately involved.
- **3** Q. One more topic with respect to the FBI, pre-July 2002
- 4 is -- well, I'm going to skip ahead just a second.
- 5 It's sometimes discussed that one of the possible EITs
- **6** which had been proposed involve a mock burial. Do you know
- 7 what I'm talking about?
- 8 A. Yeah, I'm the person who proposed it, me and Steve.
- **Q**. That mock burial idea was part of a threat-and-rescue
- 10 scenario; is that right?
- **11** A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. And was there discussion of involving the FBI
- 13 in a threat-and-rescue scenario?
- **14** A. Well, this is -- this is the circumstance under which
- 15 this came up. The -- the FBI and the CIA were going back and
- 16 forth, you know, with the National Security Council and the
- 17 President and the rest of those people in that airy place in
- 18 Washington, D.C. that I have no access to about who would have
- 19 primary custodial control over Abu Zubaydah.
- And Steve's concern was that since the FBI had been
- 21 involved in the sleep deprivation and the nudity and all that
- 22 sort of stuff -- this is my recollection; he may have a
- 23 different recollection, but this is mine -- that they wouldn't

- 1 trust the FBI folks who came in to question him because they
- 2 would think it was just more of the same, and they wanted to
- **3** switch to a completely noncoercive thing.
- 4 And so he and I talked about the potential of using a
- 5 threat-and-rescue thing, where the mean CIA sets up a
- 6 situation where it looks like they're going to bury
- 7 Abu Zubaydah, and then before that happens, the good FBI shows
- 8 up and says, "What are you bastards doing? Get out of here.
- 9 We're taking this man," and then he's off to FBI land. And
- 10 that was the -- the kind of a shorthand slang version of the
- 11 way that we thought about it.
- And it was unclear to me when I wrote the thing in
- 13 July of 2002 and included that whether they were going to do
- 14 that or not. And so I put that in there, just so that they
- 15 would -- you know, that they would know it. And it caused a
- 16 tremendous amount of controversy.
- 17 Q. When -- when you said Steve was concerned that
- 18 Abu Zubaydah wouldn't trust the FBI, that's Steve Gaudin?
- **19** A. Yes, sir.
- **20** Q. Yeah. Okay.
- 21 A. I don't know how -- I mean, Ali Soufan may have felt
- 22 the same way, I don't know. He and I are not the best of
- 23 friends, and so -- but -- and I can't read his mind.

- 1 Q. Sure.
- 2 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: The court's indulgence for a moment?
- 3 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- **4** Q. Sir, obviously you're familiar with Jose Rodriguez?
- **5** A. Yes.
- **6** Q. Yeah. Did you read his book?
- 7 A. I did read his book.
- **8** Q. Okay.
- **9** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I have the court's indulgence?
- 10 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yes.
- 11 [Counsel conferred.]
- 12 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: May I approach, Your Honor?
- 13 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- 14 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, I'm going to show the
- 15 witness the book Hard Measures by Jose Rodriguez. And I'm
- 16 going to direct his attention to the last full paragraph on
- **17** page 61.
- 18 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you. Sir, if you need to look at
- 19 something before or after that, as long as you tell us what
- 20 you're looking at, it will be fine.
- 21 WIT: Yes, sir.
- 22 MJ [Col COHEN]: All right.
- WIT: So what am I looking at?

- 1 Q. Sir, the last -- I can read it to you, but what I'm
- 2 about to read to you is the last full paragraph on page 61.
- 3 All right. The -- and then I'm going to ask you about it.
- 4 The quote is, "The FBI had talked about bringing in a
- 5 clean team, a group of agents who were not privy to whatever
- 6 Abu Zubaydah had previously said while he was in detention nor
- 7 would they know anything about how he had been treated. They
- 8 hoped he would repeat some of the things he had previously
- 9 told us so it would be useful in an eventual court case."
- **10** Do you see that?
- **11** A. Yes, sir.
- 12 Q. Okay. Did you hear any discussion of that idea?
- **13** A. Yes.
- **14** Q. And what did you hear?
- **15** A. Essentially that.
- **16** Q. Oh, okay.
- 17 A. That was the point of the -- that was the point of the
- 18 threat and rescue.
- **19** Q. Did they use the phrase "clean team"?
- A. The phrase "clean team" was used.
- Q. Was that idea, that discussion, was it ever put into a
- 22 cable, to your knowledge?
- A. Not to my knowledge.

