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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

7/4/2001); NAWAF ALHAMZI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 07/10/2001); MAJED MOQED (AA Flt. #77) (date unknown); and AHMAD ALHAZNAWI (UA Flt. #93) (date unknown). USAID card applications and color photocopies of the identifications are being disseminated to appropriate offices. Investigation being coordinated with FBI MM, FBI NK, and FBI WFO. Results will be forwarded to SIOC and all appropriate offices.

(LES/OC) Previous FBI MM investigation determined that, on 5/2/2001, MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) and ZIAD SAMIR JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) obtained Florida drivers licenses at the same south Florida location. DMV queries revealed that five Arab individuals, including MUHAMMAD MUBEEN, also obtained Florida drivers licenses on that date. FBI MM located and interviewed MUBEEN. MUBEEN identified a photograph of JIMLY ULCENA (DOB [REDACTED] 1962) as the individual who assisted MUBEEN in obtaining his driver's license. MUBEEN was polygraphed on 9/18/2001 and determined to be inconclusive. He will be re-polygraphed on 9/21/2001. ULCENA has been identified through INS records as a naturalized United States Citizen who was born in Haiti. Efforts by FBI MM are underway to fully identify ULCENA and to determine his role, if any, in assisting ATTA, JARRAH, and others in obtaining fraudulent Florida driver's licenses. Results of investigation will be forwarded to SIOC and appropriate offices. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) On 08/27/2001, six purported Pakistani nationals arrived in Miami from La Paz, Bolivia. The individuals were allegedly part of a conspiracy to destroy aircraft involved in civil aviation, based upon information provided within the intelligence community. This intelligence information was uncorroborated not only by the review of audio tapes by FBI Language Specialists, but also by a negative physical search from the hotel rooms of the individuals in La Paz, Bolivia. On 09/20/2001, three of the six individuals were polygraphed. Two subjects passed the polygraph, and one was found to be inconclusive. One requested an attorney and will not be polygraphed. The remaining two polygraphs are being conducted on 09/21/2001. Investigative results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate offices.

(LES/OC) An individual in [REDACTED] identified as [REDACTED] reported that, while at a mosque in [REDACTED] in approximately August 2001, he prayed with a Pakistani lawyer/grocery store manager from Newark, NJ. This individual inquired about the willingness of [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]

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Page 10 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020587

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001 [REDACTED]

engage in Jihad. FBI MM has obtained authorization to reopen [REDACTED] and is coordinating with FBI NK to conduct consensually monitored calls between [REDACTED] and the Pakistani national. Results will be forwarded to SIOC and appropriate field offices.

**Newark***Investigative Efforts:*

(TBS/OC) FBI NK investigation determined that MAAGDY M. BESHARA is an associate of MARWAN ALSHEHHI (UA Flt. #175). Reportedly, BESHARA owns a gas station at which ALSHEHHI would "hang out." EMIL F. BESHAY has been identified as an associate of BESHARA. Further investigation confirmed a relationship between ALSHEHHI and BESHAY. Based on these associations and relationships, FBI NK intends to obtain a search warrant for BESHARA's residence. BESHAY is currently under arrest on a Material Witness warrant based on his link to ALSHEHHI. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

(TBS/OC) FBI NK initiated a pen register on the telephone of TARIQ JAWHAR predicated on the possibility that JAWHAR may be the UNSUB in a photograph that FBI WFO secured from an abandoned rental vehicle at Dulles Airport linked to AA Flight #77. A consensual search of the digital information on a university computer used by JAWHAR continues. Investigation determined that both of JAWHAR's email addresses both contained a reference to number "93."

**Philadelphia***Investigative Efforts:*

(TBS/OC) FBI PH developed information that HALEM HASSNIN and MOHAMUD ELNEKHILY are associated with an address in Jersey City, NJ, that has been used by MOHAMMAD ASLAM PERVEZ (under detention on Material Witness warrant), MOHAMMAD AZMATH (under detention on Material Witness warrant), and ALI KHAN AYUB (under detention on Material Witness warrant). AZMATH and AYUB are associates of NABIL ALMARABH (#27 on Security Directives List). HASSNIN and ELNEKHILY are students at a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Truck Driver School in Allentown, PA. FBI PH is currently conducting surveillance on HASSNIN and ELNEKHILY. ALMARABH has a Michigan issued HAZMAT trucker driver's license.

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Page 11 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020588

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

It is anticipated that a Material Witness warrant will be issued for HASSNIN and ELNIKHILY on 9/22/2001.

**Pittsburgh***Recovery / Evidence Collection:*

(TBS/CC) FBI Pittsburgh (FBI PG) Evidence Response Team (ERT) activity at the Somerset crash site may be completed sometime on 9/22/2001 or 9/23/2001. The raking and sifting of the dirt has resulted in the recovery of a great deal of human remains. On 9/22/2001, it is anticipated that the pumping of the two acre pond near the crash site will be completed. After the pumping of the pond, FBI PG ERT will man two boats to visually look for items of potential evidentiary value in the pond. Once this is completed, FBI PG ERT and other law enforcement personnel will conduct a final "walk through" the woods in the vicinity of the crash site in an effort to locate items of value that may have been missed. This "walk through" may take place as early as 9/23/2001 or 9/24/2001. Investigation continuing.

(TBS/CC) As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the morgue is in possession of approximately 454 pounds of human remains, which are comprised of 914 separate items. The morgue has dental records for 37 individuals. Efforts are underway to identify the remains.

(TBS/CC) Six specimens of human remains will be flown to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology at Dover Air Force Base to verify or rule out possible knife wounds. To date, all such submissions have been negative.

(TBS/CC) Human remains not of evidentiary value and which are not being sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) at Dover Air Force Base, will be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Human remains sent to AFIP and returned thereafter will also be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Personal effects not of evidentiary value will be turned over to United Air Lines (UAL) for subsequent return to families of passengers and crew.

(TBS/CC) All ante-mortem interview of family members have been completed, except for the four hijackers.

**San Antonio**~~SECRET//SI~~

Page 12 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020589

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

*Investigative Efforts:*

[REDACTED] FBI SA continues to conduct investigation into ALBADER ALHAZMI, who has been detained by INS in Fort Worth, TX, and who may be related to NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77).

- \* Investigation determined that ALBADER ALHAZMI utilized the Internet account of TARIQ M. ALOTAIBI, whom FBI DL believes to be NAWAF ALHAZMI.
- \* A cellular phone utilized by ALBADER ALHAZMI (AT&T Wireless #A4324112258601). FBI DL is subpoenaing toll records for this phone. Results will be provided to SIOC and other field offices upon receipt and analysis.
- \* FBI SA continues to document ALBADER ALHAZMI's activities through research and analysis of financial, email, travel, telephone, etc. and his associates. A review of toll records for both hard line and cell phone indicate telephonic contact with a known Hamas fund raiser.
- \* Investigation continuing regarding items from search of residence and vehicle.
- \* FBI SA investigating an unconfirmed report that ALBADER ALHAZMI's children did not report for school on 9/11/2001.
- \* This search disclosed two passports, neither of which were damaged. (Previous investigation indicated that ALBADER ALHAZMI reported to ARAMCO that his passport had been damaged and ARAMCO arranged for a new one to be issued to him.)

[REDACTED] FBI DL identified SAMI AL-MAJEH as an associate of ALBADER ALHAZMI. In 6/1997 or 7/1997, ALBADER received a \$10,000 wire transfer from ALMAJEH, who opened an account but closed it in November 1997. ALBADER ALHAZMI made a trip to Boston in August of 2001 and made two telephone calls to SAMI AL-MAJEH in Boston. FBI DL is working to fully identify SAMI AL-MAJEH.

San Diego

*Investigative Efforts:*~~SECRET//SI~~

Page 13 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020593

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, British authorities arrested OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, who is linked to KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AA Flt. #77) via lease agreement. AL-BAYOUMI is a close associate of RADWAN LACHHAB. A computer was seized from AL-BAYOUMI at the time of his arrest. LACHHAB received an email response from AL-BAYOUMI which contained an address for AL-BAYOUMI in Birmingham, United Kingdom. FBI San Diego (SD) is preparing a Material Witness Warrant and is investigating financial transactions to support a criminal complaint for extradition. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) As previously reported, OSAMA AWADALLAH's telephone number was found in NAWAF ALHAZMI's (AA Flt. #77) car, which was left at Washington-Dulles Airport. AWADALLAH has admitted to being the roommate of OMAR BAKARBASHAT and that he knew ALHAZMI. On 09/21/2001, AWADALLAH failed a polygraph. AWADALLAH was found deceptive on two key questions: "Did you know beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" and, "Did you participate in any way in any of those attacks on U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" AWADALLAH was subsequently arrested on a Material Witness warrant. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) During interview, AWADALLAH (supra) stated that NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) lived with YAZID SALMI. SALMI was interviewed on 9/20/2001 and 9/21/2001. On 9/22/2001, he will be polygraphed and his car searched pursuant to consent being granted. SALMI was reportedly one of ALHAZMI's closest friends in San Diego. Interview, polygraph, and search results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) FBI SD investigation identified OSAMA BASSNAN as an associate OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI (supra) and voiced his support of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. A source met with BASSNAN for three hours during the evening on 9/21/2001. During the meeting, BASSNAN indicated he knew AL-BAYOUMI very well and also knew NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) when they lived in San Diego. BASSNAN told the source that he knew of terrorist attack in advance, but source says that BASSNAN implied he had inside information. A FISA application is being sought by FBI SD. Investigation continuing.

