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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

7/4/2001); NAWAF ALHAMZI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 07/10/2001); MAJED MOQED (AA Flt. #77) (date unknown); and AHMAD ALHAZNAWI (UA Flt. #93) (date unknown). USAID card applications and color photocopies of the identifications are being disseminated to appropriate offices. Investigation being coordinated with FBI MM, FBI NK, and FBI WFO. Results will be forwarded to SIOC and all appropriate offices.

(LES/OC) Previous FBI MM investigation determined that, on 5/2/2001, MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) and ZIAD SAMIR JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) obtained Florida drivers licenses at the same south Florida location. DMV queries revealed that five Arab individuals, including MUHAMMAD MUBEEN, also obtained Florida drivers licenses on that date. FBI MM located and interviewed MUBEEN. MUBEEN identified a photograph of JIMLY ULCENA (DOB [REDACTED]1962) as the individual who assisted MUBEEN in obtaining his driver's license. MUBEEN was polygraphed on 9/18/2001 and determined to be inconclusive. He will be re-polygraphed on 9/21/2001. ULCENA has been identified through INS records as a naturalized United States Citizen who was born in Haiti. Efforts by FBI MM are underway to fully identify ULCENA and to determine his role, if any, in assisting ATTA, JARRAH, and others in obtaining fraudulent Florida driver's licenses. Results of investigation will be forwarded to SIOC and appropriate offices. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) On 08/27/2001, six purported Pakistani nationals arrived in Miami from La Paz, Bolivia. The individuals were allegedly part of a conspiracy to destroy aircraft involved in civil aviation, based upon information provided within the intelligence community. This intelligence information was uncorroborated not only by the review of audio tapes by FBI Language Specialists, but also by a negative physical search from the hotel rooms of the individuals in La Paz, Bolivia. On 09/20/2001, three of the six individuals were polygraphed. Two subjects passed the polygraph, and one was found to be inconclusive. One requested an attorney and will not be polygraphed. The remaining two polygraphs are being conducted on 09/21/2001. Investigative results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate offices.

(LES/OC) An individual in [REDACTED] identified as [REDACTED] reported that, while at a mosque in [REDACTED] in approximately August 2001, he prayed with a Pakistani lawyer/grocery store manager from Newark, NJ. This individual inquired about the willingness of [REDACTED] to

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

engage in Jihad. FBI MM has obtained authorization to reopen [REDACTED] and is coordinating with FBI NK to conduct consensually monitored calls between [REDACTED] and the Pakistani national. Results will be forwarded to SIOC and appropriate field offices.

Newark*Investigative Efforts:*

(S//OC) FBI NK investigation determined that MAAGDY M. BESHARA is an associate of MARWAN ALSHEHHI (UA Flt. #175). Reportedly, BESHARA owns a gas station at which ALSHEHHI would "hang out." EMIL F. BESHAY has been identified as an associate of BESHARA. Further investigation confirmed a relationship between ALSHEHHI and BESHAY. Based on these associations and relationships, FBI NK intends to obtain a search warrant for BESHARA's residence. BESHAY is currently under arrest on a Material Witness warrant based on his link to ALSHEHHI. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

(S//OC) FBI NK initiated a pen register on the telephone of TARIQ JAWHAR predicated on the possibility that JAWHAR may be the UNSUB in a photograph that FBI WFO secured from an abandoned rental vehicle at Dulles Airport linked to AA Flight #77. A consensual search of the digital information on a university computer used by JAWHAR continues. Investigation determined that both of JAWHAR's email addresses both contained a reference to number "93."

Philadelphia*Investigative Efforts:*

(S//OC) FBI PH developed information that HALEM HASSNIN and MOHAMUD ELNEKHILY are associated with an address in Jersey City, NJ, that has been used by MOHAMMAD ASLAM PERVEZ (under detention on Material Witness warrant), MOHAMMAD AZMATH (under detention on Material Witness warrant), and ALI KHAN AYUB (under detention on Material Witness warrant). AZMATH and AYUB are associates of NABIL ALMARABH (#27 on Security Directives List). HASSNIN and ELNEKHILY are students at a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Truck Driver School in Allentown, PA. FBI PH is currently conducting surveillance on HASSNIN and ELNEKHILY. ALMARABH has a Michigan issued HAZMAT trucker driver's license.

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

It is anticipated that a Material Witness warrant will be issued for HASSNIN and ELNIKHILY on 9/22/2001.

Pittsburgh

Recovery / Evidence Collection:

~~(S//OC)~~ FBI Pittsburgh (FBI PG) Evidence Response Team (ERT) activity at the Somerset crash site may be completed sometime on 9/22/2001 or 9/23/2001. The raking and sifting of the dirt has resulted in the recovery of a great deal of human remains. On 9/22/2001, it is anticipated that the pumping of the two acre pond near the crash site will be completed. After the pumping of the pond, FBI PG ERT will man two boats to visually look for items of potential evidentiary value in the pond. Once this is completed, FBI PG ERT and other law enforcement personnel will conduct a final "walk through" the woods in the vicinity of the crash site in an effort to locate items of value that may have been missed. This "walk through" may take place as early as 9/23/2001 or 9/24/2001. Investigation continuing.

~~(S//OC)~~ As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the morgue is in possession of approximately 454 pounds of human remains, which are comprised of 914 separate items. The morgue has dental records for 37 individuals. Efforts are underway to identify the remains.

~~(S//OC)~~ Six specimens of human remains will be flown to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology at Dover Air Force Base to verify or rule out possible knife wounds. To date, all such submissions have been negative.

~~(S//OC)~~ Human remains not of evidentiary value and which are not being sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) at Dover Air Force Base, will be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Human remains sent to AFIP and returned thereafter will also be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Personal effects not of evidentiary value will be turned over to United Air Lines (UAL) for subsequent return to families of passengers and crew.

~~(S//OC)~~ All ante-mortem interview of family members have been completed, except for the four hijackers.

San Antonio

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Re: (b) [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

Investigative Efforts:

(S//OC) FBI SA continues to conduct investigation into ALBADER ALHAZMI, who has been detained by INS in Fort Worth, TX, and who may be related to NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77).

- * Investigation determined that ALBADER ALHAZMI utilized the Internet account of TARIQ M. ALOTAIBI, whom FBI DL believes to be NAWAF ALHAZMI.
- * A cellular phone utilized by ALBADER ALHAZMI (AT&T Wireless #A4324112258601). FBI DL is subpoenaing toll records for this phone. Results will be provided to SIOC and other field offices upon receipt and analysis.
- * FBI SA continues to document ALBADER ALHAZMI's activities through research and analysis of financial, email, travel, telephone, etc. and his associates. A review of toll records for both hard line and cell phone indicate telephonic contact with a known Hamas fund raiser.
- * Investigation continuing regarding items from search of residence and vehicle.
- * FBI SA investigating an unconfirmed report that ALBADER ALHAZMI's children did not report for school on 9/11/2001.
- * This search disclosed two passports, neither of which were damaged. (Previous investigation indicated that ALBADER ALHAZMI reported to ARAMCO that his passport had been damaged and ARAMCO arranged for a new one to issued to him.)

(S//OC) FBI DL identified SAMI AL-MAJEH as an associate of ALBADER ALHAZMI. In 6/1997 or 7/1997, ALBADER received a \$10,000 wire transfer from ALMAJEH, who opened an account but closed it in November 1997. ALBADER ALHAZMI made a trip to Boston in August of 2001 and made two telephone calls to SAMI AL-MAJEH in Boston. FBI DL is working to fully identify SAMI AL-MAJEH.