- 1 Q. Okay. How -- how did it -- how did that information
- 2 make it back to headquarters? Like, how did Mr. Rodriguez
- **3** know about it?
- 4 A. You'd have to ask Mr. Rodriguez. I don't -- I
- 5 don't -- I'm -- you know, he and I know each other and we -- I
- **6** count him as a friend. But, you know, he's the chief of CTC.
- 7 I ----
- **8** Q. Sure.
- 9 A. ----- I don't ----
- 10 Q. I'm just asking about procedures that I thought you
- **11** might know.
- 12 A. It wouldn't surprise me if or a
- 13 phone call or -- you know, I mean, I don't know. I mean ----
- 14 Q. -- is the CIA e-mail system?
- **15** A. Yes.
- **16** Q. Okay. In -- in your ----
- 17 A. But I don't know that for a fact. I mean, he had to
- 18 find out somehow. It's in his book.
- 19 Q. Yeah. Makes sense.
- The -- in the discussion, was there -- did it ever
- 21 come up why there would be ----
- 22 A. And, sir, I have an alibi.
- **23** Q. Okay.

- 1 A. He and I talked about this at some point when I went
- 2 back to headquarters, so he could have found out it from --
- 3 from me. So it may not be in a cable, it may not be in a
- 4 phone call, may not be anything. It may be from me.
- 5 Because one of the things that irked the man I called
- 6 the New Sheriff is that the director of CTC would ask for me
- 7 by name, and when he became the director of the -- the chief
- 8 of the National Clandestine Service, the same thing happened.
- 9 And, you know, so he and I had private conversations about
- 10 those things.
- 11 Q. Sure. And in the -- in the course of your discussion
- 12 with Special Agent Gaudin, was there -- was the idea that
- 13 there would be a group of agents who were not privy to what
- 14 Abu Zubaydah had previously said, was that a part of the
- 15 discussion as well?
- **16** A. Yes. That's the point.
- 17 Q. And can you -- can you explain to us what the point
- 18 was, what the idea of that part of it was?
- **19** A. Well, here's my understanding -- you'd obviously have
- 20 to ask Steve what his recollection is -- but my understanding
- 21 was that the new set of agents, the ones who were not privy to
- 22 that, would come in, read Abu Zubaydah his rights, and then
- 23 have a conversation with him about things, you know, just ask

- **1** him about his involvement.
- 2 They wouldn't use what we had gathered as part of
- 3 the -- you know, as an outline or a structure. In fact, they
- 4 wouldn't have even known that. They were basically just
- 5 ignorant of everything that had happened and they believed
- 6 that they were just getting this guy.
- 7 Q. Sure. And why would the clean team's not -- lack of
- **8** knowledge about his treatment be important?
- **9** A. You'd have to ask them. I mean, I think -- I think
- 10 they're not supposed to know anything about the case. I mean,
- 11 they're just not supposed to know what he said and not -- not
- 12 supposed to know some things. I -- you'd have to ask them.
- 13 Q. Okay. Was this -- did this discussion take place
- **14** while you were still at Location 3?
- **15** A. That's my recollection.
- 16 Q. And was the idea of -- was the clean-team idea bound
- 17 up with or part of the same discussion with the
- 18 threat-and-rescue idea? Were they the same idea?
- 19 A. The -- the involvement of new agents who had no
- 20 previous knowledge of what had been said or done, no previous
- 21 knowledge of what Abu Zubaydah had previously told either the
- 22 CIA or the FBI, that idea came first; and then the question
- 23 was how do you make that transfer?

- 1 Q. Thank you.
- A. And make it believable.
- **3** Q. Okay. So that's the end of the -- that Abu Zubaydah
- 4 spring part, and I'd like to ask you some questions now about
- 5 the meeting or meetings that took place when you returned from
- **6** Location 3 to the National Capital Region.
- 7 A. Okay.
- 8 Q. When you came back to the United States, you had been
- 9 invited to attend a meeting at the CTC; is that right?
- 10 A. Correct. Actually, I'd been directed.
- 11 Q. Directed, yes. Yes. Because you're not the
- **12** decision-maker.
- A. [Nods head.]
- **14** MJ [Col COHEN]: Affirmative response.
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes.
- 16 Q. The -- at that time, you knew that there had already
- 17 been discussions in the CIA of the use of some kind of
- 18 coercive measures; is that right?
- 19 A. I had heard -- I had heard that the gloves were off,
- 20 that officers had been asked to think outside of the box, and
- 21 that prior to that meeting -- not during that meeting, and
- 22 sometimes that gets conflated in people's minds -- but prior
- 23 to that meeting, I had heard CIA officers talking about

- 1 various sorts of things they might do to, you know, get him
- 2 talking again that involved physical coercion and other ideas.
- 3 But the crazy stuff didn't come up in that meeting.
- 4 Q. I wanted to ask you just a few more questions about
- 5 the -- sort of the pre-meeting ideas that were out there.
- 6 Did you know at that time or did you learn later that
- 7 CIA had in as early as December 2001 reached out to JPRA for
- 8 information about exploitation?
- **9** A. I found out about that when we were preparing for the
- 10 ACLU case.
- 11 Q. Okay. And whatever requests went from CIA to DoD to
- 12 JPRA, you had nothing to do with it?
- 13 A. No. Well, Dr. Jessen was at JPRA. I don't think so.
- 14 I don't think -- I mean, I'm trying to be honest with you ----
- **15** Q. I appreciate it.
- **16** A. My recollection isn't -- is that I didn't.
- 17 Q. Are you now aware of meetings that took place between
- 18 Chief of JPRA Operational Support Office, Christopher Wirts,
- 19 and the CIA regarding JPRA-assisted exploitation?
- **20** A. I think I read about that.
- Q. Do you -- do you know if it's true? Do you know if
- 22 it's true that there were such meetings?
- A. Do I know for a fact it was true?