San Francisco

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Page 14 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020591

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

*Investigative Efforts:*

(LES/OC) On 5/21/2001, INS Officials arrested NASA J. GHOLAMALI ROSHANDELL (aka WAHID ALSHEHRY), upon his arrival in San Francisco. At the time of his arrest, ROSHANDELL requested political asylum. ROSHANDELL has been in the custody of the INS since 05/21/2001. On 5/24/2001 and 9/20/2001, FBI SF interviewed ROSHANDELL. ROSHANDELL arrived in the US during the same time frame as many of the hijackers. When ROSHANDELL boarded a plane bound for San Francisco, he identified himself as WAHID ALSHEHRY. A review of the manifest revealed that there was a WAHID ALSHEHRY on the flight, but no one on the flight who used the name ROSHANDELL. ROSHANDELL is a military pilot, trained in Iran and the U.S. San Francisco, in conjunction with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (USAO SDNY), is seeking a Material Witness Warrant for ROSHANDELL. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) On 9/21/2001, FBI SF received information from FBI DL regarding ALI M. ATABAHI (2125 Canyon Oak Lane, Danville, CA). Investigation determined that ATABAHI applied \$200 of time towards a prepaid calling card on 9/9/2001 to a calling card that was subsequently used by WALEED SHEHRI (AA Flt. #11). FBI SF has begun preliminary surveillance of ATABAHI, as well as initiating extensive background and database checks on ATABAHI and any associates identified within the San Francisco Bay Area. Investigation on-going.

(LES/OC) FBI SF has been contacted by three local financial institutions with information that account holders at their businesses may be the same as individuals on the Security Directives Watch List. The Bank of the West advised that they have three accounts matching names on the Watch List furnished to them on 9/17/2001. FBI SF has requested a FGJ subpoena to obtain account holder profiles and account information. World Savings Bank noted one account in the name of MOHAMMED H. ACTA, which was opened in their Mission Viejo, CA, branch. This is believed to be a different name, and identifying information, than that on the Watch List (MOHAMAD G. ATTAA). However, FBI SF investigation continues to fully identify MOHAMMED H. ACTA. Charles Schwab reported that a WILLIAM H. FISHBACH from Florida had placed "Put Options" on airline stock, in an account he opened in July, 2001. Additional information is forthcoming and a subpoena will be issued. SIOC and appropriate offices will be advised of investigative results. Investigations continuing.

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Page 15 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020592

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

(LES/OCT) FBI SF received information from the US Postal Service (USPS) that the Daly City Post Office (2650 Bayshore Blvd, Daly City, CA) has in its possession approximately 200 suspicious-looking letters. One letter is addressed to SAEED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #93), and a second addressed to ABDULLAH ALOMARI (possibly related to ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI - AA Flt. #11). Both letters are date-stamped 9/11/2001. FBI SF is assisting the USPS with the examination of these parcels. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate offices.

**Washington Field***Recovery / Evidence Collection:*

(LES/OC) As of 12:21 pm on 9/22/2001, 1,475 body portions and 117 remains have been recovered at the Pentagon.

(LES/OC) FBI WFO has recovered the Virginia DMV identification of HANI HANJOUR from the Pentagon crime scene. Also recovered was a wallet from SALEM ALHAZMI. This wallet contained contained a couple of addresses, including one for BERNARD LNU (last name was illegible) with an address of ??? East Service Road, Wayne, New Jersey, phone number 973-256-7000. FBI WFO coordinating investigation with FBI NK and results will be provided to SIOC. Investigation continuing.

*Investigative Efforts:*

(LES/OC) FBI Washington Field Office (FBI WFO) reported on a situation involving a Saudi Arabian pilot aboard a United Airlines flight from Dulles to Heathrow. Prior to take-off, the flight crew became suspicious of one passenger. This passenger claimed to be a Saudi Arabian pilot, and asked to ride in the jump seat. The crew asked the FBI to interview him, and two other Middle Eastern travelers. These individuals were interviewed by the FBI, US Customs Service (USCS) and INS. They were cleared to fly, but the pilot refused to fly with them on board. No further investigation.

(LES/OC) VICTOR LOPEZ-FLORES was interviewed by FBI WFO concerning his assistance to AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) in obtaining a Virginia ID card. LOPEZ-FLORES described himself as a "Professional ID Provider." He identified three of the hijackers and is being detained by INS on immigration charges. According to LOPEZ-FLORES, HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77), NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and AHMED ALGHAMDI followed LOPEZ-FLORES

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Page 16 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020593

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

and another ID broker to lawyer SAMIR BURGEN'S office. BURGEN'S secretary provided DMV forms presigned by BURGEN. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) FBI WFO investigation identified EYAD M. ALRABABAH and ABDEL RAHMAN OMAR FAWFIQ ALFAURU (DOB 2/11/1967) as possible associates of the hijackers. These identifications were made through FBI WFO's analysis of Virginia Driver's Licenses with addresses provided by VICTOR LOPEZ-FLORES (supra). ALRABABAH and ALFAURU are currently located in FBI NK's territory. FBI WFO is coordinating with FBI NK to arrest both subjects on INS charges. The association of ALRABABAH and ALFAURU has been further strengthened by ALFAURU's purchase of ALRABABAH's vehicle, and their arrival in the WFO area within the year 2000. Investigation continuing and being coordinated with FBI NK.

(LES/OC) A continuing review of Dulles security camera videos indicates that two of the hijackers may have visited Dulles on 9/10/2001. It appears that they passed through the security checkpoints and baggage claim areas. Review of security cameras on-going.

(LES/OC) American Airlines reports that only five victim families have not contacted AA concerning victims on Flight #77, and are those of the suspected hijackers. This lends credence to other information that there appears to be only five hijackers on Flight #77, and not six as previously considered.

(LES/OC) Investigation by FBI WFO of associates and employers of MOHAMED HASSAN ABDI have discerned no ties to any of the hijackers. No links have been developed from the address book of 75 phone numbers seized as part of a consensual search of his residence. However, he will be arrested on 9/23/2001 on forgery charges that were uncovered incidental to this investigation. This warrant is being pursued out of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (USAO EDVA).

(LES/OC) On 9/21/2001, FBI WFO arrested HERBERT VILLALOBOS (aka OSCAR ARMANDO DIAZ) on Title 18, Section 1028 (False Identity Documentation) on 9/21/01. A consensual search was conducted of his residence (5031 First Street, NW, Apt 302, Washington, D.C.) with negative results. VILLALOBOS was identified as assisting ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt. #11) obtain a VA Identification card. Investigation continuing.

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Page 17 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020594

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Re: [REDACTED] 9/22/2001  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 9/20/2001, SAIF SALEM SAIF SAGER ALMEHAIRIBI (DOB 1/1/75), who is on the Security Directives Watch List, was contacted by FBI WFO and agreed to be interviewed. ALMEHAIRIBI was subsequently arrested by the INS as a B-2 visa overstay. ALMEHAIRIBI had reportedly been scheduled to return to Saudi Arabia by air on 09/20/01. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center advised that they had received a threat of an impending release of anthrax on Washington D.C., on 9/22/2001. Although FBI WFO does not consider this a credible threat, appropriate notifications have been made.