San Diego*Investigative Efforts:*~~SECRET//SI~~

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, British authorities arrested OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, who is linked to KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AA Flt. #77) via lease agreement. AL-BAYOUMI is a close associate of RADWAN LACHHAB. A computer was seized from AL-BAYOUMI at the time of his arrest. LACHHAB received an email response from AL-BAYOUMI which contained an address for AL-BAYOUMI in Birmingham, United Kingdom. FBI San Diego (SD) is preparing a Material Witness Warrant and is investigating financial transactions to support a criminal complaint for extradition. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) As previously reported, OSAMA AWADALLAH's telephone number was found in NAWAF ALHAZMI's (AA Flt. #77) car, which was left at Washington-Dulles Airport. AWADALLAH has admitted to being the roommate of OMAR BAKARBASHAT and that he knew ALHAZMI. On 09/21/2001, AWADALLAH failed a polygraph. AWADALLAH was found deceptive on two key questions: "Did you know beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" and, "Did you participate in any way in any of those attacks on U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" AWADALLAH was subsequently arrested on a Material Witness warrant. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) During interview, AWADALLAH (supra) stated that NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) lived with YAZID SALMI. SALMI was interviewed on 9/20/2001 and 9/21/2001. On 9/22/2001, he will be polygraphed and his car searched pursuant to consent being granted. SALMI was reportedly one of ALHAZMI's closest friends in San Diego. Interview, polygraph, and search results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) FBI SD investigation identified OSAMA BASSNAN as an associate OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI (supra) and voiced his support of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. A source met with BASSNAN for three hours during the evening on 9/21/2001. During the meeting, BASSNAN indicated he knew AL-BAYOUMI very well and also knew NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) when they lived in San Diego. BASSNAN told the source that he knew of terrorist attack in advance, but source says that BASSNAN implied he had inside information. A FISA application is being sought by FBI SD. Investigation continuing.

San Francisco

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~~(S//OC)~~ On 5/21/2001, INS Officials arrested NASA J. GHOLAMALI ROSHANDELL (aka WAHID ALSHEHRY), upon his arrival in San Francisco. At the time of his arrest, ROSHANDELL requested political asylum. ROSHANDELL has been in the custody of the INS since 05/21/2001. On 5/24/2001 and 9/20/2001, FBI SF interviewed ROSHANDELL. ROSHANDELL arrived in the US during the same time frame as many of the hijackers. When ROSHANDELL boarded a plane bound for San Francisco, he identified himself as WAHID ALSHEHRY. A review of the manifest revealed that there was a WAHID ALSHEHRY on the flight, but no one on the flight who used the name ROSHANDELL. ROSHANDELL is a military pilot, trained in Iran and the U.S. San Francisco, in conjunction with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (USAO SDNY), is seeking a Material Witness Warrant for ROSHANDELL. Investigation continuing.

~~(S//OC)~~ On 9/21/2001, FBI SF received information from FBI DL regarding ALI M. ATABAKI (2125 Canyon Oak Lane, Danville, CA). Investigation determined that ATABAKI applied \$200 of time towards a prepaid calling card on 9/9/2001 to a calling card that was subsequently used by WALEED SHEHRI (AA Flt. #11). FBI SF has begun preliminary surveillance of ATABAKI, as well as initiating extensive background and database checks on ATABAKI and any associates identified within the San Francisco Bay Area. Investigation on-going.

~~(S//OC)~~ FBI SF has been contacted by three local financial institutions with information that account holders at their businesses may be the same as individuals on the Security Directives Watch List. The Bank of the West advised that they have three accounts matching names on the Watch List furnished to them on 9/17/2001. FBI SF has requested a FGJ subpoena to obtain account holder profiles and account information. World Savings Bank noted one account in the name of MOHAMMED H. ACTA, which was opened in their Mission Viejo, CA, branch. This is believed to be a different name, and identifying information, than that on the Watch List (MOHAMAD G. ATTA). However, FBI SF investigation continues to fully identify MOHAMMED H. ACTA. Charles Schwab reported that a WILLIAM H. FISHBACH from Florida had placed "Put Options" on airline stock, in an account he opened in July, 2001. Additional information is forthcoming and a subpoena will be issued. SIOC and appropriate offices will be advised of investigative results. Investigations continuing.

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Re: (S) [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

(LES/OC) FBI SF received information from the US Postal Service (USPS) that the Daly City Post Office (2650 Bayshore Blvd, Daly City, CA) has in its possession approximately 200 suspicious-looking letters. One letter is addressed to SAEED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #93), and a second addressed to ABDULLAH ALOMARI (possibly related to ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI - AA Flt. #11). Both letters are date-stamped 9/11/2001. FBI SF is assisting the USPS with the examination of these parcels. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate offices.

Washington Field*Recovery / Evidence Collection:*

(LES/OC) As of 12:21 pm on 9/22/2001, 1,475 body portions and 117 remains have been recovered at the Pentagon.

(LES/OC) FBI WFO has recovered the Virginia DMV identification of HANI HANJOUR from the Pentagon crime scene. Also recovered was a wallet from SALEM ALHAZMI. This wallet contained a couple of addresses, including one for BERNARD LNU (last name was illegible) with an address of ??? East Service Road, Wayne, New Jersey, phone number 973-256-7000. FBI WFO coordinating investigation with FBI NK and results will be provided to SIOC. Investigation continuing.

Investigative Efforts:

(LES/OC) FBI Washington Field Office (FBI WFO) reported on a situation involving a Saudi Arabian pilot aboard a United Airlines flight from Dulles to Heathrow. Prior to take-off, the flight crew became suspicious of one passenger. This passenger claimed to be a Saudi Arabian pilot, and asked to ride in the jump seat. The crew asked the FBI to interview him, and two other Middle Eastern travelers. These individuals were interviewed by the FBI, US Customs Service (USCS) and INS. They were cleared to fly, but the pilot refused to fly with them on board. No further investigation.

(LES/OC) VICTOR LOPEZ-FLORES was interviewed by FBI WFO concerning his assistance to AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) in obtaining a Virginia ID card. LOPEZ-FLORES described himself as a "Professional ID Provider." He identified three of the hijackers and is being detained by INS on immigration charges. According to LOPEZ-FLORES, HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77), NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and AHMED ALGHAMDI followed LOPEZ-FLORES

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Re: [REDACTED] 09/22/2001

and another ID broker to lawyer SAMIR BURGEN'S office. BURGEN'S secretary provided DMV forms presigned by BURGEN. Investigation continuing.

(LES/OC) FBI WFO investigation identified EYAD M. ALRABABAH and ABDEL RAHMAN OMAR FAWFIQ ALFAURU (DOB 2/11/1967) as possible associates of the hijackers. These identifications were made through FBI WFO's analysis of Virginia Driver's Licenses with addresses provided by VICTOR LOPEZ-FLORES (supra). ALRABABAH and ALFAURU are currently located in FBI NK's territory. FBI WFO is coordinating with FBI NK to arrest both subjects on INS charges. The association of ALRABABAH and ALFAURU has been further strengthened by ALFAURU's purchase of ALRABABAH's vehicle, and their arrival in the WFO area within the year 2000. Investigation continuing and being coordinated with FBI NK.

(LES/OC) A continuing review of Dulles security camera videos indicates that two of the hijackers may have visited Dulles on 9/10/2001. It appears that they passed through the security checkpoints and baggage claim areas. Review of security cameras on-going.

(LES/OC) American Airlines reports that only five victim families have not contacted AA concerning victims on Flight #77, and are those of the suspected hijackers. This lends credence to other information that there appears to be only five hijackers on Flight #77, and not six as previously considered.

(LES/OC) Investigation by FBI WFO of associates and employers of MOHAMED HASSAN ABDI have discerned no ties to any of the hijackers. No links have been developed from the address book of 75 phone numbers seized as part of a consensual search of his residence. However, he will be arrested on 9/23/2001 on forgery charges that were uncovered incidental to this investigation. This warrant is being pursued out of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (USAO EDVA).