- 1 Q. As far as you know, was it true?
- A. Did any of the players tell me it was true? Did any
- 3 of the players -- none of the players told me it was true, but
- 4 I've treated it as if it were true, and I believe it probably
- **5** is.
- **6** Q. Okay. Are you aware now that during the first six
- 7 months of 2002, JPRA assisted in training a person sent to
- 8 interrogate an unnamed alleged high-level al Qaeda operative?
- 9 A. I'm aware now.
- 10 Q. Okay. And that operative, was that Abu Zubaydah?
- **11** A. No.
- 12 Q. Okay. That makes more sense because I -- do you know
- 13 who the person trained was?
- **14** A. No.
- **15** Q. Okay.
- 16 A. It would have -- I think it would have been a DoD
- 17 asset -- I mean, DoD personnel. I didn't have anything to do
- 18 with the DoD at that time.
- 19 Q. And do you know who the alleged al Qaeda operative
- **20** was?
- 21 A. No. The CIA compartmentalizes everything.
- Q. Makes sense. I myself have been a victim of those
- 23 compartments.

- 1 So let's talk about the first meeting after your --
- 2 that you had at the CIA -- that you attended at the CIA prior
- 3 to -- after you came back from Location 3.
- **4** A. Okay.
- **5** Q. Was that meeting on 1 July 2002?
- **6** A. I don't recall the date.
- **7** Q. Okay.
- 8 A. In -- if it's -- if that's what's in the record, I
- 9 won't contest it.
- 10 Q. Okay. And you weren't the convener of the meeting.
- 11 It wasn't your meeting in any way, right?
- **12** A. No.
- 13 Q. Okay. Was it -- was it Mr. Rodriguez's meeting?
- 14 A. He was the person in charge of the thing. He was -- I
- 15 mean, he -- he ran it, so I would say yes.
- 16 Q. Okay. Do you know how all the people who were at the
- 17 meeting came to be summoned there other than yourself?
- **18** A. No.
- **19** Q. Okay. How many people attended the meeting?
- A. A conference room full of people, standing room only.
- Q. Something like 40, like before?
- A. Yeah, something like that room you've got back there
- 23 except a little smaller, completely crowded. Imagine

- 1 everybody sitting around a big table and then there's a bunch
- 2 of people standing up, and there's a bunch of chairs in the
- 3 back, and it's all heads.
- 4 Q. Okay. And we talked earlier about how Mr. Rodriguez
- 5 had worn a couple of different hats at different times. At
- **6** that time, he was the Chief of the Counterterrorism Center?
- 7 A. I don't know when he made that difference.
- 8 Q. I think I can refresh your recollection. Can I direct
- **9** your attention to page 39 of your book.
- **10** A. Okay.
- **11** Q. Bottom paragraph.
- **12** A. Well, then, that must be correct.
- 13 Q. Did Special Agent Soufan attend that meeting?
- **14** A. No.
- 15 Q. He did not?
- **16** A. No.
- 17 Q. Did Special Agent Gaudin attend that meeting?
- 18 A. I believe he did, but I can't be certain.
- 19 Q. Okay. Who else from FBI attended that meeting?
- A. Nobody from -- nobody.
- 21 Could I speak to the -- to him for -- well, never
- 22 mind. It's -- it's an irrelevant thing that you haven't asked
- 23 about that I'm concerned about, but no big deal. Go ahead.

- **1** Q. Okay.
- 2 MJ [Col COHEN]: Yeah, let's wait until we actually get to
- 3 that matter, sir, and then we'll -- we'll address it.
- **4** WIT: Okay.
- **5** LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay. The Court's indulgence.
- **6** Q. All right. Sir, I'm going to attempt to refresh your
- 7 recollection with AAA-RDI-698, which is a part of the
- 8 transcript of the deposition in the civil case.
- 9 A. Sure.
- **10** Q. And ----
- **11** A. Is it my deposition?
- 12 Q. Yes, sir, your deposition.
- **13** A. Okay.
- 14 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, we'll give this to counsel and
- 15 the witness only since it's being given to refresh
- 16 recollection.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: That's fine. May I have access to the
- **18** document camera with those constraints?
- **19** MJ [Col COHEN]: You may.
- Q. So if you would just read this -- the page that's
- 21 available here, and then I have a question for you.
- **22** A. Okay.
- LDC [MR. CONNELL]: I'm done with the document camera.