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Page 18 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020595

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Re: (b) [REDACTED]

09/22/2001



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Page 19 of 19

MEA-HJK-00020596

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~~(U)~~ Attachment M

[REDACTED]

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June 23, 2005

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PENTTBOM

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010914251  
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See below

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Q2647 [REDACTED]

Q2647 Vancer mini-cassette recorder with tape (Your 1B4872, Item 1093(B), Barcode E02174129)  
Q2648 AVR mini cassette recorder with tape (Your 1B4872, Item 1093(C), Barcode E02174129)  
Q2649 Cannon camera with power supply (Your 1B4871, Item 1000B, Barcode E02174130)

The following specimens were submitted under cover of communication dated May 17, 2004 (040528017):

Q2650 One bottle of cologne (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696618)  
Q2651 One box cutter (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696615)  
Q2652 One plastic box (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696617)  
Q2653 Latent Lift #1 from Driver's side door (inside) (Your 1B4965, Barcode E03695551)  
Q2654 Latent Lift #2 from seat belt buckle rear right passenger side (Your 1B4965, Barcode E03695551)  
Q2655 Latent Lift #3 from Right front Passenger Door (Your 1B4965, Barcode E03695551)  
Q2656 Student travel magazine with hair (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696616)  
Q2657 Notepad (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696614)

The following specimens were submitted to the Laboratory under cover of communication dated September 17, 2004 (040916250):

Q2658 One 4mm Sony tape (1B2739, Barcode E02173332)  
Q2659 One CD-ROM, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)  
Q2660 Eight CD-ROMs, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)  
Q2668-2673 Six CD-ROMs, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)  
Q2674-2676 Three CD-ROMs, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)  
Q2677 One 80GB Maxtor HD, Model: 4W980H6, S/N: W605FT3C from Moussaoui (1B4121, Barcode E01963624)

Page 112 of 421  
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MEA-RAD-00002789

Q2647 [REDACTED]  
Q2648 [REDACTED]  
Q2649 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Attachment N**

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DAC-004 11-03

Congress of the United States  
Washington, D.C.

January 29, 2003

The Honorable George J. Tenet  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As you know, the final report of the Joint Inquiry into the events of September 11 has been submitted to the Intelligence Community for declassification review. We look forward to early release of the public report so that efforts at reforms can be accelerated.

Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan, bicameral investigation last year, we are committed to working in the current Congress to help secure implementation of its recommendations. In furtherance of that goal, we are writing to the President and heads of departments and agencies about portions of the Joint Inquiry's recommendations that may be of particular concern to them.

Our first recommendation calls for establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, who in addition to being the President's principal intelligence adviser "shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole." To help promote both strong leadership of the entire Intelligence Community leadership and an effective CIA, the Joint Inquiry also recommended that Congress provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other agency. In considering this recommendation, the Congress will certainly, we believe, benefit from learning of your views about the strengthening of the role of head of the Intelligence Community.

A number of the recommendations that follow address proposed tasks of the Director of National Intelligence, but as that reform will require study and deliberation, for the immediate future those further recommendations are directed to the Director of Central Intelligence as the present statutory head of the Intelligence Community.

The Joint Inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the U.S. Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. One of our recommendations calls on the National Security Council, in conjunction with key agency and department heads, to prepare such a strategy for the President's approval. The recommendation states that the strategy should be

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The Honorable George J. Tenet  
January 29, 2003  
Page 2

"government wide," apply both "home and abroad," and include "the growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies." The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and fully engage the Intelligence as well as foreign policy, economic, military and law enforcement elements that are "critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism." The Director of Central Intelligence's full participation in this overall process will be essential, as will the DCI's development of the Intelligence Community component of the full strategy. The Joint Inquiry recommended that the Intelligence Community's component of the overall strategy include a number of important items, among them development of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks.

To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence estimates on terrorism, the Joint Inquiry has recommended establishment on the National Intelligence Council of the position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also assist the Intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis.

Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the Administration to ensure development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center, as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend, as the recommendation states, on the center's "full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, including 'raw' supporting data as needed." Your action to ensure full cooperation between the entire Intelligence Community (including, of course, the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security will be fundamental to the success of this vital reform. We applaud the President's announcement of the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which we understand will be located under the Director of Central Intelligence. The important challenge, we believe, is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion requirement of the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced.

The recommendations include a list of significant reforms that the Intelligence Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBI's domestic intelligence capability. In regard to these critically needed reforms, the Joint Inquiry has recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the Intelligence Community, together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should report to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include "the specific manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United

[REDACTED]

**GEORGE J. TENET**  
The Honorable George J. Tenet  
January 29, 2003  
Page 3

States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil liberties."

The Committees expressed their strong conviction that "the Intelligence Community's employees remain its greatest resource." They recommend that the head of the Intelligence Community "should require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorism efforts." Several particular actions are set forth in the recommendation. One is that Intelligence Community agencies should expand and improve counterterrorism training, including about information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence personnel, the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and watchlisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve Intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and experience of retired personnel. It calls on the Intelligence Community to "enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce."

A further personnel recommendation proposes, in part, that Congress enact legislation, modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to help instill the concept of "jointness" throughout the Intelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together than has been the case. The mechanisms identified in the recommendation include such things as joint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as incentives for joint service throughout the Intelligence Community. In developing these ideas, Congress would benefit from the Administration's detailed proposals.

The Joint Inquiry identified several important objectives concerning classified information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, by state and local authorities, and by the American public. To this end, we recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of key components of the Intelligence Community, including the Attorney General, should report to the Intelligence Committees on "proposals for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of sensitive and classified information." The report should also address "proposals to protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to protect agency self-interest."

The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and response to these and other matters identified in the course of the Joint Inquiry. Further, we are confident that the Congress will benefit from other recommendations

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
The Honorable George J. Tenet  
January 29, 2003  
Page 4

that you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation's counterterrorism capabilities.

Sincerely,



Bob Graham  
Chairman, Senate Intelligence  
Committee, 107<sup>th</sup> Congress



Porter Goss  
Chairman, House Intelligence  
Committee, 107<sup>th</sup> and 108<sup>th</sup>  
Congresses

  
Richard Shelby  
Vice-Chairman, Senate Intelligence  
Committee, 107<sup>th</sup> Congress  
Nancy Pelosi  
Ranking Minority Member, House  
Intelligence Committee, 107<sup>th</sup> Congress  
and Member ex officio (as Minority  
Leader), 108<sup>th</sup> Congress

Enclosure: As stated

[REDACTED]

SECRET//NOFORN

S. REP. 116-107 116<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, 2D SESSION H. REP. NO. 107-

JOINT INQUIRY INTO  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES  
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF  
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

REPORT  
OF THE  
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
AND  
U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE

TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS

DECEMBER 2007

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PAGE FOUR--FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN  
SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

20. *India:* While in the United States, some of the forty-nine 9/11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of these individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry/Review confirmed that the less religious Community also has information, much of which has yet to be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The FBI and CIA were informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September 11 attack, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but with still have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony, neither CIA nor FBI was able to identify definitively the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBI's Washington Field Office operates a section devoted to [REDACTED]

Only recently, and at least in part due to the Joint Iinerary's focus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA establish a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Iinerary, this gap in U.S. intelligence coverage is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy of the potential risk to U.S. national security. The Intelligence Community needs to address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.

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September 11, 2001, the FBI received two messages from any member of the intelligence community that there was a [REDACTED] presence in the United States.

According to various FBI documents and at least one CIA memorandum, some of the September 11 terrorists, while in the United States, apparently had contacts with individuals who may have connected to the Saudi Government. While the Joint Inquiry uncovered this material during the course of its review of FBI and CIA documents, it did not attempt to investigate and assess the accuracy and significance of this information independently, recognizing that such a task would be beyond the scope of this Joint Inquiry. Instead, the Joint Inquiry referred a detailed compilation of information uncovered by the Inquiry in documents and interviews to the FBI and CIA for further investigation by the Intelligence Community and, if appropriate, law enforcement agencies. A brief summary of the available information regarding some of these individuals is illustrative for purposes of this report.