(LES/OC) On 9/21/2001, FBI WFO arrested HERBERT VILLALOBOS (aka OSCAR ARMANDO DIAZ) on Title 18, Section 1028 (False Identity Documentation) on 9/21/01. A consensual search was conducted of his residence (5031 First Street, NW, Apt 302, Washington, D.C.) with negative results. VILLALOBOS was identified as assisting ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt. #11) obtain a VA Identification card. Investigation continuing.

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Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 9/22/2001

~~(S)~~ On 9/20/2001, SAIF SALEM SAIF SAGER ALMEHAIRBI (DOB 1/1/75), who is on the Security Directives Watch List, was contacted by FBI WFO and agreed to be interviewed. ALMEHAIRBI was subsequently arrested by the INS as a B-2 visa overstay. ALMEHAIRBI had reportedly been scheduled to return to Saudi Arabia by air on 09/20/01. Investigation continuing.

~~(S)~~ On 9/21/2001, the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center advised that they had received a threat of an impending release of anthrax on Washington D.C., on 9/22/2001. Although FBI WFO does not consider this a credible threat, appropriate notifications have been made.

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
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Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 09/22/2001



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~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~

~~(U)~~ Attachment M

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

June 23, 2005

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

See below

010913005

010914001

PENTTBOM

[REDACTED]

010914010

See below

010916016

- 010912005
- 010912013
- 010913004
- 010913007
- 010913012
- 010913013
- 010914004
- 010914005
- 010914008
- 010914011
- 010914021
- 010914022
- 010914023
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- Q2647 Vanceer mini-cassette recorder with tape (Your 1B4872, Item 1093(B), Barcode E02174129)
- Q2648 AVR mini cassette recorder with tape (Your 1B4872, Item 1093(C), Barcode E02174129)
- Q2649 Cannon camera with power supply (Your 1B4871, Item 1000B, Barcode E02174130)

The following specimens were submitted under cover of communication dated May 17, 2004 (040528017):

- Q2650 One bottle of cologne (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696618)
- Q2651 One box cutter (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696615)
- Q2652 One plastic box (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696617)
- Q2653 Latent Lift #1 from Driver's side door (inside) (Your 1B4965, Barcode E03695551)
- Q2654 Latent Lift #2 from seat belt buckle rear right passenger side (Your 1B4965, Barcode E03695551)
- Q2655 Latent Lift #3 from Right front Passenger Door (Your 1B4965, Barcode E03695551)
- Q2656 Student travel magazine with hair (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696616)
- Q2657 Notepad (Your 1B4963, Barcode E03696614)

The following specimens were submitted to the Laboratory under cover of communication dated September 17, 2004 (040916250):

- Q2658 One 4mm Sony tape (1B2739, Barcode E02173332)
- Q2659 One CD-ROM, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)
- Q2660 Eight CD-ROMs, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)
- Q2668-2673 Six CD-ROMs, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)
- Q2674-2676 Three CD-ROMs, regarding Bayoumi's computer (1B1299, Barcode E01929960)
- Q2677 One 80GB Maxtor HD, Model: 4W080H6, S/N: W605FT3C from Moussaoui (1B4121, Barcode E01903624)

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~~10014, 10016, 10020~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~

~~(U)~~ Attachment N

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~

DAC-00411-03

Congress of the United States
Washington, D.C.

January 29, 2003

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As you know, the final report of the Joint Inquiry into the events of September 11 has been submitted to the Intelligence Community for declassification review. We look forward to early release of the public report so that efforts at reforms can be accelerated.

Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan, bicameral investigation last year, we are committed to working in the current Congress to help secure implementation of its recommendations. In furtherance of that goal, we are writing to the President and heads of departments and agencies about portions of the Joint Inquiry's recommendations that may be of particular concern to them.

Our first recommendation calls for establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, who in addition to being the President's principal intelligence adviser "shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole." To help promote both strong leadership of the entire Intelligence Community and an effective CIA, the Joint Inquiry also recommended that Congress provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other agency. In considering this recommendation, the Congress will certainly, we believe, benefit from learning of your views about the strengthening of the role of head of the Intelligence Community.

A number of the recommendations that follow address proposed tasks of the Director of National Intelligence, but as that reform will require study and deliberation, for the immediate future those further recommendations are directed to the Director of Central Intelligence as the present statutory head of the Intelligence Community.

The Joint Inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the U.S. Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy. One of our recommendations calls on the National Security Council, in conjunction with key agency and department heads, to prepare such a strategy for the President's approval. The recommendation states that the strategy should be

The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29, 2003
Page 2

"government wide," apply both "home and abroad," and include "the growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies." The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and fully engage the intelligence as well as foreign policy, economic, military and law enforcement elements that are "critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism." The Director of Central Intelligence's full participation in this overall process will be essential, as will the DCI's development of the Intelligence Community component of the full strategy. The Joint Inquiry recommended that the Intelligence Community's component of the overall strategy include a number of important items, among them development of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks.

To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence estimates on terrorism, the Joint Inquiry has recommended establishment on the National Intelligence Council of the position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also assist the intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis.

Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the Administration to ensure development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center, as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend, as the recommendation states, on the center's "full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, including 'raw' supporting data as needed." Your action to ensure full cooperation between the entire Intelligence Community (including, of course, the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security will be fundamental to the success of this vital reform. We applaud the President's announcement of the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which we understand will be located under the Director of Central Intelligence. The important challenge, we believe, is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion requirement of the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced.

The recommendations include a list of significant reforms that the Intelligence Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBI's domestic intelligence capability. In regard to these critically needed reforms, the Joint Inquiry has recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the Intelligence Community, together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should report to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include "the specific manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United

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January 28, 2003
Page 3

States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil liberties."

The Committees expressed their strong conviction that "the Intelligence Community's employees remain its greatest resource." They recommend that the head of the Intelligence Community "should require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts." Several particular actions are set forth in the recommendation. One is that Intelligence Community agencies should expand and improve counterterrorism training, including about information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence personnel, the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and watchlisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve Intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and experience of retired personnel. It calls on the Intelligence Community to "enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce."

A further personnel recommendation proposes, in part, that Congress enact legislation, modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to help instill the concept of "jointness" throughout the Intelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together than has been the case. The mechanisms identified in the recommendation include such things as joint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as incentives for joint service throughout the Intelligence Community. In developing these ideas, Congress would benefit from the Administration's detailed proposals.

The Joint Inquiry identified several important objectives concerning classified information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, by state and local authorities, and by the American public. To this end, we recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of key components of the Intelligence Community, including the Attorney General, should report to the Intelligence Committees on "proposals for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of sensitive and classified information." The report should also address "proposals to protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to protect agency self-interest."

The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and response to these and other matters identified in the course of the Joint Inquiry. Further, we are confident that the Congress will benefit from other recommendations

The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29, 2003
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that you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation's counterterrorist capabilities.


Sincerely,




Bob Graham
Chairman, Senate Intelligence
Committee, 107th Congress



Porter Goss
Chairman, House Intelligence
Committee, 107th and 108th
Congresses



Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence
Committee, 107th Congress



Nancy Pelosi
Ranking Minority Member, House
Intelligence Committee, 107th Congress
and Member ex officio (as Minority
Leader), 108th Congress

Enclosure: As stated

[REDACTED]

S. REP. NO. 107 107th Congress, 2d Session H. REP. NO. 107-

JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

REPORT
OF THE
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND
U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS

DECEMBER 2002

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAJBT FOUR--FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

30. Findings While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with and received support or assistance from individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least five of these individuals were alleged by some in the Saudi intelligence services. The Joint Inquiry's review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which has yet to be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The FBI and CIA have informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September 11 attacks, they are studying the Saudi issue seriously, but both will have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony, neither CIA nor FBI witnesses were able to identify definitively the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBI's Washington Field Office created a report dated in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Only recently, and at least in part due to the Joint Inquiry's focus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA establish a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Inquiry, this gap in U.S. intelligence coverage is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy of the potential risk to U.S. national security. The Intelligence Community needs to address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.