- 1 MJ [Col COHEN]: Thank you.
- 2 Q. Does that refresh your recollection in any way about
- 3 what -- who from FBI was present at the 1 July meeting?
- 4 A. Yeah, I think I was sloppy with my speech when I said
- 5 the entire interrogation team minus the ops psychologist. The
- **6** FBI person that was there that I distinctly remember being
- 7 there was Steve. The other one, I don't think he was there.
- **8** Q. Okay. So Gaudin was present, Soufan was not?
- **9** A. That's my recollection.
- 10 Q. Okay. That's fine. And the topic of the meeting was
- 11 the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, what had happened, what was
- **12** going to happen?
- **13** A. What next, basically.
- 14 Q. What next? Okay.
- 15 And from what you knew up to that time and the
- 16 conversation at that meeting, did you believe that the CIA was
- 17 going to use some kind of coercive pressures?
- **18** A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. And am I right that that was whether you were
- 20 present, not present, whether you had anything to do with it
- **21** or not?
- A. I believe so.
- Q. Okay. And what -- what supported that belief?

- **1** What ----
- 2 A. The conversations that I'd heard from -- you know, the
- $\bf 3$ discussions that I'd been within earshot of or had
- 4 participated in prior to the meeting.
- **5** Q. Okay. And the phrase "getting rough" is sometimes
- 6 used in connection with that; is that right?
- 7 A. Yes, a title chapter to my book.
- 8 Q. Sure. And the idea of getting rough did not originate
- **9** with you; is that fair to say?
- **10** A. No.
- 11 Q. Okay. Was it brought up at the meeting before you
- **12** said anything?
- A. I think what was brought up was the idea that there
- 14 was this impending attack, that there was a lot of chatter
- 15 about that everybody was concerned about and the President was
- 16 concerned about, and Congress was concerned about, and -- and
- 17 it -- it felt like it was looming and could potentially happen
- 18 any minute. And that, again, like I said, the President's
- 19 position, as I recall what I was told, is that they're not
- 20 going to let al Qaeda set off a nuclear weapon in one of our
- 21 cities or crash another series of airplanes into a bunch of
- **22** our buildings and the gloves were off.
- And, like I said, based on what I had heard before, I

- 1 came to believe that they were going to use some form of
- 2 physical coercion, and my concern was that they were going to
- 3 make it up on the fly.
- 4 Q. And so from your time with SERE, you had experience
- 5 with techniques that were used in that program; is that fair
- **6** to say? Is that accurate?
- 7 A. Yes.
- **8** Q. Did someone ask you, "Dr. Mitchell, do you have any
- 9 techniques that are -- have been used before that we have some
- **10** data on?"
- 11 A. I don't think it -- I don't think it went like that.
- 12 I thought about this last night because I figured we were
- 13 going to get into this, and I tried, as best I could, to
- **14** reconstruct my memory of what happened.
- 15
- I believe Steve had gone through
- 17 SERE training, and I had done a lot with SERE training. And
- 18 so I think at the original black site, you know, we -- we, the
- 19 three of us, had a discussion about SERE techniques that may
- 20 have involved someone else.
- Now, I have subsequently come to learn that there were
- 22 independent discussions that were taking place back at
- 23 headquarters that I was unaware of at the time. So it's

- **1** entirely possible that something from those informal
- 2 discussions that the three of us had somehow made it back to
- 3 headquarters, right?
- 4 The other thing -- the other reason I think they asked
- 5 me about SERE techniques was because of a paper I wrote, you
- 6 know, Recognizing, Encountering al Qaeda Resistance to
- 7 Interrogation Techniques, a Training Approach -- a Resistance
- 8 Training Approach. And in that, I used -- and I've got to be
- 9 careful here -- I used the information in the Manchester
- 10 Manual, which was a stolen resistance-to-interrogation manual
- 11 that a U.S. soldier stole and took to al Qaeda, and some other
- 12 documents that they won't allow me to talk about, I know, to
- 13 write this paper about what to expect if they've been
- 14 resistance trained and what some countermeasures might be that
- 15 were very much like what you would find in the Army Field
- 16 Manual, right, so that they would comply with the Geneva
- 17 Conventions.
- 18 And so they knew that I had some resistance training
- 19 background. And the whole point of sending me out there to
- 20 monitor the resistance training techniques that he was -- the
- 21 resistance techniques that he was using to evade answering
- 22 questions from the CIA and FBI was because I had had all this
- 23 SERE training and all of this SERE experience. So it doesn't

- 1 surprise me that someone in that meeting would have asked me
- 2 what my recommendations would be.
- **Q.** Okay. Does the second operational psychologist that
- 4 you referred to have a UFI?
- **5** A. Yes. I've given it to you already ----
- **6** Q. Okay.
- **7** A. ----- but I'll give it to you again if you'd like.
- **8** Q. That would be great. Just so we can -- it's not
- 9 always easy to match up references with the UFI.
- **10** A. Understood. ZQ5.
- 11 Q. Thank you. What was the discussion about coercive
- 12 pressures that had been going on at headquarters that you
- 13 subsequently learned?
- **14** A. I don't know the full details of it, but that they --
- 15 had been conversations back and forth between the Justice
- 16 Department and -- and from JPRA about the applicability of
- 17 these and whether or not they would be legal, that sort of
- **18** stuff, informal stuff.
- 19 Q. And at the meeting, is it accurate to say that you
- 20 recommended that the CIA should consider SERE techniques if it
- 21 intended to use coercive pressure?
- A. Right. The emphasis there should be on "if it
- 23 intended." If it intends to use coercive pressure, my