8 **Osama al Bayoumi:** The FBI has received numerous reports from individuals in the Medina community, dating back to 1999, stating that al Bayoumi may be a Saudi intelligence officer. FBI files suggest that al Bayoumi provided substantial assistance to hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Qazmi after they arrived in San Diego in February 2000. Al Bayoumi met the hijackers at a public place shortly after his arrival, with an individual at the Saudi consulate and these are indicators in the files that his assistance with the hijackers may not have been accidental. During this same timeframe, al Bayoumi had extensive contact with Saudi Government officials in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi Ministry of Defense. According to FBI files, [REDACTED] at the company told that al Bayoumi received a monthly salary even though he had been there no longer than a month. This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived in San Diego, decreased slightly in December 2000, and stayed at that same level until August 2001. That company reportedly had ties to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. In addition, the FBI determined that al Bayoumi was in contact with several individuals under FBI investigation and with the "Sony 1" and "Sony 2" individuals, which had been under investigation as a fundraising front for al Qaeda.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Osama bin Laden may have been in contact with al-Bayan and al-Bayan during their time in San Diego. Bin Laden was a close associate of al-Bayan and Qassem, another one of the hijackers' close associates. He also lived across the street from the hijackers, and made a statement to an FBI agent that he did more than al-Bayan did for the hijackers. According to an FBI Agent, Bin Laden told another individual that he met al-Bayan through al-Bayan and that this was the case of the hijackers through al-Bayan. He also said the exact that al-Bayan was referred to because he knew al-Bayan and could trust him very well. The defendant goes on to state that Bin Laden and al-Bayan have been "close to each other for a long time." Bin Laden has many ties to the Saudi Government, including past employment by the Saudi Arabian Economic Mission, referred to in FBI documents as [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. The FBI also received reports from individuals in the Muslim community stating the Bin Laden might be a Saudi intelligence officer. According to a CIA memo, Bin Laden reportedly received funding and possibly a false passport from Saudi Government officials. He and his wife have received financial support from the Saudi Embassy in the United States and his wife. A CIA report also indicates that Bin Laden traveled to America in 1982 and met with an individual who was [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. The report notes that during their trip a member of the Saudi Royal Family provided Bin Laden with a significant amount of cash. FBI information indicates that Bin Laden is an extremist and supporter of fundamentalist Islam, and his links connected to the Syrian bin Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Maghrib.
- Stay-at-Home. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorandum, al-Bayan and al-Bayan may have been in contact with Cheyenne at this time, as according to memo of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and one of the "agents" of the King Fahd mosque in Culver City, California. Also according to FBI documents, the mosque was built in 1988 from funding provided by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah. The mosque is reportedly attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely recognized for its anti-Western views.

[REDACTED]

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ANSWER: **1999**

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## ANSWER

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- Salim al-Husseini. In September 2011, Salim al-Husseini, reportedly a Saudi Muslim Missionary official, moved to the same hotel in Herndon, Virginia where al-Shanisi was staying. While al-Husseini claimed after September 11 not to know the perpetrator, FBI agents believed he was being deceptive. He was able to elude the United States despite FBI efforts to locate and to interview him, and
- Abdurrahman bin Laden. Abdurrahman bin Laden claims to work for the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. as an administrative officer. He is identified by the FBI as Usama bin Laden's half-brother. He is a close friend of Mohammad Qasid, the third, reportedly assassinated of Usama's sons and Marwan al-Shehhi (refer to September 11, 2001).

The Joint Inquiry and its other investigations have identified connections to the Saudi Government that it is important to note, including:

- The CIA and FBI have identified the Bin Tawfiq Mosque in Culver City as a site of al-Qaeda related activity. Several agents of FBI investigations prior to September 11 had close connection to the mosque and its belief to have laundered money through the mosque to non-profit organizations affiliated with Osama bin Laden. In an interview, an FBI agent said he believed that Saudi Government money was being transferred through the mosque.
- Another Saudi national with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family, ██████████, is the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations and reportedly was attacking security of the United States' southwestern border in 1999 and encouraging the entry of infiltrating individuals into the United States.
- According to FBI documents, several of the phone numbers found in the phone book of Abu Zubaida, a senior al-Qaeda operative captured in Pakistan in March 2002, could be linked, at least indirectly, to telephone numbers in the United States. One of those U.S. numbers is subscribed to by the nSPGOL Corporation, which is based in Atlanta.

372

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Colorado, and manages the office of the Consul General of the Saudi Embassy in Denver. The FBI noted that ASPCO, has an unlisted telephone number. A November 18, 2001 FBI response to the Joint Inquiry team that "CIA agents have advised us that links between individuals found in Zubaida's phone book and numbers in the United States."

- \* According to an FBI document, the telephone number of a bystander in the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C., who came to be alleged may be [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was also found in Abu Zubaida's possessions, and
- \* According to an FBI agent in Phoenix, the FBI suspects Muhammad al-Qudhaieen of being [REDACTED] Al-Qudhaieen was involved in a 1999 incident abroad in America West flight, which the FBI's Phoenix office now suspects may have been a "dry run" to test airline security. During the flight, al-Qudhaieen and his associates asked the flight attendant a variety of suspicious questions. Al-Qudhaieen then attempted to enter the cockpit on two occasions. Al-Qudhaieen and his associates were flying to Washington, D.C., to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy, and both claimed that their return was paid for by the Saudi Embassy. During the course of the investigation, the FBI has discovered that both al-Qudhaieen and the other individual involved in the incident had connections to terrorism.

Finally, the Committee is particularly concerned about the serious nature of allegations contained in a CIA memorandum found by the Joint Inquiry Staff in the files of the FBI's San Diego Field Office. That memorandum, which discusses alleged liaison discussions between the September 11 hijackers, Khalid Ghamoudi, and members of the Saudi Royal Family, was denied by a CIA officer [REDACTED] relying primarily on information from FBI files. The CIA officer sent it to the FBI in Denver, the whether CIA had additional information. He also provided a copy to the FBI agent responsible for the investigation of one of the individuals discussed in the memorandum. During the closest initial investigation of the CIA memorandum, the FBI agent included the memorandum in an individual case file and did not forward it to FBI Headquarters. FBI Headquarters, therefore, was unaware

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

419

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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of state agents in the memorandum and that the Joint Inquiry brought the memorandum's implications to the Bureau's attention. [REDACTED]

People's Social Government: Contributions by Turkey and European Countries

While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or a storage bin, from Bush administration officials who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is a *Memorandum*, from FBI sources, that it was two of these bad *hijackers* who were alleged to be Saudi intelligence officers. The *July Inquiry's review* confirmed that the intelligence community also has information, much of which remains speculative and yet to be independently verified, indicating that Saudi Government officials, in the United States may have other ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

The Committees are particularly concerned about the serious nature of allegations contained in a CIA memorandum dated within the first of the FBI's San Diego Field Office. This memorandum, which discusses alleged terrorist connections between the September 11 hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by a CIA officer [redacted], relying primarily on information from FBI files.

In their findings of fact, the Joint Inquiry, neither the FBI nor the CIA was able to definitively classify for these Committee the origins of funds supporting terrorism entirely globally or within the United States and the amount to which such support, if it came, is international or domestic in nature. Both the FBI and CIA have indicated to the Committees that they are more aggressively pursuing Sandoval-related terrorism issues.

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hearings, that, prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, the FBI received "no reporting from any member of the Intelligence Community" and there is a [REDACTED] presence in the United States.

It should be clear that this Joint Inquiry has made no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues that we have contained in FBI and CIA documents. It was not the goal of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of any such alleged connections to the Saudi Government. On this point, it is possible that further analysis of documents could suggest, as Schlesinger did [REDACTED] on July 2, 2001, "incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorist within the Saudi Government." On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of Open Allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these accusations.

Given the serious national security implications of this information, however, the leadership of the Joint Inquiry is referring the staff's compilation of this vast information to both the FBI and the CIA for investigative review and appropriate analytical and intelligence action.

Possible Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Senior Government Officials in the United States

In reviewing FBI documents and the CIA memorandum, the House Inquiry Staff has examined information suggesting that

- \* One individual who provided assistance to Nawaf al-Misri and Khalid al-Masri may be connected to the Saudi Government. A second individual who may have been in contact with al-Misri and al-Masri also had ties to the Saudi Government, including communication to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. There is reporting in PDR that these two persons have alleged that both of them individuals may be Saudi intelligence officers.

280

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## ANSWER

- The September 11 hijackers may have been in contact with other Saudi Government officials in the United States prior to the September 11 attacks, and
- Saudi Government officials in the United States may have ties to Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network.

### Names in Italicics and Names in Roman

Two individuals known to the FBI prior to September 11, 2001 - Cheif of Hezbollah and Osama Bassam - may have provided assistance or support to al-Zarqawi and al-Masri, while the two individuals to whom were living in San Diego. While the documentary evidence for al-Zarqawi provided assistance to al-Zarqawi and al-Masri is weak, the Iraq section only produced evidence that Osama Bassam had contact with the two individuals.

When al-Nasiri and al-Masri moved to San Diego, al-Bayati provided them with considerable assistance. Before the migrants moved in with the long-time FBI informant, they stayed at al-Bayati's apartment for several days until al-Nasiri was able to find them an apartment. Al-Bayati even co-signed their lease and may have paid their first month's rent and security deposit.<sup>3</sup> After al-Nasiri and al-Masri moved into their new apartment, al-Bayati threw a party to welcome them to the San Diego community. He also invited Brother Abdullah, another individual from the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), to help them get acclimated to the United States. Abdullah served as their mentor, helped them get a visa, helped, and assisted them in learning their rights. [REDACTED]

<sup>10</sup> The FBI letter, dated 22 December 1973, suggests that Harwood records indicate a "substantial" portion of the wiretaps in the October 1970 block were of Harwood's telephone as he was then living, which suggests that the telephone remained in his name. FBI response, 12 January 1974, letter, number 725-35467, file 6-100007-1, p. 202. telephone is subject to highly different regulations. The telephone records do not distinguish between telephone and cellular telephone. Although cellular telephone records are subject to the same regulations as telephone records, the telephone records do not distinguish between telephone and cellular telephone.