Discussion One reason for the limited understanding is that it was only after September 11 that the U.S. Government began aggressively investigating this issue. Prior to September 11, the FBI apparently did not have investigation resources on [REDACTED] Saudi citizens in the United States due to Saudi Arabia's not being an American "ally." A representative of the FBI [REDACTED] testified that, prior to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

September 11, 2001, the FBI received the following information from a member of the Intelligence Community that there was a [REDACTED] presence in the United States:

According to various FBI documents and at least one CIA memorandum, some of the September 11 hijackers, while in the United States, apparently had contacts with individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. While the Joint Inquiry reviewed this material during the course of its review of FBI and CIA documents, it did not attempt to investigate and assess the contacts and significance of the information independently, recognizing that such a task would be beyond the scope of the Joint Inquiry. As such, the Joint Inquiry preferred a detailed compilation of information uncovered by the inquiry in documents and interviews to the FBI and CIA, the further investigation by the Intelligence Community and, if appropriate, law enforcement agencies. A brief summary of the available information regarding some of these individuals is illustrative for purposes of this report:

- 8. **Osama al-Bayami.** The FBI has received numerous reports from individuals in the Houston community, dating back to 1999, alleging that al-Bayami may be a Saudi intelligence officer. FBI files suggest that al-Bayami provided substantial assistance to hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi after they arrived in San Diego in February 2000. Al-Bayami met the hijackers at a public place shortly after his meeting with an individual at the Saudi consulate that was reflections in the film that his encounter with the hijackers may well have been accidental. During this same timeframe, al-Bayami had extensive contact with Saudi Government organizations in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi Ministry of Defense. According to FBI files, [REDACTED] the company with which al-Bayami received a monthly salary even though he had been there for only a few weeks. This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived in San Diego, decreased slightly in December 2000 and stayed at that same level until August 2001. The company reportedly had ties to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. In addition, the FBI determined that al-Bayami was in contact with several individuals under FBI investigation and with the hijackers and Flight Attendant, which had been under investigation as a fundraising front for al-Qaida.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

* Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden may have been in contact with al-Milichar and al-Bayami during their time in San Diego. Bin Laden was a close associate of al-Bayami and Qasab al-Bayami, another one of the hijackers' close associates. He also lived on the street from the hijackers, and made a statement to an FBI agent that he did more than al-Bayami did for the hijackers. According to an FBI document, Bin Laden told another individual that he met al-Bayami through al-Bayami's wife and that he met her through al-Bayami. He also told the agent that al-Bayami was very close to Bin Laden's wife and that they were very close. The document goes on to state that Bin Laden and al-Bayami have been "close to each other for a long time." Bin Laden has many ties to the Saudi Government, including past employment by the Saudi Arabian Educational Mission, referred to as FBI Document # [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The FBI also received reports from individuals in the Muslim community alleging that Bin Laden might be a Saudi intelligence officer. According to a CIA memo, Bin Laden reportedly received funding and possibly a false passport from Saudi Government officials. He and his wife have received financial support from the Saudi Ambassador in the United States and his wife. A CIA report also indicates that Bin Laden traveled to Houston in 2002 and met with an individual who was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The report notes the funding that tip a member of the Saudi Royal Family provided Bin Laden with a significant amount of cash. FBI information indicates that Bin Laden is an extremist and supporter of Osama Bin Laden's wife, and has been connected to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Blind Sheikhs.

* Shaykh al-Thumari. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorandum, al-Bayami and al-Milichar may have been in contact with Shaykh al-Thumari, an established spiritual leader of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and one of the "sheikhs" of the King Fahad mosque in Culver City, California. Also according to FBI documents, the mosque was built in 1986 from funding provided by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah. The mosque is reportedly attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely recognized for its anti-Western views.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- 8) **Saleh al-Husayni:** In September 2001, Saleh al-Husayni, reportedly a Saudi Foreign Ministry official, stayed at the same hotel in Herndon, Virginia where al-Basri was staying. While al-Husayni claimed after September 11, 2001 to know the hijackers, FBI agents believed he was being deceptive. He was able to depart the United States despite FBI efforts to detain and re-interview him; and
- 9) **Abdullah Bin Laden:** Abdullah Bin Laden claims to work for the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. as an administrative official. He is identified by the FBI as Osama Bin Laden's half brother. He is a close friend of Mohammed Qasbi. He is said to be a possible associate of Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi prior to September 11, 2001.

The above inquiry and several other indications that individuals connected to the Saudi Government have ties to internet networks, including:

- 10) The CIA and FBI have identified the **Touqan Mosque** in Silver City as a site of al-Qaeda related activity. Several subjects of FBI investigations prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque and are alleged to have transferred money through the mosque to non-profit organizations overseas affiliated with Osama Bin Laden. In an interview, an FBI agent said he believed that Saudi Government money was being transferred through the mosque.
- 11) Another Saudi national with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family, [REDACTED], is the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations and reportedly was attending security of the United States' southern border in 1999 and discussing the possibility of infiltrating individuals into the United States.
- 12) According to FBI documents, some of the phone numbers found in the phone book of Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda operative captured in Pakistan in March 2002, could be linked, or more accurately, to telephone numbers in the United States. One of these U.S. numbers is attributed to be the **AL-SAGOL Corporation**, which is located in Aspen,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Colombia, and manages the affairs of the Colombian employees of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. The FBI noted that ASPCOB has an unlisted telephone number. A November 18, 2001 FBI response to the letter inquiry states that "CIA traces have revealed no direct links between numbers found in Zubaidi's phone book and numbers in the United States."

- According to an FBI document, the telephone number of a foreigner in the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. who came in contact with [REDACTED] was also found in Abu Zubaidi's phone book, and
- According to an FBI agent in Phoenix, the FBI suspects Mohammed al-Qudhaimi of being [REDACTED]. Al-Qudhaimi was involved in a 1999 incident aboard an Airbus West flight, which the FBI's Phoenix office suspects may have been a "dry run" to test airline security. During the flight, al-Qudhaimi and his associates asked the flight attendants a variety of suspicious questions; al-Qudhaimi then attempted to enter the cockpit on two occasions. Al-Qudhaimi and his associates were flying to Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy, and both claimed that their tickets were paid for by the Saudi Embassy. During the course of its investigations, the FBI has discovered that both al-Qudhaimi and the other individuals involved in this incident had statements in terrorism.

Finally, the Committee is particularly concerned about the terrorist nature of allegations mentioned in a CIA memorandum dated by the letter inquiry filed in the files of the FBI's San Diego Field Office. That memorandum, which discusses alleged contacts between the September 11 hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by a CIA officer [REDACTED] relying primarily on information from FBI files. The CIA officer sent it to the FBI to determine whether CIA had additional information. He also provided a copy to the FBI agents responsible for the investigation of one of the individuals discussed in the memorandum. Despite the clear indirect implications of the CIA memorandum, the FBI agents included the memorandum in an individual case file and did not forward it to FBI Headquarters. FBI Headquarters, therefore, was unaware

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of statements in the memorandum and the Joint Inquiry brought the memorandum's implications to the Bureau's attention [REDACTED]

Possible Saudi Government Connection to Terrorists and Terrorist Groups

While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were contacted with, and received support or a message from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information from FBI sources that at least two of these individuals were alleged to be Saudi intelligence officials. The Joint Inquiry's review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which remains speculative and yet to be independently verified, indicating that Saudi Government officials in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.

The Committees are particularly concerned about the serious nature of allegations contained in a CIA memorandum found within the files of the FBI's bin Laden Task Group. That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial transactions between the September 11 hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by a CIA officer [REDACTED], citing primarily to information from FBI files.

In their findings of fact for the Joint Inquiry, neither the CIA nor the FBI was able to definitively identify for these Committees the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is intentional or transient in nature. Both the FBI and CIA have informed the Committees that they are now aggressively pursuing Saudi-related terrorism issues.