- 1 recommendation is that they use SERE techniques because
- 2 they've been used since the 1950s, have produced no lasting
- 3 psychological harm or physical harm in their application.
- 4 There have been minor injuries, occasionally a broken eardrum,
- 5 sometimes a sprained back. If a slap is done incorrectly, you
- 6 could get a scratched eye. But in general, they can be
- 7 applied safely.
- **8** Q. Perhaps this is obvious, but you were not the decider?
- 9 A. No. And here's -- just so that you know -- you
- 10 haven't asked me why I recommended them, I don't think; you
- **11** just asked me if I did.
- 12 Q. Oh, yeah, true. I thought you had explained it, but
- 13 feel free.
- **14** A. No, I haven't explained it.
- 15 The problem that we have is with the phenomena that we
- 16 observed in the resistance-to-interrogation training camp that
- 17 Bruce and -- Dr. Jessen and I call abusive drift. And that is
- 18 that when people are left to make up different kinds of
- 19 coercive pressure, it tends to increase. It tends to escalate
- 20 over time as they become more comfortable with it, regardless
- 21 of the students' experience of it, right?
- And so my concern was that if it -- if they were going
- 23 to use coercive pressure, then they should use coercive

- 1 pressure that was approved, that was medically supervised,
- 2 that had psychological supervision, and that people who were
- 3 not involved in the interrogation could stop at any time they
- 4 wanted to stop it for any reason they wanted to stop it.
- 5 So I felt like it could be done safely and you reduce
- 6 the probability of abusive drift if -- and that was my major
- 7 concern.
- **8** Q. In -- in the effort to contain abusive drift, what is
- 9 the significance of an outside, noninvolved observer being
- **10** able to stop the interrogations?
- 11 A. Well, you know, what happens in a lot of cases when
- 12 that abusive drift starts is they begin to dehumanize the
- 13 detainee -- I'm going to just use detainee, but whoever it is,
- 14 student, whatever it is -- they start to dehumanize them, and
- 15 they -- they don't -- let me search for the right words here.
- 16 They think that they're justified in applying increasing
- 17 levels of pressure because they're comfortable with it and
- 18 they're used to it, and it -- you know, it feels like it would
- 19 be more effective. If a little is good, a lot is better.
- 20 And so -- am I getting away from your question?
- 21 Because now I'm lost.
- **Q.** You're answering it precisely.
- 23 A. Oh. okav.

- 1 Q. I'm sorry, I ----
- 2 A. Would you repeat it just so that I can get back on
- 3 track?
- **4** Q. I'm sorry?
- **5** A. Would you repeat your question?
- **6** Q. Sure. What is the role of the ability to -- for
- 7 outside, uninvolved observer to stop an interrogation in
- 8 containing abusive drift?
- **9** A. Got it. Thank you.
- The point is, is that that person is not involved.
- 11 They don't have their hands on them. They're in control; they
- 12 have the authority to stop it. And -- and in truth, the
- 13 instructions was that anyone, including the guards, because
- 14 there were lots of guards -- you have almost as many as we
- 15 have in the room when we waterboarded people -- you know, that
- 16 any guard, any physician, any analyst, any interrogator,
- 17 anybody could just stop it.
- 18 But the expectation was, if you weren't putting your
- 19 hands on the person and you weren't engaged in the
- 20 back-and-forth, the tussle about getting intelligence, then
- 21 you would be in a better position to say, "Knock that off.
- 22 You're getting out of control."
- Q. And we're going to come back to this in detail, but

- 1 you, yourself, tried to stop an interrogation by NX2 one time,
- 2 right?
- **3** A. I tried to stop several interrogations.
- **4** Q. By NX2?
- **5** A. I'd have to look at the thing, I don't ----
- **6** Q. New Sheriff?
- **7** A. Yes.
- **8** Q. You told us about the process -- or perhaps one of the
- 9 mechanisms involved in abusive drift of -- whereby a person
- 10 who is administering coercive pressure can dehumanize the
- 11 person who's receiving that pressure. Can you tell us a
- **12** little bit more about that?
- A. Sure. One of the things that they start to do is they
- 14 start to use euphemisms for the coercive pressure. I didn't
- 15 come up with the term "enhanced interrogation techniques."
- 16 The term that I suggested they use was "coercive physical
- 17 pressure" because it's clearly what it was, right, and
- 18 coercive SERE techniques. But someone at the agency decided
- 19 it was enhanced interrogation techniques, and that's what it
- **20** was.
- **21** 0. I see.
- A. And so there's this tendency to use euphemism and then
- 23 tendency to feel like you're entitled to use increasing levels