ANSWER

10

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21 July 2021

Appellate Exhibit 827 (AAA WBA)  
Page 190 of 213

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During the post-reporter 13 investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayan had far more extensive ties to the Saudi Government than previously realized. In fact, according to an October 11, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayan has "extensive ties to the Saudi Government." The information identified by the FBI is:

- 8. Al-Bayoumi had been an informant in the Saudi Civil Aviation investigation, from 1975 to 1993, when he relocated to the United States;
- 9. According to the FBI, Al-Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the State and the Saudi Ministry of Defense, remunerative for his valuable services;
- 10. The FBI has also located records, indicating that Al-Bayoumi received \$30,000 from the Saudi Ministry of Defense at one point;
- 11. When Al-Bayoumi applied to re-enter in the United States in 1993, he had a waiver from the Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia, and
- 12. While in San Diego, Al-Bayoumi was receiving money from the Saudi Ministry of Defense through a Saudi company called "Riyad." [REDACTED] of that company informed the FBI after September 11, 2001 that, although Al-Bayoumi only showed up at the company on one occasion, he received a monthly salary and allowances. [REDACTED] stated that, at first, he intended to return to pay Al-Bayoumi a monthly salary, but he was told that his company would lose the contract if he did not pay him. [REDACTED] informed the FBI that at this time, he was not connected to Saudi companies.

Abu Rayyan who had frequent contact with Saudi establishments in the United States. In a review of telephone toll records, the FBI learned that Abu Rayyan called Saudi Government establishments in the United States about 300 times between January and July of 2000. According to the FBI, Abu Rayyan was in contact with at least three individuals in the Saudi

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Recently in Washington, DC he participated in the South Asian Cultural Mission in Washington, DC and then移居 to the band *Common* in Los Angeles. In a speech of *Reverend*,  they also encouraged him to buy a greater number of *no* influenced in the South Committee in London.

The former Sun family agents addressed the issue of whether the legend was not an illegitimate officer at the October 9, 2012, closed hearing. The former agents agreed with the defense lawyers.

[M. Skowronek] acted like a kind of messenger of him. In my opinion, Andrii was involved with the [bushmen], which looks like he was, if he signed names, if he presented some sort of threatening or payment of some sort, then I would say that there is a clear possibility that there might be a connection between Bushmen and [UML].

A former Assistant Special Agent in Charge of San Diego testified that the FBI received "numerous, I would say, staff a dozen" telephone notifications which informed that [REDACTED] was a Soviet intelligence officer. The FBI's December 18<sup>th</sup> progress memorandum, in which the FBI initially is designating [REDACTED] as an unpermitted Soviet intelligence officer, lists against the FBI memo that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] including September 13<sup>th</sup>, was the purpose of which was that "there is an obvious" movement concerning [REDACTED] to a Soviet intelligence officer.

This fit had caused rope drag from a collapsed structure all prior to December 11, 1998 indicating that such, could easily be a 2nd intelligent action. It is found when looking to place access to large amounts of nerve from Saudi Arabia despite the fact that he did not receive any input. On the 10th day prior to Sept. 11, the FBI received information that the Egyptian had received \$100,000 from Saudi Arabia to fund some type of new target. The FBI conducted a counterterrorism investigation of Egypt in 1998 and 1999, but claimed no information on this target.

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2023-2024 Catalog - Page 10 of 118

Filed with TJ  
21 July 2021

Appellate Exhibit 827 (AAA WBA)  
Page 192 of 213

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ANSWER: 8113333333333333

Since September 11, 2001, the Commission learned that al-Bayanat had sought this re-enactment. Pasquale J. D'Amico, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence testified in the Chamber 2, 9/11 hearing that:

peripheries talking with the [REDACTED] Government about collecting at an individual level using [REDACTED] who has ties to a Syria, who has ties to Hezbollah.

In addition, the FBI reported the results of their search of al-Bayoumi's [REDACTED] that, "after an exhaustive translation of Bayoumi's documents, it is clear that in Bayoumi's correspondence he's providing guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings can be interpreted as jihadist."

According to information received by the FBI after September 11, 2001, [REDACTED] also used one of his [REDACTED] applications that is used for a company called "Dolphin Assets." According to the FBI, [REDACTED] has [REDACTED] applications of [REDACTED] Assets. According to the FBI, [REDACTED] Assets is the San Diego representative of [REDACTED] Assets. According to a separate [REDACTED] document, [REDACTED] Assets is under the same ownership company, [REDACTED] Dolphin Assets, which is a subsidiary of Al Birekash Investments and Development Company. [REDACTED] Dolphin reportedly had the contracts for cleaning and managing trash at the three nuclear airports in Saudi Arabia. The [REDACTED] document states that [REDACTED] the company has [REDACTED] in Umm Al Quwain, UAE. Headquarters was informed of the affiliation between [REDACTED] Assets and Al Birekash in February 2001, but the San Diego Field Office apparently never got this information.

accusing al-Baghdadi of Raymond's kidnapping during the time that al-Baghdadi and al-Midhat were in the United States. According to a recent [REDACTED] analysis of the ten most serious and elements of the Iraqi Government, he was kidnapped and al-Midhat arrived in the U.S. al-Baghdadi generally received approximately \$600 per month in "allowances." According to the [REDACTED] transcripts, in March 2003, a month after al-Baghdadi and al-Midhat arrived in San Diego, his "allowances" jumped to over \$2,000 a month and stayed constant until December 2003, when al-Baghdadi left San Diego. Al-Baghdadi's allowances were then decreased to approximately \$1,200 a month and stayed at that rate until al-Baghdadi left the United States in August 2003, approximately one month before the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

Appellate Exhibit 827 (AAA WBA)  
Page 193 of 213

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The [REDACTED] memorandum dated July 2, 2002, also clearly noted that it did not apply to, among living or deceased, any member of the [REDACTED] family. The [REDACTED] family includes the wife of Robert Baudle, the [REDACTED] Ambassador to the United States. The [REDACTED] has now confirmed that only Osama Bin Laden will receive money directly from Robert Baudle's wife, not that in his family will be entitled to access those of the checks from Robert Baudle's widow, which were to come to Baudle's wife after her own inheritance.

The India tragedy, also known as the *Amritsar Massacre*, was a period of political violence in the British Raj, in which British Indian Army troops opened fire on a crowd of unarmed Indian protesters.

- **Bastien was angry** (note an audio of Oberoi and Raymond's call was in telephone control) when Raymond asked him where they were, they were held in San Diego. Plus on stage his co-workers (in the form of actors in Hollywood) connected to the hijackers, including Steven Rudebeck, Alfonso Holden, who is referred to in FBI documents as Bastien's "adoptive father".
- **Proceeding from October 16, 2001 FBI documents**: MacLean informed an agent that he had been allowed to travel through California. He went to Los Angeles and part of the Southern California through Oberoi and Raymond. According to the FBI documents, he also met Raynes and that couple was "providing lodgings to the hijackers and al-Qaeda members" when "they met each other for a long time."
- **MacLean lived in that apartment/complex in San Diego** across the street from al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda.
- **MacLean made a comment** in an FBI statement to the September 11 Inquests suggesting "you're the master for the hijackers (in the San Diego area).

- \* The FBI has a wire of contact between the hijackers and a close friend of Begum's, Naseer al-Khayy, a commercial aviation pilot and certified flight instructor living in San Diego. Al-Khayy admitted to the FBI over in May 2009, al-Mihdhar and al-Baluchi contacted him about learning to fly before 9/11.

FBI documents speculate that Orman lived at [REDACTED] The FBI's November 18, 2008 response comments that [REDACTED] was an early investigative theory based on initial reporting which the FBI has not been able to corroborate. However, there is also additional information possibly tying Castro to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in 1992, while he was living in Washington, DC, Castro listed his employment as the Saudi Arabian Insurance Mission. FBI documents state that [REDACTED]

Boutin also has other ties to the Saudi Government. Boutin's wife received a monthly stipend from Princess Hilda. In a recent search of the couple's residence, the FBI located copies of 11 checks cashed totaling \$34,500, during the period February 22, 1979 to May 30, 2002. These checks were payable to Boutin's wife and were drawn on the Piges Bank account of Prince Boutefka's wife. The FBI has determined that there has been a standing order on Princess Hilda's account since January 1979 to send \$3,000 a month to Boutin's wife. Boutin's wife was allegedly receiving the funding for "nursing services." But, according to the [redacted] document, there is no evidence that Boutin's wife provided nursing services. [redacted]

On or about one occasion, Bissman cashed a check drawn on Prime Wrecker's account. According to the FBI, on May 14, 1978, Bissman cashed a check from Brender in the amount of \$3,000. Bissman's wife and received at least one check directly from Brender. She also received one additional check from Bissman's wife, which she cashed on January 6, 1978, for \$1,000.