Prior to September 11th, the FBI apparently did not focus investigations [REDACTED] Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi Arabia's status as an American "ally." [REDACTED] A representative of the FBI's [REDACTED] testified in related

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

hearings that, prior to September 11, the FBI received "no reporting from any member of the
Intelligence Community" that there is a [REDACTED] presence in the United States.

It should be clear that this joint inquiry has made no final determinations as to the
reliability or substance of the information regarding these issues that we discussed in FBI
and CIA documents. It was not the task of this joint inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive
investigation that would be required to establish the true significance of any such alleged
connections to the Saudi Government. On the one hand, it is possible, as some kinds of
connections would suggest, as indicated in a [REDACTED] dated July 2, 2002,
"inconceivable evidence that there is support for these activities within the Saudi
Government." On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations
could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.

Given the serious national security implications of this information, however, the
leadership of the joint inquiry is referring the FBI's compilation of relevant information to both
the FBI and the CIA for investigation review and appropriate investigation and intelligence
action.

Possible Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Saudi Government Officials
in the United States

In reviewing FBI documents and the CIA memorandum, the joint inquiry Staff has
examined information suggesting that

- One individual who provided assistance to Norad al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mohdawi may
be connected to the Saudi Government. A second individual who may have been in
contact with al-Hazmi and al-Mohdawi also has ties to the Saudi Government, including
connections to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. These are reporting in FBI files
that persons have alleged that both of these individuals may be Saudi intelligence
officers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- 8. The September 11 hijackers may have been in contact with other Saudi Government officials in the United States prior to the September 11 attacks; and
- 9. Saudi Government officials in the United States may have ties to Usama bin Laden's terrorist network.

Office of Beyrouni and Osama Bin Laden

Two individuals known to the FBI prior to September 11, 2001 - Osama al-Bayyumi and Osama Bin Laden - may have provided assistance or support to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar while the two hijackers were living in San Diego. While the bin Laden family spokesman has publicly provided assurances to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to testify, the bin Laden family has indicated that Osama Bin Laden had contacts with the two individuals.

When al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved to San Diego, al-Bayyumi provided them with considerable assistance. Before the hijackers moved in with the long-term FBI informant, they stayed at al-Bayyumi's apartment for several days until al-Bayyumi was able to find them an apartment. Al-Bayyumi is an assigned Saudi agent and may have paid their first month's rent and security deposit.⁵ After al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved into their new apartment, al-Bayyumi took a party in introducing them to the San Diego community. He also asked Madhur Abdulhak, another individual from the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), to help them get accustomed to the United States. Abdulhak acted as their translator, helped them get a driver's license, and assisted them in locating flight schools.

[REDACTED]

⁵The FBI notes that November 17, 2001 reports that "Bin Laden reside within 1000 yards of the crime scene" in the author's check list of Bin Laden's whereabouts in the same way, which suggests that the hijackers contacted him." FBI Newsletter 75 Response 3. However, another FBI document dated October 19, 2001, reports Bin Laden's flight instructor conclusion. The document states that "Bin Laden's flight instructor and Bin Laden's flight instructor indicate there is a high probability that Bin Laden's flight instructor is Bin Laden's flight instructor, which is Bin Laden's flight instructor." Al-Hazmi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During the post-September 11 investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi had far more extensive ties to the Saudi Government than previously revealed. In fact, according to an October 11, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayoumi has "extensive ties to the Saudi Government." The sensitive information identified by the FBI is:

- * Al-Bayoumi has been an inmate at the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration from 1975 to 1993, when he returned to the United States;
- * According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the head of the Saudi Ministry of Defense, responsible for air traffic control;
- * The FBI has also located records, indicating that al-Bayoumi received \$20,000 from the Saudi Ministry of Prisons at one point;
- * When al-Bayoumi applied to travel to the United States in 1993, he had a letter from the Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a job sponsorship from the Government of Saudi Arabia, and;
- * While in San Diego, al-Bayoumi was receiving money from the Saudi Ministry of Defense through a Saudi company called "Itina." [REDACTED] of that company informed the FBI after September 11, 2001 that, although al-Bayoumi only showed up at the company on one occasion, he received a weekly salary and allowance. [REDACTED] stated that, at first, he intended to refuse to pay al-Bayoumi a monthly salary, but he was told that his company would lose their contract if he did not pay him. [REDACTED] informed the FBI that at the time, he was aware of no Saudi corruption.

al-Bayoumi also had frequent contact with Saudi consular officials in the United States. In a review of telephone call records, the FBI learned that al-Bayoumi called Saudi Governmental headquarters in the United States about 100 times between January and July of 2002. According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in contact with at least three individuals at the Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Since September 11, 2001 FBI investigation revealed that al-Bayoumi had been the primary element, Pasquale L. DiStasio, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Countersmuggling testified in the October 2, 2003 hearing that:

[REDACTED] was talking with the [REDACTED] Government about utilization of an individual named [REDACTED] who has ties to al-Qaeda, who has ties to Bayoumi.

In addition, the FBI reported the results of their search of al-Bayoumi's [REDACTED] that, "After an exhaustive translation of Bayoumi's documents, it is noted that in Bayoumi's correspondence there is prevailing guidance to young Muslims and some other writings can be interpreted as jihadist."

According to information acquired by the FBI after September 11, 2001, al-Bayoumi stated he worked as one of his prior employers that he worked for a company called "Dallah/Avon." According to the FBI, Avon is a San Diego based company of Dallah/Avon. According to a separate [REDACTED] document, Dallah/Avon is under the name [REDACTED] company, also Dallah/Avon, which is a subsidiary of Al-Bayoumi Investment and Development Company. Avon Dallah reportedly holds the contracts for cleaning and maintenance at the [REDACTED] in Saudi Arabia. The [REDACTED] document states that [REDACTED] the company has [REDACTED] in United Arab Emirates. FBI Headquarters was informed of the affiliation between Dallah/Avon and Al-Bayoumi in February 2001, but the San Diego Field Office apparently never got this information.

According to FBI documents, al-Bayoumi's personal travel during the time that al-Bayoumi and al-Bayoumi were in the United States. According to a return [REDACTED] analysis of his between the terrorist attacks and elements of the World Trade Center, before al-Bayoumi and al-Bayoumi arrived in the U.S., al-Bayoumi generally traveled approximately 8000 per month in "yellow cases." According to the [REDACTED] document, in March 2000, a month after al-Bayoumi and al-Bayoumi arrived in San Diego, his "al-Bayoumi" joined to work [REDACTED] and Bayoumi operates until December 2001, when al-Bayoumi left San Diego. Al-Bayoumi's allowances were then decreased to approximately \$1,200 a month and stayed at that rate until al-Bayoumi left the United States in August 2001, approximately one month before the September 11 attacks.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The FBI is aware of contact between the hijackers and a close friend of Beaufort's, Khalid al-Rayedi, a commercial airplane pilot and certified flight instructor living in San Diego. Al-Rayedi submitted to the PAC on or in May 2000, an affidavit and a Miami contact him about learning to fly Boeing jet aircraft.

FBI documents speculate that Osama Bin Laden [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The FBI's November 18, 2000 response contends that this was an early investigative theory based on intel reporting which the FBI has not been able to corroborate. However, there is also additional information possibly tying Bin Laden [REDACTED] in 1992, while he was living in Washington, DC, Bin Laden listed his employment as the Saudi Arabian Education Mission. FBI documents state that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Bin Laden also has other ties to the Saudi Government. Bin Laden's wife received a monthly stipend from Princess Hafsa. In a recent search of Bin Laden's residence, the FBI located copies of 11 cashless checks totaling \$34,500, during the period February 22, 1999 to May 30, 2000. These checks were payable to Bin Laden's wife and were drawn on the Piggot Bank accounts of Princess Hafsa's wife. The FBI has determined that there has been a standing order on Princess Hafsa's account since January 1999 to send \$2000 a month to Bin Laden's wife. Bin Laden's wife was allegedly receiving the funding for "nursing services," but, according to the [REDACTED] document, there is no evidence that Bin Laden's wife provided nursing services. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

On a final but not certain, Bin Laden received a month stipend from Princess Hafsa's account. According to the FBI, on May 14, 1998, Bin Laden cashed a check from Hafsa in the amount of \$11,000. Bin Laden's wife also received at least one check directly from Hafsa. She also received one additional check from Hafsa's wife, which she cashed on January 5, 1998 for \$10,000.