- 1 of pressure because you're trying to manipulate the person to
- 2 do what you want them to do.
- **Q**. What -- what is the role of euphemism in a
- 4 dehumanization process?
- **5** A. It takes the sting out of what you're actually doing.
- 6 You know, it's -- it's one thing to say we kill grandmothers
- 7 and grandchildren and babies playing in the yard and another
- 8 thing to say collateral damage.
- **Q.** And what is the mechanism by which that sense of
- **10** entitlement grows?
- 11 A. It's the use of power over another person.
- 12 Q. Did you ever see that mechanism at play with NX2, New
- **13** Sheriff?
- **14** A. That wasn't my objection to what he was doing. My
- 15 objection to what he was doing was they weren't authorized.
- 16 They weren't judged to be legal. And I didn't think that the
- 17 agency had approved the specific techniques that he was using,
- **18** and I thought he was applying them much more intensely than I
- 19 thought this -- it warranted because, in my view -- well, I
- 20 have said in my book, so I'll say it here -- in my view, it
- 21 wasn't necessary with Nashiri at that point.
- Q. The -- is that an example of the phenomenon that you
- 23 mentioned, that some people think that if a little bit is

- **1** good, a lot must be better?
- **2** A. It could be interpreted that way.
- 3 Q. So back to the meeting on 1 July. At that meeting, is
- 4 it correct that you described some of the SERE techniques in a
- **5** less formal fashion?
- **6** A. It is. But I'd like to back up one second since
- 7 you've got me on this topic, if you don't mind.
- 8 There were basically two prevailing theories about the
- 9 use of enhanced interrogation techniques at the agency. And I
- 10 don't think this was at the senior level, but it certainly was
- 11 at the middle management level.
- 12 There was the -- there was the -- you know, the way
- 13 that Bruce and I -- and Dr. Jessen and I did it, and then
- 14 there was this other view that what you do is you essentially
- 15 hurt the person until they tell you what you want to know, and
- 16 then you hurt them a little bit more. And if they change
- 17 their story, then they're obviously lying to you, and then you
- 18 hurt them until their story becomes consistent.
- And my concern about that kind of thing was that it
- 20 leads to false information, especially if you're asking
- 21 leading questions. So I don't know how relevant that is to
- 22 you, but that was part of my calculus when I interrupted
- 23 the -- the New Sheriff.

- 1 Q. Sure. And sometimes you call that second view the
- 2 punishment model; is that right? As opposed to the
- 3 conditioning model?
- **4** A. Did I call it that?
- **5** Q. We'll come back to that. That's okay. Maybe it's one
- **6** of those papers that you wrote that -- that ----
- 7 A. Oh. Basic -- I think you're saying that EITs are not
- 8 used to punish detainees.
- **Q.** I apologize. I was skipping ahead, and that's never a
- 10 good idea, so I'll -- my mistake.
- 11 The -- so coming back to the 1 July meeting, the -- is
- 12 my understanding correct that at the meeting when you were
- 13 describing the SERE techniques, you said that some of them
- **14** have a greater risk of harm if they're misapplied?
- 15 A. That's true.
- 16 Q. Okay. And -- and what's that dynamic? How does
- 17 that -- how does that occur?
- 18 A. Well, there were SERE techniques that I didn't
- 19 recommend because when I did a study for the wing commander at
- 20 the Air Force Survival School, there were actually some
- 21 injuries that prevented pilots from staying on pilot status
- 22 for a while, and that usually happened when they were
- 23 misapplied.

- **1** Q. Okay.
- **2** A. There's also the possibility that -- oh, for example,
- 3 if walling is done incorrectly, you could inadvertently hit
- 4 the person's head instead of, you know, controlling it. You
- 5 could scratch a person's eye, like I said, if you did a slap
- 6 inappropriately. I mean, I can imagine there would be
- 7 problems with waterboarding if you did that inappropriately.
- 8 I don't think I need to describe that.
- **9** Q. Sure. In your experience of the coercive physical
- 10 pressures that were used -- some of which were EITs and, as
- 11 you've told us, some of them were not -- the -- was it
- 12 generally a training and experience problem, the
- 13 misapplication? Was it that people didn't know what they were
- **14** doing? Or was it an abusive drift problem?
- **15** A. Well, the -- your question implies that I saw people
- **16** injure detainees ----
- 17 Q. I didn't imply that. I meant -- okay. I withdraw the
- 18 question. The -- because I do want to get through this
- 19 meeting, among other things. My bad -- my poor question.
- But one more question about the 1 July meeting: At
- 21 that meeting itself, no one had asked you to participate in
- 22 applying coercive physical pressure; is that right?
- A. That's my recollection. I think that happened later.