200

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In the October 9, 2001 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director (FAD) James complied and on the basis of the above:

I believe that we do have a pretty good sum Sanderson's wife, \$2,000 a month up to about \$600.00. What big money is to be is what we don't know."

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She gives money to a lot of different groups and people from around the world. We've been able to support a number of them...but maybe if we can discover that she gives to 10 different radical groups, well, we might have a problem here.

The FBI has also developed additional information closely indicating that Basman is an extremist and supporter of Osama bin Laden. In 1993, the FBI became aware that Basman had hosted a party for the blind Shaykh at his house in Washington, DC in October 1993. Basman has made many statements made to FBI agents about Bin Laden, referring to Bin Laden as the ideal Khalifa and the ruler of the Islamic world. According to FBI agents, Basman speaks of Bin Laden "as if he were a god." Basman also stated to an FBI agent that he believed the U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He concluded such measures to be insufficient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy the United States and make it an Islamic state within ten to fifteen years. According to FBI documents, Basman like other Bin Laden's family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his mobile telephone with members of the family who are living in the United States.

**Phone Numbers Linking the Zubitskis to a Company in the United States and a Saudi Businessman in Washington**

On March 28, 2002 U.S. and coalition forces recovered the telephone book of Abu Zubaida, whom the U.S. Government has classified as a senior al-Qaida operational coordinator. According to an FBI document, "a review of cell phones has linked several of the numbers found in Zubaida's phone book, with U.S. phone numbers." One of the numbers is listed and subscriber to by the ADP/USA Corporation in Arvada, Colorado. (Indictment 13, 2004).

FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Office requesting that it investigate this connection. On September 18, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded, stating that they had not closed their initial investigation.

According to the FBI's Denver Office, ASPCOL is the umbrella corporation that manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The facility is operated by Scientific Security. Agents of the Denver Field Office noted that neither ASPCOL nor Scientific Security is listed in the phone book or is easily accessible. In addition, the Colorado Secretary of State's office has no record of ASPCOL. The Denver office did not attempt to make any local inquiries about ASPCOL, as they believed that any inquiries regarding ASPCOL would be quickly known by Prince Bandar's employees. Due to the sensitivity of this matter, they decided to hold their investigation of ASPCOL in abeyance until they received additional guidance from FBI Headquarters.

According to the FBI, the phone number of an individual named [REDACTED] of McLean, Virginia was found within the effects of Abu Zubaida. [REDACTED] is reportedly a bodyguard of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. The FBI now suspects this may be a [REDACTED]. On September 17, 2002 documents, the FBI notes that the Bureau is opening an investigation on [REDACTED] due to the size and value of his residence and his suspicious activity in approaching U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. It also appears that [REDACTED] has been in contact with [REDACTED], which is located at [REDACTED] in McLean, Virginia. The FBI has identified this address as the residence of Prince Bandar. According to the FBI, [REDACTED] is officially a driver for the Saudi Embassy. [REDACTED] number was also linked to ASACOL, Prince Bandar's umbrella acronym, located in Charlotte.

It should be noted that the FBI's November 18, 2001 memo states that the "9/11" terms have rendered all direct (emphasis added) links between numbers found in LeBaron's phone book and numbers in the United States."

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The U.S. Government also learned another Virginia member of an Osama Bin Laden safehouse in Pakistan. The member is subscribed to by an individual named [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was interviewed by the FBI in June 2002. He could not explain why the member ended up at a safehouse in Pakistan, but stated that he regularly provided services to a couple who are personal confidants to Pelon-Sudar. This couple's driver is an individual named [REDACTED], who is assigned to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. According to [REDACTED] regularly called [REDACTED] business and frequently would back and forth to Pakistan.

Other Broad Government Officials in the United States Who May Have Been in Contact with the September 11 Hijackers

Among the individuals who may have been members of the *ni-San*, and at *Milchner* was *Shaykh al-Thumairy*. According to the [REDACTED] manuscript reviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff, "initial indications are that al-Thumairy may have had a physical or financial connection to al-Qa'ida at *Milchner*, but we are still looking at this possibility." Al-Thumairy is an accredited imam of the *Sunnah* Committee in Los Angeles and is also considered head of the "Mosque" at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, California. [REDACTED]

According to FBI documents, the King Fahd mosque was built in 1996 from funding from the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdallah. The mosque is attended by members of the Saudi Committee in Los Angeles and is widely known for its anti-Western views. FBI documents indicate that Mokhles Al-Falih, known as Al-Kawari and al-Maghribi, the King Fahd Mosque, before he defected to Saudi Arabia.

Several individuals on the East Coast whom the hijackers may have met may also have connections to the Saudi Government. After the terrorist attack, the FBI discovered that, during September 2001, an individual named Balh al-Busayyan stayed at the seven-unit a Heron, Virginia where Al-Naif was staying at the time. According to FBI documents, al-Busayyan is currently a "Class II federal industry employee/agent." He claimed not to know the hijackers.

[REDACTED]

112

hot again. In the FBI's Washington Field Office, he achieved his wish being accepted. The survivor was hospitalized when a bicyclist he had passed out of (bicycled) a vehicle requiring medical treatment. He was released from the hospital ten days later and managed to depart the United States, en route to an uncertain future to locate a radical Islamic group.

Daesh al-Islam is the name of Islam Omar al-Bayyouni. Said al-Bayyouni is connected to the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) and is the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Daesh al-Islam is a major contributor to the IANA, a non-profit organization based in Michigan that is dedicated to the spread of Islam worldwide. According to the FBI, the IANA's mission is to rally to spread Islamic fundamentalism and Sharia law to throughout the United States and the world at large. The IANA collects funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors, extremist Islamic clerics, and sympathetic governmental organizations. According to FBI documents, IANA has collected money from Saudi Arabia, but the documents are unclear as to whether Saudi actually contributes money to the organization.

FBI documents also indicate that several Saudi Naval officers were in contact with the September 11 hijackers. FBI documents state that the San Diego Field Office opened a counterterrorism investigation on an individual named Osama Nash, a Saudi Naval officer, due to his association with Nawaf al-Qazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. In addition, Lead Agent Jennifer Saudi (Naval officer), was in telephonic contact with flight 77 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Qazmi on nine occasions from March 11, 2000 to March 27, 2000.

The Jacksonville FBI Field Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether lead Agent Jennifer Saudi (Naval officer) within the territory was in contact with any of the hijackers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

101

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The FBI has also discovered some more minor connections between Saudi Government personnel and the hijackers during the course of the 9/11 TIGER investigation. For example, according to the FBI, an individual named Fahd Abdallah Jacob Bahri was close friends with September 11 hijackers Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Shawal al-Qazazi. Bahri previously "worked as a pilot for the Saudi royal family, flying Osama Bin Laden between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia during QBL's exile." In addition, an FBI source stated after September 11 that he/she was 30% sure that Abdallah was a visitor at an apartment in McLean, Virginia that was occupied in July and August 2001 by Ahmad Al-Kahtani of the Saudi Embassy Military Division. FBI documents also note that September 11 hijacker Naeem Alghamdi may have also visited the address.

**Connections Between Saudi Government Officials in the United States and Other Possible Terrorist Operatives**

The 9/11 Inquiry also reviewed information in FBI files, suggesting other possible connections between Saudi Government officials and terrorist operatives.

For example, according to FBI documents, there is evidence that hijackers Marwan al-Baluchi and Mohammed Atta were in contact with Mohammad Rafiq Qasim Hattab, the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation since 1999 and a close associate of Abdallah Bin Laden, who is referred to in FBI documents as Osama Bin Laden's half brother. Abdallah Bin Laden, who is the subject of several FBI investigations, is currently in the United States. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He claims to work for the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC as an administrative officer. Abdallah Bin Laden has retained Qasim's company and it listed by Qasim as the emergency contact for Qasim's children. They are in frequent email and phone contact as well.