[REDACTED] 437

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In the October 5, 2002 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director [REDACTED] advised the following:

I believe that we do have money going from Bandar's wife, \$2,000 a month up to about \$6,000. What the money was for is what we don't know.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] She gives money to a lot of different groups and people from around the world. We've been able to identify a number of them, but maybe if we can discover that she gives to 20 different radical groups, well, gee, maybe there's a pattern here.

The FBI has also developed additional information clearly identifying that Basman is an extremist and supporter of Osama bin Laden. In 1993, the FBI became aware that Basman had hosted a party for the King of Saudi Arabia at his home in Washington, DC in October 1992. Basman has made many derogatory remarks to FBI agents about Bin Laden, referring to Bin Laden as the official Khalifa and the ruler of the Islamic world. According to an FBI source, Basman speaks of Bin Laden "as if he were a god." Basman also stated to an FBI agent that he heard that the U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He commented such measures to be insufficient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy the United States and make it an Islamic state within ten to fifteen years. According to FBI documents, Basman also knew Bin Laden's family in Saudi Arabia and spent an his mobile telephone with members of the family who are living in the United States.

Phone Numbers Linking Abu Zubaydah to a Company in the United States and a Saudi Diplomat in Washington

On March 28, 2002 U.S. and coalition forces retrieved the telephone book of Abu Zubaydah, whom the U.S. Government has identified as a senior al-Qa'ida operational coordinator. According to an FBI document, "a review of call records has linked several of the numbers found in Zubaydah's phone book with U.S. phone numbers." One of the numbers is related and subscribed to by the ALPHACOR Corporation in Aspen, Colorado. On July 13, 2002,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Office requesting that it investigate this connection. On September 18, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded, stating that they had completed their initial investigation.

According to the FBI's Denver Office, ASPCOIL is the umbrella corporation that manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The facility is protected by Domestic Security. Agents of the Denver Field Office noted that neither ASPCOIL nor Domestic Security is listed in the phone book or is easily searchable. In addition, the Colorado Secretary of State's office has no record of ASPCOIL. The Denver office did not attempt to make any local inquiries about ASPCOIL, as they believed that any inquiries regarding ASPCOIL would be quickly resolved by Prince Bandar's employees. Due to the sensitivity of this matter, they decided to hold their investigation of ASPCOIL in abeyance until they received additional guidance from FBI Headquarters.

According to the FBI, the phone number of an individual named [REDACTED] of McLean, Virginia was found within the effects of Abu Zubaida. [REDACTED] is reportedly a bodyguard of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. The FBI also reports that he may be a [REDACTED]. In a September 17, 2002 document, the FBI notes that the Bureau is opening an investigation on [REDACTED] due to the size and value of his residence and his suspicious activity in approaching U.S. intelligence community personnel. It also appears that [REDACTED] has been in contact with [REDACTED], which is located at [REDACTED], in McLean, Virginia. The FBI has identified this address as the address of Prince Bandar. According to the FBI, [REDACTED] is officially a driver for the Saudi Embassy. [REDACTED] number was also listed to ASPCOIL, Prince Bandar's umbrella corporation located in Colorado.

It should be noted that the FBI's November 18, 2002 response states the "CIA tracing have revealed an direct (emphasis added) link between numbers found in Zubaida's phone book and numbers at the United States."

[REDACTED] 497

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The U.S. Government also located another Virginia number of an Osama Bin Laden cell phone in Pakistan. The number is subscribed to by an individual named [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was interviewed by the FBI in June 2002. He could not explain why his number ended up at a cafehouse in Pakistan, but stated that he regularly provides services to a couple who are personal contacts of Youssef Saad. This couple's driver is an individual named [REDACTED] who is assigned to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. According to [REDACTED] regularly called [REDACTED] business and frequently travels back and forth to Pakistan.

Other Bin Laden Government Officials in the United States Who May Have Been in Contact with the September 11 Hijackers

Among the individuals who may have been associates of the al-Bandari and al-Ladhiq was Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to the [REDACTED] memorandum reviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff, "initial indications are that al-Thumairy may have had a physical or financial connection to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, but we are still looking at this possibility." Al-Thumairy is an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is also considered one of the "imams" at the King Fahad Mosque in Closter Park, California. [REDACTED]

According to FBI documents, the King Fahad mosque was built in 1998 from funding from the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah. The mosque is attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely known for its anti-Western views. FBI documents indicate that Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Rajhi and al-Mudharriq were the King Fahad Mosque before al-Mudharriq returned to Saudi Arabia.

Several individuals on the East Coast whose backgrounds may have not may also had connections to the Saudi Government. After the terrorist attacks, the FBI discovered that, during September 2001, an individual named Salah al-Husseini stayed at the [REDACTED] in Herndon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying at the time. According to FBI documents al-Husseini is apparently a "Class Interlock Ministry employee/official." He claimed not to know the hijackers.

[REDACTED] 230

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

but agents in the FBI's Washington Field Office believed he was being deceptive. The statement was terminated when al-Husayni either passed out or stopped responding to medical treatment. He was released from the hospital several days later and managed to depart the United States despite law enforcement efforts to keep him from leaving the country.

Dahab al-Husayni is the uncle of Usama bin al-Husayni. Said al-Husayni is connected to the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) and is the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Dahab al-Husayni is a major contributor to the IANA, a nonprofit organization based in Michigan that is dedicated to the spread of Islam worldwide. According to the FBI, the IANA's mission is actually to spread Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the United States and the world at large. The IANA collects funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors, extremist Islamic clerics, and several non-governmental organizations. According to FBI documents, IANA has solicited money from Khalid bin Muhammad, but the documents are unclear as to whether Dahab actually contributed money to this organization.

FBI documents also indicate that several Saudi Naval officers were in contact with the September 11 hijackers. FBI documents state that the San Diego Field Office opened a counterterrorism investigation on an individual named Osama Nuhm, a Saudi Naval officer, due to his association with Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. In addition, Lail al-Hazmi, another Saudi Naval officer, was in telephonic contact with flight 77 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar and hijacker al-Hazmi on nine occasions from March 11, 2000 to March 27, 2000.

The Jacksonville FBI Field Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether Saleh Ahmad Badawi, a Saudi Naval officer (dub in territory) was in contact with any of the hijackers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

According to the FBI, Abdelrahim bin Laden is a member of numerous terrorist organizations. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Students Youth Association (WASNY) and the Institute of Islamic and Arab Studies in America. Both organizations are bona fide, not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WASNY is "closely associated with the funding and financing of international terrorist activities and in the past has provided logistical support to individuals wishing to fight in the Afghan War." In 1996, the CIA published a paper characterizing WASNY as a NPO that provides funding, logistical support and training with possible connections to the Arab Afghan network, Hamas, Nigerian extremists, and Philippines militants.²

Also of potential interest, at least in retrospect, is the 1992 incident involving Muhammad al-Qudusani and Hassan al-Shahawi. Al-Qudusani and al-Shahawi were flying from Phoenix to Washington, DC to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After they boarded the plane in Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questions about the flight (as the flight attendants found suspicious). When the plane was in flight, al-Qudusani asked where the bathroom was; one of the flight attendants pointed him to the back of the plane. Nevertheless, al-Qudusani went to the front of the plane and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit. The plane made an emergency landing and the FBI investigated the incident, but decided not to pursue a prosecution. At the time, al-Qudusani and al-Shahawi claimed that the Saudi Embassy paid for their airplane tickets.