- **1** Q. Okay.
- 2 A. But there could have been a meeting earlier in June
- 3 that you're conflating with the 1 July. Whatever documents
- 4 you have that document those meetings, because there were two
- 5 meetings kind of back-to-back, close together, those are
- 6 probably accurate and my memory is probably wrong. The first
- 7 meeting, I wasn't asked to apply the pressure. After the
- 8 second meeting, I was.
- **9** Q. Okay. If I suggested that the two meetings took place
- 10 on the 1st and the 8th of July, would that sound right to you?
- 11 A. Yes. But it's also entirely possible that I was in
- 12 there for an individual meeting with Jose when he asked me if
- 13 I'd apply the pressure right after the -- the first June
- **14** meeting. I just don't recall.
- **15** Q. Okay.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, you have 11 minutes left today.
- 17 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Thank you very much.
- **18** Can I have 2137? RDI-2137.
- **19** The Court's indulgence, please?
- 20 [Counsel conferred.]
- 21 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Your Honor, I am going to direct the
- 22 witness' attention to AAA-RDI-2937, which is found in the
- 23 record at AE 628GGGGG Attachment B. It doesn't actually have

- 1 banner markings on it, but I just confirmed with the
- 2 government that the FOIA markings which are on it are
- 3 sufficient.
- 4 MJ [Col COHEN]: Counsel, are we good? Trial counsel is
- 5 indicating we're good.
- **6** Publish to the gallery?
- 7 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Yes, please.
- 8 MJ [Col COHEN]: You may do so.
- **9** Q. So I'm going to show you a document which is almost
- 10 entirely redacted, but which is entitled "Proposal for an
- 11 Enhanced Interrogation Strategy in the War on Terrorism." Are
- 12 you familiar with this document at all?
- 13 A. I think I might have seen it for preparation for the
- 14 other case, but this -- but this could be the first time I've
- 15 seen it because the title surprises me.
- 16 Q. Okay. Have you ever seen the classified version of
- 17 this document?
- **18** A. I don't recall seeing it.
- 19 Q. Okay. Do you know anything about the circumstances of
- 20 the preparation of this document?
- 21 A. I don't believe so.
- Q. Is it correct to say that you are not the author of
- 23 this document?

- 1 A. Is there another sentence that's not blacked out?
- 2 Q. Let me see if I can find you one. Hang on just one
- 3 second.
- 4 A. Well, you know what, sir? I don't know what you need
- 5 to do that.
- **6** My experience with the CIA is that when it comes to
- 7 me, they don't black out it very much, so the odds are pretty
- **8** good that it's not my document.
- **Q.** Sir, I'm going to show you the one other sentence or
- 10 half sentence that I have for you, which is AAA-RDI-2941, same
- 11 AE, and we have the words "currently interrogating a senior
- **12** al Qaeda terrorist, Abu Zubaydah." Does that help at all?
- 13 A. Yeah. I didn't write this document. I -- I don't
- **14** recall seeing that.
- 15 Q. Okay. Do you know if someone else within the CIA had
- 16 made a formal proposal for the use of coercive physical
- 17 pressures before your 1 July 2002 meeting?
- **18** A. No, I don't know that.
- 19 Q. Do you have more that you want to say about that?
- A. Well, the problem is it's speculation, and I don't
- 21 know that it would be helpful to you.
- 22 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: Okay. All right. I'm done with the
- 23 document camera. Your Honor.

- 1 Q. So you mentioned just a moment -- it's a new chapter
- 2 about the request for your personal participation.
- 3 You said a moment ago that in a -- in a sort of
- 4 private meeting, Mr. Rodriguez asked you if you would help put
- 5 together an interrogation program?
- **6** A. That's -- that characterization I'm afraid is not
- 7 entirely accurate. When I say "private meeting," there may
- 8 have been a few more people in the room, but essentially I was
- 9 walking out of the room after a discussion about enhanced
- 10 interrogation techniques when he said, "Will you help us with
- 11 this?" And I said "Sure." Thinking that I was going to do
- 12 what I had been doing all along, which is monitoring
- **13** resistance to interrogation techniques.
- 14 And he said, no, no, we want you to do the
- 15 techniques. And I said -- well, you know, because I thought
- 16 as a psychologist and, you know, a contractor, that would
- 17 probably not be the wisest move. And -- but I said I can help
- 18 you find some SERE instructor or somebody else.
- 19 And he said, "You don't understand. This is a
- 20 compartmentalized program. You've sat through all the threat
- 21 matrix information. You've watched this guy for months."
- And then some guy leaned over, who I don't recall, and
- 23 said, "After what you've -- after seeing what you've seen, how