[REDACTED] 827

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

According to the FBI, Abdellah bin Laden has a number of connections to terrorist organizations. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Association (WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America. Both organizations are local branches of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WAMY is "closely associated with the funding and financing of international terrorist entities and in the past has provided logistical support to individuals seeking to fight in the Afghan War." In 1998, the CIA published a paper characterizing WAMY as a NGO that provides funding, logistical support and training with possible connections to the Al Qaeda network, Hizbullah, Afghan extremists, and Taliban militants.<sup>2</sup>

Another of potential interest, at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident involving Mohammed al-Qudsi and Samir al-Shihabi. Al-Qudsi and al-Shihabi were flying from Phoenix to Washington, DC to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After they landed the plane in Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questions about the flight (as the flight attendants found suspicious). When the plane was in flight, al-Qudsi was seen where the bathroom when one of the flight attendants pointed him to the front of the plane. Nevertheless, al-Qudsi went to the front of the plane and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit. The plane made an emergency landing and the FBI investigated the incident, but decided not to pursue a prosecution. At the time, al-Qudsi and al-Shihabi claimed that the Saudi Embassy paid for their airplane tickets.

After the FBI discovered that an individual in Phoenix who was the subject of a counterterrorism investigation was driving al-Shihabi's car, the Bureau opened a counterterrorism investigation on al-Shihabi. In November 2000, the FBI received reporting from [REDACTED] that al-Shihabi had traveled to the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had received explosives training to perform "Khalib Bomber"-type attacks. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Office attached even greater analytic significance to this 1999 incident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this: "Phoenix FBI now

<sup>2</sup> According to the FBI's December 18, 2001 response, "among several officials in WAMY supporters of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the intelligence is insufficient to show whether the organization is a whole and its senior leadership support terrorism."

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

believe both men were specifically managing to set the society procedures of Amman West Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of UBL/AQ Qaeda operations."

In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the agent who drafted the "Phoenix 8C" stated:

In a post 9/11 world, I went back and looked at that as possibly being some sort of dry run, it is currently under investigation.

After September 11, 2001, al-Qa'ida was:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

In interviews, a Phoenix FBI agent stated that Parsons [REDACTED] believed that al-Qa'ida might be [REDACTED]. His profile is similar to that of al-Sayyidah and Basimah. He is in the United States as a student and does not have a visible means of income. He is in frequent contact with Saudi Government establishments in the United States and appears to be very involved in the affairs of the local Saudi community. [REDACTED] is a "Kuwait Club" in Phoenix, and visits Saudi students in the area. The FBI has also developed information that al-Qa'ida was entering money from the Saudi Government into [REDACTED]. In August 2002, [REDACTED] obtained the relevant bank records for review. The FBI's Phoenix Field Office has speculated that al-Qa'ida and others may be [REDACTED]

This committee believes in FBI [REDACTED] that elements of the Saudi Government may have provided support to terrorist networks. For example, the FBI has identified the Ibn Taimiyah Mosque in Culver City as a site of terrorist-related activity both before and after September 11. Several subjects of San Diego investigation prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque. Based on interviews and review of FBI files, San Diego FBI agents believed at the time that these subjects were laundering money through this mosque from to Somewhat non-profit organizations and then, in other cases, affiliated with Osama bin Laden.

[REDACTED] 454 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET

In approximately 1998, the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Barakaa Trading Company and other businesses affiliated with Usama Bin Laden. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating from the local Somali community in the form of donations to various Somali non-profits. However, the FBI now believes that some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego were involved in laundering the money.

According to the former FBI agent in San Diego who was involved in this investigation, this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide al-Qa'ida with funding through covert or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the former agent commented on the possible money laundering:

My guess Saudi-it's connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably 70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usama Bin Laden, it might be an indication.

There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through charitable organizations. The Saudi-based Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is an Islamic non-governmental organization linked to terrorist support activities. According to a May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ's activities in support of terrorism include: suspicious money transfers, document forgery, providing jobs to wanted terrorist suspects, and financing travel for youths to attend jihad training. The Defense communication notes that since September 2001, UQ tourists have transported over \$330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East. In January 2002, UQ administrator Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately \$200,000 from the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the personal assistant to the UQ administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He returned with tens of thousands of dollars, according to the Department of Defense.

CIA, Treasury, and FBI officials have all expressed their concern about the al-Haramain Foundation's ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the FBI's

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435

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

November 18, 2002 response, the Al-Bayan Foundation (PSC) has close ties to the Saudi Government, and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda. In 1993, HIF established its U.S. based office in Ashland, Oregon, and that office has since received approximately \$700,000 from the parent offices in Saudi Arabia. The FBI has ongoing investigations of HIF and the activities of the Portland HIF Office. As discussed above, the FBI has had correspondence between al-Hayyat and the UN. From the documents, it is clear that FBI was involved in apprising the UN of the message to Captain Callahan, their statement managed.

The Treasury General Counsel drafted a memo to his agency's Director about the Foundation:

MR. AUBREY: Sir, Second, and this is important point, it also does not fit into [REDACTED]'s testimony, on al-Hayyat, the two branch offices that we had a public and joint action against, al-Hayyat really does represent a significant threat to the U.S. and its interests, financing and for the United States policy. It is, of course, the major, I think the largest Islamic charity in the world. It came in synonymous with charity in the Islamic world. Its direct members are members of the Royal Family. Significant, however, are members of the Royal Family. We don't have a great deal of intelligence on the [REDACTED] members, so that whether they are knowingly assisting people in al-Qaeda and others, but in significant between [REDACTED] yet to be designated and under current investigation, we have ample evidence that [REDACTED] charities are being converted to these branch offices, that large [REDACTED] members of society are being sent to these offices, that a great deal of the money [REDACTED] distributed through misappropriation, misappropriated for, and finally, that there will be significant contacts with extremists, [REDACTED] extremists.

CIA officials recently testified that they are making progress on their investigations of al-Qaeda:

As [REDACTED] ago we had a lot of reporting regarding branch offices which tied in to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Over the last [REDACTED] we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement information and we prepared a paper about a month, six weeks ago which [REDACTED] all of that. That paper gave us the first clear indication that the head of the central office is complicit in supporting terrorism, and it also raised questions about Prince Nayef.

Finally, [REDACTED], the subject of Phoenix and Portland FBI counterterrorism investigations, also has close ties to a member of the Saudi royal family. [REDACTED] no longer resides in the United States, but is still the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI agreed on

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

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investigation of [REDACTED] a citizen of Saudi Arabia, in 1990 after receiving information [REDACTED] that Bin Laden believed Abu Zubaida had been in contact with a telephone number associated with [REDACTED] in Pakistan. In May 2001, two individuals were arrested in Pakistan and both claimed they were en route to blow up U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia. One of them had a passport that had been issued to one of [REDACTED]. The FBI's Special Field Agent who received source reporting in 1999 that [REDACTED] was traveling regularly at the Southwest border and discussing the possibility of furnishing officials with the United States.

The FBI has developed information that [REDACTED] has since left with one of the Saudi princes and accompanies him on many trips, including travel to the United States. According to the FBI, [REDACTED] subsequently immigrated to the domestic facility in Quantico, Virginia, in May. He informed the FBI that [REDACTED] got the job at Saudi Arabian Airlines through his contacts. He said that [REDACTED] did not earn much money in this job, but that he "had another source of income through a Saudi prince" named Khalid al-Saud. According to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] performed miscellaneous tasks for the Prince, such as handling real estate matters and visiting the Prince's greenhouses. [REDACTED] visited many places with the Prince, including Europe, and often to the United Arab Emirates. [REDACTED] stated the cryptic comment that nobody "knew everything about [REDACTED]." Although his name was on the State Department's visa under [REDACTED] as an employee, [REDACTED] did not know about the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service because he was traveling with the Saudi prince. The FBI only learned of the top after the fact. Agents in the FBI's Portland Field Office expressed their concern that [REDACTED] and others were using their status as Saudi Arabian airline employees as a cover up enable them in their plot to go to [REDACTED] out of the United States.

#### Lack of Saudi Cooperation in Counterterrorism Investigations

In testimony and interviews, a majority of FBI agents and CIA officers complained to the *News* inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations, both before and after the September 11 attacks. But castigating a recent New York FBI agent about this, from his

point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obstructionist for years. In this agent's opinion, the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest.

When a high-level [redacted] officer was asked how the September 11 attacks might have been prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, pointing to an example from the summer of 2001, when the U.S. Government requested Saudi assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the U.S. Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa'ida operation. The U.S. Government pressured the Saudi Government to locate him. The Saudis informed the U.S. Government that they required additional information to do so. The U.S. Government agency that had originally learned of this individual's knowledge refused to provide the Saudis with additional information because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to pressure the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without the additional information.

According to some FBI personnel, this type of response is typical from the Saudis. For example, one FBI agent described one investigation after September 11 in which he provided the Saudi Government with copies of the subjects' Saudi passports. The Saudi Government maintained that they had no record of the subjects.