After the FBI discovered that an individual in Phoenix who was the subject of a counterterrorism investigation was driving al-Qudusani's car, the Bureau opened a counterterrorism investigation on al-Shahawi. In November 2000, the FBI received reporting from [REDACTED] that al-Shahawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had received explosives training to perform "Khobar Towers"-type attacks. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Office attended even more closely to this 1992 incident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this: "Phoenix FBI now

² According to the FBI's November 18, 2001 memo, although several officials in WASNY support officials and other terrorist groups, the conclusion is insufficient to show whether the organization is a vehicle for any type of terrorist activity.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

believed both men were specifically attempting to use the security procedures of American West Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of FBI/Al Qaeda operations."

In testimony before the 9/11 Inquiry, the agent who drafted the "Phoenix EC" stated:

In a post 9/11 world, I went back and looked at that as possibly being some sort of dry run. It is currently under investigation.

After September 11, 2001, al-Qadhafi [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

In interviews, a Phoenix FBI agent noted that Phoenix [REDACTED] believed that al-Qadhafi might be [REDACTED]. His profile is similar to that of al-Sayid and Basma. He is in the United States as a student and does not have a visible source of income. He is in frequent contact with Saudi Government establishments in the United States and appears to be very involved in the affairs of the local Saudi community. He runs a "Saudi Club" in Phoenix, and attends Saudi studios in the area. The FBI has also developed information that Basma al-Qadhafi was receiving money from the Saudi Government for, as of August 2002, had not obtained for relevant bank records for review. The FBI's Phoenix Field Office has speculated that al-Qadhafi and others may be [REDACTED].

Through other relations in FBI San Diego elements of the Saudi Government may have provided support to terrorist networks. For example, the FBI had identified the Ibn Taymiyah Mosque in Chino, CA as a site of extremist-related activity both before and after September 11. Several subjects of San Diego investigation prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque. Based on interviews and review of FBI files, San Diego FBI agents believed at the time that these subjects were laundering money through this mosque into a Somali (unprofitable) organization said that, in other contact, affiliated with Osama Bin Laden.

[REDACTED] 434

[REDACTED]

In approximately 1998, the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Barakat Trading Company and other businesses affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating from the local Somali community in the form of donations to various Somali non-profits. However, the FBI now believes that some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego were involved in laundering the money.

According to the former FBI agent in San Diego who was involved in this investigation, this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide al-Qa'ida with funding through covert or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the former agent commented on the possible money laundering:

My guess Saudi-it's connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably 70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usama Bin Ladin, it might be an indication.

There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through charitable organizations. The Saudi-based Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is an Islamic non-governmental organization linked to terrorist support activities. According to a May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ's activities in support of terrorism include: suspicious money transfers, document forgery, providing jobs to wanted terrorist suspects, and financing travel for youths to attend jihad training. The Defense communication notes that since September 2001, UQ couriers have transported over \$330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East. In January 2002, UQ administrator Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately \$200,000 from the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the personal assistant to the UQ administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He returned with tens of thousands of dollars, according to the Department of Defense.

CIA, Treasury, and FBI officials have all expressed their concern about the al-Haramain Foundation's ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the FBI's

[REDACTED]

November 18, 2002 response, the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HFIF) has close ties to the Saudi Government, and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda. In 1993, HFIF established its U.S.-based office in Ashland, Oregon, and that office has since involved approximately 3700,000 from the parent offices in Saudi Arabia. The FBI has ongoing investigations of HFIF and the activities of the Portland HFIF Office. As discussed above, the FBI has become more suspicious of al-Haramain and the HFIF. From the documents, it is clear that HFIF was involved in appointing the imam of the mosque in Cajon, California, that al-Haramain managed.

The Treasury General Counsel testified about his agency's concern about the foundation:

MR. KUPHALISE: Second, and this is important point, a lot of ties out of that's testimony, on al-Haramain, the two branch offices that we took a public and joint action against, al-Haramain really does represent a significant issue for the DOJ and for terrorist financing and for the United States policy. It is, of course, the largest, I think the largest Islamic charity in the world. Its name is synonymous with charity in the Islamic world. Its direct members are members of the Royal Family, significant connections are members of the Royal Family. We don't have a great deal of intelligence on the headquarters, but whether they are knowingly assisting people in al-Qaeda and others, who is significant to each of those yet to be designated and under current investigation, we have ample evidence that large cash amounts are being carried in those branch offices, that large size amounts of money are being sent to those offices, that a great deal of the money is being disposed through mispending, unaccounted for, and finally, that those offices have significant contacts with extremists, Islamic extremists.

DOA officials mostly insist that they are making progress on their investigations of al-Haramain.

A year ago we had a lot of reporting suggesting terrorist activities carried in al-Qaida. Over the last year we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement information and we prepared a paper about a month, six weeks ago which described all of this. That paper gave us the first clear indication that the head of the central office is complicit in supporting terrorism, and it also raised questions about Prince Najid.

Finally, [REDACTED] the subject of Pasovick and Portland FBI counterterrorism investigations, also has close ties to a member of the Saudi royal family. [REDACTED] no longer resides in the United States, but it still the subject of our FBI investigation. The FBI agreed on

[REDACTED] 43A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation of [REDACTED] an employee of Saudi Arabian Airlines, in 1977 after receiving information [REDACTED] that bin Laden in October 1977 had been in contact with a telephone number associated with [REDACTED] in Portland. In May 1981, two individuals were arrested in Bahrain and been admitted they were on their way to blow up U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia. One of them had a newspaper that had been found by one of [REDACTED]. The FBI's Phoenix Field Office also received source reporting in 1979 that [REDACTED] was checking activity at the Southwest border and discussing the possibility of infiltrating individuals into the United States.

The FBI has developed information that [REDACTED] has close ties with one of the Saudi princes and accompanies him on many trips, including travel in the United States. According to the FBI, [REDACTED] was recently mentioned at the banquet (table) in Geneva and he [REDACTED] he informed the FBI that [REDACTED] got the job at Saudi Arabian Airlines through his contacts. He said that [REDACTED] did not earn much money in this job, but that he "had another source of income through a Saudi prince" named Khalid al-Bandari. According to [REDACTED] performed miscellaneous tasks for the Prince, such as handling real estate matters and assisting the Prince's grandmother. [REDACTED] traveled many places with the Prince, including Europe, and often in the United States. [REDACTED] stated the crypto community that industry "knew everything about [REDACTED]". Although his name was on the State Department's blacklist, [REDACTED] is apparently able to circumvent the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service because he was traveling with the Saudi prince. The FBI only learned of the trip after the fact. Agents in the FBI's Portland Field Office expressed their concern that [REDACTED] and others were using their status as Saudi Arabian Airlines employees as a cover to make their own private weapons in and out of the United States.

Lack of Saudi Cooperation in Counterterrorism Investigations

In testimony and interviews, a number of FBI agents and CIA officers complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks. For example, a former New York FBI agent stated that, from his

[REDACTED] 437

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obstructionist for years. In this agent's opinion, the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest.

When a high-level [REDACTED] officer was asked how the September 11 attacks might have been prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, pointing to an example from the summer of 2001, when the U.S. Government requested Saudi assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the U.S. Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa'ida operation. The U.S. Government pressured the Saudi Government to locate him. The Saudis informed the U.S. Government that they required additional information to do so. The U.S. Government agency that had originally learned of this individual's knowledge refused to provide the Saudis with additional information because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to pressure the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without the additional information.

According to some FBI personnel, this type of response is typical from the Saudis. For example, one FBI agent described one investigation after September 11 in which he provided the Saudi Government with copies of the subjects' Saudi passports. The Saudi Government maintained that they had no record of the subjects.