- 1 can we ask someone else to do it?" And ----
- 2 Q. Was ----
- **3** A. Excuse me. I'm not done with my answer.
- 4 Q. I'm sorry.
- **5** A. I just tear up when I think about this, and it slows
- 6 me down.
- 7 And I went back to my hotel room and thought about it,
- 8 and I thought, you know, there -- in my mind, a genuine threat
- 9 that there was going to be an imminent attack, possibly
- 10 involving nuclear biological weapons and certainly involving
- 11 some kind of mass casualty.
- 12 And I thought my -- after considering both sides of
- 13 it, I thought my moral obligation to protect American lives
- 14 outweighed the temporary discomfort of terrorists who had
- 15 voluntarily taken up war against us and voluntarily chose to
- 16 try to destroy us and our way of life; and that whatever
- 17 personal consequences came of that, I would just live with.
- 18 Q. Sir, you said "terrorists." Aren't we talking about
- 19 Abu Zubaydah at this point?
- A. Abu Zubaydah was viewed then as a -- as a -- at least
- 21 a facilitator for al Qaeda.
- Q. I know that, sir. That's not my ----
- A. But I'm talking ----

- **1** Q. ---- isn't it -- excuse me.
- 2 A. Yes. But the -- the point here is that they viewed
- 3 him as the linchpin for getting into the rest of al Qaeda,
- 4 which, in fact, he was, right?
- 5 So in -- in the way that it was presented to me, if we
- 6 didn't get him talking -- because they knew very little about
- 7 al Qaeda's organizational structure or about the mentality and
- 8 the thought processes of those senior leadership, and
- 9 certainly not much about their communication system or those
- 10 kinds of things.
- And to me, it just seemed like it would be dereliction
- 12 of my moral responsibility as an American who had spent most
- 13 of his life in the military to put my own personal preferences
- 14 above protecting American lives. And let me tell you, just
- 15 so, you know, I'd get up today and do it again.
- 16 Q. In making that decision, were you contemplating
- 17 designing a program for multiple detainees or at that time in
- 18 July of 2000 -- July of 2002, were you talking about coercive
- **19** physical pressures on Abu Zubaydah?
- A. My thought was that the use of coercive physical
- 21 pressures on Abu Zubaydah would provide the puzzle pieces to
- 22 allow us to capture and kill and disrupt other plots. So I
- 23 was focused on Abu Zubaydah.

- 1 Q. When you suggested the techniques -- when you
- 2 suggested consideration of the SERE techniques, did you have
- 3 in mind designing an RDI program or were you thinking about
- 4 techniques for Abu Zubaydah?
- 5 A. I think you just asked me that question, and I just
- 6 answered it. But I'll answer it again.
- 7 I was thinking about Abu Zubaydah because I viewed him
- $oldsymbol{8}$ as the linchpin to being able to get inside of the -- the
- 9 operational cycle of al Qaeda and disrupt these plots and
- 10 capture and kill other people ----
- **11** Q. I ----
- **12** A. ----- you know.
- 13 Q. I understood that answer, but the -- you've said on
- 14 multiple occasions that, at that time in July 2002, you
- 15 weren't designing any programs, you were ----
- **16** A. I wasn't. I just told you I wasn't.
- **17** Q. Okay.
- 18 A. I was designing a program for Abu Zubaydah because I
- 19 thought, through him, we could get to the others.
- Q. And -- and when you suggested consideration of SERE
- 21 techniques, were you -- did you -- contemplating when you got
- 22 to whoever those others were, that you were going to impose
- 23 coercive physical pressures on them, too?

- 1 A. No. I'm a contractor. I'm paid by the day. I
- 2 don't -- I thought at some point they would, you know, do
- 3 something else. I -- you know, my -- my thought at that
- 4 particular time was get this guy talking, get this guy
- 5 answering questions, and it -- I wasn't looking forward into
- 6 the future. I wasn't thinking, oh, I'll do this, I'll do
- 7 this, and then there will be this -- you know, this -- I'll
- 8 have a job forever kind of nonsense that people suggest. No.
- 9 I was thinking about Abu Zubaydah. But the reason I
- 10 was thinking about Abu Zubaydah was I thought he was the
- 11 linchpin to stopping this next attack because he was the
- **12** person we had.
- 13 Q. Understood, sir. Thank you.
- **14** A. And it turned out, he was.
- 15 LDC [MR. CONNELL]: That's an excellent place to stop.
- 16 MJ [Col COHEN]: Okay. Excellent. All right, we'll be in
- 17 recess for the evening, sir. I give the same admonishment to
- 18 every witness so I'll give the same one to you.
- 19 You are not sequestered during your testimony. You
- 20 can interact with folks. I just ask that you do not discuss
- 21 the substance of your testimony with anyone with whom you come
- 22 in contact.
- WIT: Can I describe the witness trailer to Dr. Jessen?

1	MJ [Col COHEN]: Let the prosecution describe the witness
2	trailer to Dr. Jessen.
3	WIT: Okay.
4	LDC [MR. CONNELL]: That will just make it easier. That
5	way I don't end up with a bunch of other questions about what
6	else was discussed.
7	WIT: Got it, sir.
8	MJ [Col COHEN]: All right. We're in recess for the
9	evening. Tomorrow morning at 0-9.
10	[The R.M.C. 803 session recessed at 1730, 21 January 2020.]
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