According to the former Chief of Alec Station, the unit in the DCT's Counterterrorist Center established in 1996 to focus specifically on Usama Bin Laden, it was clear from about 1996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating to Usama Bin Laden. There is a May 1996 memo from the DCI's Counterterrorist Center [redacted] [redacted] stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on Bin Laden because Bin Laden had "too much information about official Saudi dealings with Islamic extremists in the 1980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands." In a June 1997 memo to the DCI, Alec Station reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Laden. The former Chief of Alec Station thought that the U.S. Government's hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the U.S. Government on this matter was contrary to Saudi national interests.

433

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] testified on this issue on October 9, 2002:

On the issue of al-Qa'ida and Saudi intelligence, that goes back to our efforts to interact with the Saudis to get them to help us on investigating al-Qa'ida...for the most part it was a very troubled relationship where the Saudis were not providing us quickly or very vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't. It was just very slow in coming.

Both FBI and CIA personnel cited an individual named Midani al-Tayyib as a specific case in which the Saudis were uncooperative. The CIA and the FBI had been pressuring the Saudis for years for permission to talk to al-Tayyib. According to the former head of ALEC Station, al-Tayyib managed all of Bin Laden's finances when Bin Laden was in Sudan, and any expense over \$1,000 had to be approved by al-Tayyib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in 1996 to work with Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al-Qa'ida figure who has since been arrested. In the summer of 1996, al-Tayyib returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the FBI's and the CIA's requests to talk to al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent, that al-Tayyib was "just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything."

The former chief of Alec Station also cited the example of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Khalifa is Bin Laden's brother-in-law and an important figure in al-Qa'ida. The U.S. Government arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994. Khalifa had been sentenced to death *in absentia* by the Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the U.S. agreed to extradite him to Jordan. The Jordanians then returned him to Saudi Arabia. In the opinion of the CIA officer, the Saudis "bought off" the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa. According to the CIA officer, when Khalifa subsequently arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by at least one important government official. Khalifa now works for a Riyadh-based NGO and travels and operates freely.

The General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department testified at the July 23, 2002 hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.:

[REDACTED]

439

[REDACTED]

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ANSWER: 8113333333333333

There is an almost infinite room, however, such things are not being contemplated. So I want to fully discuss you about, you we have to ask and we have to stick and we have to stick. I will give you one and a half example. The fact is, after some period, the Saudis been agreed by the designation of a man named Jaberly, who is immediately involved in all of 2000, and for many years will be public with the next 10 days. They came forward in 2 weeks ago and said, okay, we think we should go forward with this designation and a freezing order's against Mr. Jaberly. We asked, what do you have in mind? Because they certainly knew what we have on him, because we listed it as we tried to convince them that they ought to join us. The answer back was, nothing new.

MR. HERZLICH: Do you believe that?

MR. ALTHAUSER: No, I think that's a certainty, so there is another reason we are not doing this.

*Outline of the U.S. Intelligence Community's Investigations into Cooperations Between Terrorism and Saudi Government Officials*

Both the FBI and the CIA have informed the Committee that they are treating the [REDACTED] issue seriously. According to the November 18, 1988 FBI response, the FBI and CIA have established a working group to look into the [REDACTED] issue. The FBI formed a [REDACTED] at the Washington Field Office; [REDACTED] to investigate this issue and [REDACTED]

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Appellate Exhibit 827 (AAA WBA)  
Page 208 of 213

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However, both the FBI and the CIA still have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrorist elements. In the October 3, 2002 closed hearing, Director Mueller stated:

I have one preliminary note of caution, as that at this point there are more questions than answers, and I would caution against jumping to conclusions before we know a bit more.

A document located by the Joint Inquiry Staff confirms that the FBI's Washington Field Office is still in the early stages of focusing on their investigation. In an August 15, 2002, communication, a lead office agent stated that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] 16  
that same document, the Washington Field Office asked [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

..... acknowledged and is his  
legatee, every thing in ..... understanding of his descent limited as well.

With regard to the specific question of have we seen the Saudi intelligence services supporting terror groups, I think the record is not clear at all on that.

Both the FBI and CIA recognized the possibility that individuals connected to the Senate Government may be providing support to terrorism.

www.9111.org

So there is certainly a good, good chance that there are sympathizers or even sympathetic supporters of the right within the security services.

### ANSWER KEY

Abu Zubayr said he's confident that al-Qaeda may have contacts in Saudi in the United States and that al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden are particularly—they

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Levin suggested energy in pursuing what Abu Zubaydah called good relationship with Saudis of all levels... He said he Lebin is very pleased when Saudis in the military, those successful in business and those close to the royal family to lead across security in his case. He said his Lebin actively work on good relationships.

Other DNA and SBR officials believed that it would be inappropriate to make the *Cracker* a national investigation.

What we find troubling about the cases that we learned about from FBI, both the two agents that were some of the cases that the Washington Field Office has looked at, is what you're seeing Saudi money going to people, is that a fit sort of a pattern that we've seen in terms of clandestine services here. In Saudi, the Saudi Government's longstanding support is very fundamental. Whether that Saudi money's end movement around the world, which is a fact, you see the money is going to fundamentalists, and you would be very surprised if some of it doesn't bleed over into terrorist support. So we had a lot of suspicion before September 11 which we documented in a number of different papers, and again it's a lot of minute and the issues that come up are who knows about the payments, on whose behalf are the payments being made, are they being made on behalf of the normal government or are they being made by a local official or a terrorist. Do the people who are making the payments know what's happening to the money? If they do know what's happening, why are they making the payment? Is it a form of blackmail? Do they negotiate the terrorist support? These are the sort of issues that we're dealing with ourselves as well as are they doing the due diligence that they ought to

1982-1983 Annual Meeting Program Committee

To close I must sit here and tell you that those ticks go back, too! We can prove that the female royal flycatcher is spending time in the north's mountains, for her young are emigrating, so we're now in a position to try to determine what other information is available.

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Michael Collins, the former head of the International Terrorism Operations Section at Scotland Yard

The answer to your Question is pre-9/11, there were not any significant preliminary inquiries or fact investigations, with relatively few exceptions, conducted by the FBI looking at ~~classified~~ ~~information~~ or ~~intelligence~~ or ~~suspicion~~... I.e., not going in stand here, Ms. High, and fish you in any way, shape or form.

The former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego confirmed this in his testimony.

Business [redacted] They were not a country recognized by the State Department as a state - purpose of terrorism and the cause of the September 11th attacks, so we knew that this regime was dead if there were no [redacted] these, their primary objective was to increase discontent in the region by pressuring the royal family. So they were not served as an infinitive used to continue writing.

In the October 9, 2007 closed hearing, Lieutenant Miller acknowledged that he became aware of some of the facts regarding the Saucy inaccuracy as a result of the investigating work of the *Los Angeles Times*.

I'm asking the importance of events later. I think the staff justified and, as a result of the probing, some faces came to light here and to me. Surely, the man had not come to light before, and perhaps would not have come to light had the staff not probed. That's when I'm telling you. So I'm agreeing with you that the staff probing brought to light the man who may not have come to light. Consequently?

Conner Decker: But what you're also saying, though, is that this probing this, "Several days to even weeks."

SARAH STODDARD 703

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Attachment O

[REDACTED]

Obtained by Judicial Watch via FOIA (December 31, 2013)

~~SECRET~~

To: Los Angeles Bureau Washington Field  
(U) Re: [REDACTED] 10/23/2001

### Subscriber Results

(b) Writer has submitted subscriber requests to the Legal Unit for all telephone numbers involved in call activity with target telephone [REDACTED]. As results are received, writer is attempting to search the names of subscribers through FBI databases.

Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED] This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED] On 9/26/01, telephone [REDACTED] was called once by [REDACTED] A [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] revealed the following identifiers: SOC [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] revealed one reference to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may not be disseminated without the prior approval of the originating agency. [REDACTED] revealed one reference to [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] (S)

13. Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED]  
"this telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED]"  
[REDACTED] During the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] results contained the  
[REDACTED] identifiers for [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] searches on [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(b) Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED] This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED] Telephone [REDACTED] Name [REDACTED] b3 b6 b7C  
searches on [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] b7C

(U) (S) Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Telephone [REDACTED]

Telephone [redacted] was also involved in call activity with [redacted] and telephone [redacted] subscribed to San Diego PENTTBOM subject, OMAR AL-BAYOUNI. AL-BAYOUNI cosigned the lease of an apartment rented by NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIRDHAR. Telephone [redacted] was involved in [redacted] An [redacted] UNI search revealed a reference to [redacted] in 265A-NY-280350-302- [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed by the FBI regarding his business associations with OMAR AL-BAYOUNI. [redacted] provided the FBI with documents including a resume for AL-BAYOUNI listing [redacted] as a reference. On 9/22/01, Los Angeles set a lead to San Diego to interview [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

AMIAKI-2329