According to the former Chief of Alec Station, the unit in the DCI's Counterterrorist Center established in 1996 to focus specifically on Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from about 1996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating to Usama Bin Ladin. There is a May 1996 memo from the DCI's Counterterrorist Center [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on Bin Ladin because Bin Ladin had "too much information about official Saudi dealings with Islamic extremists in the 1980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands." In a June 1997 memo to the DCI, Alec Station reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Ladin. The former Chief of Alec Station thought that the U.S. Government's hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the U.S. Government on this matter was contrary to Saudi national interests.

[REDACTED]

438

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] testified on this issue on October 9,

2002:

On the issue of al-Qa'ida and Saudi intelligence, that goes back to our efforts to interact with the Saudi to get them to help us on investigating al-Qa'ida...for the most part it was a very troubled relationship where the Saudis were not providing us quickly or very vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't. It was just very slow in coming.

Both FBI and CIA personnel cited an individual named Madani al-Tayyib as a specific case in which the Saudis were uncooperative. The CIA and the FBI had been pressuring the Saudis for years for permission to talk to al-Tayyib. According to the former head of ALEC Station, al-Tayyib managed all of Bin Ladin's finances when Bin Ladin was in Sudan, and any expense over \$1,000 had to be approved by al-Tayyib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in 1996 to work with Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al-Qa'ida figure who has since been arrested. In the summer of 1996, al-Tayyib returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the FBI's and the CIA's requests to talk to al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent, that al-Tayyib was "just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything."

The former chief of ALEC Station also cited the example of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Khalifa is Bin Ladin's brother-in-law and an important figure in al-Qa'ida. The U.S. Government arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994. Khalifa had been sentenced to death *in absentia* by the Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the U.S. agreed to extradite him to Jordan. The Jordanians then returned him to Saudi Arabia. In the opinion of the CIA officer, the Saudis "bought off" the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa. According to the CIA officer, when Khalifa subsequently arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by at least one important government official. Khalifa now works for a Riyadh-based NGO and travels and operates freely.

The General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department testified at the July 23, 2002 hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There is an almost intuitive sense, however, that things are not being remembered. In I want to fully inform you about it, that we have to ask and we have to seek and we have to solve. I will give you one-and-a-half examples. The first is, after some period, the Senate has been granted the designation of a man named Tolson, who is intimately involved in all of this, and his designation will be public within the next 10 days. They came forward to us 2 weeks ago and said, okay, we think we should go forward with the designation and a fitness order against Mr. Tolson. We asked, what do you have on him? Because they certainly know what we have on him, but we wanted it as we tried to convince them that they ought to join us. The answer back was, nothing new.

MR. HEARLITER: Do you follow that?

MR. ANTHONY: No, I think that is a possibility, or there is another motive we are not being told.

Status of the U.S. Intelligence Community's Investigations into Connections Between Terrorism and State Government Officials

Both the FBI and the CIA have informed the Committee that they are working the lead issue seriously. According to the November 18, 1993 FBI response, the FBI and CIA have established a working group to look into the DeLoe issue. The FBI formed a squad at the Washington Field Office [REDACTED] to investigate the issue and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

...significant energy is getting what Abu Zuhaybi called good relationships with Saudis of all swaddling. He said bin Laden is very pleased when Saudis in the military, those who work in business and those close to the royal family in lead across support in his cause. He said bin Laden actively seeks out body elements.

Other CIA and FBI officials echoed these remarks to retain Congressional testimony.

[REDACTED] stated:

What we find troubling also in the cases that we learned about from FBI, from the law agencies cases and some of the cases that the Washington Field Office has looked at, is that you're seeing Saudi money going to people, is that it fits sort of a pattern that we've seen in terms of direct payments from the Saudis, the Saudi Government's financing support for very fundamentalist Wahabi and Salafi activities and movements around the world, which is a huge, you see the money is going to fundamentalists and you would be very suspicious of some of Saudi's liberal variables potential support. We've had a lot of suspicion before September 11 which we documented in a number of different papers, and again it's a lot of money and the issues that come up are who knows about the payments, on whose behalf are the payments being made, are they being made on behalf of the normal government or are they being made by a local official or a person. Do the people who are making the payments know what's happening to the money? If they do know what's happening, why are they making the payments? Is it a form of blackmail? Are they recognizing the terrorist support? There's the issue of are they regulating themselves as well as are they doing the due diligence that they ought to.

FBI Executive Assistant Director Philippe D'Amico testified at that same hearing:

To this point, let me and tell you that these things go back, that we can prove that that Saudi money flow is sponsoring terrorism. But there's enough information out there are conducting several investigations to try to determine what other information is out there.

What is it that the FBI did regarding the Saudi wire communications?

[REDACTED] traced prior to September 11, 2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 442

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Michael Redline, the former head of the International Terrorism Operations Section at FBI testified:

The answer to your question is pre-2001 there were not any significant preliminary inquiry or full investigations with relatively few exceptions, conducted by the FBI looking at the [REDACTED] as a threat to national security. The one person to stand out, his [REDACTED] was in my view, shape or form [REDACTED]

The former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego confirmed this in his testimony:

Basically [REDACTED] They were not a country recruited by the State Department as a sponsor of terrorism and for those of the [REDACTED] that we saw in San Diego was that if there were [REDACTED] there, their primary objective was to [REDACTED] in the context of protecting the royal family. So they were not viewed as an internal threat to national security.

In the October 5, 2007 closed hearing, Director Mueller also acknowledged that he became aware of some of the facts regarding the Saudi [REDACTED] as a result of the investigative work of the [REDACTED] Staff.

In analyzing the sequence of events here, I think the staff pointed out, as a result of the probing, some facts came to light here and to me, frankly, they had not come to light before, and perhaps would not have come to light had the staff not probed. That's what I'm telling you. So I'm agreeing with you that the staff probing brought out facts that may not have come to the Committee."

Director Mueller: But what you're also saying, though, is that that probing thus brought facts to your attention.

Director Mueller: Yes.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~

~~(U)~~ Attachment O

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~

Obtained by Judicial Watch via FOIA (December 31, 2013)

~~SECRET~~

To: Los Angeles From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 10/23/2001

Subscriber Results

(U) Writer has submitted subscriber requests to the Legal Unit for all telephone numbers involved in call activity with target telephone [REDACTED]. As results are received, writer is attempting to search the names of subscribers through FBI databases.

b3

(S) Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED]. This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED]. On 9/26/01, telephone [REDACTED] was called once by [REDACTED]. A [REDACTED] revealed the following identifiers: SOC [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] revealed one reference to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may not be disseminated without the prior approval of the originating agency. [REDACTED] revealed one reference to [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED]

b1

b3

b6

b7C

b7E

b7D

(S)

(U) Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED]. This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED]. Telephone [REDACTED] during the period [REDACTED] results contained the following identifiers for [REDACTED]. Name searches on [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

b3

b6

b7C

b7E

b7D

(U) Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED]. This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED] Telephone [REDACTED] Name [REDACTED] searches on [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]

b3

b6

b7C

b7E

b7D

(U)

(S) Subscriber results were received from [REDACTED]. This telephone is subscribed to [REDACTED] Telephone [REDACTED] Telephone [REDACTED] was also involved in call activity with [REDACTED] and telephone [REDACTED] subscribed to San Diego PENTTBOM subject, OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI cosigned the lease of an apartment rented by NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIRDHAR. Telephone [REDACTED] was involved in [REDACTED] An [REDACTED] UNI search revealed a reference to [REDACTED] in 265A-NY-280350-302- [REDACTED] was interviewed by the FBI regarding his business associations with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. [REDACTED] provided the FBI with documents including a resume for AL-BAYOUMI listing [REDACTED] as a reference. On 9/22/01, Los Angeles set a lead to San Diego to interview [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

AWLAKI-2329